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Abstract 
This dissertation is a study of the dynamics of armed mobilization and participation in 
non-state armed organizations in the province of South Kivu, eastern Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.  It asks one of the fundamental questions of the study of violent 
conflict: Why do people participate in armed groups? In addressing this central 
question, it also addresses the inter-related questions of how do people come to 
participate in armed groups and who participates in these groups.  I make three main 
arguments.  First, contemporary armed mobilization is driven by two ‘macro’ factors 
in rural eastern DRC, the necessity to organize and provide protection to the socio-
polities that constitute rural eastern Congo on one side, and the more accumulative 
dynamics of labour mobilization and control that have long characterized the region 
and have taken novel forms with the development of an economy of predation.  The 
protective dimension in particular has often been left out in recent accounts that have 
focused or economic agendas of armed groups.  Second, the ‘social architecture’ of 
armed mobilization in the region has changed to reflect the social implantation of 
armed organizations in rural eastern Congo, resulting from the novel roles they play 
in these societies and the adaptation of these societies to their presence.  As a result, 
modes of recruitment and control reflect the multi-faceted influence that these 
organizations have over rural societies.  Third, I argue and show that individual 
determinants of participation are not time invariant, they evolve over time and reflect 
the changes in outlook and motivations of participants that results from the social 
implantation of armed organizations, but also as a result of the process of participation.  
In order to make these arguments, I use a mixed methods approach that combines a 
qualitative analysis based on interviews carried out during 9 months of fieldwork in 
the province of South Kivu, and a quantitative analysis based on original panel data 
collected through a survey of 1072 individuals and 134 villages of South Kivu.  
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“Contrarily to widespread opinion, the courage of despair has but few adepts.  
Until 1942, only a handful of solitary men attempted to engage in the fighting.  
What is wonderful is that this disparate cohort composed of unseasoned and 
excessively pampered children, of out-and-out individualists, of workers by 
tradition revolted, of generous believers, of country boys horrified by the 
prospect of exile from the homeland, of peasants with the more obscure type of 
patriotism, of unstable dreamers, of tenderfoot adventurers at the side of old 
horses back from the Foreign Legion, and the lured of the Spanish War; This 
conglomerate was on the verge of becoming, in the hands of intelligent men, an 
extraordinary orchard (...) But then something, that was hostile, or simply 
stranger to that hope, came about and threw it into nothingness” 
 
    Rene Char1  
                                                 
1 “Note sur le Maquis” in Recherche de la Base et du Sommet (1955 p.25, author’s translation). 
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Introduction     
A series of short documentaries, filmed by the video-journalist Susan Schulman and 
posted on the Guardian Development webpage (Schulman 2011, 2013), illustrate the 
ambiguous nature of participation in non-state armed factions in zones of protracted 
armed conflict.  The series follows, between 2011 and 2013, the fate of the village of 
Kimua in a remote part of the province of North Kivu, in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo.  During her first trips to the village, the reporter finds that the population 
is living under the oppressive rule of a notoriously violent foreign armed group, the 
Forces pour la Defense et la Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR-Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Rwanda).  As she follows several villagers around their daily choirs, she 
collects testimonies of the difficulty of living with such an invasive and violent 
presence. Economic activity in the village, based mainly on subsistence agriculture, 
has come to a halt, as women no longer walk to the fields because they fear attacks 
and sexual assaults by members of the armed group.  Abusive taxation and forced 
labour are imposed on villagers, and political and social activity is stifled by the 
oppressive, censoring and authoritarian presence of the Rwandan armed group.  
 
But when the reporter comes back two years later to film the second part of the 
documentary, she is surprised at how different the situation in the village is.  The 
FDLR are nowhere to be seen, as a self-defence group that has mobilized the village 
youth has chased them out and taken control of the village.2  Interviews with villagers 
denote a starkly contrasting appreciation of the presence of this new group, which is 
lauded for enabling a partial restoration of economic and social activity in the village.  
A scene shows members of the group – most of them young men from the village - 
accompanying women to work in the surrounding fields to protect them from the still 
looming danger of the FDLR, and another shows a football game between the group 
and the village population, all pointing to a form of consensus around the group’s 
purpose and presence.  The members of the armed group are “our children, our little 
                                                 
2 This group is called the Forces De Liberation du Congo (FDC- Forces of Liberation of Congo).  
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brothers, our big brothers, our papas” says the local teacher, suggesting that the 
family and communal ties that bind the group to the village are the source of this 
beneficial relationship.  The village chief insists that, by providing protection to the 
villagers, the group is taking up the role of the state, and, as a result, is a fundamentally 
patriotic endeavour. 
 
Yet a few elements in the final interviews set this apparently seamless story slightly 
out of tune.  One interviewed mother says that her son didn’t ask for her permission 
before joining the group, that she no longer has any authority over him and that she is 
afraid of what will become of him.  The schoolteacher shares his concern that, although 
all the members of the group are from the village, and as such are trusted and supported 
by the villagers, there is a fundamental metamorphosis once a person takes up arms:  
“He is no longer the same person, he becomes other; The soldier who has the gun is 
not the friend of the population, he’s 50% for the population, and 50% military.  Even 
if it’s my child, if he has a gun he orders me to sit down (...) it’s very serious”, he says 
with a measure of uneasy humour.  The football game, the very symbol of communal 
conviviality, ends with a score that hints to the unbalance that seems to be building up 
in the village: 4-0 for the ‘military’ against the ‘civilians’.    
 
These three “periods” of the Kimua story can be conceived as three “portraits”, each 
one depicting different facets of the eastern Congolese situation, and crystallizing 
different narratives and conceptual lenses that have been applied to the understanding 
of the relation between armed actors and rural societies.  In the first portrait, a rural 
village is caught under the oppressive rule of an “exogenous” rebel group, who 
terrorizes the villages and violently exploits its human and material resources.  This 
image has dominated mainstream narratives of wars on the African continent since the 
1990s, from international media to the fields of policy, advocacy and humanitarianism, 
as well as in academia.3  Its characteristic feature is the clear opposition between two, 
separate “orders”: One agrarian, grassroots, community based, and the other 
extractive, exploitative and violent.  In this picture, participation in the armed groups 
                                                 
3 These narratives have different variants.  In the case of eastern DRC, such dominant narratives have 
focused on the violent appropriation of natural resources as the main driver of armed conflict, and 
victimization of civilians – in particular sexual violence against women – as a central feature of the 
conflict.  For a detailed analysis of these narratives see Autesserre (2012). 
 19 
is either opportunistic and greed driven (those intent on exploiting others), or the result 
of exploitation (those who are recruited by force).  The second “portrait” appears at 
the return of the journalist to the village.  As a result of a collective effort, the rural 
community has regained the means of production and “restored” its political and social 
order. In this portrait, participation in the self-defence group is fundamentally tied to 
the village’s collective action, and as such is inscribed in the communal ‘moral 
economy’.  The third portrait, which appears in the final interviews and scenes, is 
something of a blurred superposition of the previous two: From within the harmonious 
features of communal collective action resurfaces the deforming rictus of 
authoritarianism, oppression and extraction, incarnated this time not by outsiders or 
foreigners, but by the very heart of the communal body turned “other” in the figure of 
the village youth who has taken up arms.   
 
The participation of the village youth in the armed group as it appears in the final 
portrait is fundamentally problematic, as it situates them at the crux of two logics that 
have predominantly been conceived as separate and contradictory, that of communal 
collective action associated to the rural social order on one side, and that of violent 
exploitation and plunder deriving from the ‘war economy’ on the other.  This tension 
constitutes the departing puzzle of this dissertation: How can we understand the 
participation of the youth in this group? 
 
This question resonates beyond the case of eastern DRC, and areas of active armed 
conflict.4  As a result of the retreat of states as main providers of security and the 
growing ‘privatisation’ of security provision, the emergence of non-state armed 
organizations that range from civil militia, vigilante groups, rebel and non-state armed 
groups, gangs and multiple other types of organizations represents one of the most 
pressing international concerns (Francis ed. 2005; Reno 2012).  The scale at which 
these organizations recruit members - tens to hundreds of thousands for gangs and 
criminal organizations, even more in contexts of armed groups in zones of armed 
conflicts – suggests that large-scale dynamics of resource and labour accumulation are 
at play.  Yet closer studies have shown that, far from reducible to the negative images 
                                                 
4 Civil wars are defined as conflicts that count more 1000 deaths per annum, and armed conflicts more 
than 25 deaths per annum (Blattman & Miguel 2009). 
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they carry, these organisations often emerge from longstanding forms of socio-
political organization, and occupy a range of functions and roles within the societies 
in which they evolve, that range from the provision of protection, the organization of 
economic activity, to the formulation and enactment of political claims (Pratten & Sen 
2007; Pratten 2008).  As a result of their social and institutional basis and the roles 
they come to play in emerging political and social orders, even those displaying the 
most nefarious and violent behaviours – such as the Islamic State, Boko Haram, or the 
Mexican drug cartels – can enjoy somewhat surprising levels of popular support.  
Understanding why people join such organizations therefore bears relevance beyond 
the context of eastern DRC and contexts of active armed conflict.  
 
While the study of participation in armed organizations has a long and rich pedigree 
in the social sciences, recent analytical framings of participation in violent collective 
action and/or armed organizations present some limitations when applied to contexts 
of protracted armed conflict such as that of Kimua.  First, there has been a tendency to 
adopt an ‘atomistic’ viewpoint of participation, conceiving it as a dependant variable 
and weighting the impact of different factors - such as economic deprivation, social 
networks, or incentives5 - on an individual’s propensity to participate (Humphreys & 
Weinstein 2008; Mc Doom 2013).  While these illuminate important facets of complex 
phenomenon, the ‘reduction’ of these factors to individual level determinants tends to 
cloud the supra-individual social, economic and political processes structure and shape 
dynamics of participation and interact in variegated ways with individual level factors.   
 
Second, the fact that participation is often framed as a ‘unitary’ outcome variable limits 
the understanding of the multiple and heterogeneous forms of participation that exist 
(Parkinson 2013), the variegated and heterogeneous ‘paths’ that lead to participation 
(Viterna 2006), as well as the ways in which participation is sustained over time 
(Parkinson 2013; Petersen 2001).  Moreover, such framings of participation rely on 
the problematic assumption that motives and determinants of participation are time 
invariant, i.e. that a single, initial motivation for participation explains participation 
throughout a period of conflict (Kalyvas 2008; Richards J. 2014). As a result, the ways 
                                                 
5 These correspond to the three main categories of individual determinants of participation identified 
by Humphreys & Weinstein (2008).  We discuss these extensively in the following section.  
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in which the factors that influence individual participation evolve over time and as a 
result of the prolonged presence of armed actors within a society remain insufficiently 
understood.  The role and effects of various individual factors on participation is likely 
to change significantly between the early stages and the advanced stages of a 
protracted armed conflict, precisely because the conflict’s multiple effects on the 
social, economic and political environment that conditions such factors.  Scholarship 
on civil wars has recently started uncovering the transformative effects of civil wars 
on societies and conceptualizing the multiple ways in which violence and 
militarization restructures political, economic and social structures and institutions 
(e.g. Kalyvas 2006; Raeymaekers & Vlassenroot 2004; Verweijen 2013; Wood 2008).  
Yet the ways in which these transformative effects alter processes of recruitment and 
control of combatants, and reshape individual determinants and incentives to 
participate are yet to be traced and conceptualized more extensively.   
 
Third, there has been a tendency in studies of contemporary armed conflicts on the 
African continent to focus on the forced recruitment of combatants, often conceived 
through the reductive forced vs. voluntary binary categorization of individual 
participation (Richards J. 2014).  As Danny Hoffman (2013 p.4) notes, the focus on 
forced recruitments has had the effect of obscuring “more complicated landscape of 
participation”.  His contention that “the actual spaces and processes of recruitment 
remain poorly understood” calls for a more thorough and systematic empirical enquiry 
into processes of participation, particularly in the context of protracted armed conflicts.  
 
These considerations provide the central motivation for the analysis of participation in 
non-state armed organizations carried out in this dissertation.  The guiding question of 
the dissertation is: Why do people participate in non-state armed organizations?  The 
analysis is thus focused on participation, which we define as active involvement in the 
security related tasks of an armed group.6  However, as mentioned above, an important 
aspect that has often been omitted in recent studies of participation is the fact that the 
causes of participation are likely to change in time, particularly in contexts of 
protracted conflict and prolonged presence of armed actors.  This calls for a second 
line of inquiry, into the transformative effects of the emergence and presence armed 
                                                 
6 See Section 1.1.1. for further clarification of concepts and definitions.  
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groups in zone of protracted armed conflict, which runs alongside the first line of 
inquiry into the causes of participation in armed organizations.  Taken together, these 
two lines of inquiry – into the causes of participation and into the transformative 
effects of armed groups on their environment - allow us to reformulate the guiding 
question as: What are the evolving causes of participation in armed organizations in 
contexts of prolonged armed conflict?  Understanding why people participate in armed 
organizations requires understanding which categories of people participate, but also 
the ways in which they come to participate.  The guiding question therefore summons 
two inter-related question that will also be addressed in this dissertation: Who 
participates in armed organizations?  As well as: how are people brought to 
participate in armed organizations?  
  
In order to address these questions, this dissertation explores contemporary processes 
of armed mobilization in the province of South Kivu, in eastern Democratic Republic 
of the Congo.  This region has been affected by an armed conflict that has lasted for 
more than 20 years, alternating between phases of large-scale war and low intensity 
armed conflict.  A myriad of non-state armed organizations have proliferated in the 
rural areas of the province since the first conflicts of the early 1990s,7 which are 
characterized by what Paul Richards (2005) described as a situation of ‘no peace, no 
war’.  Even in periods of relative calm, civilians continuously experience what 
Hoffman (2011a) calls ‘micro-encounters’ with armed actors.  Yet the duration of the 
conflict and the prolonged presence of warring factions have deeply affected the 
economic, social and political organization of the region (Raeymaekers & Vlassenroot 
2004; Tull 2003, 2005; Verweijen 2013).  This makes it a particularly relevant area to 
understand how the dynamics of participation have evolved as a result of the 
prolongation of the conflict and the transformative effects of the presence of armed 
actors.  Furthermore, the diversity and heterogeneity of the region in geographic, 
economic and socio-political terms provides an advantageous configuration to analyse 
differentiated patterns of armed mobilization and participation, and carry out 
comparisons.  
 
                                                 
7 A recent survey by Christoph Vogel and Jason Stearns estimated that, in October 2015, 69 non-state 
armed groups of varying sizes and territorial expansion were active in eastern Congo (Stearns & Vogel 
2015).  
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As Mampilly (2011 p.7) notes, there has been a tendency in the literature on armed 
conflict to focus on the relatively limited occurrences of active participation in violent 
organizations, while setting aside the more normalized and quotidian relations that 
occur between civilian populations and armed organizations.  While our focus is on 
participation, the analysis seeks to depart from such a strict focus on participation by 
situating participation in the wider set of social processes that occur as a result of the 
constitution and presence of armed organizations.  Conscious of the limitations of 
strictly individual-level approaches to the understanding of participation, I develop a 
theoretical framework to analyse and trace processes of armed mobilization at three, 
inter-dependant levels.  The first level is the political economy of labour recruitment 
and control, i.e. the ways in which labour is mobilized, organized and deployed 
towards productive functions within local and regional political economies.  The 
second level focuses on the social processes through which people are brought into 
armed organizations, and then maintained within these organizations, which I call the 
‘social architecture’ of mobilization and control.  Finally, the third level focuses on the 
individual determinants and dimensions of participation, and the ways in which they 
interact with the previous dimensions.   
 
I adopt a mixed methods approach, combining a qualitative analysis with a quantitative 
analysis of the dynamics of participation in armed groups in the province of South 
Kivu.  The qualitative analysis is based on interviews carried out with a range of actors. 
These include armed group members, commanders, recruiters and their family 
members and social entourage, as well as state, civil and customary authorities and a 
range of civilian actors who live or have lived in areas controlled or affected by armed 
groups.  The interviews were carried out over a period of 9 months of fieldwork in 
Bukavu, the provincial capital of South Kivu, and in the rural territories of the 
province, including in areas where armed group operate.  The quantitative analysis is 
based on original data collected specifically for this dissertation through a large scale 
survey that I co-designed with Raul Sanchez de Sierra as part of a project to document 
the economic, social and political history of rural South Kivu, and that was 
implemented in most territories of South Kivu, including in zones under control of 
non-state armed groups.  As the dissertation seeks to grasp the evolving factors that 
drive participation, particular attention is paid to establishing a dynamic analysis of 
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processes of participation, but also situating contemporary processes within their 
historical context.  
 
I make three main arguments in the thesis.  First, I argue that two ‘macro-factors’ 
constitute central drivers in contemporary processes of armed mobilization and 
participation in armed groups in eastern DRC.  The first is a ‘protective’ logic, driven 
by the necessity of organizing and providing protection to the fragmented socio-
polities that constitute rural South Kivu, in a context where state provision of security 
is lacking or incomplete.  In addition, I show that a more accumulative logic of armed 
mobilization and control is at play, a continuation of longstanding forms of large-scale 
labour mobilization in the region, which have taken novel features with the 
development of a militarized political economy.  I argue that these two main factors 
do not operate in isolation or in exclusion of a range of other political, economic and 
social factors that I also explore, but nevertheless emerge as the most consistent 
empirical drivers of armed mobilization. 
 
Second, I argue that, as the eastern Congolese conflict has extended in time, the modes 
and mechanisms of recruitment and control over combatants by armed groups have 
evolved to reflect the deeper implantation of these organizations in the rural societies 
of eastern Congo.  I show that this implantation derives not only from the initial social 
base of these groups, but also from the two logics previously identified, as armed 
groups have the ambivalent function of providing protection to decentralized socio-
polities while at the same time mediating large-scale dynamics of labour accumulation 
and control, and have triggered a general social adaptation of rural societies to their 
presence.  As a result, the control exerted by these groups over their members 
surpasses the military sphere, and is part of the multi-faceted forms of control that 
these groups exert over the societies in which they emerge and evolve.  
 
Third, I argue that individual determinants and dimensions of participation also evolve 
to reflect the changing role of these organizations.  I find evidence for several 
economic and social grievances as determinants of individual participation, while 
showing, as Scacco (2009) has argued, that these interact with embeddedness in social 
networks that mediate mobilization to trigger individual participation.  Furthermore, I 
show that the protective macro logic of mobilization also operates at an individual 
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level, as one of the central individual motivations for participation is the protection of 
one’s social entourage.  However, I show that these individual determinants of 
participation are not time invariant, they change in time to reflect the evolving outlook 
and motivations of participants, as well as the changing position of armed groups in 
societies.  I therefore argue, following several recent studies (Viterna 2006; Parkinson 
2013) that a processual understanding of the individual dimensions of participation is 
better suited to understanding participation in armed groups.  
 
In this introductory chapter, I start by looking in Section 1.1. at how the question of 
participation in non-state armed organizations has been framed in recent studies of 
armed conflict, and the limitations of these framings.  Departing from these limitations, 
I present in Section 1.2. the theoretical framework that will guide the quantitative and 
qualitative analyses, in particular the three levels which will be used to analyse 
participation: The political economy of labour mobilization, the social architecture of 
mobilization and control and the individual dimensions of participation.  At each of 
these three levels, I discuss the relevant literature in order to draw out the central 
questions and puzzles, which then provide the orientation of the analysis.  Section 1.3. 
concludes with a summary of the research questions and an outline of the dissertation.  
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1.1.  The persisting puzzle of participation in armed groups 
1.1.1.  Clarification of concepts  
Some conceptual definitions are necessary to clarify the focus of the inquiry.  First, by 
the term participation, we refer to the act of active involvement and/or membership in 
an armed group, and more specifically active involvement in the security related 
activities of the group.  Thus, the focus here is on people whose function and role 
within these organizations includes the potential exercise of force.  We choose not to 
systematically use the term combatant, as it suggests a degree of professionalization, 
which is not always the case in the groups we study, for example concerning 
participation in small, locally constituted groups that display low levels of 
institutionalization and professionalization.  The definition of participation that we use 
corresponds to Petersen’s (2001) second and third levels of involvement in insurgent 
groups, both the active participation in local security organizations (the second level) 
as well as participation in mobile armed factions (third level).  However, it excludes 
the first level of involvement, which corresponds to the multiple forms of civilian 
support to armed groups, such as information gathering, provision of supplies or 
various forms of encouragement.  While these other forms of involvement will be 
discussed throughout the thesis, they are not included in our definition of participation.  
The discrete roles and functions that can be taken by individuals within armed groups 
– such as recruiters, informants, or various types of communication and 
representational roles – are systematically identified and spelled out, and overlaps with 
security related tasks are pointed out to avoid confusions.    
 
Second, we define an armed group as a group of people whom, intermittently or 
permanently, exercise force and violence for a variety of purposes.  Such a definition 
captures a wide range of different groups, from large-scale rebel armed organizations, 
to paramilitary groups, to militia and civil militia, as well as self-defence and vigilante 
groups.  This is done purposely, as restricting the analysis to specific pre-established 
categories can be confusing in contexts where armed groups often correspond to 
several of the categories at the same time.  As several authors have noted, the novel 
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forms of armed and security organizations that have emerged in contemporary 
warscapes tend to defy ‘classic’ definitions and binary categorizations, such as state 
vs. civil, state vs. rebel, military vs. civilian (Francis 2005; Reno 2012).  While Reno 
(2012) provides a novel categorization of rebel groups on the African continent – 
majority rule, reform, warlord and parochial rebels – we choose not to use these 
categories a priori, as they are defined in terms of the political and economic agenda 
of armed groups, which in our case vary and change significantly in time.  We also 
choose not to use the term rebel, as many of the Congolese groups that are designated 
by the state as rebels do not pursue ‘classic’ rebel agendas, such as regime change or 
territorial secession (Englebert & Tull 2013; Hoffmann & Vlassenroot 2014).  Thus, 
the use of the term rebel can be misleading as its definitional base derives from 
changing notions of sovereignty.  We therefore choose to adopt as large and neutral a 
definition as possible from the onset, in order to then clarify in each context what the 
defining features of the groups are, both in terms of their basis and in terms of their 
political or economic agendas.  While the focus of the dissertation is not on state 
security forces – the national army, the police, and intelligence services – eastern 
Congo has been marked by repeated cycles of integration and defection of armed 
factions from the national army (Baaz & Verweijen 2013; Baaz, Stearns & Verweijen 
2013).   Thus, several of the groups we will study have been integrated into state 
security forces at some stage, which we will point out when it is the case. 
1.1.2.  Old question, new attention 
Understanding why people risk their lives to participate in violent collective action 
and join armed organizations – from violent pogroms or protests, to armed gangs or 
vigilante groups, to armed militant or rebel groups – has been one of the guiding 
interrogations of the study of violence and warfare in the social sciences (Wood 2003, 
p.10).  Although this question has guided a very long and rich stream of scholarship in 
several disciplines - in particular history, political science and sociology - it is only 
recently that this question has come into the focus of the study of International 
Development, particularly with regards to the African continent.  Until recently, the 
sharp rise in civil wars on the African continent during the 1990s 8  remained 
                                                 
8 See Straus (2012). 
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predominantly understood through old and deeply entrenched essentialist tropes about 
the continent’s inherent violence, construed as irrational and obscure, or shrouded in 
teleological predications, 9  while of little concern to mainstream International 
Development scholarship.  However, a range of academics vocally argued that, as had 
often been the case regarding Africa, obscurity was in the eye of the beholder, and that 
the civil wars and contemporary violence on the continent were everything but 
irrational and deserved the same level of critical analysis as any other phenomena, 
which contributed to put the issue back into the spotlight (e.g. Berdal and Malone 
2000; Clapham 1998; Kaldor 1999; Keen 1998; Richards 1996; Reno 1998).   
 
Progressively, the attention of the development policy and research community shifted 
as a consensus grew that armed conflict and civil wars constituted primary concerns 
not only for global security, but also for International Development.  This shift 
culminated with the 2011 World Development Report (World Bank 2011 p.1) which 
stated that “insecurity not only remains, it has become a primary development 
challenge of our time”, and set the understanding of the relation between armed 
conflict and development as a priority zone of inquiry on the development research 
agenda.  Central to this agenda shift was the development of conceptual tools to 
apprehend and understand what were identified as novel forms of violence and armed 
conflict that emerged in the late 20th and early 21st century, which didn’t fit the ‘classic’ 
conceptualizations of armed conflict and violence, in particular the war vs. peace, state 
vs. rebel, criminal vs. political paradigms (Kaldor 1999; World Development report 
2011 p.2).10  Mainstream academia also adopted this shift, and disciplines that had 
until then paid little attention to war and conflict - in particular economics and political 
economy – developed significant research agendas on these topics (Blattman & Miguel 
2009).   
                                                 
9 The most famous of these is Kaplan’s 1994 essay “The Coming Anarchy”, which is widely used to 
exemplify reductionist conceptions of armed conflict in Africa.   
10 The idea that the forms of armed conflict that emerged in the late 20th century were fundamentally 
novel was later challenged by Kalyvas (2001). 
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1.1.3.  Strengths and limitations of current framings of participation  
The renewed attention towards violence and civil wars by a range of disciplines in the 
social sciences has allowed to dissipate many of the longstanding tropes that still 
clouded the understanding of violent conflict, in particular the ideas that violence and 
participation in violence are irrational, senseless or unexplainable human actions, that 
often took an essentialist and deterministic undertone when relating to Africa  (Chabal, 
Engel & Gentili 2005; Cramer 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Keen 1998; Richards 1998, 2005). 
The application of rational choice frameworks to the study of participation in violent 
collective action, which had been initiated by studies such as Popkin (1979), has 
significantly extended in recent years and allowed to restore a much needed sense of 
agency in the understanding of participation in violent collective action.  
 
Methodologically, this has usually translated into comparisons between participants 
and non-participants, to see which factors play a larger role in explaining participation.  
In an influential article on the Sierra Leonean civil war, Humphreys and Weinstein 
(2008) measure the effects of the main factors that have been advanced to explain 
participation in violence during civil wars, regrouped into three broad categories: 
grievances, selective incentives, and social structures.  This allows us to shortly review 
these main categories of explanations for participation, before assessing the limitations 
of such a framing and building a theoretical framework for understanding 
participation.   
Grievances 
Grievances have consistently been advanced as one of the most important pre-
conditions for participation in violent collective action.  Grievances are the 
manifestations of structural processes such as poverty, inequality, marginalization or 
exclusion experienced by individuals or groups of individuals, and can take multiple 
forms.  The most prevalent ones have been associated to class (Marx 1848), land 
property in contexts where it is a crucial aspect rural livelihoods (Paige 1975; Scott 
1976), ethnicity in the context of ethnically polarized political competition that can 
lead to the marginalization of entire ethnic groups (Horowitz 1985), income inequality 
(Muller and Seligson 1987), relative deprivation and lack of opportunity (Gurr 1970), 
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social anomie resulting from the gap between people’s expectations and what they 
experience (Merton 1968; Cohen 1955 concerning armed gangs).  These theories do 
not posit a direct causal relationship between such underlying factors and participation 
in violent collective action, but rather construe them as structural conditions that 
foment grievances, which can then lead the aggrieved to act on such grievances by 
participating in various forms of violent collective action.  As these structural 
processes affect different segments of populations in differentiated manners, class, 
group or gender specific explanations of the relation between the grievances emerging 
from such structural processes and participation in violent collective action have been 
advanced.  In studies of African insurgencies and rebellions, grievances have 
repeatedly been argued to condition participation in violent organizations.  Among the 
different categories of the population, the youth – and particularly young men - have 
been argued to be the most likely to act on grievances by joining violent organizations 
(Honwana 2005; Jourdan 2004, 2011; Richards 1996; Van Acker & Vlassenroot 
2001a, 2001b).  
Selective Incentives 
A second cluster of theories recognizes the role of grievances as background 
conditions but argue that the determining factor in explaining participation in violent 
groups are the benefits that accrue to participants.  Following Popkin (1979), who used 
Olson’s (1965) theory of collective action to argue that what explains participation in 
Vietnam was the fact that insurgents offered participants “selective incentives” in 
return for their participation, and scholars of social revolutions who also argued that 
insurgents rewarded participation and support by the selective distribution of material 
and collective goods as well as protection (Goodwin and Skocpol 1989; Lichbach 
1995), a line of scholarship has focused on “selective incentives” as one of the central 
determinants of participation  (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Mason and Krane 1989).  
Selective incentives can also be more attractive to certain segments of the population.  
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) show that young men are more likely to respond to such 
incentives because of their specific opportunity structures in contexts of relative 
economic deprivation.  Furthermore, selective incentives are often strategically 
combined with “negative incentives” such as violent punishment or retaliation by rebel 
and armed organizations to obtain recruits (Beber & Blattman 2013; Gates 2002).  
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Social Structures 
Another stream of scholarship has focused on the social structural conditions that 
enable the emergence of insurgent and violent collective action.  Studying in particular 
agrarian social revolutions, these scholars identify structural features of rural and 
urban societies as central catalysts and enablers of revolts and revolutions, and, as a 
result, collective and individual participation in violent forms of collective action 
(Moore 1966; Scott 1976; Skocpol 1979; Taylor 1988).  We will come back to these 
dimensions more extensively in the following section of this chapter.  
 
In addition to these three main streams, a series of other major factors have been 
advanced to explain participation.  Among the most influential of these is Elizabeth 
Jean Wood’s (2003) study of insurgency in El Salvador, where she shows that, beyond 
structural preconditions and incentives provided by armed groups, emotional factors 
and the “pleasure of agency” play a determining role in driving individuals to 
participate in insurgent collective action.  Also, Weinstein (2006) focuses on group 
level characteristics and advances a structural argument according to which groups 
that have access to resources - either natural resources or external funding - tend to 
attract a certain type of participants that have short time horizons, while resource poor 
movements tend to attract more committed participants.   
 
Thus, a wide range of factors have been advanced to explain participation in violent 
collective action and armed organizations, the most salient of which we have reviewed 
here (but not all).  However, ascertaining and weighting the role of these different 
factors is not an easy task.  Indeed, not only do these different factors point to different 
types of processes, they are also identified by different methodologies, sometimes 
corresponding to different disciplines of the social sciences that can rest on different 
ontological assumptions, making a clear understanding of the relative importance of 
each factor difficult.   
 
The recent development of novel methods of data collection and analysis, in particular 
the collection of disaggregated and time series data in post-conflict and – as for this 
dissertation – in active conflict settings, have allowed to enrich the empirical analysis 
of civil wars (Blattman & Miguel 2009).  More specifically, it has allowed to weight 
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the importance of the different factors identified in the long and rich history of the 
study of civil wars as determinants of participation in violent collective action. 
Humphrey and Weinstein’s (2008) use of post-conflict data on participation in the 
Sierra Leonean civil war allowed them to measure the separate effect of these factors 
on an individual’s propensity to participate, and thus compare the relative importance 
of these different factors, a framing which is also adopted in the quantitative section 
of this dissertation.  Importantly, they find that all three of the ‘main’ aforementioned 
factors have significant effects on participation, and suggest that the explicit or implicit 
‘rivalry’ between these different theories is artificial, and that studies of participation 
should focus more on identifying the interaction between these factors, a point also 
made by Scacco (2009).  
1.1.4.  Articulating different levels of analysis  
However, as mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the current framings of 
participation as a unitary individual outcome variable, and various factors as individual 
level independent variables also bears some limitations with regards to understanding 
the factors and processes that condition participation in armed organizations.  
 
First, qualitative evidence and research on participation make us weary of the 
possibility of developing a single, all-encompassing theory of why people participate 
in armed organizations.  This is due in part to the fact that what is subsumed under the 
category of participation and presented as a unitary outcome variable in fact regroups 
a large number of qualitatively very different actions and processes.  As Parkinson 
(2013) notes, there are multiple degrees of participation and support, resulting from 
the numerous ways in which actors can engage with armed organizations, ranging from 
tacit support, to participation in supply or resource mobilization activities, to active 
participation in combat and violence (to which the definition of participation in this 
dissertation is restricted).  These constitute discrete roles within armed organizations 
that can be driven by separate logics, and which are somewhat problematically bundled 
into the category of participation. Furthermore, participation displays significant 
temporal variation, as it can be episodic - as can be the case with riots, pogroms or 
massacres – or extend significantly in time, as is the case with long lasting insurgencies 
or rebel organizations.  Furthermore, as previously mentioned, many recent studies 
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have relied on the problematic assumption that one initial factor explains participation 
throughout the period of participation, and remains time invariant (Kalyvas 2008; 
Richards K. 2014; Weinstein 2007).  Different modes of participation, and 
participation at different stages of a conflict or episode of violent collective action, can 
be influenced by different configurations of factors and solicit different groups and 
categories of people.  Moreover, there exist numerous and very different “paths” to 
mobilization, making a single, holistic theory of the causes of participation somewhat 
misguided (Viterna 2006).  
 
In addition to the variegated forms of participation, the range and variability of the 
organizations that are often compiled together further begs caution about a 
comprehensive explanation of participation.  Indeed, these can include large-scale 
rebel movements, private and proxy militias, various types of grassroots self-defence 
organizations, vigilantes, but also criminal organizations and gangs.  Many 
organizations bear the features of several of these categories at the same time, or 
evolve from one to the other over time.  Participation in a small vigilante group is 
qualitatively different from participation in a large-scale rebel organization, yet, as one 
can become the other over time, levelling and compiling different types of 
participation can miss such nuances.   
 
What these considerations point towards is the need to understand individual 
determinants of participation in conjunction with supra-individual factors that 
condition participation in armed organizations.  If taken exclusively, the 
methodological individualism or ‘atomism’ adopted by many recent studies of 
participation does not allow to fully capture processes that operate at a supra-
individual level, and that structure in turn the individual level factors that affect 
participation, such as social processes (Mc Doom 2013).  Furthermore, there is a need 
to take into account the transformative effects of civil wars and the presence of armed 
actors, as these are likely to influence and reshape the individual dimensions of 
participation, which are likely to change significantly over time.   
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1.2.  Towards a multi-level framing of participation 
Thus, while it has been the object of sustained attention in several disciplines of the 
social sciences, the puzzle of participation in violent collective action remains partially 
‘unsolved’, as a conceptual understanding of the evolving dynamics of recruitment and 
control resulting from the changing role that non-state armed organizations play in 
zones of protracted conflict remains to be formulated and developed.   This points to 
a variety of different aspects of the insertion of non-state armed organizations into 
societies, from their roles an functions in the economies of predation and protection 
that develop in areas of protracted conflict, to their modes of governance and 
interaction with pre-existing structures of authority, to the ways in which their 
presence affects – either directly or indirectly – the social structures and networks of 
a society.   
 
In order to grasp these different sets of factors, we develop a framework that 
incorporates the individual dimensions of participation, but attempts to articulate them 
with supra-individual dimensions.  Specifically, the framework that is presented here 
is an attempt to tie in three levels of understanding of armed mobilization and 
participation.  The first level seeks to capture the role that armed groups have come to 
play in dynamics of control over resources and labour, but also their roles in the 
extension and deepening of economies of protection that often characterize zones of 
protracted armed conflict.  This is what we call the political economy of recruitment 
and control of labour.  The second level of the analysis is oriented towards the question 
of how people come to participate in armed organizations, and focuses on the modes 
of mobilization and control of combatants, in particular the social processes through 
which people are brought into armed organizations, and the ways in which they are 
controlled by these organizations.  This is what we call the ‘social architecture’ of 
recruitment and control, which constitutes our second level of analysis.  Finally, we 
look at the individual dimensions of participation, understood not at an exclusively 
individual level but in articulation with the two other levels.  This comprises an 
analysis of both who participates in armed organizations – i.e. the individual level 
determinants of participation – as well as the emotional and other factors that can drive 
and influence participation.  Although these three levels can be considered as a form 
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of ‘zooming in’ on the process of participation, they do not suggest an order of 
causality.  
 
We now look in more detail at these three levels of understanding of participation.  At 
each level, we raise the main interrogations emerging from the literature on armed 
mobilization and the role on non-state armed group, and that will constitute the guiding 
analytical threads of this dissertation.  We include a particular focus on the literature 
concerning the African continent, as it allows us to build a more context specific and 
historically attuned framework around the processes at play.  While certain references 
to the eastern Congolese situation are inserted, the specific articulation of this 
framework to the eastern Congolese case, using the Congo specific literature, is done 
throughout the qualitative empirical chapters. 
1.2.1.  The political economy of labour mobilization and control 
Labour is a crucial resource of armed conflict, particularly armed conflicts 
characterized by low levels of technology, as if often the case on the African continent.  
The capacity to mobilize and control labour is a fundamental aspect of the political 
economy modern states.  Historically, labour conscription for war has been one of the 
drivers of the development of states and the extension of their control over populations 
(Tilly 1985; Tilly 1990; Scott 1998).  While the political economy of large-scale 
conscriptions for war is well understood for modern and centralized state, it is less 
clear in contexts of civil wars involving fragmented political power, where a 
multiplicity of armed actors mobilize combatants.  In contemporary African wars that 
are characterized by high levels of military and political fragmentation, these can 
include large-scale rebel movements, private and proxy militias, various forms of 
grassroots self-defence organizations, vigilantes, as well as criminal organizations.  
The armed groups that operate in conflict-ridden areas such as eastern DRC often 
correspond to several of these categories at the same time, making a single account of 
their motives or dynamics difficult.  Nevertheless, the aggregated numbers of 
mobilized soldiers, which can represent significant percentages of the total population 
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of regions or countries,11 suggest scales of recruitment similar to those of large scale 
wars, and beg for an understanding of the underlying political economy of labour 
mobilization at play in those configurations.  In this section, we start by situating the 
process of labour mobilization in contemporary wars in the history of labour 
mobilization in Africa.  We then identify the new dynamics introduced by the crisis of 
African states and the recent rise in armed conflict on the continent, and delineate the 
central features of the political economy of labour mobilization in contemporary wars 
on the continent.   
 
The mobilization of combatants by armed factions during contemporary wars on the 
African continent and elsewhere do not take place in an institutional or historical 
vacuum.  Rather, as Munive (2011) has argued, it is inscribed in long-standing 
institutional histories of mobilization of resources and labour, that find their origins in 
the colonial era, itself a continuation of previous forms of large scale labour 
conscription, in particular the slave trade (Northrup 1988).   The colonial state, as a 
result of its imperial origins, was in many senses the epitome of an extractive 
institution, as the administrative and political apparatus served the central purpose of 
extracting resources from the colonies (Amin 1972; Boone 2003, 2014; Mamdani 
1994; Mkandawire 2010; Young 1994).   
 
At the centre of the colonial political economy was the imperative of control over the 
productive forces of the population, and in particular conscription of manpower to 
serve both economic production and security provision in urban centres, but also in 
the rural areas.  Indeed, recent studies of the political economy of rural Africa have 
challenged the idea that the colonial and post-colonial state’s presence in rural areas 
was weak or inexistent – a position advanced by authors such as Herbst (2000) - and 
that the African peasantry had been largely left “un-captured” by central states (Hyden 
2008, Hyden 2013).  Boone (2003, 2014) has shown that the colonial state intervened 
heavily in rural areas to appropriate and mobilize resources, in particular land and 
labour.  This involved various strategies to establish political control over the rural 
areas, from direct administration and modification of property rights, to the 
territorialisation of state authority through the constitution of ethno-territorial 
                                                 
11 Our data suggests that around 12 % of the male population in rural eastern DRC has participated in 
an armed group.   
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constituencies and native authorities (Crowder 1964; Mamdani 1994; Young 1994; 
Hoffmann K. 2014).  As we will see in Chapter 2, the imposition of colonial authority 
over eastern DRC and the territorialisation of state power were highly contentious 
processes that had longstanding consequences on the political topography of the region 
(Hoffmann K. 2014).  
 
The “native” ethno-territorial circumscriptions that emerged from these forms of 
political and social engineering were integral parts of the colonial state’s extractive 
apparatus, as they facilitated the control, taxation, and mobilization of labour among 
rural populations with the coercive backing of the central state (Boone 2014; Mamdani 
2011; Munive 2011).  These institutionalized forms of labour mobilization were 
exacerbated during the large-scale conscriptions of soldiers for the First and Second 
World Wars, particularly in the French, German and British colonies (Gutteridge 
1970), but also, as we will see, in the Belgian Congo (Northrup 1988).  While the 
configurations varied tremendously, and gave rise to multiple forms of resistance and 
rebellion, they structurally shaped the resource and labour mobilization trajectories of 
the post-colonial states, both in the cities in in rural areas (Amin 1971; Young 1994; 
Mkandawire 2010).   
 
The mobilization of labour in the context of contemporary armed conflicts is a 
continuation of historically ingrained, institutionalized modes of labour conscription 
(Munive 2011).  However, in the absence of an overarching actor such as the colonial 
state, or other clearly identifiable, unitary ‘extracting’ actors, processes of resource 
extraction and accumulation are less clearly identifiable.  Indeed, while the colonial 
state’s centralized administrative apparatus made patterns of resource extraction 
“legible”, 12  these patterns are less visible in contexts of diffuse and fragmented 
political and economic power.  This is particularly the case in so called “weak states”, 
where power structures and modes of resource accumulation lack the rationalizing and 
organizing structures of a strong central state, as well as in contexts of armed conflicts 
and civil wars where political power is likely to be fragmented and contested.   
 
                                                 
12 Both for the state itself, as argued by Scott (1998) – from whom the expression is borrowed - and for 
the researcher.   
 38 
As a result of the crisis of the African state in the 1980s, novel conceptual frameworks 
were developed to apprehend the diffuse and multi-nodal forms of power that had been 
laid bare or had developed as a result of the breakdown of the central state.   Departing 
from state-centric analyses of resource accumulation and political power, recent 
literature on contemporary history of the African continent put into focus the role of 
“networks”, seen as the new nodes of power and accumulation, that span the 
commercial, military and state spheres, and more accurately capture the multi-sited 
locus of power than traditional conceptions of state power.  
 
During armed conflicts or civil wars, such networks of power often articulate around 
military actors, around which state, customary and business actors congregate because 
of their central role in contexts where access to the means of force is a central 
component of power. Raeymaekers & Vlassenroot (2004 p.14) use the concept of 
“complexes of power” to designate the novel networks of power that emerged in 
eastern Congo following the wars of the 1990s.  Although their diffuse nature hinders 
the ascription of a unitary extractive “intentionality”, it does not entail that resource 
extraction is not at play, but rather that it is tied into fragmented and multi-layered 
political economies, where sites of negotiation, allocation and accumulation of 
resources are multiple and variegated.  Understanding the political economy of labour 
mobilization and control in the context of protracted armed conflict as in eastern DRC 
therefore requires an understanding of the ways in which emerging forms of power 
and extraction that are being constituted interact with the inherited, institutionalized 
forms of both resource accumulation and political power.   
 
The breakdown of centralized provision of security by states and the multiplication of 
armed actors in contexts of armed conflict fundamentally alters political economies of 
labour mobilization.  Armed conflict challenges the institutional architecture of state 
power and introduces very different dynamics of resource accumulation and control.  
Military strength becomes a key asset through which different actors can appropriate 
resources at different levels.  The literature on African conflicts has intensely focused 
on the violent modes of resource extraction and exploitation that develop in areas 
affected by armed conflict, reaching a paradigm in the so-called “greed” literature that 
followed the seminal works of Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004).  The focus has 
largely been on the violent ways in which armed actors appropriate high value 
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resources, epitomized by the “conflict minerals” paradigm that has occupied a central 
position in mainstream depictions of armed conflict in the African continent.13  A 
parallel stream has focused on the extractive and exploitative modes of appropriation 
of labour by armed organizations, with a particular focus on the forced abduction of 
children by armed groups. 14   Recent studies of violent recruitments into armed 
organizations relying on novel quantitative methods and using insights from 
ethnographic studies of forced recruitment have shed light on the accumulative 
rationale at play in the mobilization of labour through forced recruitment (Beber and 
Blattman 2013). 
 
While violent modes of resource extraction and appropriation are important features 
of economies of war, the heavy focus on this dimension has tended to cloud the more 
complex reorganizations of political economies that occur in areas of protracted 
conflict.  Challenging these dominant narratives, several authors have shown how non-
state armed actors do not rely solely on exploitation and plunder, but develop elaborate 
relations with economic actors in areas of conflict, the basis of which is the extension 
of the ‘business of private protection’.  In contexts of high insecurity, the private sale 
of protection which is typically done by criminal organizations such as mafias and 
gangs, who sell protection to economic actors operating in extra-legal spaces 
(Gambetta 1992), extends to all economic activities as a result of the general state of 
insecurity.  For example, Raeymaekers (2010) documents how the rebel organization 
RCD-ML developed protection arrangements with trans-border traders at the DRC-
Uganda border.   
 
They are also subject to economies of scale.   Using disaggregated historical data on 
patterns of violence and taxation in South Kivu, eastern DRC, Sanchez de la Sierra 
(2016) shows that armed actors who establish monopolies of violence tend to 
strategically reduce violent modes of resource appropriation to develop long term 
revenue streams through more stable patterns of taxation, behaving as Olson’s 
“stationary bandits” and developing elaborate taxation mechanisms.  In certain cases, 
these involve the development of “state like” administrative apparatuses and 
considerably reorganize local economic and political structures (Mampilly 2011; 
                                                 
13 For a critical review of the conflict minerals literature see Rigterink (2011).    
14 See Wessels (2006) for a review of child soldiering and forced recruitment of combatants in Africa.  
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Arjona, Kasfir & Mampilly 2015).  The control over the productive forces of the 
population, which are “extracted” through various forms of taxes and mobilization of 
labour, is therefore a fundamental feature of these organizations, although it usually 
operates at much smaller scales, and with much less temporal continuity - owing to 
constant infighting and military contestation - than national states.  Tied to regional, 
national and international networks of power, these organizations become integral 
parts of the new modes of politico-military control over populations, and part of 
regional and national networks of power that aggregate in national and regional centres 
of power, taking the form of what Reno (1998) calls “warlord politics”.   
 
The political implications of the development of these types of economies of 
protection in the areas where they occur are complex, and the subject of a burgeoning 
literature.  “Private protection”, however, can be a somewhat misleading term, as the 
protection they provide is not necessarily distributed on a private basis, and can be 
provided as a collective good to socio-political entities.  As many of these non-state 
armed organizations emerge from pre-existing socio-political entities - an aspect 
which will be explored in the following section - the protection they offer can be an 
integral part of these the political organization and resource distribution of these 
entities.  This can be the case, for example, of armed organizations emanating from 
chiefdoms, villages or neighbourhoods, that can have strong political and social 
support within these entities and can play a central role in “re-localizing” security 
provision and resource distribution in contexts where state provision of security is 
lacking or insufficient.  In many cases, they come to play a central role in the local 
economies of these entities, providing protection to strategic economic activities, but 
also re-organizing local economies in multiple ways, and giving rise to complex 
“politics of protection” (Pratten 2008).   
 
In many of the contemporary armed conflicts of the African continent, the emergence 
of ‘war economies’ has also been characterized by transformations in modes of labour 
organization.  Indeed, such ‘war economies’ are usually organized around high value 
extractable resources (such as minerals in the Mano River conflicts or the eastern 
Congolese conflict) or high value trading (such as drugs in the conflicts of the Sahel).  
As a result of scarce capital and technology, these economies are often labour 
intensive, as are the armed conflicts.  The presence of two co-dependant labour 
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intensive ‘sectors’ – the mining sector, and the military/war sector – generates very 
peculiar dynamics for the political economy of labour.  Studying the political economy 
of labour in the Mano River wars of Sierra Leone and Liberia, Danny Hoffman (2013) 
shows that combatants moved fluidly in and out of different labour intensive sectors 
of the economy, such as mining or informal trading in cities, but also what he calls the 
‘work of war’- the armed factions.  As we will see in the historical section, conceiving 
participation in war as a form of labour has a long history in eastern DRC, where 
mobilization for war in the colonial and post-colonial era has often displayed similar 
dynamics to that of other labour intensive sectors of the economy, in particular the 
mining sector (Hoffmann K. 2014; Northrup 1988; Young & Turner 1985).  In this 
thesis, we will pay particular attention to the mechanisms that tie labour in the ‘war 
economy’ to other sectors of the economy, as well as tracing the continuities between 
‘historical’ and contemporary modes of labour accumulation and control.   
 
 Several questions arise from these considerations, which allow us to orient our inquiry 
into the “macro causes” of participation in non-state armed organizations, and the 
political economy of recruitment and control over combatants.  In Kimua, whose 
example was presented in the introduction of this chapter, the constitution of a village 
level self-defence group, although done to provide protection to this rural entity, comes 
into tension with the accumulative logics of labour mobilization in times of war.  What 
remains to be understood are the ways in which the ‘protective’ functions of the self-
defence group come into articulation or confrontation with the more accumulative 
logics of armed mobilization at play.  A second question that emerges is the relation 
between the novel forms of labour mobilization that the armed group activates and the 
longstanding modes of labour mobilization that characterize the region and which have 
profoundly shaped its ‘political topography’.  These questions motivate the attention 
that will be paid throughout this thesis to the political economy dimension of armed 
mobilization, both the historical modes of mobilization and control that will be 
explored in Chapter 2, and the novel modes of mobilization and control that have 
emerged with the proliferation of armed organizations in eastern DRC.  
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 1.2.2.  The  “social Architecture” of armed mobilization and control  
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the question of why people participate 
is closely tied to the question of how they come to participate.  In reviewing the 
dominant determinants of participation identified in the literature, we have seen that 
one of the most consistent findings of the study of participation in violent collective 
action is that social networks play an essential role in bringing people to participate in 
violent collective action.  Recent quantitative studies of participation in violent 
collective action have found strong evidence of for the role of social networks in 
driving participation in armed groups in times of war (Humphreys 2008), in violent 
rioting (Scacco 2009) as well as in inter-group violence, in particular in genocidal 
violence in Rwanda (Mc Doom 2013). However, as previously mentioned, the role of 
social networks in participation cannot fully be apprehended through a strictly 
individual lens, as social processes operate at a supra-individual level, requiring a more 
extensive conceptual apparatus to appreciate their effect.  
 
Furthermore, the central question of this thesis is to understand the causes of 
participation in armed organizations while taking into account the evolving role of 
these organizations in the social, economic and political environment in which 
participation occurs.  This double interrogation – on the causes of participation on one 
side, and on the evolving roles of armed organizations on the other – orients the 
analysis of the “social dimensions” of participation towards two main areas.  First, the 
ways in which armed organizations emerge from and ‘appropriate’ pre-existing social 
structures, as well as the ways in which they then transform and alter these social 
structures.  Then, the social processes and mechanisms through which individuals 
come to participation in armed organizations, with a particular attention to the ways 
new processes can emerge - or existing processes can transform - as a result of the 
presence of armed organizations.  
 
Together, these guiding questions motivate our inquiry into what can be called the 
‘social architecture’ of armed mobilization and participation, which combines an 
analysis of both these deeper and more resilient social structures and the more dynamic 
processes of recruitment that occur ‘within’ them.  The social processes and 
mechanisms that we seek to understand in this section do not operate in isolation from 
 43 
either the political economy previously identified, or the so-called “formal” 
institutions of the state.  Rather, they are constitutive of both the “formal” and 
“informal” institutions and modes of authority that regulate and organize social life, 
but also the political economy of labour mobilization previously discussed.  
 
In this section, we look at the role of social networks in armed mobilization and 
participation with the objective of identifying key points of contention, and thus 
orienting the empirical inquiry into the ‘social architecture’ of armed mobilization and 
participation.   
1.2.2.1 Social Networks and Armed mobilization 
The role of social networks in facilitating violent collective action is well established.  
Studies of insurgencies and revolutions, conceiving insurgencies as particular types of 
social movements, have thoroughly analysed and documented the role of pre-existing 
social structures in facilitating various forms of violent and/or insurgent collective 
action.  Social networks have two central functions.  First, they ‘resolve’ the 
fundamental trust, screening and monitoring constraints that usually impede collective 
action (Bowles & Gintis 2002; Ostrom 1997).  Second, they mediate one of the central 
spreading mechanisms of mobilization, which Mc Doom (2013) identifies as social 
influence.  Social influence is the process whereby an actor intentionally or 
unintentionally changes his behaviour as a result of induction by another actor or group 
(Kelman 1974 p.128).  It regroups an ensemble of social-psychological mechanisms 
including conformity, socialization, peer pressure, compliance, internalization and 
identification (Cialdini & Goldstein 2004; Mc Doom 2013 p.456).  These mechanisms 
play out in a variety of ways, but are enabled and facilitated by the pre-existing social 
networks that armed organizations build upon. 
 
The study of the social dimensions of armed mobilizations has largely focused on how 
pre-existing social networks structure insurgent mobilization or violent collective 
action, and the ways in which insurgencies or other organizations engaged in collective 
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violence ‘appropriate’15 pre-existing social networks (Barkey & Van Rossem 1997; 
Gould 1991, 1993, 1995; Marwell, Oliver, & Prahl 1988; Petersen 2001; Scacco 2009; 
Staniland 2012; Wickham-Crowley 1992).   
 
The multiplicity and variation in types and forms of social networks give rise to very 
different configurations of socially mediated mobilizations.  These can include social 
networks that develop as a result of “social proximity” and multi-faceted social 
interaction, that often bear a spatial dimension, such as those inscribed in rural villages 
or urban neighbourhoods.  Analysing the Paris Commune of 1871, Gould (1991) 
shows that the “formal” organization of the Insurgent movement was built on pre-
existing and multiple “informal” social networks embedded in Parisian 
neighbourhoods, which enabled mobilization and recruitment into the insurgency.  
Adopting a more dynamic perspective, Petersen (2001) carefully analyses the crucial 
role of community social structures in enabling and sustaining insurgent mobilization 
in Lithuania.  He shows how strong communities - characterized by shared norms, 
social values, and multi-faceted interactions – mediate norms that pressure other 
community members into participation.  Scacco (2009) shows the role of 
neighbourhood-level social networks in ‘pulling’ people into violent rioting during the 
Christian-Muslim violent riots in Nigeria in 2000-2001.  Similarly, Mc Doom (2013), 
analysing the dynamics of inter-group violence during the Rwandan genocide, shows 
that micro-social interactions resulting from spatial proximity played a decisive role 
in bringing people to participate in the genocidal violence.   
 
Spatial proximity, however, is not a requisite for social networks to mediate 
mobilization.  Recent studies of recruitment into so-called ‘terrorist’ organizations 
such as Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State have shown that recruitments can be carried out 
through social networks that can extend internationally and span several continents 
(Atran 2008; Hegghammer 2006; Sageman 2004, 2008).  During the Rwandan 
liberation war of 1990-1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Army was able to recruit 
combatants throughout the Great Lakes region - particularly in Zaire, Burundi, Uganda 
and Tanzania - using the strong social networks of the Tutsi diaspora (Mushemeza 
2007; Reed 1996; Stearns 2012).   
                                                 
15 This expression is used by (Mc Adam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001 p.115), also quoted in (Staniland 2012 
p.149).   
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Understanding the networked dimensions of mobilization requires an understanding 
of how these networks are tied into particular political economies, in which they can 
play specific economic or political functions.  It therefore requires understanding how 
they intersect and coalesce with both ‘formal’ institutions of authority, and how so 
called “informal” institutions of governance and regulation of economic and social 
activity are embedded within social networks.  In contexts of weak or failing states, 
social networks have been shown to play crucial roles in organizing economic activity, 
in particular by carrying out monitoring and sanctioning functions that the state could 
not perform.  Social networks built around professional activities, in particular, are 
bearers of trust-enforcing and protection institutions (MacGaffey 1991; Meagher 
2003, 2010, 2012).  Professional and occupational networks have proved to be 
particularly powerful mobilizing platforms for security or insurgent collective action, 
as illustrated by the case of the Bakassi Boys of Southern Nigeria, (Meagher 2007), or 
the Libyan insurgency against the Gadhafi regime (Quesnay 2012).   
 
Unsurprisingly, security related professional networks also provide strong mobilizing 
platforms.  As they tie together pools of security ‘specialists’, they have a strong 
comparative advantage with regards to security or violence related collective action.  
These can include the state security services, from the police to the army, private 
security services such as private security firms, but also various other organizations 
which have a connection to security related activities, such as boxing clubs or martial 
arts clubs.   Ex-military professional networks have been shown to be at the origin of 
large-scale rebel organizations such as the Islamic State (Gerges 2016), but also 
criminal organizations such as gangs in the United States.   
 
Pre-existing social networks do not just provide strong mobilizing platforms for 
violent collective action, they are also crucial in determining the organizational and 
institutional strength of armed organizations, their capacity to manage resources, and 
their resilience to different types of shocks.  Through a comparative analysis of 
Pakistani armed organizations, Staniland (2012, 2015) shows that, in contrast to the 
arguments following the ‘resource curse’ paradigm that posit that access to high value 
resources or external funding tends to weaken insurgent movements (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004; Weinstein 2007), it is the strength of the “social institutional” basis of 
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armed organizations that determines their capacity to efficiently manage resource 
flows.  This has also been shown to be the case for Hezbollah in Lebanon (Norton 
2007), or the Free Aceh Movement in Aceh (Aspinall 2009).  Similarly, the social 
basis of the Southern Italian and Sicilian Mafias, organized around tightly knit 
families, has been advanced as one of the causes for their institutional strength (Paoli 
2008).   
 
Studies of non-state armed organizations on the African continent have emphasized 
their strong social basis, and the role of pre-constituted social networks in bolstering 
mobilization and recruitment.  Indeed, many of the large-scale insurgencies that 
emerged on the continent emanated from social movements, of which they displayed 
one of the core features: That of using pre-existing social networks to mobilize 
resources, and in particular recruits.  This has been documented for anti-colonial 
resistance movements and insurgencies, such as the famous case of the Mau-Mau 
resistance movement in 1950s Kenya (Throup 1987).   
 
Studies of contemporary wars on the continent have also challenged dominant 
depictions of these wars as chaotic and greed driven, and shown that in many instances 
the armed organizations had strong social bases.  In particular, they have highlighted 
the imbrications of the social bases of these armed organizations and the established 
modes of political authority.  One of the most studied cases is the Civilian Defence 
Forces (CDF) and Kamajors militias during the war in Sierra Leone, whose 
organizational structure was initially based on established modes of political and social 
organization, in particular the institutions of the chiefdoms and the secret societies 
(Muana 1997; Abdullah 1998; Keen 2005; Hoffman D. 2007a, 2011a).   The 
mobilization of combatants for the CDF illustrated the inter-twined nature of 
established forms of authority and network-based mobilizations in rural African 
societies.  Indeed, chiefs - core institutions of the Sierra Leonean state in rural areas - 
were instrumental in mobilizing combatants for the counter-insurgent armed 
movement, “activating” social networks and modes of social control over rural 
societies, even though much of the recruitments took place away from the territorial 
constituencies of these authorities, in refugee camps (Hoffman D. 2007a, 2011a).  
Their capacity to mobilize was therefore tributary of an institutionalized mode of 
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power over people, tied to the architecture of political authority in the region and the 
deriving capacity to activate rural social networks.   
 
In the case of eastern Congo, Stearns and Botiveau (2013) have shown that 
mobilization into armed groups can also be mediated by strong social networks 
embedded in rural societies, an aspect that we will explore extensively throughout this 
thesis.  Even insurgencies and armed movements that have displayed some the most 
nefarious, ‘terrorist’ or exploitative behaviours have been shown to have strong social 
basis.  For example, the infamous Boko Haram insurgency grew out of a social 
movement that had developed a strong social basis in northern Nigeria (Barkindo 
2013), as well the Niger Delta’s People Voluntary Force in the conflict-affected Delta 
State in Nigeria (Hazen 2009). 
1.2.2.2.  Networks and Control: Wartime transformation  
The study of the social base of armed groups has therefore focused extensively on how 
pre-existing social structure and networks influence the organizational and 
institutional characteristics of insurgent and other types of armed organizations.  
However, these studies often rely on the assumption that social networks are resilient 
structures, at least in the short to midterm (Staniland 2012 p.150).   Recent studies of 
armed conflict have opened the ‘black box’ of armed conflict and taken a more 
dynamic approach to understand not only how armed organizations ‘appropriate’ pre-
existing social structures, but also how they reconfigure them.  Such an analytical 
viewpoint is particularly relevant in contexts such as that of eastern Congo where 
armed conflicts extend significantly over time, instilling and imprinting transformative 
dynamics to the economic, political and social environment in which they occur.  
Elizabeth Jean Wood defines such social processes of civil war as “the transformation 
of social actors, structures, norms and practices” (Wood 2008 p.540).  As previously 
stated, analysing such social processes of civil war is of central importance to this 
dissertation, as it informs the understanding of the evolving causes and processes of 
participation in armed groups.    
 
Social networks do not exist independently of the political economies in which they 
are imbricated and of which they are fundamental components.  Understanding how 
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social networks are reshaped by civil wars therefore necessitates to factor in the 
transformative effects that civil wars have on political economies, and the evolving 
role that armed organizations occupy within political economies, as has been 
emphasized in the previous section.  In particular, it requires understanding how modes 
of social control over people shift as a result of the spread of novel and often violent 
modes of accumulation of resources and labour, but also as a result of the extension 
and implantation of the economies of protection mentioned in the previous section.   
 
The modes of control over their members that violent organizations develop has been 
the topic of an extensive literature, in particular in the field of military sociology, but 
also the sociology of gangs and criminal organizations.  It is well established that 
armed organizations develop multiple mechanisms and institutions to control their 
members, ranging from entry rituals, internal hierarchies, codes of conduct, various 
forms of sanctions and punishment, to institutional incentives, as well as group 
bonding and peer pressure mechanisms (Gabriel & Savage 1979; Gutiérrez Sanin 
2008; Kenny 2008; Rush 1999, 2001).  Beyond the highly constraining ‘internal’ 
institutional and social spaces of military organizations, modes of recruitment and 
control over labour in times of war have wider manifestations in war-affected societies.  
Analysing the social and spatial dynamics of armed mobilization in conflict ridden 
Sierra Leone, Danny Hoffman (2007b; 2011a) shows that the requirements of rapid 
labour mobilization for the war prompted the emergence of spaces of predominantly 
male socialization, whose main function in the war economy was to maintain 
significant pools of labour “in a state of waiting”.  These ‘barracks spaces’, such as 
abandoned hotels where unemployed or underemployed male youth would congregate, 
or makeshift mining camps in the Mano River area, constituted reservoirs of labour 
that were easy to tap into for various labour intensive activities, ranging from hiring 
supporters for political demonstrations, to mining activities, to the ‘work of war’.  
Intrinsically tied to the commodification of labour that occurs in zones of protracted 
armed conflict, these “barracks” are thus the spatial manifestation of a social 
adaptation to novel political economies of war.   
 
While the emergence of separate and often highly constraining social spaces within 
and around military organizations serves the function of ensuring direct access to and 
control over members, what is less understood are the ways in which these particular 
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forms of social control interact and coalesce with other forms of control and authority 
in the wider social context in which they occur.  Indeed, in some configurations, 
members of armed organizations can remain closely inserted into the societies in 
which they evolve.  The sociology of gangs has been particularly informative with 
regards to the ways in which organizations that use violence as a means of production 
adapt to their social environment and take advantage of it to carry out their activities.  
In particular, studies have shown the ways in which the control of gangs over gang 
members extends beyond the restricted “social space” of the gang, to the multiple 
networks in which gang members are embedded, in particular family and community 
networks, which serve as essential parts of the political economy of these gangs 
(Joselit 1983; Sanchez-Jankowsky 1991, 2003; Venkatesh 2000).  Social control over 
populations, and members, is therefore an integral part of the way in these 
organizations accumulate and control resources, in particular labour, and thus an 
integral element of political economies that develop around these organizations.  This 
motivates our articulation of two levels of analysis, the political economy of labour 
mobilization and control on one side and its ‘social architecture’ on the other, as they 
are closely imbricated.  
 
Furthermore, the burgeoning literature on the phenomenon of vigilantism, emanating 
in particular from anthropology and sociology, has also provided rich insights on the 
ways in which such non-state security organizations adapt to and transform their social 
environments.  In their study of the contemporary global rise in vigilantism, Pratten 
and Sen (2007) show that vigilante organizations should be understood as 
continuations of longstanding forms of decentralized security provision that have 
come to play novel and multi-faceted roles since the global retreat of states as central 
security providers in the late 1980s and 1990s.  Understanding their social insertion 
into contemporary societies therefore requires understanding their institutional and 
social genealogies.  For example, several authors have shown that the rise in 
vigilantism that Nigeria has experienced in the 1990s and 2000s must be understood 
as a continuation of forms of decentralized security provision that emerged during the 
colonial era (Fourchard 2008; Meagher 2007; Pratten 2008).   
 
Moreover, this can be the case not only with vigilante groups, often closely associated 
to “established” forms of security provision as they often serve as surrogates for state 
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security services, but also of criminal organizations or ‘bandits’.  In her study of 
vigilantism and banditry in Kenya and Tanzania, Suzette Heald (2006, 2007) shows 
that rural “bandits” were deeply entrenched into the very fabric of rural societies, 
through networks of families that gave a “tentacle” form of presence to these 
organizations (Heald 2007 p.6).  Their social implantation was tied to the functions 
they had come to play in such societies, at the centre of political economies of pillage 
and banditry, but also, in several cases, as providers of collective goods to their social 
base.  Such contentions resonate with historical analyses of ‘social banditry’ on the 
African continent, in particular Crummey (1986), who followed Eric Hobsbawm’s 
seminal analysis of social banditry in Europe to show the double-edged role that such 
organizations played in rural societies, between plunder on one hand and provision of 
services and goods on the other.  Similarly, studies of gangs have highlighted the fact 
that not only do they provide goods to their members as many organizations do, but 
these goods also percolate to the wider social networks in which these organizations 
are embedded (Whyte 1943; Sanchez-Jankowski 1991; Venkatesh 2000). 
 
The modes of control that armed organizations exert over their members should 
therefore be understood as part of their wider insertion into the societies in which they 
evolve, which results from their institutional genealogies and their social bases on one 
side, and the multi-faceted roles that they come to play within these societies on the 
other.  While coercion and violence is often a central feature of their modes of control 
over populations, the emphasis on coercion and violence that has dominated depictions 
of these organizations tends to cloud the wide range of roles that they come to play, as 
well as the general “adaptation” of civilian populations to their presence.  As 
Verweijen (2013) has argued, using Anthony Giddens’ (1985) theory of structuration, 
civilians tend to adapt to the presence of such organizations, either strategically or by 
obligation.  Such processes of adaptation and adjustment are numerous and very 
diverse.  They can be seen as the social manifestations of the adaptation to the novel 
political economies of protection whose emergence in times of high insecurity was 
mentioned in the previous section, and to the complex ‘politics of protection’ that 
derive from them (Pratten 2008).   
 
Indeed, in addition to economic and business actors who strategically adjust to the 
necessity of obtaining “private” protection from such actors, civilians and actors of all 
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types often seek out protection from armed actors.  These can take particular social 
manifestations, such as women who marry members of armed groups with the 
intention of obtaining protection (Morvan 2005), or civilians strategically developing 
social ties with armed actors to obtain various types of advantages (Verweijen 2013).   
Becoming an active member of these organizations can be an essential aspect of these 
adaptations, as it can condition access to both individual and collective protection.  
Because of the authority that derives from these organizations’ capacity to provide 
protection and other types of goods, families or communities can strategically decide 
to encourage participation of some of their members to obtain protection, an aspect 
which we will specifically explore in the quantitative analysis.   
  
Furthermore, while armed organizations can come to exert multi-faceted forms of 
control over populations, this control comes under heavy contestation in contexts of 
civil wars, which introduces very specific social dynamics.  Indeed, one of the defining 
features of civil wars is the extension of the armed conflict between opposing factions 
to the social realm, and the bitter infighting that takes place for control over people 
through social networks and actors, who are often forced to align with opposing parties 
of the conflict.  This process is known as social polarization, and induces a deep 
reconfiguration of the social structures and networks within a society, including 
families and communities (Kalyvas 2006; Wood 2008).  Counter-insurgency tactics 
tend to focus on “infiltrating” networks of support to insurgencies in order to break off 
support channels, and often rely on coercion and violence to achieve those ends 
(Kalyvas 2006).  This can also involve  ‘taking control’ of institutions that aggregate 
the social networks through which support for insurgencies is mediated - for example 
by replacing university rectors, religious leaders and different types of public 
authorities and figures - but also crafting new institutions designed to exert social 
control over populations, such as local committees or youth wings.   
 
The literature points to several mechanisms tying counter-insurgency tactics, violence 
against civilians and participation.  On one hand, counter-insurgency tactics can make 
it extremely costly to join or support an insurgent organization, as it can entail violent 
retaliation on an individual’s social entourage, break down social networks that 
mediate mobilization, and thus dampen participation in insurgent groups (Gurr 1970; 
Tullock 1971).  On the other hand, the violence against civilians that often takes place 
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in counter-insurgent operations can generate further grievances, which can lead to 
more participation, or leave civilians with ‘no other way out’ than to find refuge and 
protection from such violence in insurgent groups (Goodwin 2001; Kalyvas & Kocher 
2007; Lichbach 1995; Mason & Krane 1989; Wood 2003).  Thus, in understanding the 
transformation of social structures during civil wars, that are likely to reshape 
dynamics of participation in armed groups, the specific dynamics introduced by social 
polarization must be taken into account. 
 
Three salient points emerge from this brief overview of the literature on the social 
dimensions of civil wars and the constitution of non-state armed organizations.  First, 
understanding the social basis of armed groups, and the pre-existing social structures 
from which they emerge and which they can ‘appropriate’ is crucial in understanding 
their modes of recruitment of combatants.  In eastern DRC, the high level of socio-
political fragmentation of the rural areas is likely to condition very different types of 
socially mediated mobilizations, an aspect that we will explore in this dissertation.  
Second, while recent streams of literature have deepened our understanding of the 
transformative effects that civil wars and the emergence of armed groups have on 
social structures, the ways these in turn reshape modes and processes of recruitment 
of combatants remains to be spelled out and traced more precisely.  In particular, the 
extension of both the accumulative functions of armed organizations and the 
economies of protection that develop around them which we have seen to be 
characteristic features of zones of protected conflict are likely to reshape the social 
processes of recruitment and control over combatants.  Third, the specific dynamics 
introduced by the socially polarizing effects of civil wars, and the role of counter-
insurgency operations in particular are an essential aspect of the reconfiguration of 
social structures during civil wars, and should therefore be taken into account in 
analysing the evolving modes of recruitment of combatants.  
 
Together, these questions allow us to orient our inquiry into the ‘social architecture’ 
of participation in non-state armed organizations, both the macro-structures that shape 
armed mobilization and the more dynamics social processes of recruitment over 
combatants.  This line of analysis is pursued throughout the dissertation.  In the 
qualitative empirical chapters (Chapters 4-8), I pay particular attention to situating 
such processes of armed mobilization in their social and institutional history, looking 
 53 
at inherited modes of labour mobilization and the way they structure contemporary 
mobilizations, and then trace the transformative effects of the war on the novel 
processes of participation.  The quantitative analysis carried out in Chapter 9 keeps 
this thread of inquiry and looks into the effects of institutional and social mediation of 
participation.  
1.2.3.  Individual dimensions of participation  
While the political economy and “social architecture” of armed mobilization shape 
and constrain the process of participation in multiple ways, they also delineate the 
spaces of agency, and freedom, of individuals.  Participation, in the end, is a human 
action, and in that sense it bears the unpredictability and complexity of all human 
actions, despite and beyond their structural determinations.  The story of participation 
in armed organizations is a story of people, of individualities, caught up in collective 
processes that often supersede their motives and actions, but are also shaped and 
altered by them.  Without adopting a binary conception of structure versus agency, we 
seek to develop an informed and nuanced understanding of the individual dimensions 
of participation.  This implies an analysis of how the previously identified processes 
shape the individual decisions and behaviour of participants, and are reflected in the 
ways in which they make sense of their own decisions and actions, but also the ways 
in which these individuals supersede and overcome such determinations.    
 
Studies of violent collective action have long assumed that individuals participating in 
collective violence or violent organizations had specific psychological, social or 
biological traits that distinguished them from the rest of the population and explained 
their proclivity to engage in violent actions.  The pathological characters advanced as 
causes for individual participation in violent collective action ranged from “biological 
sadism” and natural tendencies towards violent behaviour (Yablonsky 1966), to 
various forms of social delinquency or anomia (Cohen 1955).  In studies of violence 
on the African continent, such pathological explanations have long been suffused with 
ontologies of race - whose genealogies can be traced back to the colonial and pre-
colonial era - positing that Africans, as opposed to other human beings, were inherently 
or naturally violent (Alexander, Mc Gregor & Ranger 2000; Leopold 2005).   
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The academic literature on violence and violent collective action has come a long way 
to rebuke such ideas, although they remain pregnant in popular depictions of violence 
on the African continent.  Following Hannah Arendt’s (1963) famous rebuttal of 
Eichmann’s prosecutor’s depiction of the mastermind of Nazi logistics as a ‘monster’, 
and her contention that, in fact, Eichmann was an ordinary citizen, a growing literature 
has sought to show that participation in violence isn’t due to pathological biological 
or psycho-social traits, and that participants in violence do not have exceptional 
individual characteristics.  In particular, recent studies of perpetrators during the 
Rwandan genocide have revealed that those who participated in the violence had no 
particular distinguishing social or psychological trait, and, apart from a gender 
dimension, they were in fact fairly representative of the general population of Rwanda 
(Mc Doom 2009, 2013; Straus 2006; Verwimp 2005). 
 
However, this does not entail that individual level characteristics or motivations are 
irrelevant for understanding participation.  As mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, the literature on participation has extensively documented the role of various 
types of grievances - stemming from economic deprivation, inequality, social 
marginalization, lack of opportunities - in motivating individual decisions to 
participate in violent collective action (Gurr 1970; Humphreys & Weinstein 2008; 
Jourdan 2004; Richards P. 1996; Scacco 2009; Van Acker & Vlassenroot 2001).  
Wars, and the very act of participation, can enhance such grievances or generate new 
ones, by further depriving and/or socially ostracizing participants, and generating 
‘endogenous grievances’, which can motivate participation or remobilization (Eastern 
Congo Initiative 2013; Honwana 2005; Richards J. 2014).   
 
Additionally, another particular war-related grievance that can play a role is the 
victimization of civilians and their entourage by armed actors.  Attacks on civilians 
can considerably enhance frustration and grievances on the part of civilians, who can 
in turn decide to seek revenge by joining armed organizations.  This ties in with several 
authors who have shown that armed actors can strategically use violence against 
civilians to force ‘free riders’ and bystanders into the conflict (Kalyvas & Kocher 
2007).  Azam (2006) showed that such a tactic reduces the opportunity cost of joining.  
While these represent constraining mechanisms to force individual participation, 
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participation can in turn entail access to protection from such victimization.  
Protection, in this case, represents an individual incentive to participate, in order to 
reduce victimization on an individual and his social entourage.  What Richards (2014 
p.310) calls ‘recruitment for protection’ can thus be part of the strategies and tactics 
of civilians to navigate the presence of armed actors, which we have discussed in the 
previous section (Morvan 2005; Verweijen 2013).  
 
The difficulty of identifying ‘strictly’ individual determinants of participation stems 
from the inter-related nature of the individual and the social and institutional.  Studies 
of participation in armed groups in Africa have predominantly adopted the ‘forced vs. 
voluntary’ paradigm to understanding participation.  Yet finding the ‘strictly’ 
individual motivations for voluntary participation is difficult, and understanding what 
voluntary means is similarly difficult in contexts where the voluntary dimension is 
difficult to disentangle from external coercion (Honwana 2005; Seymour 2011; Boas 
& Hatloy 2008; Richards K. 2014).  Similarly, it is not clear whether the relation 
between protection and participation occurs at an individual level, or a collective one, 
through families or even communities.  The analysis of the individual determinants of 
participation must therefore be done in conjunction with the analysis of supra-
individual factors.  While such combined explanations are prevalent in qualitative 
studies of participation, it is only recently that quantitative studies have started 
exploring the interaction of individual and supra-individual factors.  For example, 
Scacco (2009) finds that, while economic grievances do not explain participation in 
violence when taken independently, they become significant when interacted with 
social networks that mediate participation.  Thus, she argues that individual grievances 
are ‘activated’ by the social networks that link together potential participants.   
 
Beyond socio-economic pre-conditions and profiles, several authors have underscored 
the role of emotional factors, which can take multiple forms.  In her study of insurgent 
mobilization during the civil war in El Salvador, Wood (2003) argued that, while 
important, socio-economic grievances are insufficient by themselves to explain why 
people risked their lives by participating in the insurgency.  She argues that emotions 
associated with participation, what she calls the “pleasure of agency”, were a decisive 
aspect of their decision to join the insurgency.  The pleasure of agency, however, 
cannot be understood solely as an individual level factor, as it is experienced 
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collectively, and rests on shared values and appreciations of what constitutes righteous 
actions.   
 
Similarly, several studies of armed conflict on the African continent have put into light 
the fact that, in situations of economic and social crisis, the youth were most likely to 
participate in armed organizations, as these provided them with a form of social 
integration and community that they no longer had access to in their societies 
(Hoffman D. 2011a; Honwana 2005; Jourdan 2004; Van Acker & Vlassenroot 2001a).  
The experience of deprivation, and the desire to escape the oppressive orders in which 
they were constrained by forging new forms of sociality and community are collective 
emotions, which a focus on the strictly individual level characteristics cannot fully 
capture.  Similarly, we have seen in the first part of this chapter, the literature on 
participation has shown that ‘selective incentives’, and in particular material incentives 
in the form of rewards, played an important role in driving participation (Popkin 1979; 
Kalyvas & Kocher 2007; Mason & Krane 1989).  However, the individual’s valuation 
of these incentives, and his proclivity to join as a result of these incentives, does not 
happen outside of the social context in which he evolves, which shapes and influences 
his decisions.   For examples, young men socialized into the types of Barrack Spaces 
that Hoffman has shown to emerge in times of war, are perhaps more likely to respond 
immediately to material or monetary incentives, or what Hoffman (2011) calls the 
“cash nexus”.  Yet their individual proclivity to respond to such incentives is tied to 
their socialization into groups where cash-paid labour is commonplace, and 
collectively valued.  
 
What these considerations point towards is an understanding of the processual 
dimension of participation, and the ways in which participation can reshapes the 
outlook of individuals, whose motivations can evolve as a result of their participation.  
While the youth of the village of Kimua who joined the self-defence group might 
initially be motivated by the protection of their families and communities, their 
participation opens new opportunities and constraints, such as the possibility of 
pursuing a military career, or leaving their village to embark on an adventure, which 
also constitute a form of ‘pleasure of agency’, that can be experienced individually but 
also within various forms of collective socialization.  
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These considerations focus our inquiry into the individual dimensions of participation 
on three main points.  First, ascertaining whether there are clear, identifiable, 
individual level variables that explain participation.  This will be carried out by paying 
attention to the leitmotivs in the narrative reconstructions of participants’ experiences, 
to see whether factors such as grievances, protection, or opportunity appear 
consistently throughout the qualitative interviews.  Furthermore, in chapter 9, we will 
look at whether specific individual level factors have clear effects on the propensity to 
participate.  Second, following the aforementioned need to adopt a processual 
understanding of the individual determinants of participation, attention will be paid in 
the qualitative chapters to the ways in which participation reconfigures individual 
motivations for participation.  Third, attention will be paid – particularly in Chapters 
6, 7 and 8 that adopt a closer geographical focus – to the role of particular individuals.  
1.3.  Dissertation Road Map 
This dissertation therefore seeks to understand the evolving causes of participation in 
zones of armed conflict, by looking at three, inter-related dimensions of recruitment 
and participation into armed organizations: The political economy of labour 
mobilization, the social architecture of recruitment and control, and the individual 
determinants and dimensions of participation.  This is done through both a qualitative 
analysis of processes of mobilization and participation, and a quantitative analysis of 
participation in armed factions.  Accordingly, the dissertation is structured as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 begins by situating contemporary processes of armed mobilization in the 
history of labour mobilization in eastern Congo.  The Chapter shows that, historically, 
the mobilization of combatants has been driven by the provision of security to the 
fragmented socio-political entities that constitute eastern Congo on one side, and the 
more accumulative logics of labour mobilization that were implanted by the empires 
that took control of the region on the other. This tension between these often 
conflicting forces has shaped the political and institutional “topography” of the region.  
The chapter then introduces the historical background of Congolese wars of the 1990s 
and 2000s.  As this dissertation does not focus on the geopolitical, international or 
strictly political aspects of the conflict, these are summarized in this chapter in order 
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to situate the analysis. Chapter Three then presents the mixed methods approach of the 
dissertation, provides a justification of the qualitative case studies and discusses the 
challenges associated with conducting research in an African conflict zone.  
 
The objective of Chapters Four and Five is to identify two key “macro-logics” of 
armed mobilization in the Mayi-Mayi resistance movement of South Kivu, by bringing 
examples from different areas and time periods into comparative focus.  Chapter Four 
analyses the initial phases of the Mayi-Mayi mobilizations in the town of Bukavu and 
several rural areas of South Kivu, focusing on the “protective” mobilizations by the 
decentralized socio-polities of South Kivu and their articulation with the spreading 
dynamics of the Mayi-Mayi resistance movement, which bore the features of a social 
movement.  Chapter Five identifies a contrasting “accumulative” logic of recruitment 
and control of combatants, which, although present from the onset of the Mayi-Mayi 
resistance movement, became more prevalent as the war dragged on.   
 
The following chapters adopt a much narrower geographical focus in order to provide 
a closer tracing and historical contextualization of processes of armed mobilization 
and participation.  Chapter Six focuses on the successive waves of armed mobilization 
that occurred during the rule of the RCD in the Midlands and Lowlands of the Mbinga 
Sud Grouping, in the territory of Kalehe.  First, the chapter traces the Local Defence 
mobilization orchestrated by the RCD, who relied on chiefs to recruit labour on a large 
scale.  The chapter then traces the “counter-mobilization” that followed defection from 
the RCD army by the Mayi-Mayi group of Cisayura, who relied on the charisma he 
had developed as a leader of the Local Defence as well as the deep channels of 
penetration into the Havu societies of the Midlands to recruit combatants for his group.  
We will argue that the modes of control that the group developed over its members 
should be understood in the light of the wider power that the group developed in the 
societies of the Midlands, which came to constitute a form of counter-authority in the 
region.  
 
Chapters Seven and Eight focus on a close yet significantly different region, the 
Northern Highlands of the territory of Kalehe in South Kivu, and traces the successive 
rounds of armed mobilization that took place in the Hutu societies of the Highlands.  
Chapter Seven starts with a historical introduction to the region and points out the 
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social and institutional origins of the conflicts that took a militarized turn in the 1990s.  
It then traces the repeated rounds of armed mobilization that occurred in the Hutu 
societies of the Highlands in the 1990s and 2000s, emphasizing the progressive 
imbrication of these societies into larger dynamics of power politics playing out at the 
regional level, as well as their progressive militarization.  Chapter Eight focuses on the 
most recent round of armed mobilization in the Hutu societies of the Highlands by 
tracing the emergence of the Nyatura armed movement in 2011- 2012.   The chapter 
provides a close range analysis of the events that preceded the mobilization in order to 
ascertain the role of different factors in explaining the mobilization, and then analyses 
the “social architecture” of the first round of armed mobilization in 2011 and the 
second round of “crisis mobilization” against the Raia Mutomboki militias in 2012.   
 
Finally, the same lines of analytical inquiry are pursued in Chapter Nine, in which a 
quantitative analysis of armed mobilization in the province of South Kivu is carried 
out.  The analysis is based on a survey of 1084 individuals and 134 rural villages of 
South Kivu that allowed to develop a retrospective panel dataset that reconstitutes the 
economic, social and political “histories” of these villages and individuals over the last 
20 years.  Three main regression analyses are proposed, guided by the three central 
questions of the dissertation, namely why and how people participate in armed 
organizations, as well as who participates in the armed organizations.  The dissertation 
ends with the concluding chapter Ten, that highlights the main contributions of the 
dissertation to the understanding of contemporary processes of armed mobilization, as 
well as the limitations of the dissertation and the avenues for future research.   
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       Chapter Two                                                                                            
Armed Mobilization in Historical Perspective 
This study focuses on the dynamics of participation in armed organizations in the 
province of South Kivu, in eastern DRC.  The mobilization of combatants for war 
related purposes has a long and intricate history in eastern DRC, which is intrinsically 
tied to the dynamics of armed conflict and violence in the Great Lakes Region.  The 
sheer historical and geographical extensiveness of this ‘history of violence’, which has 
been the topic of an extensive literature, is beyond the scope of this historical 
background chapter.  The objective of this chapter is rather to look at historical patterns 
of labour mobilization for war related purposes, and the institutional and social 
mechanisms that enabled or constrained mobilizations.  We will see that participation 
in armed organizations is tied to several, distinct processes.  First, the provision of 
security to the decentralized socio-polities that have constituted the region, from pre-
colonial kingdoms to the ethno-territorial constituencies that were crafted during the 
colonial period.  Armed mobilization within these entities was either tied to the 
provision of security and protection to these entities, or to resistance against ‘external’ 
political control and resource extraction, from “Arab” slave traders and Rwandan 
invaders, to the colonial and post-colonial state.   
 
In addition, the mobilization of labour for war has been inscribed in processes of labour 
conscription on a larger scale, from the colonial state’s “extractive” rule to the more 
complex forms of large-scale extraction that have come to prevail in the post-colonial 
era.  These macro-logics of labour mobilization have interacted in complex ways with 
the more decentralized forms of mobilization.  The armed groups that roam the 
countryside of eastern DRC today therefore have long “institutional genealogies”, 
historically situated at the crux of functions of accumulation and control, but also 
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resistance and provision of security to decentralized entities.  The chapter also provides 
a historical background to the contemporary wars in eastern Congo, focusing on the 
international and political dynamics that are not specifically the topic of this 
dissertation.   
2.1.  A brief history of labour mobilization in eastern Congo 
The armed mobilizations of the 1990s and 2000s that are the focus of this study are 
inscribed in a long history of labour conscription for security and war in the Great 
Lakes in eastern Congo.  While novel in their scope and impact on society, the 
mobilizations of the 1990s reflected, re-deployed and transformed engrained 
frameworks of political and social organization and resource mobilization.  Here, our 
objective is not to carry out an extensive history of labour conscription and 
mobilization for war in the region, but rather to identify some of the main ways in 
which labour conscription was institutionalized in eastern DRC, in order to trace the 
“social and institutional genealogies” of contemporary processes and mechanisms of 
mobilization.   
2.1.1.  Pre-colonial political organization in eastern Congo 
Up until the mid-19th century, at the moment of the arrival of the first exploratory 
European expeditions that would pave the road to the colonial expansion, the region 
that now constitute the provinces of North and South Kivu was marked by political 
fluidity, with a domination of lineage based systems, connected through the inter-
lacustrine trade networks, that aggregated into several chiefdoms such as Bushi, 
Buhavu, Butembo or Buhunde, and, further to the East, the great ‘Rega cluster’ formed 
of a constellation of smaller and semi-autonomous “forest societies” (Biebuyck 1973; 
Newbury 1992).  While some of the chiefdoms displayed signs of political 
centralization and social stratification, in particular Bushi, it was incomparable to the 
much more structured, centralized and socially stratified “states” that were 
consolidating on the eastern shores of the great lakes, in particular the Kingdom of 
Rwanda.16  This, however, did not mean that notions of territorialized authority and 
                                                 
16 Newbury (2009), p.69.   
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political competences were absent in eastern Congo.17  While political authority was 
centred on the figure of the chief, it was elaborately balanced along lineage groups, 
and political competition concentrated on succession to the thrones of these entities 
(Newbury 1992).  These polities displayed little signs of large-scale resource 
mobilization and accumulation.  Labour mobilization existed, but was of a collective 
and communal nature, inscribed in the dense systems of reciprocal and collective 
relations and public goods provision that characterized these societies.18  Soldiers and 
security personnel existed as well, but were mostly tied to protection of these small 
political entities against external assaults and banditry, and thus lacked the scale and 
institutionalization of the larger states of the Great Lakes region, in particular King 
Rwabugiri’s highly militarized state in Rwanda.19  
 
From the mid-19th century, the relative isolation of the region and its political 
equilibriums were deeply shattered by several converging forces.  The belligerent 
expansionism of the Rwandan Kingdom under Rwabugiri was projected unto the 
region as it carried out repeated military expeditions to expand the Kingdom’s territory 
and force neighbouring kingdoms into vassalage.  Repeated campaigns on the Havu 
island of Idjwi from around 1870 led to periods of full military control by Rwanda 
over the island, while other campaigns went as far west as Mpinga and Butembo, West 
of the Mitumba Mountain Range.20  These expeditions favoured the emergence and 
spread of a corporatist military culture, epitomised by the “bovine armies” and “social 
militias” that spearheaded the conquests and carried out forced recruitments 
throughout the region.  The most prolonged campaigns were directed towards the 
Kingdoms of Bushi on the South-Western Shores of Lake Kivu, where the Shi opposed 
a fierce resistance and repeatedly defeated Rwaburigi’s army, eventually causing his 
death. These episodes of violent resistance against Rwanda would constitute important 
institutional and discursive templates for subsequent armed resistance movements 
throughout the 20th century.    
 
                                                 
17 Chretien (2000), p.149.    
18 Northrup (1988), p.18.   
19 Newbury (2009), p.137.   
20 Newbury (2009), p.136. 
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Superimposed to the military incursions of Rwanda was the expansion of ivory and 
slave trade networks into the region, which introduced large-scale accumulative modes 
of labour conscription.  Indeed, the East African slave trade, dominated by the 
sultanate of Zanzibar and the ‘Turks’ of Khartoum, had been expanding throughout 
the Great Lakes along with ivory and other trades, targeting the weaker and more 
politically fragmented areas, including the Western Shores of Lake Kivu where slave 
raiding expeditions intensified around in the mid-19th century.  These expeditions 
relied on elaborate networks of intermediaries and columns of “African” mercenaries 
recruited throughout the region, known as the arabises. 21  Tippu Tip established 
himself in Kasongo in eastern Congo, and progressively became the most powerful 
trader in the region, commanding over large military expeditions throughout the region 
and setting up the foundations of a regional empire.  Pillage raids – known as razzia - 
penetrated deeper and deeper to the West, mostly to obtain ivory and captives, who 
were then either sold as slaves or incorporated as “slave soldiers” into the 
expeditionary forces that could gather up to 10 000 men, initiating a culture of violent 
mercenarism that would take a solid anchorage in the region throughout the 20th 
century.22 
 
Two of the most important modes of participation and recruitment into armed 
organizations were therefore present in what is now eastern Congo in the period 
immediately preceding the colonial expansion: On one side, large scale conscription 
into the slave trade and violent mercenary forces.  On the other, mobilization as part 
of the resistance movements that emerged from the existing socio-polities against these 
violent intrusions into the region.   
2.1.2.  Labour in the colony: The Extractive imperative 
As in much of the African continent, the colonial conquest, and colonial rule, brought 
significant and durable changes to the political landscape of eastern Congo.  The 
absorption of the region into the Congo Free State was a very violent process, 
involving a war against Tippo Tipp and his trade empire, but also repeated military 
                                                 
21 Chretien (2000) p.179. 
22 Northrup (1988). 
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campaigns to “pacify” the rebellious populations of the East.   Under the rule of the 
Congo Free State and then the Belgian Congo from 1908, the slavery practiced by the 
Zanzibarites was replaced by similarly extractive and exploitative modes of labour 
conscription, in particular the state enforced system of forced labour, as well as the 
gradual introduction of exploitative forms of wage labour.  The colonial state soon 
developed institutional means to mobilize “internal” labour from its territory.  
Legislation and decrees were passed as early as 1891-1892 requiring African Chiefs 
to provide prestations in food and corvees (compulsory unpaid work) to colonial 
agents, as well as soldiers to staff the colonial army, the Force Publique.23  The 
brutality with which Congo Free State’s system of forced work was enforced, 
particularly for the production of rubber and the collection of ivory, have been vividly 
depicted in historical accounts of the period.24  The Forces Publiques, initially staffed 
by former militiamen from the Zanzibari militias - the arabises - who pursued their 
brutal methods, was key to maintaining order in eastern Congo and ensuring that local 
chiefs met their quota.   
 
Comprehensive reforms were implemented following the takeover of Congo by the 
Belgian parliament, including a reform of the labour tax in 1910 that was replaced by 
taxes in cash and the abolition of physical punishment.  However, these did not alter 
the fundamentally exploitative nature of labour conscription.  The progressive 
introduction of wages only faintly dissimulated the coercive nature of labour 
conscription by the colonial state.  Wage labour nevertheless provided an alternative 
to the system of corvees (compulsory unpaid work), and pushed a large number of 
people towards wage earning jobs in plantations, or into the Force Publique.25  The 
Force Publique itself served the double function of a state enforcer and labour 
mobilizing institution.  Indeed, the miliciens (militiamen) of the Forces Publiques had 
the status of soldier-labourers and were deployed towards all sorts of labour intensive 
tasks.  The nexus between security and wage labour, an important feature of the current 
conflicts, was therefore institutionalized in the early colonial state.  World War I, 
during which the Belgian Congo engaged in military confrontation against German 
East Africa from 1916, sparked a huge effort to conscribe soldiers, porters and 
                                                 
23 Northrup (1988) p.41.   
24 See Hothschild (1988) or Van Reybrouck (2013).  
25 Northrup (1988) p.71.   
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resources to the eastern fronts.  The vast increase in the burden of corvees, as well as 
various other taxes led to widespread famine and pauperization, amplified by 
calamitous epidemics of sleeping sickness and influenza that decimated the population 
of eastern Congo.26  
 
From the 1920s, a significant rise in private investments in eastern Congo changed the 
configuration of economic activity and the role of the state in recruiting labour.  The 
development of export agriculture, mining and trade and the resulting increase in 
infrastructure investments led to a sharp rise in the demand for labour.  The role of the 
Colonial state shifted from being the primary employer of labour to the primary 
provider of labour to the colonial private sector.  The state continued to oversee labour 
recruitment throughout eastern Congo, institutionalizing it through legislation, and 
established quotas to ensure a steady supply of labour.  Although efforts were made to 
reduce the tax and conscription burden on the populations, the system remained highly 
coercive, with quotas of labourers being imposed on village chiefs, and several 
instances of revolts occurring as a result.  This was particularly the case for the Force 
Publique, a much less attractive option than wage labour in the agriculture or mining 
industries because of the meagre pay and harsh conditions, leading to coercive pressure 
on chiefs and reluctant recruits and numerous instances of forced conscription.27  This 
reluctance led to initiatives to import labour, in particular through the Mission 
D’immigration des Banyarwanda (Mission of Immigration of the Banyarwanda), a 
state orchestrated policy of migration of Rwandan (mostly Hutu) labourers to the 
coastal plantations of Kivu. 
2.1.2.1. Territorialization and the role of chiefs  
The ‘extractive imperative’ also drove a drastic reorganization of political space in 
eastern Congo which Hoffmann K. (2014) argues constituted a territorialization of 
state power.  This was done through what he calls ethnogovernmentality, the 
organization of mediated state power through the constitution of ethno-territories, 
which corresponded more or less to the pre-existing socio-political entities.28   In 
                                                 
26 Northrup (1988) p.112. 
27 Northrup (1988) p.126. 
28 Hoffmann (2014) p.116.   
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eastern Congo, the creation of the native homelands and the imposition of what is 
known as indirect rule was a messy and violent process, giving rise to multiple 
resistance movements, but also setting the scene for internal infightings between 
different ethno-territorial groups.  
 
The institution of the chief was central in the colonial state’s apparatus of resource 
mobilization.  Chiefs had already been playing the role of mediators in the 
mobilization of resources under Zanzibari rule, who relied on them to conscribe slave 
soldiers.29  The colonial state extended, systematized and institutionalized their role, 
backed by a discursive justification inspired in part by the nascent discipline of 
anthropology, as well as pseudo-scientific justifications of indirect rule that 
accompanied the colonial project.30  In 1891, the institution of the chiefdom was 
recognized by royal decree, enshrining native chiefs into the colonial state.31  The land 
over which indigenous chiefs ruled was given a separate legal status as Terres 
Indigenes (Native Land).32  A series of decrees and laws, in particular the law of May 
2, 1910, further delineated the role of the chief, defining his power over territory and 
people.  
 
The creation of the Native authorities, which included an administrative “gridding” of 
rural areas with the establishment of chiefs and sub-chiefs,33 as well as mapping efforts 
and population censuses carried out in the early 20th century, served two main 
functions.  On one hand, the native authorities ensured control over rural populations 
at a low cost.  On the other, they served to mobilize taxes and labour destined, as 
previously seen, to a range of activities, from public works for the colonial state - in 
particular porterage - to the various industries, to the staffing of the Forces Publiques.  
This put the chiefs in a difficult position, as they often tried to protect their subjects 
from the demanding quotas of the state, but nevertheless had to comply or face being 
deposed, imprisoned or even assassinated.  Northrup shows that, initially, a “politics” 
of recruitment of labour was at play among the chiefs subjects, with chiefs 
                                                 
29 Northrup  (1988) p.45.   
30 Hoffmann (2014), chapters 5 and 6.   
31 Ibid, p.121.   
32 Native lands were governed under customary right, following the June 3, 1906 and May 31, 1934 
decrees (Mpoyi 2013). 
33 Sub-Chiefdoms were instituted by the law of May 2, 1910.   
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systemically designating domestic slaves, former slaves, or marginal segments of their 
population for conscription as soldats travailleurs (worker soldiers) in the Forces 
Publiques.34  However, the incessantly increasing labour demands of the colonial state, 
particularly during the two World Wars, led to an ambiguous and often compromised 
relation of the chiefs with their population, or to multiple forms of resistance.   
2.1.2.2.  Resistance 
Of all the Belgian Congo, the populations of eastern Congo opposed one of the fiercest 
resistances to the colonial occupation.  Resistance in the region started early on, as a 
continuation of the resistance against the Rwandan invaders and the slave raids by the 
Zanzibari and arabises.  The “pacification” of the Southern areas of Kivu (that 
correspond to the current province of South Kivu) required significant military efforts, 
in particular in the bellicose Kingdoms of Bushi and in particular the chiefdoms of 
Kabare and Ngweshe, who opposed severe resistance to colonial rule and the taxes 
imposed by the colonial state up to the onset of the first World War.35  The colonial 
authorities in Costermansville (the former name of Bukavu) used both military force 
and political manoeuvring to quell the violent resistance.  Brutal retaliations were 
organized against rebellious chiefs, rebellious chiefdoms were broken apart and 
incorporated into different administrative entities, and cooperative chiefs were given 
ascendance over rebellious ones in the crafting of the colonial native authorities.36  In 
many cases, this accentuated pre-existing rivalries between chiefs and often led to 
violence, with “rebel” chiefs sending punitive expeditions to collaborating villages, 
and the colonial state in turn organizing violent punitive expeditions in areas under the 
rule of rebel chiefs.37  
 
Resistance took multiple forms, from overt resistance by hosting armed factions, to 
more “passive” forms of resistance against the colonially imposed taxes and forced 
works.  In the hinterland, in the forests behind the Mitumba mountain range, and 
                                                 
34 Northrup (1988) p.44. 
35 For example, Lieutenant Tondeur of the Free State was assassinated in 1902 by men from Kabare, 
which led to a brutal repression by the colonial state (Hoffmann 2014 p.156).   
36 Hoffmann (2014) p.155.   
37 This was particularly the case for Mwami Kabare, who organized the resistance before fleeing to 
Buloho (Hoffmann 2014 p.156.) 
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particularly in the area of Butembo, a fierce resistance was conducted by the remaining 
columns of rebel arabises.  As a result of the disrupting presence of these militias, 
Butembo had undergone severe political fracturing, and competition between rival 
chiefs had often taken violent forms, through alliances with armed factions.  An 
economy of plunder and predation emerged, in conjunction with contraband of 
weapons and rubber, and a famous local warlord emerged as the strongman of the 
region, Nkijo Kingumwa.  Supported by several chiefs in the area, he was targeted by 
punitive expeditions of the Forces Publiques, which also targeted the populations 
believed to be in association with him in 1911 and 1912.38  
   
Thus, we have seen that, during the second half of the 19th century and the early 
colonial period, two “macro-logics” of armed mobilization emerged in the region, and 
would prove highly resilient throughout the 20th century and in the wars of the 1990s.  
An accumulative or extractive logic of conscription of labour on a large scale was 
instilled by the Zanzibari rulers, and then significantly expanded by the colonial state.  
Through a violent and conflictual process, local chiefs became one of the colonial 
state’s most important “handles” to mobilize labour on a large scale, and were 
incorporated into the very architecture of the colonial state.  On the other hand, the 
violence of the colonial penetration, the heavy taxation that the colonial state exerted, 
and the political engineering that the colonial authorities engaged in sparked several 
armed resistance movements from the polities of eastern Congo.  In conjunction with 
these processes of large scale mobilization and resistance, economies of predation and 
protection emerged in remote areas and became closely imbricated with existing forms 
of social and political organization, with the figure of the warlord emerging as a new 
form of authority.  The nexus between established forms of authority, external forms 
of power and violent actors would remain prevalent throughout the 20th century.   
2.1.3.  Political Power and Rebellion after Independence 
The dramatic post-colonial history of the former Belgian Congo has had a tendency to 
defy all classifications and comparisons, breeding an entire vocabulary seeking to 
capture its convoluted trajectory.  Even Frantz Fanon, the “cold surgeon” of African 
                                                 
38 Hoffmann (2014) p.163.   
 69 
post-colonial political psyche, seemed to have surrendered to the aura of catastrophism 
that surrounds the country when he stated that “Africa has the shape of a gun, and its 
trigger is the Congo”.  While often adding obscurity rather than dissipating it, this 
language reflects a reality of extremes, in a country that has alternated between violent 
civil wars and abusive, autocratic and exploitative forms of power.  In this section, we 
shortly point out a few of the salient features of this post-colonial trajectory that will 
inform our understanding of the contemporary period, in particular the ‘politics of 
exclusion’ and the social entrenchment of armed rebellion in certain parts of eastern 
Congo.  
 
The complexity of the post-colonial trajectory of the Congo is tied to several factors.  
First, the country’s vastness and extreme geological diversity have been a structural 
hindrance to the effective projection and centralization of state power, as Herbst (2000) 
has argued.  The distant provinces of the East proved particularly difficult to control 
both militarily and administratively, as had been the case under colonial rule.  Second, 
the colonial origins of the state and its political architecture resulted in structural 
imbalances that underpinned the repeated crises that the country underwent (Young & 
Turner 1985; Young 1994).   In particular, the ethno-territorial basis of political power 
structurally shaped aggregate political interests and the lines of political competition 
in the post-colonial era, a feature that would take abrasive turn in the wars of the 1990s. 
 
The crisis that shook the Congo after its Independence represents a critical juncture 
that shaped the dynamics of both political and military contention and resistance of the 
post-colonial state.  Following Independence, when political power was devolved to a 
nascent political class with great haste, the country fell into a deep crisis that reflected 
both the weakness of its political institutions and the numerous vested interests that 
underpinned political control over the country’s territory and resources.  These 
included the colonial interests that controlled the majority of the countries industries 
and companies, international diplomatic interests in the context of the cold war, but 
also the emerging interests of the Congolese business and political class, organized 
around ethno-territorial constituencies.   
 
As Kisangani (2012) argues, the wars of secession that followed the Independence of 
Congo were consequences of what he calls the “politics of exclusion”, that have been 
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a dominant feature of political competition in post-Independence Congo.  The politics 
of exclusion corresponds to a winner takes all configuration of political power playing 
out in the provincial and national arenas, where each “party” is an ethno-territorial 
constituency.  Exclusion at the “top” entails exclusion of entire ethno-territorial 
constituencies, thus creating the impetus not only for excluded elites to resort to violent 
methods, but also the structural conditions for entire ethno-territorial constituencies to 
follow because their “exclusion” is felt not only at a political level, but also at an 
economic and social one.  Following Independence, political turmoil quickly turned 
into violent conflict with the secessions of the provinces of Katanga (1960-1963), 
Kasai (1960-1962), and the rebellions of Kwilu (1964-1965) and rebellion of the 
eastern provinces (1964-1966).39  Both those rebellions were tied to national level 
politics, in particular the progressive exclusion of the Lumumbist MNC/L 
“nationalist” party from government, 40  but also to provincial level political 
competition between different ethno-territorial constituencies (Ngonzolo-Ntalaja 
2002).   
 
The eastern Rebellion was initiated in Fizi and Uvira, two territories of South Kivu.  
The excluded former Lumumbists sent lieutenants Gaston Soumialot and Laurent 
Desire Kabila to spark a rebellion in Fizi and Uvira, where they found a receptive ear 
in the disgruntled Babembe and Bafuliro ethnic group leaders who had been 
marginalized in provincial politics.  As Kisangani (2012 p.78) argues, several factors 
converged to create propitious grounds for rebellion, including the economic 
deprivation of large sections of the youth, a crumbling state, as well as an “ideology” 
inspired by socialist precepts and incarnated by the charismatic figures of Patrice 
Lumumba and Pierre Mulele.  However, as Verhaegen (1969) notes, ideology seems 
to have been less of a factor than the mobilizing power of the tight social networks of 
the Bembe and Fuliro, combined with the use of a particular ‘social technology’ of 
insurgency known as the dawa,41 that led to large-scale recruitments of Simba, or 
Mayi-Mayi, as the combatants of the rebel army were called.  The rebellion spread all 
                                                 
39 The Kwilu rebellion started on Jan 6, 1964, while the eastern Rebellion started on April 15, 1964. 
40 On September 14, 1960, Patrice Lumumba was deposed by a military coup by Mobutu, before being 
assassinated.  Lumumba’s party was then progressively excluded from national and provincial politics 
(Kisangani 2012 p.65). 
41 The dawa is one of the rituals carried out by the Simba rebellion to protect combatants against enemy 
fire that came in many forms and had a large array of strategic and social functions (Verhaegen 1969 
pp.548-564).  We come back to these practices in Chapter 4.   
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the way to Stanleyville (current Kisangani), but met severe opposition by the other 
ethno-territorial constituencies of South Kivu, in particular the Shi and Rega who 
feared losing their power in the provincial government.  The rebel occupation of large 
territories of eastern Congo sparked the emergence of multiple sub-conflicts, of 
various scales and configurations, whose complexity are evocative of those of the 
1990s in the region, and which intensified the polarization of ethnic identities.  The 
eastern Rebellion was eventually crushed in 1966 by the central government forces, 
with the active support of the United States and Belgium who provided material, 
logistical and ground support to the Mobutu regime,42  although small pockets of 
resistance, in the form of small armed organizations, remained throughout the Kivus.  
The rebellion, however, had significant consequences on the region, setting in places 
mechanisms that would resurface in the 1990s crisis.  These included deep 
antagonisms between ethnic groups that fought bitterly during the rebellion, in 
particular between the Rwandophone populations of the Highlands of Uvira, known 
as the Banyamulenge, who provided crucial military support to the regime to counter 
the rebellion that had found a deep social anchorage in the neighbouring ethnic groups 
of the Fuliro and Babembe (Verhaegen 1969).  This led to a deep social entrenchment 
of idioms and practices of armed resistance that would provide a strong template for 
the wars of the 1990s. 
2.2.  The Congo Wars 
We have reviewed some of the episodes of large-scale recruitment of labour for war 
as well as violent resistance movements that constitute important historical 
antecedents to the wars of the 1990s and 2000s, which are the focus of this study.  Here 
we present a historical background to the analysis presented in the empirical chapters, 
looking in turn at key antecedents to ethnic wars at the end of the Mobutu era, the two 
Congo wars from 1996-2003, and the post-war period from 2003 to 2012.  The 
objective of this section is not to provide a detailed account of the Congo Wars, which 
                                                 
42 Kisangani (2012) p.87. 
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have been the topic of several recent publications,43 but rather to highlight the key 
events and points of contention in order situate the analysis.   
2.2.1.  Precursors to the First Congo War 
The introduction of multi-party politics in the early 1990s created new political space 
for opposition movements at the provincial and national levels and significantly 
enhanced pressure on the already crumbling regime of Mobutu.  Contrarily to the 
caricatural tone of many depictions of Mobutu’s reign, Mobutu had crafted an 
extensive apparatus of power over the Congolese population, in particular through his 
party and his ruthless control over the security forces (Young and Turner 1985; Tull 
2003, 2005).  The legacy of the Mobutist state can still be felt today.  Despite 
displaying all the features of a weak or failed state, recent studies have showed the 
continued importance of the Congolese state in structuring and regulating political, 
economic and social life in the Congo, including in the rebellious eastern provinces 
(Englebert & Tull 2013; Hoffmann & Vlassenroot 2014).  
 
 In the early 1990s, however, the bankruptcy of the state and the loss of blind military 
support by external backers provoked the loss of Mobutu’s two key handles over 
power, the resort to external military interventions to quell armed rebellions on one 
side and control over the state administration and party on the other.  Facing an 
increasingly desperate situation, Mobutu resorted to administrative reorganizations 
and immersion into provincial politics to counter the emergence of national opposition 
movements, through a strategy that came to be known as geopolitique, the appointment 
of “local” ethno-territorial leaders to provincial positions, instead of “external” 
governors (Turner 2005 p.119).  Given that provincial politics were centred on ethno-
territorial competition, this caused the immediate exacerbation of inter-ethnic 
antagonisms that resulted from years of “politics of exclusion”.   
 
The opening of multi-party politics, and the strategy of geopolitique proved to be 
particularly incendiary in the provinces of North and South Kivu, where longstanding 
                                                 
43 See for example Turner (2005), Reyntjens (2009), Prunier (2009), Stearns (2012) and Rift Valley 
Institute’s (2013) Usalama Project: Understanding Congolese Armed Groups.  
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ethno-territorial competition over political power and control over resources had 
repeatedly taken a violent turn.  The ownership of the lucrative land - the main asset 
in a region rich with mines, cattle and export crops - had been the object of a 
particularly fierce competition since Mobutu’s Bakajika Law of 1967 and the law of 
197344 that had facilitated large scale land buy-ups by networks of elites often closely 
associated with the Mobutist regime.  In many cases, those who benefitted from these 
buyups were ‘ethnic foreigners’, which created deep resentment among the 
‘indigenous’ ethno-territorial groups whose customary land tenure rights were being 
directly threatened (Turner 2005).   
   
In addition to the thorny issue of land ownership, political contention was sharply 
polarized around citizenship, another key dimension that Mobutu had strategically 
manipulated throughout his reign.  As recognition of citizenship entailed the right to 
constitute a customary entity and claim “customary” ownership over land, the issue of 
the citizenship of a large Rwandophone population living in both North and South 
Kivu became a key point of tension.  Indeed, the “autochthonous” (indigenous) ethno-
territorial entities saw it as a threat to their power in territories where Rwandophones 
constituted a majority, in particular the territories of Masisi and Rutshuru in North 
Kivu.  As political parties had not been authorized, the main vehicles of political 
organization in these territories were the mutuelles, identity-based associations that 
functioned as de-facto parties, such as the Hutu dominated Mutuelle d’Agriculteurs 
des Virunga (MAGRIVI).  The tension reached a climax with the organization of a 
census to determine the nationality of the Rwandophone populations in the East, as 
part of the Conference Nationale Souveraine (CNS), the institution in charge of 
supervising the democratic transition, leading to the “ethnic” Masisi war of 1993 in 
North Kivu that pitted Rwandophone militias against “autochthonous” ethnic groups, 
an episode that we will come back to in Chapter 7.   
 
                                                 
44 Before 1967 and 1973, land was divided between state owned land, which could be ceded to private 
users through various conventions, and Native Land, ruled by customary law.  The 1973 Land Act 
changes this status, as all land came under the sole ownership of the state.  However, the former Native 
Land became State land on which local communities exert a right of usage, which includes a right to 
inhabit, cultivate and exploit in accordance with local customs (article 388 of the 1973 land rights law).  
But the law that was supposed to delimitate collective and individual ownerships of land in such 
contexts was never passed, and Native communities were unable to legally claim of ownership over 
their land, either individually or collectively, which facilitated predation and buy-ups (Mpoyi 2013). 
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In the province of South Kivu, similar tensions over access to land, citizenship and 
identity were simmering, particularly between the so-called Banyamulenge 45 
Rwandophone populations of the Highlands of the territories of Uvira and Fizi and the 
neighbouring Bembe and Fuliro ethnic groups, whose rivalry had taken a militarized 
character since the rebellions of the 1960s.  As in North Kivu, provincial ethnic 
tensions were brought to a national scale in the early 1990s with the Conference 
Nationale Souveraine (CNS).  In 1995, the transition parliament from the CNS adopted 
a resolution calling for all “Rwandan Refugees” to leave the territory of Zaire, a call 
that was echoed in the territories of Uvira and Fizi by Bembe leaders who called on 
the population to take up arms and chase the Rwandophone populations out of the 
province.   
 
These provincial tensions were exacerbated by the arrival in the early summer of 1994 
of around a million refugees fleeing the crisis in neighbouring Rwanda, which caused 
a spill-over of the Rwandan conflict dynamics into eastern Congo, as is often the case 
with large scale refugee crises that constitute an important mechanisms of conflict 
diffusion.46  The presence of the ex-Forces Armees Rwandaises (ex-FAR) and the 
genocidal militias among the refugees, who found a logistical base in the massive 
refugee camps that popped up along the border, as well as the destabilizing effects of 
the refugees on local economic and social balances, soon led to a regional crisis.   
2.2.2.  The AFDL War in eastern Congo  
The First Congo War started after a public announcement by the governor of South 
Kivu that all Banyamulenge were requested to leave the province of South Kivu within 
a week, and a rapid escalation of “ethnic” violence between the Banyamulenge and 
the Bembe militias in Uvira and Fizi. Banyamulenge fighters seized the town of Uvira 
on October 24, 1996, and launched the rebellion that took the name of Alliance des 
Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo (AFDL), which regrouped a 
heterogeneous coalition of actors.  On one side, Banyamulenge military actors reacting 
                                                 
45 The Banyamulenge (the people from Mulenge) differed from the Rwandophones in North Kivu in 
that they had arrived in the region in the 19th century, while the North Kivu Rwandophones started 
settling in the area in the 1930s.  
46 See Gleditsch & Salehyan (2006). 
 75 
to the provincial and national threat of eviction, temporarily allied with Rwanda, 
whose initial objective was to destroy the operational command of the Rwandan Hutu 
armed forces in the refugee camps along the border, but soon changed their objective 
to deposing the Mobutu regime, an objective that gathered support by a range of other 
countries.  The official leader of the AFDL was Laurent Desire Kabila, a veteran of 
the 1960s Mulelist and Simba rebellions, who had maintained a revolutionary 
organization in the Highlands of Fizi in South Kivu until 1984, before going into exile.  
Contacted in Dar-Es-Salaam, Kabila was groomed by the Rwandans to take the lead 
of the rebellion, allegedly because they saw in him an experienced yet manipulable 
leader (Stearns 2012).  With substantial military support from Rwanda, the AFDL 
moved swiftly to take control of the eastern provinces, facing meagre opposition by 
the disbanding Zairian military although there were pockets of fierce resistance,47 and 
then marched on to Kinshasa, that fell into the hands of the AFDL on May 17, 1997, 
after Laurent Desire Kabila declared himself the new leader of the country.    
 
Several features of the AFDL rebellion and rule in the eastern province bear 
importance for the analysis.  First, the AFDL engaged in large-scale recruitments in 
the eastern Provinces, benefitting from the initial popularity of its anti-Mobutist 
objective, which resonated strongly in the aggrieved population.  In many areas, the 
recruitments bore a spontaneous character, with scores of youth ‘jumping into the 
trucks’ of the AFDL, allured by the general euphoria that surrounded the perspective 
of a ‘second independence’, but also promises of financial reward for recruitment 
(Jourdan 2011).  In other cases, recruitment necessitated more elaborate negotiations, 
such as in areas where armed organizations were already operating, in particular in 
Butembo where the AFDL negotiated with the Tembo customary authorities and 
militias before obtaining the authorization to recruit.  In the eastern Provinces, the 
euphoria surrounding the toppling of Mobutu’s regime was, however, balanced with 
scepticism regarding the presence of Rwandan troops on the Congolese soil, 
interpreted by many as an act of invasion, quickly leading to opposition and resistance 
to the AFDL.  From July 1997, an armed insurgency emerged in the Kivus and took 
                                                 
47  These included the ex-Forces Armees Rwandaises, the Congolese Hutu militias of the Kalehe 
Highlands as well as the Tembo militias around Bunyakiri, who initially opposed a fierce resistance to 
the AFDL.  We will come back to these in Chapters 4 and 5.    
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the name of Mayi-Mayi, in reference to the 1960s rebellions.  This movement will be 
the focus of chapters 4 and 5.    
2.2.3.  The Second Congo War of 1998-2003 
The second Congo War erupted when Laurent Desire Kabila turned against his foreign 
backers, particularly Rwanda and Uganda, ordering that all Rwandan troops leave the 
country in July 1998.  After a failed attempt at deposing Kabila through a speedy 
military intervention, Rwanda and Uganda backed the creation in August 1998 of a 
new large-scale politico-military movement, which took the name Rassemblement 
Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) and quickly took control of the eastern 
provinces of Congo.  The second Congo War lasted until the Sun City Agreements of 
April 19, 2002, which marked the beginning of a process of integration of the rebel 
factions into a transition government, as part of a process that would lead to the 
national elections of 2006.   
 
The Second Congo war involved a dizzying array of national and international actors, 
with more than 12 African countries involved in military operations, earning the 
surname of “Africa’s World War” (Prunier 2009).  Territorial control quickly became 
the key stake of the war, with three main actors carving up the territory: The national 
government in the West and South, Jean Pierre Bemba’s Mouvement pour la 
Liberation du Congo (MLC) in the North and North West, and the RCD in the East, 
which broke into two main branches, the RCD-Goma that controlled the Kivu 
provinces and the RCD-Kisangani (later RCD–ML) that controlled the Province 
Orientale, following a fallout between the two main sponsors of the RCD, Uganda and 
Rwanda.  Following the 1999 Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement, that initiated the 
diplomatic dialogue that would tumultuously lead to the Sun City Agreement of 2002, 
the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was 
deployed in the Congo in 1999-2000, which would later take the name United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUSCO) from 2010.  While the complexity of the game of alliances, counter-
alliances between this array of major actors and dozens of smaller armed factions is 
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beyond the scope of this chapter, a few key features of the conflict, particularly 
concerning the way that it played out in South and North Kivu, must be highlighted.   
 
In North and South Kivu, the main lines of armed conflict generally reflected the 
national level opposition between the Kinshasa government and Kigali, who each 
supported arrays of proxy forces in the eastern provinces.  The Rassemblement 
Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD, later RCD-Goma), controlled the main cities of 
Bukavu and Goma, as well as the main strategic axes throughout the province.  In the 
rural areas, however, it faced a war of attrition led by several opposing armed factions, 
many of them receiving logistical and military support from the Kinshasa government 
and its allies.  The first of these were the ex-Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR- 
Rwandan Armed Forces) and their ancillary militias, who had reorganized in the deep 
forests of North and South Kivu to form the Army For the Liberation of Rwanda 
(ALIR), which later became the Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda 
(FDLR).  Commanding over several thousand heavily armed and trained combatants, 
the FDLR continued to pose a major security threat to Kagame’s regime in Rwanda, 
which launched regular attacks against the FDLR.   
 
The second cluster of resistance was the Mayi-Mayi movement, initially an 
uncoordinated resistance movement that had emerged in opposition first to the AFDL 
and then the RCD.  However, the Kinshasa government soon started to support the 
movement logistically and materially, in particular through General Luetcha and a 
series of instructors who were sent to South Kivu to structure the movement into a 
coherent and efficient force, although that objective was never achieved.  The 
dynamics of mobilization and the complex insertion of the Mayi-Mayi militia in the 
rural societies of the Kivu will be the focus of Chapters 4, 5 and 6.   
 
While the international war between the Kinshasa government on one side, and 
Rwanda and Uganda, each supporting several armed organizations represented the 
central polarizing axis of the conflict, a highly complex mosaic of smaller armed 
conflicts emerged ‘inside’ the larger conflict.  These were tied either to longstanding 
political competition between ethno-territorial constituencies over ownership of land 
that resurfaced as a result of the breakdown of the state enforced political order, as has 
been emphasized by Autesserre (2010), but also to the development of a militarized 
 78 
political economy, focused on the extraction of resources.  Both the provinces of North 
and South Kivu were rich with mineral deposits, from Gold in the South Kivu “Gold 
Belt”,48 to Tourmaline, Cassiterite, and Colombite–Tantalite (coltan) throughout the 
region.  As the Congolese state no longer controlled the rural areas, a fierce 
competition between armed groups for the control and taxation of these lucrative 
mines incessantly changed the military configuration of the region.   
 
Coalitions of “power, profit and protection” 49  tying armed actors on the ground, 
regional business operatives and politicians emerged, consolidating a trans-border 
business of mineral smuggling that became one of the region’s most profitable 
economic activities, often with direct involvement of actors at the highest level of the 
Rwanda, Ugandan or Burundian states, and a constellation of intermediaries. 
Competition for territorial control reached a peak during the Coltan Boom of 2000, 
which triggered a “rush” for the control of the coltan mines.50  In addition to control 
and taxation of the mines, the armed factions operating in the rural areas engaged in a 
multiplicity of economic activities, from cultivation of cash crops - including 
marijuana - to taxation of trade, households and agricultural output, entrenching 
‘economies of violence’ that would become a central feature of the rural Kivu’s 
(Laudati 2013).  
2.2.4.  War and Peace in the Post- Sun City era 
The second Congo War came to an end in 2003, after a long and faltering peace process 
initiated by the Lusaka cease-fire Agreement of June 1999 and ended by the Sun City 
Peace Deals of 2002, the deployment of an international peacekeeping force, and the 
assassination of Laurent Desire Kabila, to whom his son Joseph succeeded.  The peace 
was conditioned on a power sharing agreement with the rebel factions, the merging 
and integration of the warring parties into the Congolese state, both through the 
integration of the “rebel” political parties into the transition government in view of the 
                                                 
48 The South Kivu Gold Belt Stretches from Walungu to Maniema, with high concentrations in the 
Kamituga and Kitutu areas of the territory of Mwenga.   
49 This expression is borrowed from (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers 2004 p.21). 
50 The Coltan Boom was a sharp rise in the price of Columbite-Tantalite (Coltan) tied to speculation 
over the release of the Playstation 2 (De Failly 2001).  The sharp rise in military competition and conflict 
for control of Coltan producing mines was documented and analysed by Sanchez de la Sierra (2016).   
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democratic elections to be held in 2006, but also the integration of the rebel militaries 
into a new army, the Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo 
(FARDC), which was created in 2003.  Here, we shortly present the main politico-
military developments of the post-war era as they provide the background for chapters 
7 and 8.   In particular, we show how the nexus between military control, political 
seating and control over business networks became the dominant feature of the post-
war era, entrenching processes of large scale resource mobilization, whose 
manifestations will be explored in this dissertation.  At the same time, continued 
insecurity in the rural areas, and resistance to these processes of large-scale 
accumulation and control sparked several armed resistance movements.   
 
Despite the ‘official’ end of the war, most of the ingredients that had caused the initial 
war were still present, and gave rise to several large-scale rebellions.  The elite 
networks that had thrived under RCD rule and extended their control over regional 
business saw the integration of the RCD and the elections as a threat to their political 
and economic clout in the region.  Indeed, given the extreme unpopularity of the RCD 
in the eastern provinces, democratic elections entailed the loss of the political seating 
that underpinned their economic power, but also the threat of possible retaliation 
against the Tutsi community as a whole.  This was all the more concerning that the 
Hutu elites that had been co-opted by the RCD, in particular the powerful governor of 
North Kivu, Eugene Serufuli, were being courted by the Kinshasa government (Stearns 
2012).  These concerns echoed directly with the Rwandan authorities, the regional 
patrons of these networks of power.   
 
The loss of political control over the eastern Provinces entailed the possibility of a 
renewed security threat for the Rwandan authorities, as the FDLR armed group was 
far from dismantled in eastern Congo.   This concatenation of issues polarized sharply 
around the integration of the former RCD troops into the national army that was being 
overseen by the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation, and could potentially entail 
the loss of military supremacy over the region.  As a result, the Rwandan authorities 
threw their weight behind the creation of a new politico-military movement, the 
Congres National pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP - National Congress for the 
Defence of the People).  Backed by the elite networks and military support from 
Rwanda and headed by Laurent Nkunda, the CNDP soon became the most powerful 
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military player in eastern DRC, holding in check the process of military integration.  
The former RCD officers who had been integrated into the FARDC had already shown 
their power in 2004, when they seized the South Kivu capital of Bukavu.  From 2006, 
they consolidated their military control over the mineral and cattle rich area of Masisi 
in North Kivu, engaging in repeated military confrontations against the national army, 
the FARDC.    
 
The CNDP insurgency sparked the formation of another large-scale politico-military 
formation to counter its influence in North Kivu, the Union des Patriotes Resistants 
Congolais (PARECO).  The PARECO was initially a coalition of elites from several 
ethnic groups, in particular the Hunde, Nande and Hutu who felt threatened by the rise 
of the CNDP’s military power, in particular in the lucrative territories of Walikale and 
Masisi in North Kivu.  These Hutu elites had consolidated their power in the late years 
of the RCD, when the Rwandese and Tutsi had offered them prominent positions in 
the RCD as part of a strategy to isolate the Rwandan rebels of the FDLR.  The most 
powerful of these Hutu players was Eugene Serufuli, the former governor of North 
Kivu, who had consolidated an extensive network of business and military 
connections, as well as a solid power base in the rural Hutu communities of the 
Highlands of Masisi and Kalehe.  From 2006 to 2008, numerous military 
confrontations occurred in the region between the CNDP, the FARDC and the 
PARECO, in complex games of shifting alliances, further destabilizing the region.   
 
The creation of the CNDP and PARECO was one among many failures of a flawed 
series of military integration and demobilization programs, which were supposed to 
be cornerstones of a durable peace process and a strong national army, the FARDC, 
but instead came to symbolize the repeated failures of international and national efforts 
at stabilizing eastern DRC.  Among the numerous armed factions that had 
mushroomed in the eastern provinces during the Second Congo War, only a fraction 
had been ‘successfully’ integrated into the national army or demobilized.  The creation 
of the FARDC and the integration of former warring factions was carried out unevenly 
and hastily, generating a highly volatile game of integration and defection of armed 
factions, and the incessant launching of new armed rebellions.  For leaders of armed 
groups and their political and economic backers, launching these rebellions constituted 
an important bargaining chip to obtain better positions in the state military and 
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administration (Baaz & Verweijen 2013; Baaz, Stearns & Verweijen 2013).  The 
objective of these armed groups was rarely to subvert the political order or achieve 
territorial secession, but rather to obtain better inclusion into the military and 
administrative organs of the state and higher delegation of powers, another 
manifestation of the persisting – if surprising – role of the Congolese state as a central 
referent and regulator in the region (Englebert & Tull 2013 p.9).   
 
The Mayi-Mayi movement, on the other hand, significantly lost in power as a result of 
the integration program.  The movement had fallen prey to internal infightings, 
rivalries and “collinisme” 51  since its inception, making it more vulnerable to 
leadership and rank division strategies.52  While General Padiri, the Commander in 
Chief of the Mayi-Mayi of eastern Congo as well as several other high profile leaders 
of the movement were given high office in Kinshasa, many commanders of the Mayi-
Mayi movement were parked in integration camps where they found themselves 
“dispo”, that is, nominally integrated into the national army but without any real 
functions and receiving little or no salary.  This created widespread resentment among 
the Mayi-Mayi, who felt that the years of effort they had put into the liberation of the 
country amounted to nothing.  Furthermore, deception on the military front was 
matched by deception on the political scene.  Many of the Mayi-Mayi armed groups 
had morphed into political parties in view of the end of the war, hoping to transform 
their military successes into political clout, but were side-lined in the reshuffling of 
the political cards that followed the peace treaty, perhaps because of a lack of political 
experience and connections.53 
 
2.2.5.  The post-Goma Conference era 
The Accords de Goma of 2009, that followed the failed Goma Conference of 2008 and 
entailed the integration of the CNDP, PARECO and a range of armed factions into the 
                                                 
51  “Collinisme” refers to internal rivalries and infightings between different factions, in particular 
factions coming from different areas, villages or “collines” (Hills).   
52 Integration of armed factions often requires separating the members of an armed organization from 
their leaders and from the base, to break hierarchies of command. 
53  Mayi-Mayi political parties were given 13 out of the 620 parliamentary seats, four of the 63 
ministerial positions, and one of the 11 provincial governorships.  (Stearns et Al. 2013b. p.26).   
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national army did little to quell the dynamics of armed mobilization and conflict in 
eastern DRC, whose fundamental causes remained unaltered.  The FARDC’s military 
efforts – often with the support of MONUSCO - were geared towards dislodging the 
Rwandan FDLR in the rural areas, but with very limited success.  These operations 
often created havoc in the rural areas, disturbing fragile ad-hoc politico-military 
equilibriums that in certain areas had brought a modicum of stability, and triggered 
retaliatory violence by the FDLR on civilian populations (Sanchez de la Sierra 2016). 
 
The integration of the CNDP, PARECO and other warring factions soon reproduced 
the same configurations as before, with ex-CNDP commanders, tied to the elite 
networks of business and politics, taking the upper hand in the positions of military 
command, and creating additional frustration for the armed factions that were left 
aside. Replacing Laurent Nkunda, General Bosco Ntaganda became the new 
strongman of these power networks, controlling important parts of the mineral trade 
and elaborate parallel systems of taxation (Stearns 2012).  Attempts to break these 
networks of power led to a new large-scale rebellion in 2012, the Mouvement du 23 
Mars (M23).  The M23 proved even more threatening than its predecessor, seizing the 
town of Goma in November 2012, before being defeated by the MONUSCO and 
FARDC.  As the M23 had been a replica of the CNDP, the Nyatura movement echoed 
the PARECO, reforming in the Hutu populated Highlands of South Kivu and soon 
gaining prominence in Masisi territory, an aspect to which we will come back in 
chapters 7 and 8.   
 
In addition, a new large-scale insurrection known as the Raia Mutomboki gained 
prominence in 2011 in the territory of Shabunda, in South Kivu.  Contrarily to other 
large scale armed factions such as the M23 and PARECO, whose emergence was tied 
to elite politics, the Raia Mutomboki was a highly decentralized, ad-hoc type 
movement, that mobilized on a large-scale through social networks embedded in the 
rural Rega communities of the territory of Shabunda, in South Kivu (Stearns & al. 
2013; Botiveau & Stearns 2013; Vogel 2014).  The Raia Mutomboki had first emerged 
in 2005 in the Southern territories of Shabunda, under the leadership of Jean Musumba, 
a former Mayi-Mayi fighter who set up the auto defence movement in response to the 
widespread insecurity that gripped rural South Kivu in 2005.  The movement then 
remained dormant until 2011, when it re-emerged as a result of renewed widespread 
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insecurity resulting from the temporary withdrawal of FARDC troops from the rural 
areas of South Kivu.  Spreading to Northern Shabunda, and then into Kalehe territory, 
the movement attracted significant popular support and mobilized on a large scale, 
before falling play to the dynamics of fragmentation that have characterized many of 
the armed movements that operated in the region.  We will come back to the specific 
dynamics of mobilization of this movement in Chapter 5.   
 
In addition to these dynamics of armed mobilization and conflict that operated on a 
territorial, provincial and regional scale, a myriad of armed conflicts emerged ‘within’ 
the broader conflict, often tied to longstanding local conflicts over customary authority 
and land tenure rights that had taken a militarized turn during the war (Autesserre 
2010).  These ‘local’ armed conflicts were the manifestation of the entrenchment the 
‘militarization of public space’ (Reyntjens 2005, 2012), and of violence as what 
Englebert & Tull (2013 p.6) call a ‘structuring force’ in the region.  As violence has 
become a coherent strategy of ‘contestation and negotiation’ by a range of different 
actors, it has also brought about a profound reconfiguration of political order (Tull 
2003, 2005), as well as a broad social transformation (Raeymaekers & Vlassenroot 
2004).  As the objective of this thesis is precisely to see in which ways these 
transformations have affected dynamics of participation, we will come back to these 
issues throughout the thesis.  
2.2.6.  Labour in a militarized political economy 
In recent years, the ‘conflict minerals’ paradigm has dominated accounts of the region, 
promoting a monolithic conception of labour relations in eastern Congo, seen almost 
exclusively through the lens of coercive exploitation (Autesserre 2012; Verweijen 
2013).  Yet the political economy that has emerged in rural areas as a result of the war 
and the ways it has transformed longstanding modes of labour organization are still 
poorly understood.  As the objective of this thesis is precisely to uncover the modes of 
control over labour that have emerged as a result of militarization, we will not discuss 
this issue extensively here but simply present a few salient features of the relation 
between militarized mining and the political economy of labour. 
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As previously mentioned, the Second Congo War caused the entrenchment of 
‘networks of power, profit and protection’ in rural eastern DRC, focused on the 
extraction of resources from the most lucrative sectors of the economy, in particular 
cattle raising, cash crop production and the mining sector.  In the mineral rich rural 
areas of eastern DRC, armed groups started competing for military control over mining 
sites, a competition that became particularly acute during the Coltan Boom of 2000, 
although other minerals – in particular cassiterite and gold – also attracted significant 
interest (De Failly 2001; Nest, Grignon & Kisangani 2006; Sanchez de la Sierra 2016).  
While brute force and coercion undoubtedly represents one of the key modes of 
imposition of revenue extraction by armed groups, recent in-depth research has shown 
that the modes of taxation and reorganization of economic activity by which armed 
groups generate revenue are far more complex and variegated than brute force.  Indeed, 
they range from direct reorganization of property rights, taxation of entry and exit from 
mining sites, but also more elaborate forms of ‘indirect taxation’ through a range of 
governance arrangements with local authorities and economic actors (Mampilly 2011; 
Arjona, Kasfir & Mampilly 2014; Gafaro, Ibáñez & Justino 2014; Sanchez de la Sierra 
2016).  In eastern DRC, such institutional arrangements between armed factions, 
economic actors and local authorities display significant variation, which can be 
explained by several factors.  First, the modes of taxation established by armed groups 
is dependent on their level of military control over mining areas.  Those mining sites 
that fall under heavy military contestation by several armed groups tend to experience 
much more exploitative forms of revenue generation, which are associated to higher 
levels of violence (Sanchez de la Sierra 2016).  In contrast, armed groups that establish 
durable monopolies of violence over mining sites tend to reduce their levels of revenue 
extraction and behave as ‘proto states’, levying less economically burdensome taxes 
and engaging in a range of modes of reorganization of economic activity.  While one 
of the central objectives of armed groups is to develop such monopolies of violence 
and maximise their territorial control, their relative lack of capital and resources and 
the highly difficult terrain of eastern Congo – composed mainly of deep forests and 
high mountains - represent profound structural impediments to the development of 
large and centralized armed groups.  In this context, commanders and sub-factions 
have a strong incentive to behave opportunistically and breakaway from command to 
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appropriate mineral resources, which has been one of the drivers of the fragmentation 
of eastern Congolese armed groups, although this is not the only factor.54      
 
Adding to the variation of the political economy of rural eastern DRC are the 
variegated ways in which armed groups insert themselves within the socio-political 
entities that constitute rural eastern DRC.  Once again, these present much more 
nuanced and variegated characteristics than what the exploitative and autocratic 
depiction of ‘rebel rule’ often suggest, depending on the pre-existing relation between 
the armed groups and these entities, the relation with these entities and the state, and 
the modes of resource extraction used by armed groups.  While autocratic and 
exploitative forms of rule are rife, many armed groups share elaborate social and 
political ties with authority structures in rural eastern DRC, and are often an integral 
part of the governance structures (Stearns & Botiveau 2013; Usalama Project 2013, 
2015; Hoffmann 2014; Hoffmann & Vlassenroot 2014).  We will come back to this 
aspect extensively during the thesis, as it constitutes one of the central lines of 
analytical inquiry.  
 
Furthermore, the acute military competition for control over the mineral rich areas of 
rural eastern DRC altered and accelerated deep transformations in the organization of 
labour in the mining sector.  As in many countries across the continent, the 1980s 
witnessed a profound crisis of the Congolese public sector that affected the eastern 
Congolese mining industry.  As the large state owned mining companies in the east 
went bankrupt, the already fragile legal and institutional framework that regulated the 
mining sector in the east collapsed, plunging large parts of the sector into the informal 
economy (De Failly 2001; Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers 2004).  The acute economic 
and social crisis that hit the rural populations of the east, and the liberalization of the 
mining sector in 1982 created a large rush of poor, rural populations towards the 
mining sector, in search for – highly precarious – livelihoods.  
 
                                                 
54 Other factors include the dynamics of military-integration and defection previously mentioned (Baaz, 
Stearns & Verweijen 2013), as well as what Staniland (2015) calls the ‘social-institutional’ basis of 
armed groups, which explains the high level of ex-ante decentralization and fragmentation of armed 
groups: As armed groups often emanate from pre-existing socio-political entities, the ‘historic’ 
decentralization and fragmentation of the socio-political lanscape of eastern DRC explains that the 
armed groups emerging from these entities follow the same pattern.  This aspect will be analyzed 
throughout the thesis.  
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The growth of the artisanal and small-scale mining sectors in the 1980s was 
significantly accelerated by the Congolese wars.  In addition to the increase in demand 
for minerals such as coltan, the extreme deprivation caused by the war increased the 
inpouring of labour into the sector.  Human and material destruction, insecurity and 
the cutting of conventional trade routes between rural and urban areas for agricultural 
products plunged the region’s population into acute levels of poverty and deprivation.  
With the mining sector quickly becoming a key component of military competition, 
labour was in high demand in the mines, attracting people from far flung regions, in 
particular in the mineral rich territories of Mwenga, Shabunda, Walungu and Kalehe 
in South Kivu. 
 
The end of the war and the demobilization of thousands of combatants - often ill-
trained and poorly educated – generated a large class of deprived youth, whose 
economic deprivation was accentuated by the social ostracism resulting from their 
participation in the war and the violence.  As in the Mano River area, these ex-
combatants congregated in urban centres, working low-skilled jobs in the informal 
economy, and entering the artisanal mining sector in great numbers (Hoffman D. 2011, 
2013).  As Danny Hoffman has skilfully noted in his studies of the Mano River wars, 
working in the mines bore many similarities to participating in the armed groups and 
the war, an activity which was often equally conceived as a form of labour (Hoffman 
D. 2011).  As he argues, both the artisanal mining sector and the economy of violence 
correspond to post-fordist ‘just in time’ modes of production, characterized by a high 
level of mobility and adaptability of the labour force.  
 
Given that, in many rural areas, the armed conflict did not end with the war, and armed 
groups continued to compete for military control over mining sites, a form of co-
dependency between the mining sector and the economy of violence developed.  
Demobilized soldiers working in the mines could easily be re-mobilized through 
financial incentives as well as social network pressure – an aspect which will be 
explored in this thesis – to work as soldiers in the armed groups.  In turn, the repeated 
rounds of demobilization meant that when demobilized, these ex-combatants would 
once again join the mining sector.  This thesis will pay particular attention to the 
dynamics of the movement of labour between the ‘informal’ low skill sectors of the 
rural economy on one side, and the armed groups and war economy on the other.  
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Together with military control over mining areas and the modes of governance 
developed by armed groups to organize economic activity, the dynamics of the labour 
market constitutes a central dimension of the militarized political economy of the east.  
 
While this militarized political economy persists to this day, the situation of the mining 
economy varies drastically according to different areas.  First, the mining sector does 
not necessarily represent the main source of revenue of armed groups, which have 
diversified their modes of revenue generation (Laudati 2013; Autesserre 2012), and in 
many cases do not operate in the mining sector at all.     Furthermore, a large number 
of mining areas are no longer under the military control of non-state armed 
organizations, and are secured by the state military, police, usually in combination 
with private security companies.  This is the case both of areas than have moved to 
industrial mining, but also of a great number of artisanal mining areas, which are no 
longer – or only very rarely – subjected to military competition or control.  While the 
state security forces are regularly accused of various forms of illegal taxation and 
extortive practices, such mining areas have seen a restored presence of the state, and 
reorganization of the legal and institutional framework around mining - not simply in 
the formal sector, but also in the informal sector.  Comparing the organization and 
practices of artisanal mining in eastern Congo and Tanzania, Bryceson and Geenan 
(2016) find that they are in fact strikingly similar despite the legacy and ongoing effect 
of the eastern Congolese armed conflict.   
2.3.  Conclusion  
In this chapter, we have examined some of the driving logics of both recruitment of 
labour and armed mobilization in the history of eastern Congo.  We have seen that, 
since the pre-colonial era, the recruitment of combatants for war related purposes was 
the result of both large-scale dynamics of labour mobilization on one side, and the 
formation of decentralized protective and/or resistance movements on the other. We 
have also provided the historical backdrop to the Congolese Wars and the post- war 
era, showing in particular how the nexus between political competition, military 
control and resource accumulation became one of the dominant features of the era.  In 
the following chapters, we will take a closer look at how these somewhat contradictory 
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logics of accumulation on one side, and protection on the other, shaped processes of 
armed mobilization in the region, with a particular focus on the Mayi-Mayi movement 
in chapters 4-6, and the armed groups that emerged from the Hutu communities in 
chapters 7 and 8.    
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Chapter Three                                                                                
Considerations on Methods 
 
“We can talk about anything military, but we cannot talk about politics” 
Major Muhindo Changoco, Mayi-Mayi Commander 
 
 
In this chapter, we succinctly present the methods used to carry out our analysis of 
participation in armed organizations.  We focus on the methodological issues 
associated with the qualitative chapters, as those associated specifically with the 
quantitative analysis are discussed in the quantitative chapter.  The chapter starts by 
exposing the Mixed Methods Approach used in the dissertation, followed by a brief 
justification of the case studies.  Then, we discuss some of the main epistemological 
and ethical concerns associated with carrying out research on African conflicts, as well 
as the particular methodological difficulties associated with reconstituting local 
histories of armed mobilization in polarized social contexts.   
3.1.  The mixed methods approach 
This thesis uses a Mixed Methods Research (MMR) approach to analyse the process 
of participation in armed organizations, combining a qualitative analysis with a 
quantitative analysis of participation in armed organizations.  Methodologically, we 
make an effort to both separate and integrate the qualitative and quantitative 
approaches.  A deliberate choice was made to separate the quantitative chapter from 
the qualitative ones, following a recognition of the difficulty of reconciling methods 
that rest on very different ontological and epistemological bases, and correspond to 
very different intellectual and academic “cultures” (Goertz & Mahoney 2012).  The 
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separation was thus made to maintain a certain “internal” methodological consistency 
in both approaches.   
 
However, an effort is made to allow a dialogue between the two approaches, through 
what Thaler calls a connected complementarity in his typology of mixed methods 
(Thaler 2015 p.8).  While not fully integrated, which would require that the findings 
of the two methodologies be presented simultaneously, or fully separated (when the 
complementarity is discussed only in the conclusion), the connected complementarity 
brings the results of both methods in dialogue with one another throughout the 
chapters.  The survey design was set up through several pilot projects carried out 
concomitantly to the qualitative fieldwork, using an iterative process.  Thus, the 
quantitative analysis closely reflects the questions discussed in the qualitative chapters.  
For example, as the qualitative chapters pay particular attention to processes whereby 
armed mobilization is mediated by institutional and social structures, the quantitative 
chapter proposes an analysis of the effects of institutional and social mediation on an 
individual’s propensity to participate in armed organizations.   
 
The analysis of participation undertaken in the qualitative empirical chapters is based 
on Process-Tracing and Historical Contextualization, as detailed by Bennett and 
George (2005 pp.205-232).  The process-tracing approach allows to identify and trace 
both macro-structural processes of armed mobilization, but also meso and micro 
processes that lead to participation, and their articulations and inter-dependencies.  
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 focus on the identification of two distinct macro-logics of 
armed mobilization in the Mayi-Mayi movement, by bringing several examples taken 
from all over South Kivu into comparative focus.  In contrast, Chapters 6, 7 and 8 
adopt a narrower geographical focus, which enables a much closer historical 
contextualization of the processes of armed mobilization, and a careful analysis of their 
articulation with the context in which they occur and the multiple factors that affect 
them.  
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 3.2.  Justification of the case 
The armed groups that have emerged in the eastern Congo display great variation, from 
local self-defence groups and petty gangs to large-scale rebel organizations and 
national armies.  Many armed groups that are referred to as unitary entities display 
high internal fractionalization, and encompass numerous sub-groups that vary 
drastically in terms of size, military capacity, internal organization and 
institutionalization, and relation with the institutional and social environment in which 
they evolve.  As a result, processes of recruitment in the region have been extremely 
varied, providing a privileged context in which to understand their multiple 
dimensions and carry out comparisons.  Furthermore, the political fragmentation of 
the region, owing to its geographic extension as well as the highly variegated 
institutional trajectories of the different socio-polities that constitute it, reinforces the 
variation in the ways armed mobilization has affected different areas.   
 
The case studies that are presented in the qualitative sections have been selected in 
order to ensure maximum “within case variation”, which allows for a more controlled 
form of comparison of processes (Bennett & George 2005 pp.151-179).  The region 
of the Midlands of Kalehe that is the focus of Chapter 6 was selected on the basis of 
its geographical proximity to the provincial capital of Bukavu and the relatively strong 
presence of the state apparatus, which has influenced the capacity of armed groups to 
recruit combatants.  The Highlands of Kalehe, whose history of armed mobilization is 
explored in Chapters 7 and 8, were selected because of their relative isolation from 
centres of power and economic activity, as well as their specific demography, which 
introduced specific dynamics of armed mobilization. These cases are justified and 
presented more thoroughly in the introduction of each corresponding chapter.  A third 
case was initially included, that of the Raia Mutomboki and Mayi-Mayi mobilizations 
in the areas of Kalonge and Bunyakiri.   However, due to a security incident involving 
several academic researchers, I was not able to go there in person.  Interviews 
concerning this area were nevertheless carried out in the provincial capital of Bukavu, 
and examples from this area are used in chapters 4 and 5.  Such security concerns are 
part of the broader logistical, epistemological and ethical challenges associated with 
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carrying out research in African conflict zones, the most salient of which we now turn 
to.  
3.3.  “Understanding” Africa: Ontology and Positionality 
3.3.1.  Fitting Uncomfortable shoes 
I first arrived in eastern Congo in late 2011, when I carried out a first reconnaissance 
trip for my thesis research while at the same time working for a research project based 
at Colombia University.  As it appeared to me when I was about to cross the border 
from Rwanda, the Congo displayed one of the most beautiful sceneries that I had ever 
witnessed: Huge mountains and active volcanoes, bordered by lush forests, towering 
over and mirrored by the majestic Lake Kivu.  I initially felt a very peculiar feeling, a 
kind of electric aura, stemming from my awareness of the history of human suffering 
and violence that had afflicted the region, and the grandiose and tragic history of the 
Congo which I was about to enter.  Despite the fact that I had already extensively 
travelled the Continent, crossing the border into the largest country in central Africa 
spelled and embodied adventure.   
 
Little did I realize at the time how historically trodden, and politically charged, those 
enthusiastic steps were.   I was coming to the Congo to humbly attempt to “understand” 
the war that had been affecting the region for decades.  But as a white man, I was 
following the steps of generations of white men who had come to “understand” the 
region, and whose footsteps had left a durable imprint.  Soon, the exploration of eastern 
Congo also became an exploration of the genealogy and history of my problematic 
positionality.  
 
In eastern Congo, being a white man remains a position of privilege, one that is directly 
tied to the long and tortuous history of race and gender, which finds its origins in the 
brutal history of the colonial conquest and occupation.  I personally felt this even more 
acutely than in West Africa, where I had extensively travelled, perhaps because of the 
strong presence of the United Nations and humanitarian industry, which in many 
senses exacerbated these racial cleavages.  Indeed, as Autesserre (2014) has shown in 
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her ethnography of Peacekeeping Operations, the sharp social divide between 
expatriates and “locals” often maps onto pre-existing histories of racial tensions.  Few 
areas that I know display this phenomenon as acutely as eastern Congo, where the 
Congolese population is among the poorest and most deprived in the world, and the 
Humanitarian and Development sector is the most important provider of jobs, which 
imbues its workers with significant economic and social power that often takes a racial 
dimension, as a majority of them are white.  Inevitably, as a result of the association 
of academia with the development industry, I also fell into this category.  For an avid 
reader of post-colonial theory, this made me uneasy, yet I must recognize that it 
constituted a form of social capital that at certain times was useful for navigating the 
areas where I conducted fieldwork, in particular because it constituted a form of 
protection, an aspect to which I will come back. 
3.3.2.  The academics of the mirror: The village, the chief and the community 
In addition to this particular positionality that inevitably shaped my social interactions 
during fieldwork, the way in which I collected and analysed information was also 
affected by modes of knowledge production in and on the region.  As Autesserre 
(2012) has cogently argued, the narratives that are forged in the policy and 
humanitarian spheres of eastern DRC are strongly shaped by pre-established 
narratives, which often remain prevalent given the situation of relative social isolation 
in which the expats in such “NGO-poles” live with regards to Congolese societies.  
 
Given that such narratives are prevalent in policy discourse, and are thus relayed by 
powerful actors, they tend to be adopted and discursively redeployed by a range of 
local actors.  While this is often done strategically, they can in some cases come to 
constitute the very categories through which people make sense of their own lives.  In 
a region where the livelihood of the population has become highly dependent on the 
“international community”, and where academic research shapes NGO and policy 
agendas, a particular form of “academics of the mirror” 55 can arise, whereby local 
actors are strategically adapting and responding to the discursive categories that are 
deployed by the academic and development communities.  
                                                 
55 This is a reference to the « politics of the mirror » described by Chabal and Daloz (1999). 
 94 
 
Obtaining valid information in such a context therefore requires a preliminary analysis 
of the genealogy of the concepts that are used to explain the region, as well as their 
analytical validity, as they can reveal more about dominant narratives than about what 
is actually going on.  Many of the pre-conceived ideas that continue to shape the 
understanding of the political and social life on the African continent are, in my 
opinion, direct heritages of colonial mental frameworks of governance, whose 
genealogy can be traced to early anthropologists.  Perhaps the most ingrained trope is 
that of the African Village, which historically has been construed as the centre of rural 
African life and community, or that of the Chief, when conceived as a form of timeless 
traditional authority.  Although extensive scholarship has deconstructed the Orientalist 
ontologies on which such tropes are based, Villages and Chiefs remain among the 
default conceptual categories through which social and political life is understood and 
narrated, and remain prevalent in NGO reports, policy discourse and even academia 
on the region.  Similarly, I came to realize that the concept of “community” was 
somewhat analytically problematic because of the implicit signification it carried.  As 
it was one of the central concepts of numerous NGO projects, it was being used by a 
wide range of actors making all sorts of claims, and therefore carried an implicit 
political signification.  As a result, it was often more confusing than revealing as a 
concept during interviews, and I realized that perhaps I too had been influenced by 
such longstanding tropes. 
3.4.  Researching Armed Conflict: Methodological and Ethical Considerations 
Beyond these aspects, another range of methodological challenges arose from the fact 
that the field research was carried out in an active conflict zone.  Here, we review a 
few of these challenges, in particular access to the research sites and informants, as 
well as various limitations to the data gathered.   
3.4.1.  Accessing the “field” and respondents 
Before arriving to eastern DRC in late 2011, I had never been to an active conflict 
zone, which present very specific security, financial and logistical constraints.  Indeed, 
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while the towns of Bukavu and Goma were generally safe, owing to a large state and 
NGO presence, the rural areas displayed much more volatile security situations.  My 
first research trips outside of the towns of Bukavu and Goma were in the territory of 
Mwenga, where I was initially conducting research for Columbia University and an 
International NGO.  While I was able to access some very remote areas and carry out 
interviews and collect data, I remained limited in my movements by the security 
protocols of the NGO, which required that I travel in a 4X4 of the NGO and spend the 
night in larger towns.  As a result, I was somewhat affected by what Judith Verweijen 
has called the ‘car window syndrome’, a relatively cocooned environment that, 
although necessary for security purposes, tends to amplify the problems of 
positionality previously mentioned.   
 
However, as soon as the work with the NGO ended, and in subsequent trips to the 
region, I started travelling to rural areas by ‘public transport’, on minibuses and 
motorcycle-taxis, as well as on foot, and sleeping in small hotels or houses in the rural 
areas.  While this generated some security and logistical challenges, it allowed me to 
gain a closer view of the region.  I was particularly marked by the bustling life that 
prevailed despite and “within” the armed conflict, and the relative ease with which the 
region could be navigated.  Undoubtedly, this was due in part to the fact that, contrarily 
to conflict zones such as Somalia or Northern Mali, “westerners” are rarely direct 
targets of the warring factions in the region, and a form of protection derives from the 
social “status” of Westerners in the region that was previously mentioned.  
 
The security situation, however, was highly variable and fluid.  Coups de balles 
(gunshots) were regular, and on three occasions, I was forced to leave a village or town 
precipitously for security reasons.  The tension was particularly palpable in the 
summer and fall of 2012 as a result of the intensification of fighting between the 
national army and the M23 rebellion around Goma, which threatened to spill over to 
South Kivu.  In the Midlands and Highlands of Kalehe where I was at the time, 
rumours abounded that the M23 was about to seize the entire province, and armed 
groups were re-mobilizing at an accelerated pace.  Perhaps as collateral effect of this 
climate of tension and the pressure it created on authorities, I was arrested three times 
by the Congolese Army and Intelligence services and questioned extensively on my 
work.   
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In such a tense environment, access to key informants was often difficult.  In the 
Kalehe Highlands, the Congolese Army was carrying out a counter-insurgency 
operation against the Nyatura armed group that I was trying to study.  Although it was 
possible, I decided at the time not to go to their military base.  Similarly, in the 
Midlands of Kalehe, the group that I was studying was being remobilized by its 
commander, Colonel Cisayura, while I was carrying out interviews.  This led to some 
confusion, as I was “activating” the same networks of ex-combatants that the 
commander was remobilizing, earning me some tense explanations with state and 
military authorities who were closely monitoring ex-combatants and attempting to 
quell the remobilization.  Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, I also had to cancel a trip 
to the areas of Bunyakiri and Kalonge, where I had the intention of studying the Raia 
Mutomboki mobilization, following a security incident involving several foreign 
researchers.  
 
While initially quite daunting, I progressively learned to navigate rural South Kivu, 
and realized that many actors who seemed inaccessible could in fact be interviewed.  
This was confirmed by a stream of excellent academic work that came out during my 
fieldwork, and was based on thorough fieldwork in very risky areas, in particular the 
Usalama project on Congolese Armed Groups chaired by Jason Stearns, or the rich 
and detailed work of Judith Verweijen or Justine Brabant, among others.   
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3.4.2.  Reconstituting histories of armed mobilization  
« Unfortunately, contemporary social science is often ill equipped to 
understand the constitutive role of symbols, myths, metaphors, and 
rhetorical strategies, preferring instead the apparent solidity of 
institutional arrangements, the regularity of codified rules, or the 
reassurance of abstract models.  Much that is important and subtle falls 
through the grid of standard modes and methods and is ignored.  
Interpretive daring is precluded.  My method, if it can be called that, is not 
unlike Hanna Arendt’s description of her own approach.  She charmingly 
dubbed it perlenfischerei, « pearl fishing ».  (...) The important point is to 
remain open to one’s subject matter, to see where it is going and follow - 
not to impose a prefabricated formula over diverse and paradoxical 
material » 
                                                                         Jean Bethke Elshtain (1987) 
3.4.2.1.  The ethical imperative 
Perhaps the most significant methodological challenge that I encountered when 
carrying out this research was time.  In a region with such rich and variegated history, 
where more than 20 years of conflict has made the understanding of an extremely 
dense set of events particularly difficult, attempting to humbly follow Hannah 
Arendt’s method of “perlenfisherei” requires a lot of time.  In the nine months that I 
spent in eastern DRC, around three months were spent in the rural areas, mainly 
because of the time it took to set up the data collection project in Bukavu (where I was 
also conducting interviews), and the difficulty and risks associated with spending long 
periods of time in remote areas.  Despite these limitations, the ethos that guided the 
field research was inspired by Jean Bethke Elshtain’s advice to not stick to the safety 
of pre-existing models and conceptualizations and simply seek to confirm or infirm 
them, but rather engage with the linguistic, cultural and emotional complexity and 
paradoxes that inevitably surrounds such an extreme event as civil war.   
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This required not only an awareness of my positionality, but also an ethical approach 
to the interactions and relations with the people who are the subjects of the research.  
In a context where academic research sometimes mirrors the other extractive industries 
present in the region, with scores of large scale surveys being carried out at a high pace 
and often superficial consideration for the social context in which they occur, adopting 
a non-instrumentalist and ethical approach to research requires fully acknowledging 
the multi-faceted nature of the research relation and the social context in which it is 
inscribed.  This involves developing and nurturing relations of mutual respect and 
friendship, yet not in an instrumental fashion.  In such contexts where the gaps of 
experiences are so steep, and various forms of heavy trauma might have affected those 
with whom the relations are established, this can require significant time, effort and 
attentiveness.  Yet it is precisely through these relations that I started gaining an 
understanding of the social and emotional complexity of the human experience of war, 
and the ways in which it was experienced in that part of the world. 
 
Perhaps as a result of a form of initial reluctance or timidity to talk about such 
traumatic events, intertwined with a bit of fear of the reactions that could emerge, I 
initially took large precautions before addressing certain topics in interviews and 
discussions.  However, I progressively realized, not without some surprise, that people 
were often ready and open to talk about sensitive issues, owing perhaps to a 
longstanding culture of debate in the region.  However, the readiness to discuss such 
events varied tremendously from one person to another, as many displayed either a 
form of reluctance, or timidity, while others seemed eager to share their experiences 
of the war.   
3.4.2.2. Getting lost in translation and dodging standardized answers 
The qualitative material collected for this thesis is based on 126 “formal” interviews, 
interspersed with numerous “informal” discussions recorded in field notes, carried out 
during three trips to the province of South Kivu between the fall of 2011 and the 
summer of 2013, totalling 9 months of fieldwork in the area.  In addition, qualitative 
interviews were carried out by the surveyors with the village authorities of each of the 
134 villages where the survey was carried out.  While these additional interviews 
primarily served the purpose of triangulating the data collected through the survey, 
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and were not used as primary sources for the qualitative chapters of this thesis, some 
examples are brought in from these interviews.  In such cases, it is explicitly pointed 
out in next to the interview.  In the following section, I only refer to those interviews 
that I personally carried out.  
 
The interviews were semi-structured: Themes and questions were prepared in advance 
and adapted to particular contexts, but a large space was left for the multiple directions 
the interviews could take.  The interviews were carried out both with “active” agents 
of recruitment into armed organizations - armed group commanders, recruiters and ex-
combatants – and with a range of other actors involved or affected by armed 
mobilization. The interviews varied widely in terms of length and quality, with most 
interviews lasting a few hours - usually between 2 and 5 hours - while others were 
spread out over several days, and in some cases several weeks.  In bringing together 
the material collected through interviews, particular attention was given to 
triangulating the information as best possible by comparing different interviews and 
cross checking with additional sources, in particular academic publications as well as 
NGO and United Nation reports and documents.   
 
Both in the way they were carried out and in their content, the interviews were 
inevitably influenced by the temporal and geographical proximity of the events that 
were discussed, which in certain cases were unfolding in real time.  This gave rise to 
a number of methodological challenges in ascertaining the “validity” of the 
information gathered.  The most immediate of these were those of translating and 
understanding the vernacular narrative reconstitutions that were collected.   Beyond 
the difficulties created by the language barrier, that at times required the intermediation 
of a translator - usually a local acquaintance capable of translating, or one of the 
Congolese researchers tied to the research project-, this necessitated something of a 
linguistic understanding of the ways in which events are narrated and presented in 
different areas, and by different actors.  While a full linguistic analysis was beyond the 
scope of this thesis, and a great deal of variation existed, some patterns started 
emerging while I was conducting interviews.   
 
One of the first of such patterns I noticed was the prevalence of “grand narratives”, 
and a tendency to conflate “local” histories with regional and national histories, which 
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sometimes made it difficult to obtain local and contextualized information.  While this 
reflects a normal process of appropriation of these narratives, it could sometimes lead 
to some confusion, for example when questions concerning “local” Mayi-Mayi groups 
were answered in consideration of the Mayi-Mayi movement as a whole.  This led to 
a lot of fine-tuning and adaptation of the qualitative interviews, but also the survey 
where a lot of attention was given to the formulation of questions, to avoid such 
conflations.   
 
Furthermore, I also noticed that some answers displayed a somewhat consensual or 
standardized character.  This owed perhaps to the documented tendency of rural 
agrarian societies with strong oral traditions to relay “consensual histories” that reflect 
implicit hierarchies of authority and allow less space for individual nuances.  However, 
in areas where people had already been subjected to numerous interviews and surveys, 
this was also a result of the “academics of the mirror” described earlier, whereby 
standardized narratives and concepts become prevalent and can also carry political and 
economic weight, such as the emphasis on victimization, rather than agency, in the 
narration of experience of war.  Particular attention was given to repeatedly re-
formulating questions and focusing them specifically on the interviewee, as well as on 
specific events. 
3.4.2.3.  Looking into « architectures of silences and non-truths » 
These idiosyncratic elements of language and discourse translation were enhanced by 
the polarizing effect that years of armed conflict had imprinted on the region, deeply 
penetrating public discourse and popular narratives, and, as a result, the ways in which 
people made sense of war-related events.  As several authors have argued, the “logic” 
of polarization during civil wars affects all the political, social and discursive spaces 
of a society.56  As a result, when conducting and analysing narrative reconstructions 
of war-related events, the first element to take into consideration is the positionality of 
the interviewee and the implicit hierarchies and positions that their narratives might 
be reflecting or advancing.   In certain cases, these might be relatively straightforward 
to identify.  In other cases, these polarized narratives are intertwined with variegated 
                                                 
56 See for example Kalyvas (2006) and Wood (2009). 
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collective and personal experiences of violence and conflict, making them more 
difficult to ascribe to fixed or established positionalities or intentionalities.  The silence 
that surrounds the traumatic events that inevitably occur during civil wars also 
constitutes one of the methodological challenges in reconstituting local histories of 
armed conflict (Wood 2003 p.40).   Together, these factors create complex 
“architectures of silence and non-truths”, which surround recollections and claims 
related to wartime events.  A few of the driving factors of these can be briefly pointed 
out. 
 
First, what people chose to talk about could be affected by what was going on in a 
context where armed conflict was still on-going.  This depended on a large number of 
factors tied to the configuration of the conflict.  The same person could speak very 
openly about one particular group, and completely refuse to talk about another.  
 
Second, the recollection and restitution of war-related events can be affected by the 
personal experience of individuals with regards to these events, and can bear the marks 
of various forms of personal or psychological trauma.  Violent and traumatic events or 
experiences can be voluntarily or involuntarily omitted, but also lead to a large array 
of memory distortions.  While innovative methods have been developed to deal with 
the recollection of such traumatic events, 57  I noticed that several respondents, in 
particular ex-combatants, were affected by such trauma, and took this factor into 
account when ascertaining the validity of their testimonies.  Beyond traumatic 
experiences, a host of factors tie the personal experience of war-related events to the 
types of narrative recollections that emerge, and thus require a close range analysis.  
 
Third, given the temporal proximity of events, individual narratives often echoed 
politicized and “partisan” narratives deployed at a larger scale, which themselves had 
very specific genealogies.  As an example, respondents often referred to ethnic groups 
as if they constituted unitary agents of political, or social action – i.e. The Tutsi have 
attacked us.  Such narratives drew on deeply engrained ethno-territorial conceptions 
of authority and identity, tied to the particular history of eastern DRC, but also to their 
                                                 
57 For example, the 2013 eastern Congo Initiative and Harvard Humanitarian Initiative report We Came 
back With Empty Hands uses innovative psychology methods to help recollection of violent and 
traumatic events by child soldiers in eastern DRC. 
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reinforcement during wars in which ethnicity was often a highly salient line of 
polarization.   
 
Fourth, the sheer speed at which very dense set of events unfold during armed 
conflicts, a consequence of the speed of military action, often make it particularly 
difficult to reconstitute sequences of events.  This is all the more the case that 
participants and witnesses of events are often themselves in crisis situations when they 
unfold, and can thus have limited recollection of the events.  In a region that has been 
undergoing such violence for more than 20 years, particular attention must be paid to 
temporally situating events mentioned by respondents, in order to avoid the very 
common risk of mixing up years, groups and areas.  This was done through a thorough 
attention to triangulation, and the discarding of material that wasn’t clearly temporally 
and geographically situated.   
 
Carrying out the interviews, and interpreting the collected material therefore required 
a close attention to their linguistic and idiomatic framings, as well as the ways in which 
they could be affected by the polarizing effects of the war.  Perhaps the interviews that 
required the most intensive of such efforts were with military leaders and commanders, 
some of which lasted up to three days.  Some of these commanders displayed a very 
calm and composed attitude towards the interviews.  Other commanders, however, 
were more difficult to interview because of the underlying game of power in which 
the interviews were inevitably nested.  As elites and power wielders in the military 
sphere, these commanders often have to constantly perform and display their power, 
particularly in a context where competition is so fierce and death so swift.  As a result, 
the “space” of the interview was sometimes hard to negotiate, and I had to make efforts 
to find as neutral a ground as possible.  Some commanders insisted that their heavily 
armed “escorts” be present during interviews and engaged in direct intimidations, 
creating a climate less propitious to interviews.  
 
Yet such performances and almost theatrical displays of power gave some insight into 
the nature of the power exerted by these commanders, a key interrogation of this thesis.  
Indeed, such power is often an elaborate conjunction of military and strategic ability, 
combined with the capacity to induce fear, but also more elaborate forms of 
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charismatic authority.58  This was visible during the interview with Major Muhindo 
Changoco, one of the most prominent Mayi-Mayi “witchdoctors”.  When I first saw 
this small and lean man of around 40 years old, who initially appeared very reserved 
and uneasy, I wondered how he had commanded up several thousand men in his Mayi-
Mayi Kalehe group.  The interview, which lasted two full days, gave me some hints.  
Indeed, throughout the interview, Major Muhindo Changoco performed various 
rituals, that incessantly interrupted the questions and answers, and made the interview 
particularly slow and long, yet nevertheless of very good quality.  Muhindo repeatedly 
expressed a form of lassitude or irritation at my questions which in his words “weren’t 
in the spirit of the Mayi-Mayi“, which he argued lay in the rituals he was carrying out 
and the prophetic and esoteric parables in which his answers were imbued.  While I 
was initially slightly destabilized by these rituals, that included cutting off the leg of a 
live chicken, I came realized that, far from superfluous “cultural” folklore and 
paraphernalia, these rituals and idioms were in fact the very source of his charismatic 
authority, that was inseparable from his military power and functions.  As a result, 
leaving them aside to enter the “rational space” in which my interviews attempted to 
direct him constituted a surrendering of the very basis of his power, and the entrance 
into a zone of rationality and discursive power in which I was more at ease than him 
and that, given the positionality of white men that we have seen in the region, also 
carried significant social power.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58 See Hoffmann (2010).  This aspect is discussed throughout the thesis.   
 104 
3.5.  Conclusion 
These elements constitute some of the dimensions of the “architectures of silence and 
non-truths” that characterize personal and collective recollections of war-related 
events.  While fully disentangling them is almost impossible given the multiplicity of 
individual and collective process at play, I nevertheless attempted to work against the 
more debilitating ones, not to uncover an ‘underlying’ truth, but to ascertain the 
validity and relative strength of the empirical material.  In many senses, this was as 
much a human and emotional endeavour as an academic and linguistic one, as these 
narratives were tied and evolved with my relations to the people whom I interrogated 
and discovered the region with.  In no way do I consider the understanding of the 
experience of war that I have gathered through these interactions as definitive, but 
rather see them as the beginning of a path of understanding, one that has been 
immensely rich and humbling.   In addition to the methodological challenges discussed 
in this chapter, a large number of other methodological challenges presented 
themselves during the fieldwork and the writing, which, when important, are discussed 
in the chapters.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 105 
Chapter Four                                                                                             
Grassroots Processes of Armed Mobilization in The Mayi-Mayi 
movement 
“Placed under the same circumstances, all men will behave the same” 
Priest of Irambo, South Kivu 
 
 
The two chapters that constitute the first part of the dissertation focus on the processes 
of recruitment and control of combatants in the Mayi-Mayi movement.  Contrarily to 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, that adopt a narrow geographical focus in order understand 
how armed mobilization is inscribed in the history of specific regions, the two chapters 
that constitute the current section are focused on identifying macro-processes of armed 
mobilization, which is done by bringing examples from different areas of South Kivu 
and different periods into comparative focus.  While the chapter focuses on 
mobilization into the Mayi-Mayi movement, examples are taken from other armed 
mobilizations in the region as well.  
 
Together, the two chapters advance the argument that participation in the Mayi-Mayi 
armed movement is tied to two concurring macro-processes of armed mobilization.  
On one hand, the Mayi-Mayi movement bore the features of a social movement, one 
that was able to provoke armed mobilization on a large scale as a result of its capacity 
to formulate a clear mobilizing message, drawing on longstanding cultural frames to 
formulate a novel political project as well as a “praxis” of insurgent collective action.  
In the rural areas of Kalehe, this mobilizing message articulated with the imperative 
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of security provision to the decentralized rural communities in a context of crisis.  As 
a result, the strength of the insurgent mobilization owed to the fact that it was mediated 
and “appropriated” by the socio-political entities that formed the basis of the South 
Kivutian societies, although this process was far from linear or homogenous.   
 
The second “macro-logic of armed mobilization corresponds to a more accumulative 
and control focused one, symptomatic of the insertion of the Mayi-Mayi movement 
into a militarized political economy, where control over resources and populations 
becomes the key focus of politico-military competition.  Rather than the grassroots 
social movement that it had been in certain areas, the Mayi-Mayi movement became 
a vehicle of accumulation and control over resources, and in particular labour.  
 
Importantly, these two macro-logics of armed mobilization represent two 
“dimensions” of the process of armed mobilization, but should not be understood as 
separate.  Indeed, they do not play out separately or in temporal succession, but rather 
concomitantly, often leading to tensions that we will seek to flesh out and understand.  
Chapters 7, 8 and 9, which take a close range historical approach to armed mobilization 
in specific regions of South Kivu, will then allow us to see how they play out and 
articulate in specific configurations.  
 
The main empirical focus of these two chapters is the Mayi-Mayi resistance movement 
and armed rebellion against the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD), 
which took control of eastern DRC between 1998 and 2003.  As mentioned in the 
historical introduction, the Mayi-Mayi movement was never a fully unified movement, 
but rather a broad constellation of civilian, military and political actors, who coalesced 
under the Mayi-Mayi banner and then broke into a multiplicity of armed factions, 
whose trajectories have been highly variable and heterogeneous.  Because of this 
heterogeneity, it is difficult to provide a single, linear historical account of the 
movement, which is not the purpose of these chapters.  We will focus on the province 
of South Kivu, and in particular on the territories of Kalehe and Mwenga, with some 
examples taken from the territory of Shabunda and Walungu.  
 
In this chapter, we start by discussing the Mayi-Mayi movement’s features as those of 
a social movement, looking in particular at the framing of the movement’s core 
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objectives and their inscription in eastern DRC’s socio-cultural frameworks.  We will 
then see the way in which the Mayi-Mayi mobilization played out in both urban and 
rural contexts of the province of South Kivu, and in particular the way in which it was 
mediated by pre-existing forms of social and socio-political organization.  
4.1.  The Mayi-Mayi Insurgency as a social movement 
As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, insurgencies can be conceived as a particular 
type of social movements, albeit ones for which the constraints to effective collective 
action are more acute, as a result of the use and threat of violence.  In this section, we 
will show that the Mayi-Mayi movement fits at least partially the definition of social 
movements as “actions (...) based on dense social networks and effective connective 
structures and draw on legitimate, action oriented cultural frames” (Tarrow 2010).  
Indeed, the Mayi-Mayi insurgency owed its mobilizing strength to the articulation of 
a clear, simple political claim that underpinned the call for collective action which 
resonated profoundly in existing cultural frames, and to the fact that the mobilization 
was at least partially articulated around pre-existing structures of authority and social 
organization, setting in motion dense social networks.   
4.1.1.  Strength and modularity of an insurgent repertoire 
The strength of the Mayi-Mayi mobilization owed in part to the simple, yet powerful 
message that it carried at its core: The Congolese people must defend, by any means 
necessary, their land against invasions by foreigners.  This message, which constituted 
the main rallying call of the Mayi-Mayi, was based on an ontological distinction 
between “autochtones” - conceived as righteous bearers of the land - and “foreigners” 
(Jackson 2006).  This simple message, and the moral obligation to defend the land that 
naturally derived from it, carried the strength that scholars of contentious politics have 
identified as necessary for successful mobilizations across socio-cultural boundaries, 
owing in particular to its modularity – i.e. its adaptability to different socio-cultural 
environments (Tarrow 2010).  Indeed, in the fragmented political landscape of eastern 
Congo, where ethno-territorial and cultural boundaries tend to hinder political 
mobilization, such a message appealed to longstanding supra-ethnic conceptions of 
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nationality, but could also be appropriated and adapted to the differentiated ethnic 
identities of the region.   
 
This insurgent identity drew on a longstanding repertoire of resistance to foreign 
occupation, dating back to the resistance against Rwandan expansionism in the 19th 
century, as well as the resistance movements against the colonial invasion and 
occupation, such as the Kitawala Movement of the 1940s, but also to the Mayi-Mayi 
and Mulelist rebellions of the 1960s (Jourdan 2011; Iniguez de Heredia 2013).  The 
figure of the Mai-Mai fighter therefore constituted what Scott (1990) has called a 
“hidden transcript of resistance and rebellion”, which was summoned by the leaders 
of the new revolt against the RCD.    
 
Furthermore, the Mayi-Mayi formulated their claims in a discourse that summoned a 
range of longstanding mythologies, beliefs and norms that were re-appropriated and 
“set into motion”, as Hoffmann (2014) has argued.  These included ancient beliefs 
about the correspondence of the spiritual and material world and the existence of a 
supreme being that were shared by several societies of eastern Congo, 59 as well as 
references to Christian theology and myths, in which the Mayi-Mayi political claims 
and insurgent identity was discursively embedded, imbuing it with a mythical and 
religious aura (Misako 2008).  As a prominent Mayi-Mayi witchdoctor claimed in an 
interview: “God was the First Mai-Mai”.60  These cultural repertoires were not always 
invoked instrumentally, and the success of the Mayi-Mayi message was not just tied 
to their invocation.  After all, people constantly invoke such cultural frames, without 
necessarily obtaining attention.  Rather, as we will see by analysing how the Mayi-
Mayi mobilization spread, it is the negotiation and appropriation of the Mai-Mai 
message by different actors, owing to its modularity and capacity to adapt to cultural 
frames, but most importantly its political relevance in a context of crisis, which 
explains its success.  Rather than constituting a “cultural capital” that the Mayi-Mayi 
could instrumentally deploy, these cultural frames were part of the moral economy in 
which the political message of the Mayi-Mayi was articulated and discursively 
negotiated with the population (Hoffmann 2014). 
                                                 
59 The Supreme Being - called Ongo by the Batembo, or Kimbiligiti by the Rega - is part of the beliefs 
of several communities of the region (Biebuyck 1976; Newbury 1991- Quoted in Hoffmann (2015 p.15).   
60 Interview with Major Muhindo, Bagira, June 2013.   
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While crouched in longstanding idioms and repertoires of contention, the strength of 
the Mayi-Mayi discourse owed as much to the novelty of the political project that it 
proposed.  This political project was framed in the contemporary language of 
development and progress, that had permeated the official discourse of the Congolese 
State, and that the Mayi-Mayi also shared with the Development and Humanitarian 
industries whose presence in eastern DRC increased significantly with the war 
(Hoffmann 2007).  By reclaiming of the land of the ancestors, the Mayi-Mayi also 
offered to develop and modernize the Congo.  It was therefore as much the use of 
culturally resonant frameworks and idioms as the formulation of novel political claims 
in the language of development and progress that explains the strength of the Mayi-
Mayi message. 
 
Furthermore, an essential feature of the Mayi-Mayi repertoire was the range of rituals 
and practices known as the dawa, whose role was to make soldiers invulnerable.  The 
name Mayi-Mayi was itself a reference to a cleansing ritual whereby sacred water 
(Mayi-Mayi, water in Kiswahili) would be sprinkled on combatants to make them 
invulnerable.  Reports of the use of protective rituals, talismans and amulets in wars 
on the African continent and more specifically in Congo date back to the colonial era, 
such as the Batela revolt in 1895, the Maji-Maji insurgency in modern Tanganyika 
from 1905-1907, the Kitawala millenarianist resistance movement of 1944 in 
Walikale, and more recently the Mulelist rebellion in the Kwilu and the Simba 
rebellion in Fizi Uvira (Verhaegen 1969).  They are also widely used in contemporary 
African armed conflicts, from the Sierra Leone Conflict (Keen 2005; Wlodarcyck 
2009) to the conflict in Central African Republic.  Despite their widespread use, these 
rituals have persistently suffered from a form of cultural and intellectual racism that 
has cast them as them epitome of irrationality or barbarism, which has hindered a 
deeper understanding of their role and function.   
 
Recent scholarship, however, has brought the study of these so called “magical” 
practices into social science studies of warfare, demonstrating that these practices were 
neither irrational nor obscure, but served specific strategic and military functions, 
relating to military tactics and objectives, the internal organization of armed groups 
and to their relation with the social environment (Jourdan 2011; Titeca 2010; 
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Wlodarcyck 2009).  Indeed, access to a powerful ritual allows a group to enhance their 
military efficiency, maintain internal cohesion and obtain resources from its social, 
political and economic environment, conferring them a significant strategic advantage 
in contexts of low technology warfare (Wlodarcyck 2009).  
 
Therefore, the dawa used by the Mayi-Mayi is neither a cultural ornament, nor the 
manifestation of a type of “false consciousness”,61  but in fact the central “social 
technology” that enabled the insurgent collective action.  Indeed, adding to the 
articulation of grievances into cultural frames and idioms, it channelled them towards 
a clear praxis of insurgent collective action.  As the Mayi-Mayi fighter represented a 
cultural repertoire of contention, the dawa constituted a “practical” repertoire of 
contention, whose strength is also intimately tied to its modularity.  Central to the 
effectiveness of the dawa are the behavioural prescriptions that must be followed for 
it to be effective in combat, called conditions.  While docteurs (witchdoctors) in charge 
of crafting the conditions of the dawa pointed to their spiritual origins during 
interviews, many observers have noted that these conditions had the function of 
controlling the behaviour of combatants, not only with regards to the internal 
organization of armed groups but also with regards to the civilian populations that 
surrounded them (Verhaegen 1969; Jourdan 2011; Kisangani 2012).  These 
prescriptions can thus represent one of the ways in which communal values and ethics 
can be prescribed to combatants, thus forming a mechanism of communal governance 
over the behaviour of soldiers, also lodged in the moral economy tying combatants to 
their wider social environment.  
 
As a result of these dense socio-cultural meanings, participation in the Mayi-Mayi was 
experienced by many as a way to perform participation in a moral community, but also 
in a fundamentally novel political project.  All of these attributes of the Mai-Mai 
message, cultural repertoire and dawa were not intrinsic to the movement, but rather 
emerged as a result of discursive and political negotiations throughout the social 
history of the Mai-Mai movement. 
                                                 
61 As Hoffmann argues, the very designation these rituals as magic is more revelatory of their status as 
what Foucault calls “subjugated knoweldges” in the colonially crafted hierarchy of knowledges 
(Hoffmann 2007 pp.18-19).   
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4.2.  Social processes of armed mobilization 
We have seen that one of the strengths of the Mayi-Mayi insurgency was its capacity 
to formulate a clear praxis of insurgent collective action that drew on historically 
embedded cultural frames of resistance, while formulating a novel and original 
political message.  Beyond these idiomatic and discursive characteristics, however, it 
was the fact that the call to resistance was initially relayed and mediated by existing 
structures of socio-political organization that enabled widespread support and rapid 
mobilization in the region.  As seen in the theoretical section, the appropriation of pre-
existing social networks and structures of socio-political organization is a determining 
element of the success of social movements (Mc Adam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001; 
Staniland 2012).  This mediation was also central in framing and “adapting” the 
movement’s objectives and message to different socio-cultural frameworks.  But the 
“social architecture” of the Mayi-Mayi mobilization varied extensively across 
different regions, owing to the highly variegated social and institutional histories of 
South Kivu, and the way in which the Mayi-Mayi “social movement” adapted to them.  
In this section, we identify some of the social processes at play in the mobilization. 
4.2.1.  Mobilization in Bukavu 
Bukavu, the provincial capital of South Kivu and former colonial capital of the Kivu 
province, has historically been a hotbed of civilian and armed resistance movements, 
dating back to pre-colonial resistance movements against Rwandan expansionism on 
the Western Shores of Lake Kivu, as seen in the historical section.  Following the 
turmoil caused by the first Congo War, resentment had been mounting in the eastern 
Provinces as a result of the perceived “invasion” of eastern Congo by the Rwandan 
troops and their Banyamulenge “allies”.  Despite pockets of resistance to the AFDL, 
in particular in Butembo, The AFDL’s rebellion was initially “tolerated” in the region 
because of widespread resentment against Mobutu and a general consensus around the 
necessity to put an end to his 30-year rule (Turner 2005).  
 
However, following Laurent Desire Kabila’s accession to power, this very unstable 
equilibrium quickly faltered as the Rwandan Patriotic Army continued to occupy 
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eastern Congo and carry out military operations, fostering deep resentment towards 
what was generally considered as an invasion, reinforced by the fact that Kabila named 
James Kabarebe, the Rwandan general who had led the attack on Kinshasa, as chief of 
Staff of the newly born Forces Armees Congolaises, the new national army (Prunier 
2009 p.175).  Resentment was enhanced by the appointment of several Rwandophones 
in prominent political and military positions in the East, and the tension soon took a 
military turn, with dozens of armed factions forming in rural South Kivu and North 
Kivu to oppose AFDL rule, with more or less coordination by the elites in Bukavu.  
These loosely coordinated forces that would progressively take the name of Mayi-
Mayi started a fierce insurgency against the AFDL that lasted from July 7, 1997 to 
July 1998, just before the RCD rebellion, and caused several thousand deaths 
(Kisangani 2012 p.135).  Furthermore, rather than appeasing the tension, Laurent 
Desire Kabila sharply antagonized the Mayi-Mayi insurgency, dismissing it as an 
international conspiracy and conducting military operations against the militias, which 
exacerbated tensions and even led to the Mayi-Mayi attacking and shortly occupying 
Bukavu on December 11, 1997 (Prunier 2009 pp.174-175).   
 
In Bukavu, public resentment was further fuelled by several assassinations of 
prominent public figures, In particular that of the Archbishop of Bukavu Christophe 
Munzihirwa, a widely respected public figure who had vocally criticized the Rwandan 
military occupation of eastern DRC and called for resistance.  His assassination in on 
October 29, 1996 was widely believed to have been carried out by Rwandans.  The 
tension further escalated when the RCD rebellion seized Bukavu in August 1998 and 
launched a fierce campaign of repression.  Public criticism of the movement was 
curtailed by the systematic detention of “intellectuals”62 and critics of the RCD, but 
also outright assassinations and massacres, the largest of which was the massacre of 
Kasika in the territory of Mwenga, on August 14 1998.63  
 
The first civilian resistance movements that emerged were composed in part of former 
Lumumbists and Mulelists, who had maintained small clandestine resistance 
                                                 
62 In DRC, the term intellectual is colloquially used to designate most leaders and public figures. 
63 Following an ambush by Mayi-Mayi forces on August 23, 1998, the RCD retaliated against the 
population, assassinating 37 people at the Church of Kasika and several more in the surrounding villages 
on August 24 (Turner 2005 p.93).  The massacre was followed by the assassination of the Chief Mwami 
Mubeza of Lwindi, an important customary chief.   
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organizations such as the Service de Liaison de l’Armee Populaire (SLAP- Liaison 
Service of the Popular Army), and who brought with them their experience and set up 
the initial networks that would become the backbone of the Bukavu branch of the 
larger Mayi-Mayi movement.  In the town of Bukavu, a core number of activists 
emerged as the foundational base of the movement, carryout out the tasks of 
coordination and organization that are fundamental to the success of social movements 
(Tarrow 2007).  According to Mackalele Ntumulo, who was in charge of logistics in 
the movement, there were around 35 to 40 core activists in Bukavu.64  Many of these 
were Shi civil society leaders, as well as businessmen and politicians.  These core 
activists had monthly reunions to coordinate activities, which took place around 23h 
in secret locations.  They played a crucial role in penetrating and activating social 
networks to garner support for the movement, and spark the mobilization.   
 
According to those in charge of mobilizing combatants, the task of finding recruits 
was relatively straightforward in the initial days of mobilization, owing to the poor 
level of development of the RCD repressive apparatus as well as widespread support 
of the population.  Based in Bagira - one of the three communes of Bukavu - the 
recruiters would circulate with relative ease in all the communes and neighbourhoods 
of Bukavu.  Muganga, one of the recruiters of the time, recalls mobilizing 
“Neighbourhood by neighbourhood, avenue by avenue, youth by youth”.65  He and 
several other recruiters would carry out small, discreet meetings in different 
neighbourhoods, in schools, hospitals and churches, to raise awareness about the 
nascent resistance movement.  The purpose of these semi-clandestine meetings was to 
garner support for the movement, attract resources in the form of donations - money, 
food equipment - but also to recruit volunteers for the military branch of the 
movement.  In parallel, the movement set up a secret radio, the radio des patriotes 
(patriot radio), an essential tool for the communication of the movement, to which they 
asked people to tune into to “get the real news of the occupation, but also to learn how 
to resist it”.66   
                                                 
64  Interview with Mackalele Ntumulo, Bagira, June 2013. 
65 Interview with Muganga Murhiminya, Bagira, June 2013.    
66 According to Denis, who was responsible for the Itinerant Radio, broadcasts would be held at regular 
times, in particular at 22h at night.  They would broadcast news about the number of people assassinated 
or arrested by the RCD, as well as nationalist appeals to join the resistance.  The radio was hosted 
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According to these recruiters, they mainly used “snowballing” methods in the initial 
days of the mobilization, with the bouche a oreille (hearsay) being the main vector of 
information circulation, also serving as a vouching mechanism to enter the movement.  
Muganga, a former recruiter in the city of Bukavu, recalls: 
“When we recruited a person, we immediately asked him to find two other 
people in his entourage (...) It was a condition for joining the movement, 
they had to find the two other people before they even entered; with this 
system, we were sure that those who were brought to us were worthy of 
confidence; In those times, it went very quickly, because the youth were 
very sensible to our cause and very eager to resist the invader; The youth 
participated massively, so we had no shortage of new recruits; in some 
neighbourhoods, like here in Bagira, we just had to wait and recruits 
would arrive on their own through this system” 67 
This reliance on existing social networks as a both a mobilization and vouching 
mechanism would prove to be one of the most persistent methods of recruitment of the 
Mayi-Mayi resistance movement, as will be emphasized throughout this chapter.  
Furthermore, as in many urban-based resistance movements, the town’s universities 
represented one of the most fertile grounds for recruiting aspiring combatants, as they 
concentrated educated and skilled youth with acute political awareness.  Although the 
recruitment was carried out clandestinely, recruiters and former students recruited 
during that period recall a great effervescence around the resistance movement, with 
the powerful student unions working as relays to mobilize students, and several 
hundreds of students being mobilized in the major universities of Bukavu.  In many 
instances, the call to arms was – unofficially - supported by key actors, such as 
University professors, or the Catholic Church, which played an important role in 
bolstering support for the Mayi-Mayi movement (Bwenge 2003).  Jacques Nyakasali, 
who was mobilized when he was university student and eventually became the 
Executive Secretary of the Mayi-Mayi Kalehe, recalls how he was mobilized: 
                                                 
clandestinely, and the people responsible for it would move around Bukavu to avoid being caught.  
Interview with Denis, Bagira, June 2013.   
67 Interview with Muganga Murhiminya, Bukavu, June 2013.  
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 “I have always loved my country. I was ready when the RCD arrived, but 
I didn’t really know what to do.  I was living on campus for my 3rd year 
of Graduat; I was wondering with some friends how we could do this, how 
are we going to make it.  A professor came to us one day when we were 
talking about these issues and asked us why are you not doing anything? 
You are young and you could be very helpful.  We told him that, 
unfortunately, we had never done the military service, and that if we had 
done it we would have already gone.  The professor told us that no, we 
could still do something.  It was him who recruited us, me and 15 of my 
colleagues.  At the time, I wasn’t entirely sure, because I was nurturing 
the dream of entering the catholic seminar (...) I spoke to the priest who 
was counselling me at the time, and he told me that, were he not in the 
orders, he would definitely join the resistance, and that I should join.  That 
is how I left for Bunyakiri to join the group of Padiri”68  
 In order to channel recruits, Several clandestine recruitment houses were set up in the 
town of Bukavu, where new recruits would congregate before being sent by bus to the 
rural areas where the movement had set up military camps (initially mostly in the 
territories of Mwenga and Kalehe), with around 200 new recruits leaving every week 
during the initial 6 months of the mobilization.69   
 
The initial phase of popular mobilization through institutions was, however, quickly 
stalled by a brutal campaign of repression and infiltration of the institutions and 
networks through which recruitments were being carried out.  In the Universities, pro-
RCD directors were appointed and tasked with quelling the haemorrhage of students 
leaving for the resistance. The Jeunesses Etudiantes (Student Youth), a RCD 
sponsored student association, served as a vehicle to infiltrate the student recruitment 
networks.  As a result, University recruitments channels were soon broken off, forcing 
city-based recruiters into deeper clandestinity, and to adopt new tactics, as they could 
“no longer arrive in the institutions”.70  Those suspected of being associated to the 
                                                 
68 Interview with Jacques Nyakasali, Bagira, June 2013.   
69 This figure was advanced by Muganga Murhiminya.   
70 Interview with Muganga M, Bagira, June 2013.  
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Mayi-Mayi movement were arrested, beaten and even assassinated, breaking off many 
of the recruitment networks by using reverse snowball methods of repression.71  
 
As a result, the Bukavu based recruiters adapted their tactics and abandoned the 
“snowballing” method of recruitment, deemed too risky in a context where the RCD 
“had planted spies everywhere”, in favour of methods of individual recruitment.  As a 
result of the progressive implantation of the RCD state apparatus in the city, 
penetrating the “social space” of potential recruits became a much more complex task, 
even within the context of relative anonymity of a larger city like Bukavu.  Denis, one 
of the recruiters, recalled that: 
“Even in a city like Bukavu, people know who you are, especially if you 
are moving in a neighbourhood.  A lot of people had started to work 
directly or indirectly for the RCD, and they reported every suspicious 
movement.  In our neighbourhood, Bagira, they weren’t so strong because 
everyone was for the resistance, and people who would give information 
to the enemy would be immediately spotted.  But in the rest of the city it 
became more complicated, because one is never sure (...) we learned, and 
we became more prudent”72 
Individual recruitments necessitated a more thorough work of preliminary research 
and “scanning” of potential recruits than the snowballing techniques, requiring the 
gathering of information on a potential recruit’s entourage, family and acquaintances, 
a difficult task to carry out clandestinely.  Recruiters argued that, to a certain extent, 
they favoured those youth who were a bit isolated, because getting close to them was 
easier, and approaching them “would make less noise in the neighbourhood if 
something went wrong”. 73   Following a period of initial screening and research, 
various approach tactics would be deployed.  Muganga recounts how he would carry 
out such recruitments in the Commune of Bagira:  
                                                 
71 Denis recalled that his own brother, who was also part of the Mayi-Mayi recruitment networks, was 
arrested by the RCD.  The RCD asked him to give 10 names, or indicate houses where the recruitments 
were being carried out, which he refused to do and as a result was severely beaten.  
72 Interview with Denis, Bagira, June 2013.   
73 Interview with Denis, Bagira, June 2013. 
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“We would observe a young guy in the neighbourhood for a while, see his 
behaviour and the people he hanged out with, try to get some information 
about who he was, what he was up to, who was his family (...).  Then we 
would approach him discretely and progressively, to make sure not to 
scare him off.  There were several techniques; if we knew a relative, we 
would try to go through the relatives, but this had its own risks (...).  One 
technique I used very often was to get close to the youngster with a radio. 
When I approach him discretely, I try to find some news, and sometimes 
put the Patriot Radio on.  Something where he could hear the harm being 
done by the RCD.  I would then observe the reaction of the youngster, and 
if I felt he was responding negatively, I would start testing him with 
questions: Petit, do you think this is normal what is happening to our 
country? What are you going to do about this? We would usually talk for 
a while, and I would observe him and what he said, to see if he had the 
heart of a patriot.  Then, if I see that he seems to be solid, I would tell him 
about our resistance, and give 300 francs and send him to spend the night 
in Kadutu, where we had a house.  The next day, he was off to the forest”74 
The recruiters interviewed indicated that, by 1999, they had more or less stopped 
recruiting in the cities, for several reasons: First, the RCD intelligence services had by 
then deeply extended their infiltration of the town’s institutions, and it had become 
difficult to carry out new recruitments in the town.  Second, the movement already had 
a sufficient amount of recruits, and many of those who had been recruited into the 
RCD Army had started defecting to join the Mayi-Mayi, providing sufficient numbers 
of recruits to the movement.   
 
We have seen that the initial phase of the urban based recruitments displayed some of 
the of core attributes of a social movement: A simple yet powerful mobilizing 
message, relayed by a core number of activists who strategically used pre-existing 
social networks, embedded in the town’s neighbourhoods and institutions, to drive 
mobilization and recruitment into the armed groups.  We now turn to the rural areas, 
the central focus of this dissertation.  
                                                 
74 Interview with Muganga, Bagira, June 2013.  
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4.2.2.  Mobilization in rural South Kivu 
We now turn to an analysis of the dynamics of mobilization and recruitment of 
combatants into the Mayi-Mayi movement in the rural areas of South Kivu, with an 
empirical focus on the territories of Mwenga, Kalehe and Shabunda, where fieldwork 
and interview were carried out for this study.  The objective here is to delineate the 
elements that allow us to identify the Mayi-Mayi mobilization as a social movement, 
albeit one that was quickly permeated by the more accumulative and control focused 
dynamics that will be analysed in the following chapter.  We will focus in particular 
on the role of pre-existing forms of socio-political organizations in relaying and 
mediating the mobilization, and the negotiated process through which a novel 
insurgent identity emerged, that incorporating pre-existing social and communal 
identities.  The “shape” of the mobilization, however, was highly dependent on the 
pre-existing structures of socio-political of different regions, and the ways in which 
the resistance movement activated these pre-existing structures.  Importantly, the 
mediation of the mobilization by institutions and social networks at a very micro-scale 
was not incompatible with “high level” political manoeuvring, but rather reflected the 
inter-connectedness of so called “local” dimensions of armed mobilization with 
regional and national level processes. 
 
As noted earlier, the AFDL rebellion of 1996 threatened the already fragile political 
equilibrium in the province of South Kivu.  As many of the high ranking officials of 
the AFDL were Congolese Rwandophones, in particular the so-called Banyamulenge 
Congolese Rwandophones of South Kivu who had been in longstanding political and 
military conflict against the Babembe of Uvira, ethno-territorial competition that had 
been playing out in the provincial arena soon took a militarized turn, with elites 
mobilizing resistance through the ethno-territorial channels of power.  This was the 
case, for example, of the Bembe militias that mushroomed throughout the territories 
of Uvira and Fizi in 1997-1998, in direct opposition to the threat posed by the newly 
acquired political power of the Banyamulenge elites (Vlassenroot 2013).   
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4.2.2.1.  Mobilization in the territory of Walungu 
An example of the articulation of provincial level politics and the social basis of armed 
mobilization was that of the Mudundu 40, an armed group that emerged in the territory 
of Walungu in 1997-1998.  According to several witnesses, the decision to form the 
Mudundu 40 was taken after a series of meetings in Bukavu where prominent Bashi 
civil society leaders and businessmen expressed their concern that the territory of 
Walungu - the administrative entity that regrouped several of the “traditional” Shi 
Kingdoms - could not be “protected” from the Rwandan invasion by the armed factions 
of Uvira and Kalehe.  Other reasons invoked were the desecration of the Shi Royal 
Tombs by Rwandophone elements (Turner 2005 p.95; Tull 2005 p.197).  Odilon 
Bwenda Mwuzi, the initiator of the Mudundu 40, and Albert Kahasa, the second 
military commander who would become the famous “Fokker Mike” and later break 
away from the Mudundu 40, made an “alliance” with the King of Walungu, Mwami 
(King) Ntadabaye in early 1997 to implant and develop a militia in the territory of 
Walungu.  The movement started in the town of Bukavu, more precisely in Bagira, in 
the Astiba, and then moved to set camp in the territory of Walungu.  
 
 According to former members of the Mudundu 40 as well as interlocutors interviewed 
in Walungu, the fact that the Mudundu 40 had the support of the Mwami (King) of 
Walungu allowed it to mobilize a large number of combatants.  The Bashi Kingdoms, 
as seen in the historical introduction, were among the most centralized political entities 
of the area since the pre-colonial era, but had also obtained prominent positions in 
provincial and national politics in the post-colonial era, closely articulating elite level 
politics with the rural basis of the ethno-territorial constituency.  According to several 
interviews, the resistance movement also had the support of the Catholic Church in 
Walungu, who helped with the mobilization.  A local notable of Walungu Centre, the 
main town of the territory of Walungu, remembers: 
 At the beginning, the movement (Mudundu 40) was supported by the 
church.  Here in Walungu, people would go to church, and the priest would 
talk to us about the invasion that was going on in the area, that this AFDL 
that we were hearing about was in fact a trick of the Rwandans to seize 
the land of the Bashi.  He would ask us what should we do about it? (...) 
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His language was a bit concealed, he was not telling people to directly 
participate; he said that we the Bashi had always known how to resist the 
invaders, and those who have the courage should do something about it, 
that there were people waiting for them outside.  This excited the spirit of 
the youth, and many joined the movement”75 
This excerpt points to the close articulation of several important features of the 
resistance movement.  First, the mediation of pre-existing structure of authority and 
social organization, in this case the church and the local Catholic Priest, which 
conferred legitimacy to the movement.  Then, the clear articulation of the call for 
mobilization in longstanding cultural frames of resistance, through the reference to an 
ethno-political identity – the Bashi- and to previous phases of resistance.  Finally, the 
popular dimension of the recruitment, enhanced by a form of excitement on the part 
of the recruited youth.  The Mudundu 40 represents one among several examples 
where elite level decisions to mobilize are mediated through established channels of 
authority and social networks, conferring to the movement a social character, in 
addition to an elite driven one.  The elite coalition behind the Mudundu 40 would 
however fracture around 2000, when a fraction of the movement chose to collaborate 
with the RCD-Goma, who nominated Patient Mwendanga - a businessman and alleged 
high-ranking leader of the Mudundu 40 - as Governor of South Kivu in 2001 (Tull 
2005 p.197).   Another fraction of “hardliners” in the civil and military branches of the 
Mudundu 40 refused to ally with the RCD, and continued the armed resistance under 
the leadership of Fokker Mike.  
4.2.2.2.  Mobilization in the territory of Mwenga 
In the territory of Mwenga, adjacent to that of Walungu, the mobilization was 
significantly different, owing to the very different socio-political history of the 
territory, the presence of an important mining industry as well as a large number of 
armed organizations of various scales that had set base in the area.  Since pre-colonial 
times, many of the “forest societies” West of the Mitumba mountain range were 
characterized by much lower levels of political centralization than the societies of the 
                                                 
75 Interview with Hotel Owner, Walungu Centre, 31/10/2011.  
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Rift Valley area (Newbury 1992).  What Biebuyck (1972) calls the « Rega cluster », a 
complex ensemble of clan based, relatively autonomous yet closely inter-connected 
societies that coalesced under the ethno-territorial banner of the Rega under colonial 
rule, formed a majority of the territories of Mwenga and Shabunda.  Historically, these 
lineage-based societies had been less affected by the penetration of the Swahili slave-
raiders, and the clan-based nature of the societies had not been fundamentally altered 
by the colonial imposition of more hierarchical forms of authority (Verhaegen 1969 
Vol.  II p.29).   
 
During the late colonial and post-colonial era, however, the region was affected by the 
development of the mining industry around the “Gold Belt”, along which the main 
roads were build, as well as the main urban centres of Kamituga and Kitutu. The 
mining camps along the gold belt progressively turned into villages and towns, and 
peasants started pouring into artisanal mining after the liberalization of the Gold 
mining sector in 1982, leading to the emergence of large mining communities 
(Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers 2004, p.121).   
 
During the First and Second Congo wars, armed factions found in the mountains and 
deep jungles of the region a natural hideout, causing widespread insecurity in a region 
that had been relatively spared from large-scale warfare.  These included the ex-FAR 
and Rwandan militias that set camp in the remote forests of Mwenga to find cover 
from the attacks of the Rwandan Patriotic Army and the AFDL.  Somewhat 
surprisingly given the violent reputation of these armed factions, many testimonies 
from residents of the territories of Mwenga and Shabunda point to various forms of 
cohabitation between the Rwandan armed factions and the Rega populations of the 
region in the first stages of the war.  In several areas, the Rwandans were given land 
to cultivate, and married into local families.76  In exchange, the armed factions often 
provided a form of protection in the context of widespread insecurity that prevailed in 
the region.   
 
When the AFDL rebellion progressed into Mwenga, it took control of the larger 
mining towns, in particular Kamituga and Kitutu and a range of smaller mining 
                                                 
76 This was attested in numerous interviews in the territories of Mwenga and Shabunda.   
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centres.  The AFDL were initially able to recruit a large number of youth in the larger 
towns, playing on the euphoria that accompanied the prospect of political change.  The 
AFDL and then RCD occupations were marked by a sharp militarization of the mining 
industry, as military control over mining sites became a key objective of competing 
armed factions, particularly during the period of the Coltan boom (Vlassenroot & 
Raeymaekers 2004; Sanchez de la Sierra 2016).   
 
In the territory of Mwenga, The AFDL and RCD occupations did not lead to a unified 
resistance movement, owing perhaps to the more decentralized structures of socio-
political organization in the region, and to the lack of the social and cultural 
implantation of traditions of armed resistance that existed in Butembo or Bubembe, in 
the territories of Kalehe and Uvira.  Furthermore, many of the Mayi-Mayi groups that 
evolved in Mwenga initially came from other territories, in particular the Bembe 
militias who had crossed over from Itombwe, and the Tembo Mayi-Mayi who had 
crossed over from Shabunda into Mwenga.77  A sign of ingrained ethno-territorial 
conceptions of authority, many interviewees emphasized the ethnic foreignness of the 
Mayi-Mayi militias and the fact that, as a result, they could not legitimately occupy 
territory of the area.  This was also emphasized in numerous interviews in the areas of 
Shabunda that had undergone “external” Mayi-Mayi occupations.  In contrast, the Raia 
Mutomboki were often considered legitimate as a result of their “home-grown” 
character.  While having “local” origins did not immediately confer legitimacy and 
popular support, ethnic and even communal “foreignness” seems to have constituted 
a serious obstacle, an aspect that is confirmed in the quantitative analysis.  This 
negative perception of the Mayi-Mayi was reinforced by the authoritarian behaviour 
that the Mayi-Mayi groups often displayed, on which we will return in the following 
chapter.  Yet most interviewees made a clear distinction between the groups they had 
encountered, and the idealized “real Mayi-Mayi”, whose cause was considered to be 
legitimate and just, and whose actions were considered morally righteous.  Thus, 
despite the fact that in Mwenga the Mayi-Mayi mobilization was not mediated on a 
large scale by established authorities as in other areas, the core message of the 
movement and the cultural frames in which it had been formulated had nevertheless 
transcended ethno-territorial boundaries.   
                                                 
77 Interview with ANR official, Kitutu, 20/10/2011.  
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In several areas of Mwenga, however, the arrival of external Mayi-Mayi did spur the 
formation of local Mayi-Mayi groups, which in some cases did display the features of 
social movements in their modes of propagation, activation of pre-existing social 
network, and discursive appropriation.  The survey data tells us that, among all the 
reported Mai-Mai groups in the territory of Mwenga, 23% originated locally.78  This 
was the case in the Basile Chiefdom, and particularly in the Bashimwenda 1 Grouping, 
where several a local Mayi-Mayi groups were formed.  The following testimonies were 
collected in two villages of the Bashimwenda 1 Grouping, and highlight some of the 
social processes at play in the constitution of the movement and the recruitment of 
combatants.  We quote them extensively before discussing the processes they 
highlight: 
 
Village of Kasese (55 recruited in the village)79 
« The auto-defence initiative came from a few members of the village who 
were a little bit intellectual.  When they exposed the idea to our local 
chiefs, these approved and followed the initiative, but in a secretive way, 
because none of the chiefs wanted their name to be cited.  The initiative 
continued to the point where school teachers, close to the initiators, 
started talking up the morale of their students (...) this did not cause any 
problems, because the local chiefs were informed and supportive, and the 
family chiefs had been informed during the Barza (Village Assembly)80 
and had agreed.  This form of initiation was much increased during the 
period of foreign aggression.  From the regular discussions between all 
men in the village as well as their adult sons, several strategic decisions 
were taken.  First, to confront the attackers, particularly the RCD who 
committed massacres wherever they went, we needed to get close to all the 
Hutu who were present in the area: The village leaders talked to their 
                                                 
78 This means that it is either a person or group of people of a given town or village, or one from the 
neighboring villages, who initiated and organized the armed group.  For more details see Chapter 9.    
79 Source: Village Survey.   
80 The barza is one of the “traditional” communal institutions in eastern DRC. It usually takes the form 
of a gathering of a village’s men, in the evening around a fire or under a tree, to discuss important 
matters and take decisions.   
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representatives (...) several training were organized with them, for the 
population of the village.  Because some villages didn’t have enough 
people, they had to link up with other villages to consolidate the base (...) 
as this initiative was gathering strength, a delegation was sent to the 
Chiefdom to inform it and ask for moral and material support.  The 
Chiefdom encouraged the idea, but didn’t want to pronounce itself 
directly.“81 
Village of Mazimingi (35 recruits) 
“In Mazinmingi, the defence initiative came from neighbouring villages, 
who had tried out such initiatives in order to guarantee their own security, 
in particular the village of Kalundu.  Everything started when a group of 
youth from the village were chatted up by youth from neighbouring 
villages.  The group had several people within it, but in particular those 
who had already been Mayi-Mayi and had come back, in collaboration 
with those who were poorly intellectual.  The initiative had progressively 
been supported by the chiefs, who became involved in it.  (...)  Recruitment 
was clandestine at first, but became voluntary after the cause of the 
movement was explained to the population, because the RCD controlled 
almost all the centres in the area.  The population started supporting the 
initiative when they realized that it was for the public good, that the 
objective was to bring security to all the villages (...) the recruitment 
wasn’t destined to everybody, we had to convince those who could directly 
contribute something to the movement, not only strength.  That’s why 
several hunters of the area had been approached and convinced, because 
they knew the most remote parts of the area.  Some local elders, as well as 
those same hunters, knew very well about the roots and the leaves that are 
needed to protect against bullets, as well as to poison spears and arrows 
in order to kill them instantly.  (...) They carried out rituals and ceremonies 
to summon the ancestors to protect their tattooed children, and help them 
secure their land and its multiples riches (...) there was no real link 
                                                 
81 Surveyor Interview with former Mayi-Mayi member in Kasese, 16/05/2013. 
 125 
between the initiation societies and this group, because the initiation is 
done by the wise ones and Kimbiligiti, the spirit of the ancestors, and the 
ancestors do not recognize the Mayi-Mayi.  However, it is true that it is 
these same wise men and sorcerers who develop these traditional plants 
that are used as gri-gri (fetishes); but this is only a certain number of these 
wises (sages) who cannot have a real link with traditional initiation.  (...) 
The relation between these groups and the authorities remained calm 
throughout the existence of the group, because they were the children of 
the village.  There weren’t really any taxes, because each of the 
participants lived his life and ate at his home, but the chiefs did ask for a 
little something in each household” 82 
For both these villages, the “local” origins of the mobilization was confirmed in both 
the village surveys and household surveys.  Similar testimonies were collected in the 
neighbouring villages, as well as in several villages in the territory of Shabunda.83 
Although the apparent seamlessness of these descriptions must be taken with a 
measure of critical distance, as they can be distorted by the tendency to relate 
‘consensual histories’, a few key elements can be gathered from these two accounts.   
 
First, the mobilizations were in both cases transmitted through the tight social linkages 
between the rural villages in the Grouping, in particular through the youth.  Several 
other testimonies gathered in other villages of Mwenga point to a similar youth based 
transmission of the movement, which was also a central feature of the Raia Mutomboki 
movement (Stearns 2013; Vogel 2014).  Vogel (2014) shows that the Raia Mutomboki 
called the act of going from village to village and rounding up youth into the movement 
arsenal.   
  
The testimonies also illustrate the negotiated character of the mobilization, that 
involved in both cases the consultation and discussion of the initiative with various 
                                                 
82 Surveyor Interview with Village Chief of Mazimingi and his advisors, 22/04/2013.   
83 These include Kisubimusokolo, Mulambozi and Mizulo in Mwenga.  In Shabunda, in the villages of 
Nduma, Nkuni, Ntuku, Lulingu, Musweli and several others of the region, a similar movement of 
autodefense, which later took the name of Mayi-Mayi, had been organized by local leaders and state 
administrators, who used established channels of authority to mobilize combatants.  Source: Surveyor 
Interviews.   
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village authorities and groups, as well as the intervention and “vouching” of key 
institutions, such as the chief and the barza.  The first account points out that the barza 
- the traditional institutional forum for village level decision-making in Rega societies 
- was convened much more regularly during this period of crisis and mobilization, 
suggesting accrued organizational efforts to deal with the crisis.  Furthermore, the 
accounts reveal the ambiguous and shifting positioning of the chiefs, which only 
gradually gave their support to the movement, and often covertly because of the risks 
of retaliation.   
 
The accounts also point to the activation of collective resource mobilization 
mechanisms.  While the “intellectuals” provided the discursive support, local specialist 
knowledge is summoned, such the geographical knowledge of the hunters and the 
“forest” knowledge of the elders in concocting potions.  The resources that are lacking 
- in particular the military knowledge - are sought from the outside, in these cases 
through the solicitation of the FDLR present in the area.  This specialist knowledge, 
as well as the protection that the FDLR could provide is partly “internalized” through 
the insertion of the FDLR into the rural communities, which, as mentioned before, 
occurred in many rural areas before the end of the second Congo war. 
 
Finally, these accounts illustrate the efforts that were made to inscribe the movement’s 
purpose in the rural moral economies of the Rega societies of Mwenga.  The blessing 
of the elders and the institutional “vouching” through the consultation of the barza 
constitute a form of appropriation of the resistance movement by existing communal 
authorities.  Resistance to the foreign invasion is re-framed as a collective moral 
obligation, and as a result, participation becomes constitutive of communal identity.  
Such processes, however, are neither linear nor seamless, and one must be careful not 
to project idealized conceptions of African communal life and collective action onto a 
very nuanced and fractured reality.  
 
 The second example seems to carry something of a contradiction with regards to the 
religious and spiritual rituals that are carried out to provide legitimacy to the 
movement.  Indeed, the chief of Mazimingi alludes on one side to local elders 
summoning ancestors to protect the combatants, yet on the other insists that the Mayi-
Mayi could not be recognized by Kimbiligiti, the central divinity of the Rega religious 
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creed (Biebuyck 1972).  This alludes to the highly differentiated nature of the process 
of mobilization, whereby certain actors step in to take advantage of novel 
opportunities, while others remain much less involved.  For the fabrication of the 
dawa, interviews with feticheurs and doctors (witchdoctors) of the Mayi-Mayi 
movement as well close witnesses point to the intervention of a number of 
entrepreneurs in spiritual affairs, who stepped in to participate in the fabrication of the 
antiballes (anti-bullet potions), which initially seems to have been produced in a 
decentralized fashion in the regions where the Mayi-Mayi resistance took a local 
anchorage.   
 
A former Mayi-Mayi “doctor” from Mwenga recalled that local and regional 
“specialists” would be called in by Mayi-Mayi initiators or commanders to pool their 
knowledge of plants and leaves, and participate in long “research” sessions to develop 
the antiballes, which could last several months.84  However, chiefs, elders and various 
spiritual leaders interviewed in Mwenga thoroughly insisted that the spiritual leaders 
associated with Rega traditions, in particular those responsible for the Rega initiation 
ceremonies, were not involved in the preparation of these “medicines”.  Separate 
interviews with prominent Mayi-Mayi witchdoctors, in particular Major Muhindo 
Changoco, one of the foremost witchdoctors of the Mayi-Mayi Padiri, also point to a 
dissociation between those involved in the preparation of the Mayi-Mayi dawa and the 
“traditional” spiritual leaders and healers; “We would ask some remedies to the 
guerisseurs (traditional healers), but none of them could know about the anti-machetes 
or the anti-balles; these were born inside the Mayi-Mayi movement”.85  According to 
Major Muhindo Changoco and several other interviews, the first dawas to emerge 
within the movement carried a large number of conditions, which as we have seen 
served the function of controlling the behaviour of the combatants.  Interviews with 
non-combatants attest that the population was well aware of these conditions, and often 
referred to them, suggesting that these conditions were initially nested in the wider 
relations of reciprocity and accountability that tied the combatants to the communities 
from which they had emerged.  For example, a village chief of the territory of 
Shabunda in which a “local” Mayi-Mayi group had emerged stated that “The Mayi-
                                                 
84 Interview with ex-Mayi-Mayi, Kitutu, 22/10/2011. 
85 Interview with Major Muhindo Changoco, Bagira, 14/06/2013.   
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Mayi were our sons, and the sons of the neighbouring villages, and they could not 
harm us because of their fetiches”.86  This might have been reflective of the initial 
anchorage of the Mayi-Mayi movement in local moral communities, or at least of 
efforts by those involved in the constitution of local chapters of the movement to seek 
legitimacy by sending such signals of good behaviour.  Interestingly, while the Mayi-
Mayi movement was not inscribed in the Rega “traditional” cosmogony, the Raia 
Mutomboki, who emerged from Rega communities in Southern Shabunda, were 
considered by many Rega interviewed as the “breath of Kimbiligiti”(the central deity), 
enjoying a much closer association with Rega traditional cosmogony.   
 
The Mayi-Mayi movement therefore took a form of social anchorage in certain areas, 
as it was appropriated by local actors who activated pre-existing channels of labour 
mobilization, and deployed discursive efforts to inscribe the movement within local 
idiomatic and moral frameworks.  This was not always the case: In other 
configurations, the Mayi-Mayi inserted themselves at the margins of rural 
communities, constituting a form of rural “counter order”, which we will explore in 
the following chapter.  Furthermore, the very capacity to organize collective action 
was not an innate feature of rural communities in South Kivu.  While larger centres 
and towns were controlled by larger armed groups, many smaller villages did not have 
the social and institutional capacity to organize such collective action.  Indeed, the two 
examples previously presented were old villages with an agrarian base, characterized 
by dense social relations and the longstanding existence of the Rega institutions of 
social and political organization, an important pre-condition to effective collective 
action.  In the mining camps and towns that had emerged in the Territory of Mwenga 
as a result of the boom of the mining industry, such pre-conditions for collective action 
were often absent.   
4.3.  Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have identified some of the social processes of armed mobilization 
of the Mayi-Mayi resistance movement, in both urban and rural settings.  We have 
seen that, in the initial phases of the mobilization, the Mayi-Mayi movement displayed 
                                                 
86 Surveyor Interview with Village Chief of Nduma, 15/06/2013. 
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some of the features of a social movement, as it was mediated by pre-existing social 
networks and “appropriated” by various pre-existing social entities, although it was a 
fundamentally novel endeavour.  These served to mediate and percolate the 
fundamentally novel political message that the Mayi-Mayi movement carried, and in 
many cases initially triggered widespread adherence, and a “popular” form of 
participation.  This remained highly variegated, according to the different socio-
political histories of different regions, which we have alluded to in this chapter but 
which will be explored with more depth in the following chapters.  These grassroots 
dimensions of the Mayi-Mayi armed insurrections, however, do not entirely capture 
the logics at play in the mobilization.  As we will argue in the following chapter, the 
Mayi-Mayi movement also displayed a strong accumulative logic, focused on the 
control of resources - both material and human - that often came into contradiction 
with their social basis.   
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Photo 1: The town of Kitutu in the territory of Mwenga 
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Chapter Five                                                                                                 
Capture and Control in the Mai-Mai Movement 
In the previous chapter, we have seen that the Mayi-Mayi movement displayed some 
of the characteristics of a social movement, as it was - at least partially - mediated by 
pre-existing social entities, and characterized by efforts to inscribe the movement in 
the decentralized socio-political entities of eastern DRC, although this was far from 
uniform or linear.  Yet, as previously mentioned, this was not the only macro-logic at 
play in the expansion of the movement and the recruitment of combatants.  From the 
onset, and increasingly as the movement developed, it displayed a more accumulative 
and control focused behaviour with regards to both material and human resources.   
 
In the war of attrition that played out between the RCD and the constellation of armed 
factions allied with the Kinshasa government, control over territory quickly became 
the central object of military competition, not only because it allowed to weight on the 
political and diplomatic fronts of the war, but also because it commanded access to 
substantial resources, through control and taxation of the economy and the population 
(Sanchez de la Sierra 2016).  In a context of low-technology warfare, labour 
(combatants, porters, cooks) - was a crucial aspect of military success, and became the 
object of a fierce competition between warring factions that reinforced the polarizing 
effects of the war.  This accumulative or extractive rationale echoed a long history of 
large-scale mobilization of labour in the region, explored in the historical introduction, 
which in the 1990s progressively took the form of a militarized political economy.  As 
discussed in the theoretical framework, the task of discerning a single, unitary 
“extracting” actor is made more difficult in a context of political and military 
fragmentation.  However, the “industrial” scale at which recruitments into armed 
groups occurred suggests that such a logic was at play, albeit operating in a 
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decentralized fashion, through the numerous armed faction that were present in the 
region.   
 
In this chapter, we will explore how this political economy of labour accumulation has 
shaped the “social architecture” of recruitment and control of combatants, using 
examples from the Mayi-Mayi movement during the war against the RCD, as well as 
other examples brought into comparative focus.  We will see in particular how novel 
forms of labour accumulation and control came into articulation – or superseded – 
longstanding modes of labour mobilization in the region.  The chapter is organized 
into two sections.  The first section traces the attempts to centralize the Mayi-Mayi 
movement, during which the recruitment of combatants became subject to various 
forms of systematization and rationalization.  Taking into account the grassroots and 
socially entrenched dimensions of the mobilization, we will then look at how these 
two, somewhat conflicting logics played out often concomitantly, and how they played 
out in an increasingly polarized context.  
5.1.  Centralization and fragmentation of the Mayi-Mayi movement 
The Mayi-Mayi resistance movement that had emerged in July of 1997 against the 
AFDL, and intensified when the RCD seized the eastern Provinces of DRC, was 
submitted to opposing processes of centralization and fragmentation, with great 
variation according to the different geographical areas in which it operated.  In South 
Kivu, the military structure of the movement coalesced around two main poles: The 
Mayi-Mayi of General Padiri based in Kalehe and Shabunda on one side, and the 
Mayi-Mayi of General Dunia based in Uvira and Fizi on the other.87  
 
 In Kalehe, particularly in the area of Bunyakiri, the home of the Tembo ethno-
territorial constituency, the Mayi-Mayi movement was structured around the militias 
that had emerged during the “ethnic” wars of 1993-1995, known as the Batiri or the 
Katuku, who had strong ties with Tembo customary authorities.  When the AFDL 
                                                 
87 Lwecha commanded over the Secteur Operationnel Est, which comprised the territories of Uvira, 
Fizi, Mwenga (although Mwenga was under contested control) and parts of Northern Katanga.  (Stearns 
et al. 2013a p.23). 
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rebellion broke out, these militias had initially confronted the rebellion, before an 
alliance was struck between Tembo authorities and the AFDL,88 whereby parts of the 
Tembo armed factions joined the AFDL in toppling the Mobutu regime.  A segment 
of these militias, however, refused to join the AFDL, and kept their military positions 
in rural Kalehe, under the leadership of Padiri Bulenda.  While these militias had 
emerged in an ad-hoc fashion, years of fighting against the Congolese Hutu militias of 
the Kalehe Highlands and then against the AFDL had structured their ranks and 
hardened their combatants.  Several of these factions had started engaging in various 
forms of economies plunder and protection, particularly in the Kalehe Highlands as 
we will see in Chapter 7.  
 
When the anti AFDL Mayi-Mayi insurgency broke out in 1997, and the RCD rebellion 
followed, these militias came to form the backbone of the armed resistance in South 
Kivu.  Many former officers and soldiers of the Mobutist army had joined their ranks, 
particularly after the severe repression of former FAZ officers by the RCD,89 and 
brought with them their knowledge of how to organize, train and structure a 
professional army.  Furthermore, the Mayi-Mayi movement of Kalehe was in close 
contact with the Bukavu based resistance, and “received” a large number of the youth 
who had been clandestinely mobilized in Bukavu. 90   As these recruits often had 
university level education, many were given important administrative positions in the 
movement.  The centralization and structuration of the Mayi-Mayi of Kalehe was 
significantly enhanced after the Kinshasa government started supporting the 
movement logistically and militarily, sending instructors to coordinate the different 
factions.  Padiri Bulenda, a Tembo who had started off as a Katuku, imposed himself 
as the leader of the Mayi-Mayi in Kalehe after facing severe competition.  In 1999, he 
was proclaimed General de Brigade by Laurent-Desire Kabila, in charge of 
commanding all Mayi-Mayi forces in eastern DRC.  Under his command, the Mayi-
Mayi adopted a structure mirroring that of the defunct Zairian army in the East, 
organized into divisions, brigades, battalions, companies, platoons and sections 
(Hoffmann 2007 p.58). 
                                                 
88 The Bitale agreement was sealed on December 4, 1996 (Hoffmann 2014 p.218). 
89 On August 2nd, 1998, the high-ranking officers of the former Forces Armees Zairoises in South Kivu 
were summoned to the airport of Kavumu for a meeting, and were assassinated by the RCD, although 
some managed to escape.   
90 Interview with Jacques Nyakasala, Bagira, 12/06/2013.   
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The centralization of military command was accompanied by an effort to centralize 
resource mobilization, which echoed the long history of resource extraction in the 
region and required the establishment of an elaborate system of governance of civilian 
populations, which effectively became an effort to build a fully functioning state.  
Padiri himself conceived the role of the movement as that of restoring the authority of 
the state (Hoffmann 2007 p.97).  At the centre of the structure was the Etat Major 
Politico-Militaire (Politico-Military headquarters).  A rudimentary administration des 
Forets (Forest Administration) was set up at the military headquarters of the armed 
group in the Village of Mangaa, with a civilian administrator at its head, although 
Padiri had a tendency to rule in an autocratic and personalized manner (Morvan 2005 
p.56).   
 
The governance of civilian populations combined direct modes of administration, and 
more decentralized forms of administration through local chiefs.  Deploying soldiers 
in the various axes (roads) that it controlled, the group set up an elaborate system of 
taxation to finance its war effort, with some sectors of the economy coming under 
direct control by the movement, while others were left to more decentralized forms of 
taxation through intermediaries.  For example, the regulation and taxation of the 
mining sector was highly centralized, with Padiri deploying soldiers to each mine 
under his control to collect taxes in kind or in cash, which were directly channelled 
back to his headquarters.91  On the other hand, the collection of compulsory Household 
Taxes - known as effort de guerre or ration (War Effort) - was usually delegated to 
local chiefs, under the threat of violence.  The collection of resources, both taxes and 
the recruitment of soldiers, was further reinforced by the development of a state-like 
administrative apparatus, with the Bureau of Coordination of Internal Affairs that 
seconded the Politico-Military Headquarters and took care of relations with civilian 
and customary authorities, and local Comites de Soutien (Support Committees) being 
established in most villages to supervise the collection of resources.92  In addition to 
creating a state like apparatus, Padiri’s Mayi-Mayi movement closely reproduced 
“statist” discourses and modes of rule (Hoffmann & Vlassenroot 2014).  The 
                                                 
91 For a detailed analysis of the modes of taxation of the mining sector see Sanchez de la Sierra (2015).   
92 From April 2001, these became the Comites de Securite Civile (Civilian Security Committees).  
Morvan (2005 p.56), Hoffmann (2007 p.98).   
 135 
mobilization of combatants for the movement must therefore be understood in light of 
this institutionalized effort to mobilize resources.   
 
Despite Padiri’s group thorough efforts to centralize command over the Mayi-Mayi 
movement, and the discursive efforts of Padiri to portray the movement as unified, 
effective control over the constellation of Mayi-Mayi armed factions in South and 
North Kivu was never achieved, owing to the huge logistical and organizational 
constraints associated with controlling armed groups spread over such a vast and 
impenetrable area, and to the game of incessant rivalry, coalitions and internal revolts 
that characterized the movement.   In the territories of Mwenga, Shabunda and Kalehe, 
armed factions nominally under the command of General Padiri enjoyed a high level 
of autonomy, regularly breaking off from the central chain of command.  This was the 
case, for example, of the group that came to be known as the Mayi-Mayi Kalehe under 
the command of Muhindo Changoco, who had been deployed to the Southern 
Highlands of Kalehe and soon rebelled against Padiri’s authority, to which we will 
come back to in Chapter 6.93  While they didn’t enjoy the same military capacity and 
troop numbers, these smaller groups engaged in various forms of taxation and rule 
over civilian populations, often with the recourse to civilian intermediaries, with 
varying levels of success and legitimacy.   
5.1.2.  Building the Mayi-Mayi Army 
As we have seen, the centralization of the Mayi-Mayi movement was part of the 
attempt to create a structured resistance to the RCD in eastern DRC.  While guerrilla 
tactics of hit-and-run prevailed on the ground, the objective, which was never fully 
achieved, was to create a full-fledged army that could oppose a united and cohesive 
front to the RCD.  The imperative of obtaining a large military force and bringing it 
under centralized command drove a more accumulative approach to the recruitment of 
combatants, which often conflicted with the “grassroots” and popular logic of 
mobilization that had been driving the mobilization of ad-hoc, decentralized groups 
explored in the previous chapter.  Testimonies from the territory of Kalehe point out 
                                                 
93  Major Muhindu Changoco was Padiri Bulenda’s commandant des operations.  Changoco 
subsequently broke off from Padiri’s group with 300 soldiers, and set up his base in Katasomwa, in the 
Grouping of Mubugu, in the Southern Highlands of Kalehe.  
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that, at the beginning of the mobilization against the AFDL, it seemed to have the 
popular character of the type identified in the previous section. However, the 
mobilization soon took a different character, of which we will identify some of the 
features here.   
 
In interviews, Mayi-Mayi commanders systematically emphasized the need to create 
a single, unified chain of command, including commanders who had broken away 
from Padiri’s group.  When asked what happened with the small, ad-hoc self-defence 
groups that had proliferated in the early days of the resistance, they responded that 
they were either incorporated into the movement, or dismantled.  Colonel Mbangu, a 
high-ranking officer in Padiri’s group who would subsequently form several other 
armed groups, formulated this imperative in an interview, reflecting on the period of 
“conquest” of the Mayi-Mayi Padiri: 
“If we entered a village and found a group there, we immediately captured 
that group and we put it in our own troops; those within the group who 
want to fight, we take them with us, and those who don’t they just return 
to civilian life.  There is no question of leaving the village groups there 
(...) they represent a danger for us because we can never know if they were 
real Mayi-Mayi, or if they were enemies”94 
Similarly, Jacques Nyakasali, who was attached to the administration (Bureau 2) of 
Padiri’s group, and subsequently became executive secretary of the Mayi-Mayi Kalehe 
of Major Muhindo Changoco, argued that: 
“There was only one thing that we could say to these smaller groups: If 
you are real Mayi-Mayi, then join us; if you are not real Mayi-Mayi, and 
don’t join us, then you are rebels, and we must fight and capture you (...) 
we could not leave them there” 95 
                                                 
94 Interview with Colonel Mbangu, Bagira, 19/06/2013. 
95 Interview with Jacques Nyakasali, Bagira, 12/06/2013.   
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The apparent simplicity of the dichotomist rhetoric of these excerpts, typical of 
wartime narratives, underscores the logic of capture and control of smaller groups that 
stemmed from a strategic imperative, that of dismantling autonomous groups that had 
the potential of joining the enemy’s side, but also an accumulative logic towards 
labour.  Small, village level auto-defence groups were often explicitly targeted for 
“capture”, as were other armed groups, because they represented pre-constituted 
“labour pools” and allowed to bypass the organization of burdensome recruitment 
campaigns.  The absorption of pre-constituted groups was systematic with Padiri’s 
group, but many of the smaller splinter groups also displayed the same type of 
accumulative approach to recruitment.  Major Muhindo Changoco, who commanded 
the Mayi-Mayi Kalehe, recalled “capturing” several smaller groups, in particular 
Congolese Hutu militias in the Kalehe Highlands.96  
 
The absorption and “capture” of small, ad-hoc groups often involved breaking the 
communal logic that tied these groups to their social environments.  This was often a 
conflictual process.  Despite the tendency of Mayi-Mayi officers and leaders to deny 
or minimize episodes of internal dissent or popular resistance to the movement, several 
commanders admitted that their centralisation efforts were regularly resisted by the 
smaller, “village” type organisations.  Jacques Nyakasali recalls: 
“It happened quite often that these groups of villagers refused to join our 
movement (...) There were many reasons, specific to each group, but the 
main one that we found was that they didn’t want to leave their villages.  
If they refused, we would immediately engage in combat, and capture 
them.  We were afraid that if they stayed in their villages they would harass 
villagers, and tarnish the reputation of the movement, so we had to stop 
them from doing that.  Once we had captured them, it was easier, because 
they went and convinced the others to join our movement”97 
The severing of communal ties was enhanced by a set of measures designed to induce 
compliance among the novel recruits and establish various forms of social and 
psychological control over them.  These measures included transferring the recruits 
                                                 
96 Interview with Major Muhindo Changoco, Bagira, June 2013.   
97 Interview with Jacques Nyakasali, Bagira, June 2013. 
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away from their home areas, but also military trainings and initiation ceremonies, in 
particular the initiation to the Mayi-Mayi dawa, which served the purpose of 
psychologically embedding the Mayi-Mayi hierarchy into the recruits and, according 
to Colonel Mbangu, “giving the real Mayi-Mayi ideology to these uneducated 
villagers”.  These rituals were often violent.  For example, several former recruits of 
Major Muhindo’s group recall having been buried in the ground for up to three 
weeks,98 a ritual that Muhindo himself presented as “a way to recognize the people 
who have the real heart of the Mayi-Mayi.  This coerced severing of social ties and 
induction of compliance to the Mayi-Mayi hierarchy contrasted with the “spirit” in 
which many of these recruits had initially been mobilized.  Combatants that followed 
this sequence of mobilization - from a communal or popular mobilization into a local 
group, then an absorption into a larger group - recall the sharp contrast: 
“The youth of our village had formed a group, but we didn’t really fight 
against the enemy.  But then Changoco’s group arrived and told us to join 
the real Mayi-Mayi movement.  Some of us didn’t want to go because it 
meant leaving to a faraway place.  They captured a few of us forcefully, 
and told us that if we didn’t join we would be considered as rebels and 
taken prisoners.  Immediately we left the village; there was a lot of 
suffering.  I was beaten several times.  I did a long time without returning 
to my village “ 99 
The use of force was by no means limited to the absorption and capture of pre-
constituted groups.  Numerous testimonies collected for this project, as well as reports, 
articles and studies attest to the widespread and repeated use of violence by the Mayi-
Mayi movement to recruit civilians, which was sharply enhanced after the RCD had 
extended its military control and counter-insurgency measures to Mayi-Mayi 
strongholds, in particular the area of Bunyakiri.  A resident of Bunyakiri recalls that, 
when the RCD advanced into the region of Bunyakiri in May 1999, the Mayi-Mayi 
militias who had been based all around the town were forced deeper into the forest, 
                                                 
98 Interviews with ex-Mayi-Mayi combatants, region of Lemera-Kasheke- Nyabibwe.   
99 Interview with former Mayi-Mayi Changoco combatant, Bukavu, 14/08/2012. 
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from where they started conducting raids and violent recruitments, leading to a shift 
in public perceptions of the movement.100   A former resident of Bunyakiri recalls:  
“Padiri’s group would take people against their will, by force.  Before, 
many had joined, in 1996, to stop the AFDL; and the population and 
authorities had called to the Mayi-Mayi to help them; but then when they 
started controlling the area, it was terrible.  They took things by force, and 
asked for food.  They took youth by force; the only way out was to go away 
as far as possible, to Bukavu or Goma; many, including myself, fled at that 
moment, and have been waiting for the area to calm down.  If a family had 
money, the first thing they did would be to send off their children, so that 
they don’t get captured”101 
5.2.2.  Recruitment as Taxation 
In the areas under Mayi-Mayi military control, the recruitment of combatants for the 
Mayi-Mayi movement was also mediated by local chiefs, which gave rise to a political 
economy of recruitment that echoed the long history of mediated conscriptions of the 
region.  Padiri himself gave public directives to all authorities and families of the areas 
under his control that they should give their sons to the movement (Hoffmann 2007).  
Smaller groups, although not commanding the type of resources of Padiri’s group, 
often reproduced this process and required that villages under their control provide 
recruits, negotiating the provision of recruits at the village level rather than at the 
individual level, as a form of taxation.  In practice, the process of mobilization was 
much more messy and conflictual, and often backed by the recourse to violence and 
force, applied not only to individuals but also to villages and groups.  As has been the 
case historically, the mobilization of labour was one of the main functions of local 
chiefs, who could face heavy sanctions if they didn’t meet the quotas imposed by 
armed groups.   A resident of Bunyakiri recalls: 
                                                 
100 Interview with Simeon Lukeno Bikanaba, Bukavu, 12/08/2012. 
101 Ibid.    
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“The Mayi-Mayi had requested that the village authorities help them 
recruit soldiers.  What choice did they have? But it didn’t really work.  The 
youth were fleeing the neighbourhood.  First, they had asked for the 
volunteers, who had been gathered up by the chief; but then the volunteers 
fled; when the chief had drawn up a list of those who had to be recruited, 
these had already fled.  Then the others were fleeing; so they started 
capturing people by force in the village, with the help of the chief who 
didn’t want to be sanctioned”102 
Another resident of Bunyakiri recalls that:   
“If a village contributed soldiers to a group, the group wouldn’t attack 
and pillage that village.  On the contrary, villages that didn’t give soldiers, 
or other things, were targeted.  In many villages, the chiefs would 
encourage some people to participate, so that the group didn’t attack the 
village.  Each village had its programme of contribution: Either money, 
either combatants, sometimes both.  It was the chief who took care of the 
program.  When I was recruited, the chief told us that the commander had 
told him” If you don’t give children, then you are going to face the 
consequences“; what could we do? The chief could denounce us to the 
group if we didn’t accept” 103  
In the territory of Shabunda, where Padiri set up his base after being dislodged from 
Kalehe by the RCD, similar processes were reported.  A former bodyguard of general 
Padiri recalls:  
“In the area of Shabunda-Katchungu, we would organize recruitments.  
There had been negotiations between the chiefs and the Mayi-Mayi 
commanders.  At 5am, we would stop by every household in a village, and 
recruit half of the young men.  If there is only one youth, we check if his 
parents are still young; if they are, we take him by force.  If not, if he is 
                                                 
102 Interview with Bunyakiri resident, Bukavu, 13/08/2012. 
103 Interview with former Mayi-Mayi combatant, recruited in Bunyakiri, Bukavu, 14/08/ 2012.  
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almost a head of family, we don’t take him.  The chiefs had made a big 
reunion, after the advance of the RCD.  They are the ones who gave this 
idea to the Mayi-Mayi.  After reunions with the different village chiefs, 
each had gone to raise awareness in his village, and each household had 
to give the first-born son to the movement.  I would say that there was 
about 60 % of voluntary, 40% of forced”104 
These excerpts point to the transactional nature of the recruitments, played out at 
several levels of negotiation – between the Mayi-Mayi and village authorities, between 
the village authorities and the inhabitants, between the families and the recruits.  A 
political economy of recruitment therefore surfaced, with several layers, inter-village, 
intra-village, and intra-household.  The excerpt of Padiri’s former bodyguard reveals 
that there were demographic considerations in the recruitment of combatants, as they 
spared households with insufficient men to avoid destroying the demographic capacity 
of the population.   
 
As a transaction, in many cases a form of taxation, recruitment reflected power 
relations in villages and households.  As has often been the case in large-scale 
conscriptions, families with more financial means or social capital could dodge 
recruitment either by sending their children off to the city, paying a fine to the group, 
or asking chiefs not to draft their family members.  This was not limited to male 
recruits for military purposes: many testimonies pointed to the fact that the same type 
of bargaining happened for young girls, who would be taken as “wives” by the armed 
factions.  Even in cases where recruitments were voluntary, symbolic payments were 
often made to a recruits family or entourage to acknowledge the transaction.  
 
Once a person was integrated into a group, his entourage or family could still claim 
her or him back by negotiating with the group and paying a “liberation fee”, although 
these tended to be particularly high given that groups had a significant bargaining 
advantage in such configurations.  A university graduate who experienced the 
emergence of the Mayi-Mayi movement in Bunyakiri recalls: 
                                                 
104 Interview with former bodyguard of general Padiri, Bukavu, 13/08/2012.  This was confirmed by 
separate interviews carried out by surveyors in the area of Katchungu. 
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“When a child was captured by the Mayi-Mayi, it was possible to get him 
back by paying a large amount of money.  For poor families, this was 
impossible.  But for families who had a little more means, they would ask 
the armed groups for the liberation of their children, and they had to pay, 
sometimes an entire cow (...) Sometimes, families would get together to 
help out a family who didn’t have enough money to pay for their children.  
And it also often happened that families would amass the sum, and then 
the commanders would just take it, and not give the child back.  They only 
gave the child back if he was weak”105 
5.2.  Recruitment and Control in a Polarized social Context 
We have seen that, in areas under control by the Mayi-Mayi armed factions, the 
mobilization of combatants was often institutionalized and deputized to local chiefs 
under the threat of force, constituting a form of taxation that gave rise to multiple levels 
of negotiation within pre-existing social entities.  This was also the case in the areas 
under control by the RCD, in particular with the creation of the Local Defence, a 
paramilitary force that mobilized youth at a decentralized level through the 
intermediation of established state and customary authorities with the objective of both 
providing additional manpower but also preventing youth from joining the Mayi-
Mayi.106  Control of the population, and in particular the youth, was thus a central 
feature of the conflict that was playing out.   
 
In most areas, however, control over the populations by opposing forces was partial 
and contested, and the conflict permeated deep into societies, initiating a sharp social 
fracture and polarization, a distinctive feature of civil wars (Kalyvas 2006, Wood 
2008).  The RCD developed an apparatus of control over the population, comprising 
military presence and the co-option of the state apparatus of security, the co-option of 
established authorities through the repression of critical intellectuals and leaders and 
their replacement by “complacent” state and customary leaders, the development of 
                                                 
105 Interview with Simeon Lukeno Bikanaba, Bukavu, 12/08/2012. 
106  Interview with former Local Defense Commanders and recruits. See chapter on the Kalehe 
Midlands.   
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civilian defence initiative (in particular the Local Defence) and the extension of an 
intelligence service that “infiltrated” deep into Congolese society.  As a result, the 
Mayi-Mayi were often forced out of urban centres and strategic areas into the remote 
forest areas of rural South Kivu, from which they conducted a guerrilla war of attrition 
against the RCD.  The combination of the physical displacement of the Mayi-Mayi 
from the societies in which they had emerged, the internal structuration of the 
movement that we have previously exposed, as well as the counter-insurgency carried 
out by the RCD sharply enhanced the division between the Mayi-Mayi and the 
societies from which they had emerged.   
 
Yet even in such contexts, the Mayi-Mayi continued to exert a multi-faceted influence 
over the rural societies of South Kivu, of which the recruitment and control over 
combatants was a central component.  This stemmed from a subtle combination of 
their “appropriation” of social networks embedded in the societies of rural Kivu, and 
the role they came to play at the margins - and sometimes at the centre - of the war-
torn Kivutian societies, as both an exit option for many youth of the region, and a 
counter authority to RCD rule.  In this highly polarized social context, the social 
insertion of combatants into the rural societies was at the crux of two, somewhat 
opposing forces.  On one side, the necessity to stimulate support among the population, 
on which such rebel movements are dependant for resources, by continuing to 
emphasize the movement’s inscription within a the moral economy of the rural South 
Kivu societies, as seen in the previous chapter.   On the other side, the necessity to 
establish a social and spatial separation between the combatants and the population, as 
a result of the imperative of maintaining a corporate form of control over combatants, 
and preserving the movement from the RCD’s counter insurgency and infiltration 
tactics.  Interestingly, the dawa, which constituted a practical repertoire of insurgency 
that the Mayi-Mayi had deployed, came to reflect this ambiguous social positioning of 
the Mayi-Mayi fighters, and the more corporate approach to the control of combatants.  
Indeed, the conditions associated to the dawa progressively reflected less the norms of 
good relations with the population than the necessity to maintain control over 
combatants and maintain a social and spatial separation with the population.107  In 
Padiri’s Mai-Mai group, affairs relating to the dawa were even institutionalized into 
                                                 
107 This is based on a study of the conditions presented by Major Muhindo Changoco.   
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the administration, with the creation of a Bureau 6, in charge of spiritual matters, an 
attempt to centralized the control over what effectively constituted a separate chain of 
command, presiding over up to 100 doctors in charge of preserving the secret of the 
dawa and administering it to different groups (Hoffmann 2007 p.98).  We will now 
identify some of the social processes of recruitment of combatants in such highly 
polarized contexts, with a particular attention to how the transformed political 
economy affected the “social architecture” of recruitment, but also to the individual 
dimensions of the mobilization of combatants, in line with our theoretical framework.  
5.2.1.  Recruitment through networks of family and peer 
In the areas that had come under military and administrative control of the RCD, it 
became much more difficult for the Mayi-Mayi to approach potential recruits given 
the relatively “confined” social settings of rural towns and villages and the extension 
of the RCD’s networks of spies and informants.  As the recruitments became 
clandestine, pre-existing social networks became essential channels of recruitment of 
combatants, and were strategically used by armed groups to obtain new recruits.  
Jacques Nyakasali, who was in charge of recruitment for the Mayi-Mayi Kalehe, 
pointed to the “spontaneous” role of these networks in the initial days of the 
mobilization, but also their continued role in the context of the RCD repression:  
In Bunyakiri, when I was still with Padiri, a lot of natives joined our 
movement in the beginning; If a youth came to us, we would ask him if he 
knew other people who would be interested to join, some of his brothers, 
but it was almost automatic, they would come in groups (…).  Some of 
them would be integrated directly as combatants, others would be sent 
back into the population to give us information on troop movements and 
the positions of the RCD (...) when the RCD controlled the “milieu”, then 
it was more difficult.  There were about 80% of the chiefs who were with 
the RCD, and the RCD always had their ANR (intelligence services) in the 
area to verify movements.  But we were still recruiting.  We would send 
the youth we recruited into the area as civilians so that they would sensitize 
their siblings and friends; this was done in a clandestine way, but as 
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people were already familiar with the movement and held it in their heart, 
it worked well (...)”108 
Family and peer networks therefore represented privileged conduits for carrying out 
recruitments, but should not be conceived too mechanistically.  Mobilizations that 
were mediated through these channels retained a highly negotiated character, which 
could lead to conflicts or ruptures in these networks, particularly in a context where 
people who were seen to be associated with such activities could be spotted by RCD 
informants and targeted for retaliation, regardless of their real implication.  This was 
enhanced by the fact that, in many areas, the Mayi-Mayi were not considered as 
“natives” - such as the Bembe Mayi-Mayi militias in the Rega areas of the territory of 
Mwenga, or the Tembo militias that operated in Havu areas of Kalehe - or had lost 
their popularity as a result of their violence.  In such contexts, family and community 
networks could entirely “shut off”, with those seen to be associated with the Mayi-
Mayi being prevented from “penetrating” the social space of potential recruits.  A 
native of the Grouping of Mubugu in the Territory of Kalehe, one of the homes of the 
Mayi-Mayi movement, recalls how he attempted to protect his sons and nephews from 
recruitment: 
“The Mayi-Mayi were born in this area.  Many people I know, cousins, 
friends, were part of the Mayi-Mayi.  I was never a Mayi-Mayi because I 
do not like the matters of war.  At the beginning people thought that the 
Mayi-Mayi were good because they said they were protecting us from this 
invasion, but soon we realized that they were doing crazy things, harassing 
people and taking everything they wanted, even imprisoning people to ask 
for ransoms (...) Two of my nephews were with them.  For us, and their 
parents, it was as if they were dead, we had given up on them.  They were 
still coming back to the area from time to time, as if they were not 
militaries but we knew that they were with the Mayi-Mayi.  When they 
came back in the area we were afraid because even though they didn’t 
have their weapons we knew that they were dangerous (...) they were trying 
to chat up other youth from the area who hadn’t joined.  We couldn’t do 
                                                 
108 Interview with Jacques Nyakasali, Bagira, June 2013. 
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much because we were afraid of the Mayi-Mayi but we were trying to get 
them not to join (...) we told them that they should not listen to their 
brothers and cousins in the movement, that they were lying to them and 
what awaited them was just a life of suffering.”109 
These network based strategies of recruitment came into articulation with the potential 
recruit’s individual motives and desires to participate, which, as argued in the 
theoretical framework, are multiple and irreducible to single or discrete categories.  As 
seen in the theoretical framework, several authors have emphasized the role of 
economic deprivation and social marginalization, and the resulting attraction for a 
better life as major determinants for participation (Jourdan 2004, 2011; Richards 1996; 
Van Acker & Vlassenroot 2001a, 2001b).  For youth evolving in the confined social 
environments of rural South Kivu, which offered little in terms of economic stability 
and social integration as a result of the crisis that was affecting eastern DRC, the 
emergence of armed factions represented a way of “opting out” from their positions of 
marginality, but also experiencing new forms of community and citizenship 
(Vlassenroot & Van Acker 2001a; Amuri Misago 2003; Jourdan 2011).  
 
In interviews, Mayi-Mayi commanders repeatedly pointed to recruits arriving 
voluntarily to the group as a result of either their ‘frustration’, or specific events that 
cast them as outcasts from their hometowns and villages.  The following example, 
exposed by Jacques Nyakasali, points to the combination of such a socially isolating 
and financially burdensome event with the types of negotiations that the Mayi-Mayi 
operated at the margins of the rural societies: 
“There was a village in Mubugu not far from one of our bases.  One day, 
a boy arrived and said that he wanted to join because he had impregnated 
a woman.  We did a little inquiry and we realized that it was true.  This is 
a difficult position for a country boy because he was poor and unable to 
take the woman in marriage.  We sent a delegation to both families to see 
what could we done, and we found an arrangement whereby his family 
                                                 
109 Interview with Mubugu resident, Numbi, October 2012.  
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gave something to the family of the impregnated woman, and he stayed 
with us”110 
These testimonies point to articulation of the experiences of deprivation or 
marginalization, and the strategies of recruitment by armed groups.  In many cases, 
marginalization and grievance were experienced and expressed collectively, as well as 
the appeal for the “exit” option that the Mayi-Mayi represented.  These were often 
reinforced by the charisma of armed group leaders who were popular among certain 
segments of the youth, reinforced through discussions and collective admiration of 
leaders’ military feats.  An individual’s decision to join is therefore rarely taken ex 
nihilo, but rather nested in collective and socially mediated processes of psycho-social 
communication, persuasion, and pressure.  Behind or rather “within” the activation of 
social networks, an ensemble of processes of social influence and persuasion occurred.  
The testimony of a young boy in Lemera, who was mobilized after being clandestinely 
convinced by his brother, bears some insight onto the inter-connectedness of the 
different factors and mechanisms at play in the mobilization:  
“The Mayi-Mayi had done a campaign of “sensibilisation” (awareness 
raising) in the area; they said that they were going to send us to school if 
we joined the resistance.  My family was not capable of paying my tuition 
fees for school, so I was interested. (...) My older brother was a Mayi-Mayi 
with that group (...) I would see him around here, but my family refused to 
see him because they didn’t want anything to do with him anymore (...) It 
was him who really interested me to join the Mayi-Mayi.  He was a doctor 
for the movement, he was responsible for the fetiches and water.  He was 
always telling me that I would have a good life with the Mayi-Mayi and 
get a salary and education (...) He was telling me about the fact that the 
commanders treated them well, that they ate meat every day.  So I decided 
to go (...) I can say that I went because I trusted him even though I had 
heard many stories about the Mayi-Mayi.  But then when we arrived to the 
mountain where they gathered us, we saw that they had brought weapons, 
and they started giving them to us so that we could learn to use them (...) 
                                                 
110 Interview with Jacques Nyakasali, Bagira, June 2013. 
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There was no possibility of leaving at that moment.  I had no choice; I had 
left secretly, without telling my parents or my family” 111 
This testimony (quoted only partially) points to several, intertwined “pull” factors 
which are not discrete or mutually exclusive but, combined, seem to have led to the 
decision to participate.  While the youth points to the grievance related to not being 
able to go to school and the resulting attraction for the Mayi-Mayi, the decisive factor 
seems to have been the influence of his brother, whose repeated visits and efforts to 
construe participation in the group as something desirable persuaded the young man.  
The coercive element - in this case, his “capture” by the armed group - only occurred 
after he was convinced by his brother to participate, and isolated from his social 
environment.  An interview with the older brother confirmed this version of the 
sequence of events, although he said that it was his commander who had sent him to 
take his younger brother.  The testimony therefore points to both the use of pre-existing 
social networks, but also to the social influence that this allowed to exert on the 
younger brother, which articulated with the young man’s feeling of deprivation.  While 
this concerns only one case, groups that had a large number of combatants could 
significantly exploit the networks they had access to in order to exert of form of 
influence, an aspect that is explored in the quantitative chapter.    
 
When interrogated about their recruitment strategies, the leaders of the Mayi-Mayi 
Kalehe- Major Muhindo Changoco, Colonel Cisayura as well as colonel Mbangu- 
pointed to this use of pre-existing social networks of family and peer to deploy 
discursive and persuasive strategies of recruitment in the areas under control by the 
RCD.  While it is important to remain wary of the testimonies of leaders of armed 
groups, which often carry a strong “dominant” bias, Major Muhindo Changoco, the 
commander of the Mayi-Mayi Kalehe said that their main strategy was the use of 
“testimonies”, which he defined in the following way: 
 “We didn’t do any “sensibilisations” of the population to recruit 
soldiers, but instead we used testimonies (...) the people who were 
witnesses to our exploits, and the strength of our dawa, would join the 
                                                 
111 Interview with Mayi-Mayi ex-combatant, Lemera, November 2012. 
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movement on their own (...) When we were not in combat, the recruits 
would go back to their villages to testify of the strength of our dawa, and 
our military feats against the RCD (...) and do some demonstrations of the 
strength of our antiballes (anti-bullet devices) (...) That was enough to 
convince many youth to join us”112 
The insistence on the strength of the dawa as the persuasive factor that transpires in 
this interview is not surprising given that Changoco was one of the most renowned 
witchdoctors of the Mayi-Mayi movement.  Nevertheless, it attests to the deployment 
of discursive efforts, in conjunction with the use of social networks, to obtain recruits.    
5.2.2.  Control over recruits 
We have seen that, in areas where the Mayi-Mayi did not have a strong military hold, 
and were thus unable to set up various modes of administration over rural populations 
to levy taxes and recruit combatants in a systematic and institutionalized fashion, the 
recruitment of soldiers was often carried out through social networks, which mediated 
processes of persuasion and coercion, and articulated with individual and collective 
factors.  Such networks also served to exert control over combatants, who in a highly 
polarized context were susceptible to be captured by the RCD’s own networks of spies, 
or attempt to escape the harsh living conditions in the Mayi-Mayi.   This form of 
control over recruits, which superseded the “direct” control that was exerted in the 
spatially and socially confined context of armed camps and factions, where direct 
coercion was prevalent, was part of the larger modes of influence that the Mayi-Mayi 
exerted over the societies through their networks of support and the multi-faceted 
interactions they engaged in with populations.  Almost all Mayi-Mayi ex-combatants 
referred to the situation of confinement to which they were subjugated, both within the 
group but also in the areas in which the group operated.  A former Mayi-Mayi from 
Major Muhindo Changoco’s group recalls:  
 “As soon as we had entered this movement, we could not leave it. We 
could try to escape, but if we did they would find us and beat us severely 
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for days; they can find you easily in the neighbourhood; Even if you go to 
Kabamba, or Minova, even in Bukavu they will find you.  And they will 
hurt your family.  The commanders were afraid that those who left would 
reveal the secret of the Mayi-Mayi, so they had all the strategies to catch 
you and bring you back.  You just have to be spotted in the milieu and their 
ANR (informants) will know that you are back here”113  
Control over the armed group members was tied to the group’s knowledge of the social 
entourage and family of the recruit, on which pressure could be exerted.  It was also 
enabled by the elaborate networks of informants that the Mayi-Mayi groups would set 
up.  These could consist of the Mayi-Mayi kinship or peer networks, but often included 
a larger set of people who had multiple types of connections with the Mayi-Mayi.  In 
many cases, these were tied to trade networks with which the groups carried out 
business.  For example, a trader moving from Mayi-Mayi held territory, engaging in 
various forms of trade with the Mayi-Mayi, could also serve as an informant for the 
group.  In places such as mining towns, that were the object of repeated fighting 
between the Mayi-Mayi and the RCD for military control, the social climate was 
particularly tense as association with one group could be denounced to the other and 
entail retaliation.  Usually portrayed as the epitome of arbitrary violence, the targeting 
of civilians was often the manifestation of the deep rootedness of such forms of control 
that armed factions come to exert on societies in periods of civil war.  A former Mayi-
Mayi recruited in Kalonge describes the networks of informants that existed during 
the period when the RCD controlled the centre:  
“People are paid to look over the activities of the population; if you leave 
the group, then the ANR (intelligence) of the group will spot you; they are 
the younger brothers of a commander, or various family of the group.  
They will spot you and denounce you to the group.  (...) But even someone 
whom you know can spot you and then decide to make a little money and 
he will denounce you to the group.  So you have to leave far or they will 
capture you again (...) in my group, there were 3 escapees who had left 
one night.  A few days later, they were spotted in a neighbouring town.  I 
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was sent with two others to capture them.  When we brought them back to 
the camp, two of them were beaten to death and the other was severely 
injured”114 
The father from Mubugu whose testimony we have already partially covered before 
also alluded to this point: 
 “If a youth runs away from the group, then he is in severe danger.  Even 
those who will try to help him out will be in severe danger, unless people 
gather enough money to pay the commander, but it’s not even sure that he 
will accept.  It did happen a few times that some people that I know gave 
shelter to youth that had fled the group, and had organized to quickly send 
them away.  If they stayed in the “milieu”, they would eventually be 
captured by the group, and why not even killed”115 
This control over the population was not total, and played out in a context where the 
RCD was also seeking to establish its control over the population, through the co-
optation of chiefs and the planting of informants throughout the society.  In the areas 
that it controlled militarily, the RCD often resorted to local chiefs to obtain information 
on combatants, further intensifying the polarization between those civilians associated 
with the Mayi-Mayi and the rest of the population.  A former RCD combatant in the 
area of Kalonge recalls: 
 “We knew that the population was supporting the Mayi-Mayi; the 
population itself was like a combatant. In order to catch and kill them, we 
had to go through the chiefs; we would corrupt a chief and ask him to give 
us the names of those who were the Mayi-Mayi in the village.  That’s how 
we captured them”116  
The infiltration of the population through spies and informants was a risky task, with 
numerous people testifying to the violent repression that came upon those perceived 
                                                 
114 Interview with ex-Mayi-Mayi from the Padiri group, Bukavu, August 2012.  
115 Interview with resident of Mubugu, Numbi, October 2012. 
116 Interview with former RCD combatant from Kalonge, Bukavu, August 2012.   
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to be associated with the Mayi-Mayi.  In certain areas, as in the village of Nduma in 
Shabunda, the RCD had ordered that all those caught with a tattoo (the proof that 
someone had undergone a dawa initiation ceremony) should be considered as an 
enemy.117  The dawa therefore also served the function of a marker, which perhaps 
was done intentionally, in order to create the type of social separation with the 
population that was necessary in a context of acute polarization.  Certain conditions of 
the dawa also seem to have reflected this imperative of social separation from the 
population that served a strategic function.  A former Mayi-Mayi interviewed in 
Lwege recalls:  
“Initially, I would come back regularly to the village; it was always 
clandestine and there were a lot of conditions; I could not stay in my home, 
I couldn’t talk to anyone, not even my wife, and I had to carry out some 
rituals before being able to get close to my house, where I just had to drop 
something off for my family without being seen or engaging with anyone.  
But one day I went back with 5 others of the same village, but the RCD 
had some lists; they knew that we were Mayi-Mayi.  One of us was killed, 
I managed to escape.  After that, I never came back to the village while I 
was a soldier.”118 
5.3.  Conclusion 
These two fist chapters have allowed us to delineate the contours of two central 
‘macro-logics’ of armed mobilization and participation during the Mayi-Mayi 
resistance movement against the RCD in South Kivu.  In Chapter 4, we have seen that 
the Mayi-Mayi movement displayed some of the characteristics of a social movement.  
Through the articulation of a simple yet novel mobilizing message in longstanding 
cultural frames, and the development of a ‘practical’ repertoire of insurgent collective 
action, the movement was able craft the ‘modularity’ necessary to mobilize across the 
fragmented ethno-political landscape of eastern DRC, although its mobilizing capacity 
varied significantly in different areas.  The strength of the mobilization owed to its 
                                                 
117 Surveyor interview with chief of Nduma, 15/06/2013. 
118 Interview with ex-Mayi Mayi, Lwege, August 2012.  
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‘appropriation’ and mediation by pre-existing social networks.  In the town of Bukavu, 
these included networks embedded in the town’s neighbourhoods and universities, that 
provided important mobilizing platforms, as has been the case with many insurgencies 
on the continent (Reno 2012).  In rural areas, the call to arms articulated in variegated 
ways with the imperative of organizing security and protection to the rural socio-
polities in a context of crisis and the sharp rise in insecurity.  Self-defence groups 
formed across the rural areas, often emanating from the fragmented and decentralized 
socio-polities that characterize the region, and using social networks embedded in rural 
villages to mobilize resources and labour.  In some cases, these groups ‘appropriated’ 
the insurgent Mayi-Mayi identity, but this varied strongly according to different areas.  
 
In Chapter 5, we have shown that, concomitantly to the ‘grassroots’ dynamic of 
mobilization, a more accumulative and extractive logic of labour started implanting 
itself, and was progressively reinforced by the efforts to centralize and structure the 
insurgent movement.  This translated into much more coercive and violent modes of 
recruitment, either through forced abductions of soldiers or through the ‘capture’ of 
locally formed groups.  It also translated into significantly more coercive modes of 
control over recruits, which often implied a ‘breaking’ of the communal logic that had 
driven the many of the localized mobilizations.  Thus, while many of the initial 
mobilizations had been driven by a ‘protective’ impetus and initially remained 
inscribed within rural ‘moral economies’, this more accumulative logic of labour 
mobilization significantly changed the ‘social architecture’ of mobilization.  
Furthermore, this logic was systematized and institutionalized in the areas that fell 
under military control by the Mayi-Mayi movement.  The efforts of Padiri’s movement 
in particular to create a state-like administration in the areas that fell under its control 
reproduced longstanding modes of rule and resource mobilization in the region 
(Hoffmann 2014), in particular the use of chiefs as ‘handles’ to mobilize combatants, 
and gave rise to complex politics of recruitment within villages.  The fragmentation of 
the movement that resulted from constant infighting and competition gave rise to 
variegated patterns of insertion of the smaller Mayi-Mayi groups into the areas where 
they operated, but these groups also displayed accumulative approaches to the 
recruitment of combatants.  In the context of enhanced social polarization resulting 
from the civil war and counter-insurgency tactics by the RCD, social networks 
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remained important vectors of recruitment of combatants, which were strategically 
instrumentalised by commanders.  
 
While this chapter has allowed to identify two ‘macro-logics’ of armed mobilization, 
and delineate the ways they operated across the three levels of analysis that constitute 
our theoretical framework, a closer focus is necessary to identify the ways in which 
they both play out in specific social and institutional configurations.  Accordingly, the 
following chapters adopt a narrower geographical focus, and closely trace processes 
of armed mobilization in the Midlands and the Highlands of the territory of Kalehe.  
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Chapter Six                                                                                                
Cisayura’s Men: Armed Mobilisation in the Kalehe Midlands 
“The man on whom you have inquired, the Mayi-Mayi man, is still abandoned to his 
sad fate“  
SMS by Lieutenant Colonel Cisayura 
 
 
In this chapter, we analyse the armed mobilizations that occurred during the rule of the 
RCD in the Midlands of the territory of Kalehe, with a particular focus on the towns 
of Kasheke and Lemera in the Grouping of Mbinga Sud.  The objective of the chapter 
is to provide a closer historical contextualization of the processes identified in 
Chapters 4 and 5, in particular the articulation between large-scale dynamics of 
resource mobilization and the ‘protective’ logic of mobilization.  We analyse the 
armed mobilizations that occurred in this area at the three levels of analysis exposed 
in the theoretical framework:  First as a shift in the political economy of labour 
mobilization and control induced by the war, which translated into a changing ‘social 
architecture’ of recruitment and control over combatants, and finally as an individual 
process of adaptation to these evolving conditions.  
 
We start by analysing the Local Defence mobilization in the Grouping of Mbinga Sud, 
during which the RCD co-opted state channels of resource mobilization to conscribe 
the youth, and the gradual loss of control of both the RCD and the customary 
authorities over large fringes of the recruited youth that followed the conscription into 
the Local Defence.  We then take a closer look at the second round of armed 
mobilization by the former Local Defence leader Cisayura, who re-mobilized the ex-
Local Defence to form an insurgent Mayi-Mayi armed group.  This second 
mobilization will be understood as part of the constitution of a ‘counter-authority’ in 
the region, whereby the Mayi-Mayi used their channels of penetration into the societies 
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of the Midlands of Mbinga Sud to create support networks, mobilize resources, recruit 
and exert control over combatants.  The fieldwork for this chapter was carried out from 
August to November of 2012, in Coastal Kalehe and the Midlands of Kalehe, with a 
particular focus on the region that surround the small towns of Kasheke and Lemera. 
6.1.  Background to the Armed Conflict in Kalehe  
The lakeshore area of Kalehe and the eastern slopes of the Mitumba mountain range 
of the Mbinga Sud Grouping, an area known as the Moyen-Plateaux (Midlands), 
experienced a markedly different institutional trajectory than the areas west of the 
Mitumba mountain range, owing to a much deeper integration into the colonial state 
and colonial agricultural capitalism.  The Bahavu “ethnic” group who populated the 
area had obtained a relatively privileged position in the colonially crafted ethno-
territorial order, as the Buhavu chiefdom, created in 1928, was given authority over all 
land and people of what now constitutes the territory of Kalehe, including the Batembo 
and Barongeronge chiefdoms and their people (Hoffmann 2014 p.182).  The 
accessibility of the lakeshore and western slopes of Kalehe territory from the colonial 
capital Costermansville, and the favourable climate of the region attracted colonial 
agricultural entrepreneurs.  Under colonial rule, the area mostly fell under what Boone 
(2014) calls a “statist” land tenure regime, where the colonial state directly reallocated 
land to colonial agricultural capitalists, pushing local populations into wage labour 
contracts and “importing” additional labour,119 particularly from Rwanda, in sharp 
contrast with decentralized systems of customary land tenure that prevailed west of 
the Mitumba mountain range.   
 
The pre-emption of land allocation prerogatives by the colonial state, the concentration 
of land ownership and the resulting “proletarianization” of rural populations, whose 
livelihoods became more dependent on wages or precarious work contracts in the 
plantations rather than smallholding production eroded the authority of customary 
chiefs, whose role was reduced to organizing the mobilization of resources - taxes and 
labour - for the state and the colonial economy, and maintaining order.  The 
                                                 
119 For a more detailed analysis of the land related conflicts in Kalehe see Vlassenroot and Higgins 
(2005), Claessens (2012), and APC-LPI (2012). 
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concentration of land ownership was reinforced in the post-colonial era, with a small 
class of grands proprietaires (large landowners) acquiring most of the arable land 
from the colonial landholders 120  and constituting a small landed elite, while the 
majority of the population was confined to customarily allocated parcelles (small 
parcels of land) in the villages and towns of the area, and driven to work in the 
plantations to be able to sustain themselves. 
6.1.1.  War and polarization under the AFDL and the RCD 
This rampant social fracture between a landed elite with close ties to the central state 
and customary authorities on one side, and a progressively marginalized youth on the 
other was exacerbated during the 1980s and 1990s, when the economic crisis was 
amplified by a security and humanitarian crisis caused by the arrival of millions of 
Rwandan refugees in the region, and provided one of the central axes of social and 
political polarization during the wars of the 1990s, and in particular the rule of the 
RCD from 1998 to 2003. 
 
Violent conflict started in the area with the arrival of the AFDL in the Grouping of 
Mbinga Sud in 1996, which set up a base in the small town of Lemera at the fringes of 
the Kahuzi-Biega National Park, from which it launched military operations in the 
Southern Highlands of Kalehe where ex-Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and 
Interhamwe militias had found refuge.   Considering the AFDL coalition as a foreign 
invasion, the Tembo militias that had formed during the Masisi war of 1993 allied with 
disbanding Zairian Armed Forces and Rwandan Hutu militias to stall the progression 
of the AFDL, conducting military operations on the AFDL positions in the midlands 
of Kalehe.   This complex constellation of armed groups also started occupying land 
and pillaging cattle in the Highlands and Midlands of Kalehe, many of which belonged 
to Havu landlords, who were accused by the militias of collaboration with the 
AFDL.121  
 
                                                 
120 Interview with Muganga Bicinga, Village Chief of Kasheke, November 2012. 
121 Interview with Village Chief of Kasheke.  The AFDL eventually joined forces with Tembo militias 
to topple the Mobutu regime following the Bitale Agreement of December 4, 1996 (Hoffmann 2014 
p.218).   
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This pattern of geographic separation between the Highlands and Midlands of the 
Grouping of Mbinga Sud was reproduced during the RCD rebellion, as Mayi-Mayi 
militia under the command of Muhindu Changoco, in evolving alliances with the 
various Hutu militias, took control of the Highlands from where they conducted 
military operations on the Midlands and Lowlands of Kalehe to attack RCD positions.   
This further entrenched a line of military confrontation that would profoundly, if 
temporarily, reorganised economic activity in the region.  Access to land in the 
Highlands was cut off for the Havu landowners and workers by the presence of the 
Mayi-Mayi militia, who conducted regular attacks on Havu populations, considered to 
be allied with the RCD.122  
6.2.  Mobilization and counter-Mobilization under RCD rule 
When the RCD rebellion seized the state apparatus in Goma and Bukavu, state and 
customary authorities were compelled to either accept the new rulers or enter the 
resistance.  In the coastal areas of Kalehe, the authorities had little choice but to align 
to the RCD or face retaliation, which could come swiftly because of the proximity of 
Bukavu and the connectedness of the region in terms of roads and infrastructure.  
Furthermore, the main priority of the Mbinga Sud Grouping state and customary 
authorities was the restoration of security, as the repeated attacks and population 
displacements were putting their authority under significant pressure.  As a result, 
many of the state and customary authorities of the Grouping of Mbinga Sud 
strategically sided with the RCD, and actively sought protection against the Mayi-
Mayi and Hutu militias who mounted regular attacks on the plantations in the 
Highlands to steal cattle, as well as on the Havu populations of the Midlands and 
coastal areas, often accused by the Mayi-Mayi of supporting the RCD.  The Village 
Chiefs of Kasheke and Lemera made an official request at the Bureau of Kalehe 
Territory for the RCD to detach soldiers to their circumscriptions to provide protection, 
facilitated the set-up of an RCD military camp, and organized food collections and 
contributions to support the RCD troops.123  The RCD military presence was, however, 
insufficient to counter infiltrations and night raids by Interhamwe and Mayi-Mayi 
                                                 
122 Interview with Pasteur Nyamigogo, Lemera, November 2012. 
123 Interview with Village Chief of Kasheke, November 2012.   
 159 
elements, and a more comprehensive effort was required, involving the mobilization 
of civilians to ensure security.124   
 
The mobilization of civilians for security provision proved to be a delicate and risky 
endeavour.  On the one hand, the RCD army was proving incapable of restoring 
security to the region, making the mobilization of additional means a necessity if the 
authorities were to maintain their control over the population, and in particular the 
youth, who were being targeted by clandestine recruitments into Mayi-Mayi groups.  
On the other, mobilizing civilians in such a tense context could lead to unforeseeable 
outcomes, including further organized resistance.  As the ANR agent of Nyamucubi 
and former leader of the Local Defence recalls: 
“We had to watch the formation of groups very closely, even the ones we 
formed ourselves; the youth were very rebellious at the time and many 
were being interested by the Mayi-Mayi ideology.”125   
Indeed, rampant frustration at the economic and security situation as well as the 
perceived collusion of local authorities with the RCD were driving support for the 
Mayi-Mayi resistance movement, particularly among the youth.  Shortly after the 
arrival of the RCD, Jean Paul Eneondo Sido, a native of Kasheke who had returned to 
his home area after the RCD took control of Goma, had started to muster up resistance 
against the RCD among the local youth, and gathered a small group of ex-Forces 
Armees Zairoises soldiers, as well as ex-AFDL Kadogo (soldiers) and a few other 
youth, to form a small Mayi-Mayi group, with whom he took off to the bush and 
established ties with the Tembo Mayi-Mayi groups of the Highlands and the grouping 
of Mubugu.126  This group, as well as Major Muhindo’s group in the Highlands of 
Mbinga Sud, were conducting clandestine recruitments among the youth.  The 
formation of civilian defence initiatives was not just a way to use local resources – in 
particular labour - to provide a modicum of security to the population, but was also a 
means to exert control over the local youth, both by the RCD and the customary 
authorities.   
                                                 
124 Interview with ANR representative and former Local Defense leader, Kasheke, November 2012. 
125 Interview with ANR official, Nyamucubi, October 2012. 
126 Interview with Muganga Bicinga, Village Chief de Kasheke, November 2012.     
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Mobilization into ad-hoc civilian defence groups had begun long before the arrival of 
the RCD, as part of a range of initiatives to counter the insecurity that had spread in 
the area since the arrival of the Rwandan refugees in 1994 and particularly the AFDL 
in 1996,127 with more or less coordination by local authorities. Throughout Mbinga 
Sud Grouping and coastal Kalehe, local authorities and youth had started organizing 
neighbourhood patrols and vigilante groups, which started monitoring irregular 
activity, and using machetes and spears to deter assailants in the case of attacks.  In 
Kasheke, it was unclear who first initiated these patrols, as the chief of Kasheke claims 
that he and his adjuncts had first set up the system, while Cisayura Bienvenue, who 
would become the leader of the Kasheke Local Defence and subsequently a Mayi-
Mayi commander, contends that he has formed the first group on his own, and that he 
was later approached by local authorities who wanted to support his group. 128   
Cisayura, a Native of Nyamutwe, a sub-village of Kasheke, traces his initiative to form 
a small self-defence initiative directly to the personal experience of violence:  
“When I saw the Interhamwe make the village suffer, that’s when I decided 
to do something.  I myself had been a victim of the Interhamwe, they burnt 
our houses in Nyamutwe.  So I chatted up some youth in the village (...) 
the movement was my initiative; then the Village Chief saw that our 
activity was good, and they decided to start supporting us” 129 
With the advent of the RCD rebellion in 1998 and the intensification of violence in the 
region, renewed efforts were made to mobilize civilians into more structured auto-
defence organizations, under direct supervision of the RCD and state authorities.  In 
1998, the Kalehe Territory Administrator, as well as prominent RCD commanders in 
Kalehe, Colonel Kazungu and Colonel Mulamba, sent out the order that each village 
should organize its security by mobilizing all able bodied men and forming self-
defence groups, which would complement the security provided by the RCD 
                                                 
127 Many interviewees date the sharp rise in insecurity to the arrival of the AFDL, arguing that, despite 
being disruptive, the arrival of the refugees in 1994 did not create insecurity in the coastal areas of 
Kalehe, contrarily to other regions.   
128 Interview with Colonel Cisayura Kavumu, June 2013.   
129 Ibid.   
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military.130  A concerted effort to mobilize resources and labour by the apparatus of 
state and customary authority thus led to the emergence of civilian defence 
organizations called rondes, who carried out the same type of tasks as the ad-hoc 
vigilante groups, but under close supervision by state, customary and military 
authorities.  The men were organized by village, neighbourhood or avenue, under the 
supervision of Village Chiefs and their adjuncts, themselves under the command of 
the police and RCD military.   
 
The youth whom had formed the first ad-hoc patrols were integrated into these rondes, 
but mobilization was extended, as in most towns and villages all able men were 
required to take part.131  The mobilization therefore resembled longstanding modes of 
labour mobilization, which as we have seen had formed an integral part of the 
constitution of political authority in the region, and was mediated by social 
mechanisms of community, family and peer pressure.  Indeed, while most authorities 
and participants claimed that participation in the rondes was voluntary, numerous 
interviews point out that refusal to participate entailed sanctions.132  For example, in 
the village of Kiniezire, in Mbinga Nord, the youth mobilized into these rondes would 
themselves seek out those who were reluctant to participate and bring them to the 
Village Chief, whom, after discussing the motives for not participating, would either 
compel them to participate or impose a fine, or in certain cases refer them to the 
police.133  Many participants in these organizations, however, stressed that their main 
motive for participation was the experience of direct harm on their families or 
entourage resulting from attacks, and the resulting desire to protect their communities.  
 
Although these rondes were organized as part of a Grouping and Territory level 
initiative to reinforce defence, the mobilization initially retained a highly “local” 
character, and a low level of institutionalisation and professionalization.  Participating 
in the rondes was a part time activity, as participants usually continued to carry out 
their “normal” activities during the day, and joined the rondes in the evening and 
                                                 
130 Interview with ANR official and former leader of the Local Defence, Kasheke, November 2012. 
131 Ibid.   
132 Interview with Rondes leaders and participants in Lemera, Kasheke, Nyamucubi, Nyabibwe, 
Mukwidja and Kiniezire.  September-November 2012.   
133 Interview with Chief of Kiniezire and leaders of Kiniezire self-defence organization, Kiniezire, 
October 2012. 
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nights, when the risk of attacks was highest.  Apart from those who were tasked with 
providing direct support to RCD troops, there were very few deployments beyond the 
local circumscription, the village or neighbourhood, and as a result the youth remained 
closely integrated to their familial and community structures, “staying and eating in 
their homes”. 134   Most interviews point to “normal” relations between the men 
mobilized into the rondes, and the rest of the population, often attributed to the 
communal character of their participation.  In addition, small contributions were 
usually organized at the village and neighbourhood levels, with each household asked 
to contribute some money to equip the rondes with whistles, torches and batteries.135  
This first stage of territory wide decentralized mobilization, which lasted around 4-6 
months, was therefore closely orchestrated by and integrated into established 
structures of authority and social organization.  This, however, did not last, as the 
decentralized mobilization soon turned into a more centralized military conscription.   
6.2.1.  The Local Defence mobilization in Mbinga Sud 
In parallel to the establishment of these decentralized self-defence organizations, 
further initiatives were taken by the RCD leadership to step up mobilization into its 
army and create a more professional and institutionalized paramilitary force to counter 
the various insurgencies that the RCD was facing.  In late 1998, the RCD launched the 
Local Defence Initiative, a provincial strategy initiated by the RCD governor of North 
Kivu, Eugene Serufuli, and the governor of South Kivu, Norbert Bashengezi 
Kantitima, to provide a decentralized security system relying on the sub-provincial 
resource mobilization capacities of the state and local authorities.  The initiative was 
actively supported and relayed by the Kalehe territory and Mbinga Sud Grouping 
authorities, as well as by many village chiefs and their collaborators, several of whom 
had been actively lobbying the RCD for a more comprehensive protection strategy.136  
Following a meeting at the office of the grouping chief, the Village Chief of Kasheke 
Muganga Bicinga and his adjuncts, as well as the sub-Village Chiefs, organized a 
                                                 
134 Interview with chief of Kasheke, November 2012.   
135  Interview with Rondes leaders and participants in Lemera, Kasheke, Nyamucubi, Nyabibwe, 
Mukwidja and Kiniezire.  September-November 2012. 
136 Interviews with chief of Kasheke, November 2012.   
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sensibilisation (awareness raising) of the population of the 8 sub-villages of Kasheke 
to recruit youth to staff the Local Defence initiative.   
 
According to these authorities and several interviewed residents, recruitment into the 
Local Defence was done strictly on a volunteering basis.  According to the chiefs and 
authorities who carried out the mobilization, recruits didn’t correspond to a particular 
social profile, nor were they recruited with particular attention to their credentials.  For 
to a Pastor in Lemera, the Local Defence youth were “a mix of good elements, and 
some bad elements”.137  Both recruiters and the local authorities insisted that the 
purpose of the Local Defence was population and community protection.  A Local 
Defence Instructor in Kasheke recalled: 
“I suffered personal attacks from the Interhamwe, that’s why I decided to 
join the Rondes, and then the Local Defence.  My brother in law had been 
assassinated, my house and neighbourhood had been pillaged and burned, 
and my little sister had been raped.  It was the Neighbourhood Chiefs who 
brought the youth to the training of the Local Defence.  Our objective was 
to protect our families, protect our communities.  I was trained as a Local 
Defence in Nyabibwe, and then deployed in Kasheke.  We had weapons, 
we would carry out rondes in the entire area, organized by axes.”138  
Around 120-130 youth from the Kasheke area were recruited into the Local Defence 
initiative, and sent off to RCD bases in Lwiro or Kalehe, where they received three 
months of military training before being redeployed in the region, in Kasheke but also 
in various other “axes” of Kalehe littoral and Midlands.  For many of the mobilized 
youth, this represented the first severing of ties with their social environment, and a 
first contact with the harsh and competitive environment of the RCD military.  Many 
insisted on the discriminating treatment they received from RCD troops during and 
after the training.  A former member of the Local Defence recalls that “we were treated 
like slaves by the RCD soldiers; they would even spit at us and we could do nothing”.139  
Competitions were organized to evaluate the military ability of recruits, at which 
                                                 
137 Interview with Pasteur Nyamigogo, November 2012.   
138 Interview with ANR official and former Local Defense Instructor, Kasheke, November 2012.    
139 Interview with ex-Local Defence and ex-Mayi-Mayi combatant, Lemera, November 2012.   
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Cisayura Bienvenue earned the reputation of a sharpshooter.140  After the training, the 
Local Defence were deployed in coastal Kalehe, the Midlands and the Highlands, but 
not necessarily according to their area of origin.  The communal logic that had 
characterized the constitution of the rondes, where participants remained spatially 
inscribed in their villages or neighbourhoods was no longer systematic in the Local 
Defence, generating frustration among many recruits.  
 
Contrarily to the rondes whose role was mainly to deter attacks, The Local Defence 
represented a real paramilitary force.  In Kasheke and Lemera, the Local Defence 
assisted the RCD in conducting attacks on Interhamwe militia and Mayi-Mayi 
positions in the Kahuzi Biega National Park, as well as in the Midlands and Highlands, 
serving as reconnaissance scouts, but also engaging in combat with enemy troops.  The 
rest of the time, they conducted patrols in the area of Kasheke, or staffed roadblocks 
set up to control population movements.141  Firearms had been distributed to the Local 
Defence, but they were often closely monitored by the RCD military authorities.  In 
several towns and villages of the area, the Local Defence were required to hand in their 
weapons during the day to the local RCD commander or ANR (intelligence services) 
officer, who would hand then back to the Local Defence for the evening patrols.  
Because of the scarcity of weapons, rotations of weapons were established.  In 
Kasheke, Cisayura Bienvenue was in charge of the only weapon that had been 
distributed to the Local Defence as a result of his sharpshooting abilities and military 
feats.    
 
Testimonies from families and residents point to a change in the behaviour and attitude 
of the youth during the period of redeployment that followed the training.  Although 
the Local Defence remained close to their social environment after redeployment, 
often sleeping in their own homes and dependant on contributions collected in the 
village or neighbourhood to sustain themselves, many testimonies point to the fact that 
“their behaviour changed, they started behaving a bit like bandits”.142  A local resident 
recalls:  
                                                 
140 Interview with Cisayura Bienvenue, June 2013. 
141 Interview with former Local Defence commanders, Kasheke and Lemera, November 2012.  
142 Interview with chief of Kasheke, November 2012.   
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“The youth of the Local Defence had already changed their behaviour; 
they harassed people, often to obtain something to eat or some money; if 
you weren’t one of their relatives, you were likely to be harassed by them 
if you met them on the way; We the population couldn’t do much about it, 
but we complained several times to the chiefs”.143  
According to former members, frustration was rife in the ranks of the Local Defence, 
as a result of poor living conditions, but also repeated harassment and humiliation by 
RCD troops.  State and customary authorities, whose authority formed an integral part 
of the apparatus of RCD control over the Local Defence, were often perceived as 
treacherous and abusive as a result of their collusion with the RCD.  Defiance towards 
both the RCD command and the local authorities who collaborated with the rulers was 
widespread, and included a wide range of practices, such as refusing to wear the RCD 
uniforms and insignia, or taking them off when officials were absent. 144   These 
“everyday practices” echoed longstanding idioms and repertoires of resistance, 145 
often framed as a continuation of age-old resistance of the people of eastern Congo 
against external invaders, and in particular their Rwandan neighbours.  A priest who 
was in service in the Parish of Nyabibwe at the time when the RCD controlled the 
town argued:  
“In those days everyone was resisting; some resisted by refusing to obey 
order by RCD commanders, and by refusing to go to the forced works.  
Others resisted by covertly burning the peanuts in their fields, so that the 
harvest didn’t give anything.  The Shi and we have always known how to 
resist the Rwandans.  Each time we spot a Rwandan way of doing things, 
then we start the resistance; and the Rwandans become afraid because 
they know that we are resisting“146 
According to a local RCD commander and several local chiefs, concern about the 
Local Defence recruits was growing, as insubordination or defection were clear and 
                                                 
143 Interview with local shopkeeper, Lemera, November 2012.   
144 Interview with ex-Local Defence in Butale, October 2012. 
145 See Iniguez de Heredia (2013). 
146 Interview with former Priest of Nyabibwe, Irambo, August 2012.   
 166 
present threats as a result of the presence within the environment of Mayi-Mayi 
members, whom, as we will see, often had close social ties with members of the Local 
Defence.147  
 
The Local Defence was therefore a comprehensive effort to mobilize resources at a 
decentralized level, yet on a large scale, through established channels of state and 
customary authority.  Importantly, the Local Defence initiative was not only directed 
towards potential soldiers, but also included trainings for local authorities, village and 
neighbourhood chiefs, who were also included in the military and “ideological” 
trainings of the RCD, designed to enhance compliance to RCD rule.  In addition to 
mobilizing resources, the Local Defence thus constituted an effort to enhance the 
RCD’s control over the population, albeit one that would soon show its limits.   
6.2.2.  Military integration and the defection 
Around the year 2000, the RCD leadership and the provincial governors of North and 
South Kivu pushed for the full integration of the Local Defence into the RCD army, 
which suffered from very low levels of direct recruitment because of its unpopularity, 
and was under significant military pressure by the multiple fronts and insurgencies it 
was dealing with.  This was part of a broader effort to boost the troop numbers of the 
RCD, which included a public campaign for recruitment throughout eastern DRC 
(Human Rights Watch 2001).  As numerous youth had been mobilized into the Local 
Defence, they represented pre-constituted labour pools that were easier to corral into 
the army, as part of a large-scale effort of labour conscription that echoed the long 
history of large-scale military conscriptions in the region.  The Local Defence were 
already an integral part of the RCD military apparatus, serving as essential auxiliaries 
and frequently requisitioned to assist RCD troops on various military fronts.  There 
remained, however, a difference in status, but also a difference in “ideology”, which a 
new round of training by the RCD was intended to bridge.  The Local Defence that 
had been dispersed in various axes in the area of Kasheke were rounded up a second 
time and sent to a second training in Mushake, Masisi, preceding full integration into 
songambele, as the RCD army was referred to locally.  The objective of the Mushake 
                                                 
147 Interview with Colonel Cisayura, June 2013.     
 167 
training, contrarily to the first training that had focused on military tactics, was to “give 
us the ideology of the RCD, and change our mentality, to get us out of the mentality of 
the Local Defence, and into the mentality of the RCD” according to Cisayura.  
Interestingly, the shift from a discursive focus on community protection, which had 
formed the backbone of the “ideology” of the Local Defence, to one focused on the 
military and territorial expansion of the RCD was systematically presented by former 
Local Defence as the main cause for defection from the RCD army: 
“it was then that we realized that the ideology of the RCD was not to 
protect us, but to conquer us; They showed us that the RCD was purely 
Rwandan, and that their ambition was to sell the country; when we 
realized that we were conquered, many attempted to run away, but that 
could lead to beatings or imprisonment or even death”148 
More prosaic motives accompanied these acute feelings of deception, such as the bad 
“treatment” the Local Defence received in Mushake, where financial compensation 
was meagre and denigration by RCD officers systematic.  According to several 
testimonies, the atmosphere at the Mushake camp was very tense, with frequent fights 
breaking out between RCD soldiers and the Local Defence.  Cisayura, who had 
imposed himself as the leader of the Local Defence in Kasheke, was active in stirring 
up resentment against the RCD in the camp, which soon led to a series of defections.  
One night, after a fight between RCD soldiers and Local Defence from his Kasheke 
group, he fled with 84 of the Kasheke youth, taking 47 weapons and heading back to 
the Kalehe Midlands.149  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
148 Interview ex-Mai Mai, Lemera, November 2012. 
149 Interview with Colonel Cisayura, June 2013.   
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Photo 2: The town of Lemera in the Midlands of Kalehe 
 
 
6.3.  Cisayura’s mobilization in Lemera and Kasheke 
We now turn to the second period of focus of this chapter, the re-mobilization of Local 
Defence recruits by Cisayura and the Mayi-Mayi.  This period represents a critical 
juncture in the history of the Midlands of Mbinga Sud, one that has durably affected 
the structure of authority and social organization in the region, entrenching military 
networks that were repeatedly reactivated in subsequent rounds of armed mobilization.  
In this section, we will present the mobilization led by Cisayura as a struggle for 
control over the youth of the region and their productive capacity, waged on one side 
by the RCD and collaborating local authorities who resorted to coercive means and 
various mechanisms of social control to attempt to quell the mobilization, and on the 
other by Cisayura and his group, who used a subtle mix of persuasion and coercion to 
mobilize recruits.    The struggle for control over the youth was part of the wider war 
that was playing out in the region, and had permeated and polarized all spheres of 
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economic, political and social activity.  We will pay particular attention to the 
individual and collective social processes at play during the mobilization of Cisayura’s 
group, and then show how they were tied to the constitution of a “counter” authority 
in the Highlands and Midlands of Kalehe. 
6.3.1.  Confusion and counter-insurgency in the aftermath of the defection  
In the Mbinga Sud Grouping, a period of confusion seems to have followed the 
defection of large numbers of Local Defence recruits.  Former Local Defence recruits 
recall that, after these defections, they went in different directions, with some fleeing 
towards Bukavu or Goma where anonymity allowed some protection against recapture 
by the RCD, while others returned to their home towns or villages and attempted to 
settle back into civilian life.150  The return of the Local Defence recruits put local 
authorities in a difficult position, as their hierarchy required them to report the 
defectors to the RCD command,151 while the population had often actively requested 
the return of these “reluctant recruits”.152  The confusion led to different responses by 
Local Authorities in different localities of the Mbinga Sud Grouping.  In Nyabibwe 
for example, the Grouping Chief and Village Chief initially accepted the return of the 
defectors, which were encouraged to return to civilian life and tasked with staffing the 
local rondes that were still taking place.  However, a few weeks later, RCD troops, 
with the alleged support of these very same authorities recaptured the returnees, who 
were sent to staff Local Defence units in the Kalehe Highlands.153  
 
In Kasheke and Lemera, the situation that followed the defection from the Mushake 
training was similarly tense and ambiguous.  Cisayura, the leader of the Kasheke Local 
Defence, claims that, after spearheading the defection from the camp in Mushake, he 
immediately led his group of 86 Local Defence into the forest to form his own Mayi-
Mayi group.  Most other testimonies, however, suggest that the transition wasn’t as 
                                                 
150 Interviews with former Local Defence members in Lemera, Kasheke, Nyamucubi, Nyabibwe, 
Mukwidja and Kiniezire, September-November 2012. 
151 Interview with former Local Defence Commanders, Kasheke and Nyamucubi, September-
November 2012. 
152 This expression is borrowed from HRW (2001).   
153 Interview with former Local Defence Leader and participants in Nyabibwe, October 2012. 
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seamless, and that a fierce struggle for control over the former recruits took place 
between local authorities and Cisayura’s nascent group.   
 
The exact military configuration during this period remains unclear, as accounts are 
sometimes contradictory, owing, to the density of events that were unfolding at a quick 
pace, but perhaps also to competition for authority between different Mayi-Mayi 
commanders, who all claim to have been the sole leaders at the time.  From what has 
been gathered during fieldwork and interviews, it appears that, following their 
defection, Cisayura and a group of former Local Defence spent an initial period in 
Kasheke and Lemera, semi-clandestinely circulating the area to carry out recruitments 
and preparing a military base in the forests of the Midlands to the north of Lemera.  
Cisayura and his group were in contact with the Mayi-Mayi group led by Muhindu 
Changoco, which was active in the Mubugu Grouping.154   While Cisayura and his 
group made at least one trip to meet the Mayi-Mayi of Changoco in Mubugu, and 
received both training and Mayi-Mayi initiation rituals which usually entail a form of 
allegiance to the Mayi-Mayi hierarchy of command, Cisayura operated his group 
autonomously from Changoco for two years, before being absorbed into Changoco’s 
group, from 2002 to 2004, when all groups were integrated into the national 
government.155  
 
The Village Chiefs of Kasheke and Lemera and the local ANR (intelligence services) 
were aware of the risk that the Mayi-Mayi infiltrations and recruitment was posing to 
the area, and actively sought to quell the recruitments by Cisayura and his men.  
Several reunions were held in Kasheke and Lemera with local notables to discuss the 
actions of Cisayura and his group, and Sub-Village chiefs called for residents to 
discourage their family members from joining the Mayi-Mayi rebellion and report 
suspicious activities.156   The behaviour of the former Local Defence was closely 
monitored, both by customary authorities and their adjuncts, and the state police 
services and their informants.  However, the paucity of the RCD security system, and 
the absence of a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy in Kasheke and Lemera 
                                                 
154 Muhindo Changoco had broken off from Padiri’s movement to form a large Mayi-Mayi armed group 
in the Kalehe Highlands, known as the Mayi-Mayi Kalehe.  
155 Interview with Colonel Cisayura and Major Muhindo Changoco, June 2013.    
156 Interview with chief of Kasheke, and the sub-village chief of Nyamutwe, November 2012. 
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allowed Cisayura and his networks of recruiters to dodge attempts at stopping their 
recruitments.    
6.3.2.  Crafting control: Individual and collective processes of participation 
We will now take a closer look at the social processes at play during the armed 
mobilization led by Cisayura and his group, conceived as a battle for control over the 
youth by established authorities on one side, and the nascent group of Cisayura on the 
other.  The remobilization led by Cisayura in the aftermath of the defection is the result 
of a set of individual and collective social processes that should be understood not as 
separate or mutually exclusive, but as profoundly intertwined and inter-dependant, as 
argued in the theoretical framework.  
 
The task of discerning the importance of different categories of individual and 
collective motivations for decisions involving such high levels of emotions is a 
difficult task, as multiple and often conflicting motives coalesce.  Yet individual 
motivations to follow Cisayura’s call to arms cannot be separated from the group 
dynamics at play among the former Local Defence, and are often indiscernible in 
testimonies by former participants, where the “we” is much more prevalent than the 
“I” in the narratives.  Forged during the collective experience of the Local Defence 
and the trainings and deployments in the RCD army, these group dynamics remained 
prevalent after the defection, as the former recruits were reported to “always hang out 
together”,157 and presumably exert high levels of social influence on each other, which 
has been argued as a prime determinant of individual participation in violent collective 
action (Mc Doom 2013). 
6.3.2.1.  Collective experience and the appeal of the Military Career 
In their testimonies, former Mayi-Mayi recruits of Kasheke and Lemera emphasize the 
collective experience of hardship, stigmatisation and marginalization experienced as a 
group in the Local Defence and the RCD army, which triggered deep resentment and 
                                                 
157
 Interview with Sub-Village Chief of Nyamutwe, November 2012.    
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feelings of revenge against RCD commanders, although these collective grievances 
were often formulated in “standard” lines of anti-RCD Mayi-Mayi discourse. 
 
Tied to these grievances was the appeal of the military career and the opportunities it 
created for these youth in a context of warfare, a result of their individual and collective 
socialization into the militarized environment of the RCD.  The forging of “militarized 
subjectivities” (Hoffmann K. 2007) as a result of this socialization is consistent with 
accounts that emphasize the conception of war as a form of labour or as a “way of life” 
(Hoffman D.  2012), which can present a strong appeal for youth in periods of acute 
economic and social distress.   
 
This appeal for the particular type of lifestyle and opportunities that the military career 
enabled is referred to by the local authorities and notables who were active in trying 
to oppose the mobilization, but also the families and entourage of the defectors of the 
Local Defence, who emphasized their loss of influence and authority over their sons 
and relatives, a symptom of the broader loss of traction of the established social order 
on the lives of these youth.  The father of a former Local Defence who was recruited 
into Cisayura’s group recalls:  
“He had already changed when he was part of the Local Defence, and he 
didn’t want to hear anything from us; He refused to work in the fields 
again, and he didn’t want to leave the military career because he had 
become something of a bandit; He was always out and about and hanging 
out with his friends from the Local Defence, and we were only hearing 
trouble from that group; And then he disappeared and we learned that he 
had joined the Mayi-Mayi movement, so we declined any responsibility 
over him” 158 
Several other testimonies by family members of recruits point to the decision to join 
the Mayi-Mayi rebellion as a turning point in the progressive social differentiation that 
had been growing between these youth and their entourage.  The decision to join the 
Mayi-Mayi rebellion of Cisayura was therefore not simply the result of individual 
                                                 
158 Interview with family of Mayi-Mayi combatant, Nyamutwe, November 2012.   
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predispositions or individually experienced grievances, but rather constituted through 
the collective experience of both exclusion and hardship in the ranks of the RCD and 
the shift in outlook that resulted from socialization into the “military career”.   
6.3.2.2.  The « aura » of Cisayura 
The role of individuals has often been side-lined in recent accounts of mobilization for 
violent collective action, but it shouldn’t be underestimated as a factor, as recent 
accounts focusing on the role of charismatic leadership and individual personalities of 
armed group commanders have shown. 159   This type of charismatic influence, 
however, should not be understood solely through the lens of individual characteristics 
or personality traits of the leaders and commanders, but rather as part of the collective 
processes at play in the formation of insurgent collective identities, and the role these 
individuals play in orienting collective decision making processes.    
 
Following his defection from the RCD and the period of constitution of his Mayi-Mayi 
group, Cisayura developed a significant level of popularity among certain segments of 
the population of the Kasheke and Lemera areas, and in particular the youth.  Growing 
popular resentment stemming from the catastrophic security and economic situation, 
but also the perceived betrayal by local authorities who had sided with the RCD 
fostered a tacit - and sometimes active - support for the Mayi-Mayi resistance across 
eastern DRC.  As is often the case during military occupation by a force perceived to 
be foreign, 160  the large-scale conscription of soldiers during the Local Defence 
represented a tipping point in popular resentment and support for the resistance.  
However, most of the Mayi-Mayi groups that had been active in the Highlands and 
Midlands of Kalehe and who exerted a direct influence on the lives of the Havu 
populations were perceived to be foreign to the area - either Hunde or Tembo - which 
constituted a barrier for support.  Indeed, many perceived their intrusive and violent 
presence as an attempt by the Hunde or Tembo ethnic groups to conquer Havu 
territory, a symptom of the deeply engrained territorialized conceptions of ethnicity 
                                                 
159 See Hoffmann, K.  (2010) for the role of general Padiri, or Stearns et al. (2013b) for the role of 
Yakutumba.   
160 Parrallels can be drawn with German occupation of continental Europe during the Second World 
War, where the imposition of forced conscription boosted support for the resistance.   
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and authority in eastern DRC (Hoffmann K. 2014).  As a Havu and “son of the soil”, 
Cisayura represented a more familiar and legitimate figure for the Havu populations 
of the Midlands and littoral areas, who had forged a reputation through his military 
ability and fearlessness and the fact that he had managed to significantly reduce the 
number of attacks on Lemera and Kasheke from Interhamwe militias as the leader of 
the rondes and Local Defence. His act of outright defiance and rebellion was therefore 
perceived by many as a legitimate act of courage, although this feeling changes 
according to the different interviewees, as it was particularly prevalent among the 
youth but much less so among the customary and state authorities.  Many interviewees 
also emphasize his sense of fairness as a leader of the Local Defence, drawing a much 
more complex portrait that those usually drawn of warlords and military commanders 
in the area.   
 
The aura of Cisayura seems to have been particularly magnetic for the former Local 
Defence, for whom his leadership and authority had been forged amidst the collective 
experience of conscription and integration in the RCD.  Several former Local Defence 
recruits pointed to the influence of Cisayura on their decision to join the Mayi-Mayi 
rebellion, although the language used to describe this influence is often shrouded in 
metaphors.  As a former Mayi-Mayi recalls: 
“Cisayura was our chief in the Local Defence; he is our brother and our 
father, and he showed us that we had to resist the negative system of the 
RCD (...) he has done many great things for us; So when he came to us to 
tell us to come with him to the forest, and explained to us what was in him, 
(his motivation), we saw that what he had in him was also in us, so we 
accepted his “mot d’ordre”(order) and went with him”161 
Another recruit recalls 
“Cisayura was our chief; we followed him because we knew that he was 
good; The RCD was always trying to hold us (control us), and we saw that 
                                                 
161 Interview with Mayi-Mayi ex-combattant, Lemera, November 2012.   
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this could not be good, so when Cisayura called we answered present 
immediately; He just had to ask us and we came”162 
Testimonies by non-participants, from customary authorities to the entourage of 
combatants, also emphasize the crucial agency of Cisayura in the mobilization. 
Cisayura’s charisma therefore seems to have been an important factor in the decision 
to join the Mayi-Mayi insurgency, yet it should not be understood as simply one of 
individual admiration or attraction, but as part of the complex and multi-faceted 
relation that had developed between Cisayura and his group, a combination of social 
ties created before the war and reinforced through the common experience of 
conscription and hardship, the progressive establishment of an internal group 
hierarchy during the rondes and the Local Defence, but also genuine admiration 
towards the character and achievements of Cisayura.    
6.3.2.3.  Coercion and social pressure for mobilization  
We have attempted to uncover some of the factors of attraction that influenced 
individual’s decisions to participate in Cisayura’s mobilization, both the appeal for the 
livelihood opportunities opened by the military career and the role of Cisayura’s 
charismatic leadership, which were experienced not only individually but collectively 
by the former Local Defence.  The social processes of the mobilization into Cisayura’s 
Mayi-Mayi group were not, however, devoid of various forms of coercion, which, as 
we will attempt to show, were intricately tied in to the relations of dependence and 
social influence that had been forged within the group.  Indeed, after remobilizing a 
core number of followers who joined voluntarily, Cisayura proceeded to recruit the 
rest of the former Local Defence members of Kasheke, often resorting to coercion. 
 
Among the actors interviewed in the Kasheke and Lemera areas during the field 
research, the customary authorities and notables were the most vociferous about the 
fact that Cisayura and his group had used violence, threats and coercion to remobilize 
those former Local Defence who had refused to join Cisayura’s newly formed Mayi-
Mayi group.  Considering the high level of political and social polarization generated 
                                                 
162 Interview with ex-Mayi-Mayi combatant, Nyamutwe, November 2012.   
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by the armed mobilization and the violence wielded by the Mayi-Mayi, which was 
particularly acute during the period of fieldwork as Cisayura was actively trying to 
remobilize ex-combatants in the area,163 the testimonies of these authorities must be 
taken with a level of critical distance.  However, several other testimonies, including 
from former participants, point to the use of threat and coercion in the mobilization of 
reluctant.  The Village Chief of Kasheke contends that direct force and various types 
of threats were used by Cisayura’s group to remobilize the former Local Defence, 
including the beating of reluctant former members, as well as physical violence and 
threats on members of the recruits’ entourage:  
 “When Cisayura remobilized the Local Defence for his group of Mayi-
Mayi, some joined voluntarily, but those who refused to join had no 
choice; It’s as if the Mayi-Mayi thought that these ones would be a menace 
to their group if they stayed in the population (...) They beat up a young 
man close to the centre of Kasheke one day (...) For another one, it was 
the entire family who was visited at night, and they beat them up and 
threatened to kill them if he didn’t enter; for a youth of Nyamutwe 
(Cisayura’s home village) the Mayi-Mayi even abducted the father and put 
him in the prison of the group, and the boy had to join the group for his 
father to be liberated”164 
Testimonies by former Local Defence who were recruited into Cisayura’s group point 
to less direct forms of coercion, percolated through the social networks of individuals 
and peer groups, particularly through the group of former Local Defence themselves.  
A former Mayi-Mayi of Cisayura recalls:  
“I heard that Cisayura was asking his men to join him in the forest (...) I 
didn’t really care at first because everybody knew that I had decided to 
leave the military career and that I was at ease.  But the others (former 
Local Defence) were in the area, and I would see them; Some told me that 
if I didn’t join them, they would come and get me; They made the joke that 
                                                 
163 As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, Cisayura was actively remobilizing ex-Mayi-Mayi 
soldiers at the time of the interviews, in the fall of 2012.   
164 Interview with chief of Kasheke, November 2012.   
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the Mayi-Mayi would come and get me and my family, which made me 
think and be afraid, because they all knew where I lived and they knew my 
family; One day a friend of mine told me that Cisayura was looking for me 
and that he did not accept that others could leave his group without his 
permission; I knew that at any moment they could make a move and 
capture me (...) What could I do? If I left they could harass my family.  So 
I contacted the others, and one night I left and joined the group”165 
Coercion and the threat of physical violence and punishment, like the factors of 
attraction for the group described earlier, were therefore socially mediated, both by 
the group of former members of the Local Defence, which exerted a form of peer 
pressure among each other, but also through wider networks of influence and coercion 
that the Mayi-Mayi group was developing to establish itself as a form of “counter 
authority” in the areas of Kasheke and Lemera.   
 6.3.3.  The Mayi-Mayi Kalehe and the constitution of a counter-authority 
In the preceding sections, we have analysed some of the social processes at play during 
the mobilization led by Cisayura in the aftermath of the defection from the RCD that 
combined various socially mediated processes of attraction and coercion.  Yet the 
recruitments by Cisayura’s group - who would fuse with Changoco’s group in 2002 to 
form the Mayi-Mayi Kalehe - must also be understood in the light of the emergence 
of a Mayi-Mayi “counter” authority in the region.  Indeed, in the period that followed 
the constitution of his group, Cisayura developed an extensive and multi-faceted 
influence over economic, social and political life in the Midlands and Coastal areas of 
Kalehe.  Based in the area around Lemera, his group, which eventually reached 500 
men, became active in all the of Highlands, Midlands, and coastal areas of Kalehe, 
extending its area of activity all the way to Kabamba, and carrying out attacks as far 
out as Kavumu, Bukavu’s airport.166  While the group established full military control 
over several villages in the area surrounding Lemera - and several times in the town 
                                                 
165 Interview with Ex-Mayi-Mayi combatant, Lemera, November 2012.   
166 Interview with Colonel Cisayura, June 2013.  
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of Lemera as well - it also exerted strong influence over towns and villages under RCD 
control.   
 
In the areas it controlled, the group engaged in the type revenue generating practices 
that are typical of rule by non-state armed groups in eastern DRC.  The group set up 
barrieres (road blocks) to tax population movements and trades, fined access to trading 
centres and markets, set up sentinels at strategic spots to levy daily contributions from 
agricultural production in the fields or forest products such as charcoal at the fringes 
of the Kahuzi Biega national park.167  Taxes on households were also levied, a weekly 
cash or in kind contribution called ration, which was usually collected by the local 
authorities - Village of Neighbourhood chiefs, under direct threat of violence in the 
case of non-compliance.  A Priest of Lemera remembers:  
“It was compulsory for all residents of the areas under their control to 
provide the ration.  If someone refused to give it, the chief would have to 
report it to the group, and that person was immediately visited by the 
group, who would pillage his goods and put him in prison until someone 
from his entourage paid the ransom”168 
The group also engaged in various other forms of ‘taxation through disruption’, for 
example by arresting civilians on arbitrary charges or adjudicating private disputes 
through an ad-hoc tribunal, which gave them justifications to detain people and impose 
a ransom for their liberation.  Although often depicted as authoritarian, the rule of the 
group was strategically negotiated and instrumentalized by civilians, who actively 
solicited the group to settle private scores or obtain advantages,169 as Verweijen (2013) 
has shown is often the case in militarized contexts.  Cisayura himself noted that “all 
day civilians would come to me to give me presents, to thank me for the protection that 
I had brought, and to obtain favours”. 170   These transactions that had a highly 
personalized character were central to the recognition of Cisayura as a local authority.   
 
                                                 
167 These were all detailed in the interview with Colonel Cisayura.   
168 Interview with Pasteur Nyamigogo, Lemera, November 2012.    
169 This was the case of a local notable who was detained in the armed group’s “prison” for several 
days and freed after his family paid a ransom.  Interview with JP Cirundu, Lemera, November 2012.    
170 Interview with Colonel Cisayura, June 2013.   
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As for the Local Defence and the RCD, the recruitment and control over combatants 
was a central aspect of the group’s rule.  Despite its “local” character, Cisayura’s group 
quickly started displaying the type of accumulative approach to recruitment that was 
detailed in the previous section.  Cisayura himself provided an example: 
“I captured a group of Hutu who had left from Walungu to go back to the 
Highlands; they were coming by car.  This was one month after we had 
left the RCD.  That group of Hutu were also Local Defence, but from the 
Highlands; when they heard that that a new Hutu resistance was born in 
the Highlands, they decided to defect from their camp in Walungu; We 
captured them on the road when they were on their way to the Highlands; 
there was some resistance, but they saw that we were strong; That’s how 
I got 500 soldiers in my group.”171  
While several testimonies pointed to the fact that the group severely punished those 
who attempted to escape, control over members was more complex than 
straightforward coercion, and symptomatic of the multi-faceted influence that the 
group exerted over the Havu societies of the Midlands and Coastal Kalehe.  In areas 
where the RCD maintained military and administrative control, as in most of the larger 
towns of coastal Kalehe, the influence of the Mayi-Mayi was more covert and 
clandestine, but nevertheless significant.  The fact that Cisayura and his men were 
natives of the area gave them much deep channels of penetration into the Havu 
societies of coastal Kalehe.  Taking advantage of the paucity of the RCD military 
presence, whose soldiers were mostly active during the day but confined to their camps 
at night, Cisayura’s group could “move in all corners”172 of coastal Kalehe, using a 
subtle mix of persuasion and coercion to obtain resources from the populations, not 
only recruits but also various types of contributions in food or other resources, forming 
elaborate support networks in the region.  These contributions served the ambivalent 
function of both alleged support for the movement and protection from punitive 
operations from the group, which came swiftly in cases of refusal to contribute, or 
when civilians provided information to the RCD.  A priest in Irambo declared that: 
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 “At the time, you just had to be seen with people associated with the RCD 
for the Mayi-Mayi to believe you were collaborating with the Tutsi, and 
therefore an enemy”173  
In the highly polarized context of the RCD led counter-insurgency, these contributions 
were key to establishing relations of debt and dependence of individuals and 
households towards the group.  Testimonies from local residents present during this 
period point to the hardships generated by the necessity of contributing taxes to two 
separate and competing authorities, one active during the day, and the other mostly at 
night.174  Through this covert but powerful presence in the population, a subtle mix of 
coercion, relations and influence, Cisayura and the Mayi-Mayi group thus developed 
the foundations of an authority, which even the customary authorities, despite their 
collusion with the RCD, were forced to recognize and take into consideration.  
 
The relation between Cisayura’s Mayi-Mayi group and the Havu populations of the 
Midlands and coastal areas of Kalehe was therefore more complex than what a story 
focused simply on the accumulative and coercive aspects of the group’s presence 
would suggest, as the group developed elaborate relations with the population, which 
included various forms of coercion, but also support, in a highly polarized context.  
Indeed, the Mayi-Mayi would continuously send “spies” into the population, soldiers 
“disguised” as civilians.  As Cisayura detailed:  
“At that time, I had 500 soldiers.  Those who had weapons were sent to 
fight.  The others were sent as civilian spies into the population, they would 
give me reports about the positions of the RCD, as well as the traitors”175  
At the same time, the RCD was also sending spies and informants, creating a highly 
polarized social context where people were often forced to declare allegiances or face 
retaliation by one or the other group.  RCD retaliations and indiscriminate violence, 
however, tended to enhance support for the Mayi-Mayi among various segments of 
                                                 
173 Interview with priest, Irambo, November 2012.  
174 Several interviewees detailed the “visits” that the Mayi-Mayi would carry out at night, often to 
obtain contributions from the population.   
175 Interview with Colonel Cisayura, June 2013.   
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the population.  For example, interviews with priests in the parishes of Irambo, Ihusi, 
Nyabibwe and Minova pointed to active - yet unofficial- support of many Catholic 
priests for the Mayi-Mayi movement.  The priest who was responsible for the parish 
of Nyabibwe, one of the strategic centres of the Kalehe littoral area, attests to the 
climate of deep polarization: 
“In Nyabibwe, the RCD had an intelligence service to know who was with 
the Mayi-Mayi.  They carried out massacres; One day, they killed 6 people, 
including one of my catechists, in the forest of eucalyptus next to the lake.  
If you were called to the hill (where the military camp is), it was as if it 
was the end for you (...) The Mayi-Mayi attacked Nyabibwe several times; 
in late 1998, there was a terrible attack, combats lasted three days.  I 
managed to not get killed; and then the RCD was telling me that if I am 
invincible like that then I must be with the Mayi-Mayi.  And then they said 
we will soon find out whether you are invincible.  Several times they 
ordered me to come to the camp but I never went, because I knew that my 
death was waiting for me up there.  I am very lucky to be alive; everyone 
was fed up with the RCD; they were colonizers, and they were killing us.  
So we supported the Mayi-Mayi”176 
The priest went on to describe his relation with the Mayi-Mayi: 
“The Mayi-Mayi were hiding in the mountains and forests; But they were 
also present in every neighbourhood, and village through their ANR; it 
can be a young guy from the neighbourhood, who will report to them (...) 
I knew that if something happened, the Mayi-Mayi commanders would be 
informed, so people had to be careful with that too.  They would carry out 
infiltrations and attacks, and they carried out a lot of massacres (...) It was 
because they were hiding in the population that the RCD would engage in 
reprisals.  But everyone was supporting the Mayi-Mayi.  Sometimes you 
                                                 
176 Interview with former Priest of Nyabibwe, Irambo, October 2012.   
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gave a little something; or you could also tell things that you knew.  I 
myself buried numerous Mayi-Mayi soldiers who died in battle. “ 
In 2002, Cisayura’s group was absorbed into Changoco’s Mayi-Mayi Kalehe group, 
with Cisayura becoming the second in command of the group, and maintaining his 
positions in the Midlands of the Mbinga Sud Grouping.  As most of the Mayi-Mayi 
groups operating in South Kivu, Cisayura and his men eventually joined the army 
integration program in 2004.  However, the networks that the group had forged did not 
disappear with the integration, and Cisayura, after defecting from the Army in 2004-
5, quickly remobilized the soldiers who had demobilized and took back his military 
positions, illustrating the entrenchment of the processes of armed mobilization and the 
group’s networks.  He would further integrate the national army, and then defect and 
remobilize several times, as was the case in the fall of 2012, while I was conducting 
interviews.   
6.4.  Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have traced the two rounds of armed mobilizations that occurred in 
the Midlands of Kalehe during the period of RCD rule, providing a closer historical 
contextualization of the ‘macro factors’ identified in the previous chapters and the 
manifestations they had on the social architecture and individual dimensions of 
participation.  We have seen that the initial mobilizations were driven by the necessity 
of providing protection to the villages and towns of the Midlands and Lowlands of 
Kalehe in a context of acute crisis and repeated attacks by armed factions.  The 
constitution of civilian security organizations was orchestrated by the RCD, who used 
longstanding and institutionalized modes of decentralized security provision, in 
particular the local chiefs.  The ‘social architecture’ of this mobilization reflected the 
pre-existing social structures of the region, as it ‘activated’ communal modes of 
resource mobilization and social control over recruits.   
 
In contrast, the Local Defence mobilization, illustrated the limitations of such 
institutionalized modes of mobilization and control over labour, particularly when the 
RCD attempted to corral this large labour force into its army, which sparked 
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widespread defections and resistance from the mobilized youth, and the constitution 
of an insurgent group by Cisayura.  In a context of acute social polarization, where the 
RCD attempted to exert control over the youth through their intelligence networks and 
by co-opting local chiefs, the Mayi-Mayi group of Cisayura used their deep channels 
of penetration into the societies of the region to develop a form of ‘counter-authority’ 
in the region, using a subtle balance of coercion and attraction to support and exert 
control over recruits.     
 
Several salient points emerge from this chapter and shed light on the central questions 
of this dissertation.  In particular, we have found evidence that the individual factors 
that drive participation evolve over time and as a result of the transformative effects 
of the armed conflict.  Indeed, while the desire to protect their entourage provided the 
guiding motivation for participation in the first, locally formed groups, the sentiment 
of being ‘captured’ as the Local Defence were corralled into the RCD army  - a 
manifestation of the ‘accumulative’ logic that was at play – sparked their decision to 
defect from the army.  However, their experience in the Local Defence had 
progressively socialized them into a more militarized environment, which changed 
their outlook and provided novel opportunities, and articulated with a genuine 
resentment against the RCD and motivated several to join Cisayura in forming a local 
rebel Mayi-Mayi group.  Protection, however, did not disappear as a factor in this 
second phase of mobilization, but rather than the communal protection that had driven 
the first mobilizations, personal protection, and protection of their entourage, drove 
the second.  Indeed, under the threat of both the recapture into the RCD, and the 
coercive pressure exerted by Cisayura’s group on their entourage to remobilize, they 
had little choice but to join.  This constitutes an example of what Richard (2014) 
‘recruitment for protection’ which is intimately tied to the coercive pressure that armed 
actors exert on societies to obtain recruits (Kalyvas & Kocher 2007).  
 
The chapter also illustrated the progressive social implantation of armed groups in 
rural societies.  Given the configuration of the region, where military intervention by 
the RCD was facilitated by the proximity to the larger towns and roads, the Mayi-Mayi 
group was not able to establish durable military control in the region, intermittently 
controlling certain villages but based mainly in remote hideouts.  Yet, through the 
clandestine influence exerted through the social networks it had access to as a result 
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of it’s largely Havu membership, the group was able to exert a covert yet significant 
influence, developing networks of support, both through coercive methods, but also as 
a result of genuine support from segments of the population.  The mobilization in the 
Midlands of Kalehe represents one among many configurations of the insertion of 
armed groups into the rural societies of Kalehe.  We now turn to the case of the 
Highlands of Kalehe, which, although geographically close to the Midlands, presents 
a sharply different configuration of the insertion of armed organizations into rural 
societies.  
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Chapter Seven                                                                                             
Armed Mobilization in the Highlands of Kalehe  
The two chapters that constitute this part of the dissertation (Chapter 7 and Chapter 8) 
provide a close range analysis of armed mobilization and control in the Northern 
Highlands of the territory of Kalehe, a remote region of the province of South Kivu 
that has been embroiled in a series of violent conflicts since the early 1990s.  The 
analysis focuses on the ways in which the process of armed mobilization is shaped by 
established structures of authority and social organization, themselves inscribed in 
specific political economies, but also how, in turn, these are reconfigured by the 
process of armed mobilization.  The chapter focuses specifically on the armed 
organizations that emerged from the so-called Hutu Rwandophone societies of the 
Kalehe Highlands, the Combattants, PARECO and Nyatura armed groups and their 
offshoots.  
 
The chapter starts by showing how the initial rounds of large-scale mobilization were 
reflective of the decentralized and agrarian nature of the Rwandophone societies of the 
Highlands, which came under severe existential threat in the early 1990s.  These 
grassroots organizations were progressively absorbed into larger politico-military 
movements, and as a result became imbricated in the regional economy of predation 
and protection.  While exerting multiple forms of violence and predation, these 
organizations continued to play an important role with regards to the civilian 
authorities and populations of the Highlands, constituting their only means of 
protection, but also a key vehicle for the advancement of political claims.   
 
Participation in these organizations will be analysed in the light of the evolving relation 
between these organizations and the civilian authorities and populations of the 
Highlands.  While in the first episodes of armed mobilization, participation was 
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reflective of the deep rootedness of these organizations in the agrarian societies of the 
Highlands, it progressively changed as these organizations came to play a multi-
faceted role in the region.  Indeed, in a context of growing commodification of labour, 
a result of both the expansion of the mining industry and the concomitant implantation 
of an economy of predation and protection, participation in armed organizations 
became a form of employment for an economically deprived underclass.  However, 
this did not entail a complete dissociation from the rural communities from which 
those armed organizations had initially emerged.  Repeated threats to the rural 
Rwandophone communities in a context on persistent inter-ethnic strife, and 
militarized competition over land solidified their political role as protectors of rural 
livelihoods and vehicle for political claims.  We will argue that, rather than a 
destruction of the agrarian societies of the Kalehe Highlands, these organizations have 
triggered a re-adaptation of the societies around their presence, and the emergence of 
new “war communities”.   
 
As the chapter traces these processes of adaptation and social transformation, it 
interrogate the principal lens through which the conflicts of the Kalehe Highlands have 
been analysed and understood, that of “communal conflict” between clearly 
demarcated ethnic groups.177  Indeed, what little attention has been paid to this isolated 
region has predominantly framed the armed conflicts as communal conflicts, often 
construing communities as clearly identified, unitary agents of political action and 
conflict.178  In a highly polarized political context where communal protection is a 
central tenet of discursive justifications of violence, an uncritical use of the term is 
unhelpful as it can reproduce politically charged discourses.   However, it begs an 
understanding of the social basis of these communal identities, which, as we will see, 
are powerful mobilizers in the region.  In tracing the social transformations of the 
region resulting from war, we will therefore pay attention to the emergence of these 
communal identities. 
 
                                                 
177 In the Highlands of Kalehe, these include the two Rwandophone ethnic groups, the Hutu and Tutsi, 
as well as the Tembo and the Havu whose ethno-territorial constituencies lie on both sides of the 
Highlands.   
178 The academic or policy literature on this isolated region of the territory of Kalehe is very scarce.  
The most detailed published literature has been produced by the Bukavu based NGO Action pour la 
Paix et la Concorde, in association with the Life and Peace Institute.  
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The analysis puts an emphasis on a historical understanding of the process of armed 
mobilization, and is divided in two separate chapters.  The first chapter traces the 
establishment of the Rwandophone societies of the Kalehe Highlands and their 
insertion into the political economy of South Kivu.  It then shows how the social and 
political characteristics of these societies shaped the armed mobilizations of the 1990s 
and 2000s, in particular the Combatants mobilizations of the Masisi war and the 
PARECO mobilization.  
 
The second chapter focuses on the most recent episode of large-scale armed 
mobilization in the Kalehe Highlands, the emergence of the Nyatura movement in 
2011-2012.  It analyses the specificities of armed mobilization in the context of an 
already militarized political economy, where military control is an essential feature of 
ethno-territorial political competition.  The chapter then explores how militarized 
politics trickle down into a militarized social body, where mechanisms of large-scale 
armed mobilization are imbricated into mechanisms of communal organization.  The 
chapter is based on fieldwork carried out in the Kalehe Highlands in the fall of 2012, 
with additional interviews carried out in Bukavu in June 2013.   
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7.1.  Background to the Highlands Conflicts  
7.1.1.  The Highlands: A frontier within a frontier region 
 
“The people of the Highlands are pioneers” 
Honore de Numbi 
 
The Highlands of Kalehe sit at the crest of the Mitumba mountain range and constitute 
a frontier “within” a frontier region (Mathys 2014), having played the ambivalent role 
of both a separation and connection point between two large socio-political complexes, 
the Great Lakes societies to the East and the forest societies of the Congo basin to the 
west (Newbury 1992).  Opposing forces of integration and isolation have shaped the 
region’s history.  In the pre-colonial and early colonial times, the Highlands of the 
Mitumba mountain range were dominated by dense bamboo forests that prevented the 
establishment of settlements.  The Havu of the eastern slopes of the Mitumba mountain 
range didn’t show much interest in this region, while the Tembo, who occupied the 
western slopes of the Mitumba mountain range, were known to practice hunting and 
gathering in the area.  The only settlements that existed seem to have been either 
resting points in trade routes or hunting trails, or outposts where dignitaries paused 
during their tax collection tours. 
 
The late colonial period marked the beginning of a drastic change in the region as the 
colonial authorities incorporated the Highlands into their regional policy of mise en 
valeur (development), encouraging the establishment of cattle raising farms in the 
Highlands of Masisi and Kalehe, which displayed exceptionally favourable conditions 
for cattle raising.  The Highlands progressively became one of the most lucrative areas 
of the regional economy, prompting economic development and in-migration of 
labour.  In the late colonial period, a mining industry developed in the area following 
the discovery of significant mining deposits around the towns of Numbi and Ngungu.     
 
The development of cattle ranching and the associated forest clearing and in-migration 
continued in the post-colonial era, arguably becoming the most lucrative activity in the 
entire region.  The lucrativeness of the cattle raising industry and the mining sector of 
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the Highlands led to severe conflicts over ownership of the land, but also initiatives by 
the Congolese state to control and regulate the economic activity of the Highlands; in 
the 1980s, a poste d’encadrement administratif (Administrative Outpost) was set up 
in the centre of Numbi to control and tax the cattle market and the trade in minerals.  
In contrast, the wars of the 1990s and 2000s had the opposite effect of re-isolating the 
region. The Highlands have provided an advantageous geographical configuration for 
rebel organizations, as their remoteness and extensive range provide a hideout, but also 
a natural conduit through which armed factions can move through the region.  As a 
result, local businessmen point to a breakdown of the Highlands economy between 
1994 and 2009.   
7.1.2.  Land, Taxes, and Political Representation in the Highlands 
 
“Here, all politics revolve around is land” 
Celestin Seburikande, Chief of Lowa-Numbi 
 
As a result of their economic attractiveness, the Kalehe Highlands, and particularly the 
northern areas of the Kalehe Highlands, known as the Cinq Collines (Five Hills) have 
been the at the centre of a range of conflicts that have mostly revolved around two 
axes: Authority over the land of the lucrative Five Hills and the associated right to 
exert taxes on the area’s economic production, and the taxation and political 
representation of the populations of the Highlands, in particular the Rwandophone 
population which constitutes a majority in the region.  We will start by presenting the 
conflict over customary authority over the northern Highlands of Kalehe, known as 
the Conflict of the Five Hills, and then expose the conflicts that have arisen as a result 
of the presence of a Rwandophone population.   
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7.1.2.1.  The Conflict of the Five Hills: Land and Customary Authority 
The Five Hills, a reference to the five “Villages”179  that roughly encompass the 
northern area of the Kalehe Highlands, have been the subject of a longstanding conflict 
between the Tembo Grouping of Ziralo on one side, and the Havu Grouping of Buzi 
(both part of the Chiefdom of Buhavu), which sit on opposite sides of the Mitumba 
mountain range and both claim the right to customary authority over the Five Hills.  
Customary authority commands access to substantial resources as it entails the right 
to allocate land, to adjudicate land disputes and to levy annual customary taxes on the 
land. 
 
The conflict over the Five Hills is part a larger set of longstanding conflicts over the 
delimitation of administrative boundaries in the territory of Kalehe between the Havu 
and the Tembo ethno-territorial constituencies.  Like many conflicts over land and 
customary authority in eastern DRC, the Five Hills conflict dates back to the colonial 
partition of rural eastern DRC into ethno-territorial constituencies.  Under colonial 
rule, the different ethno-polities of Kalehe had been subsumed under the authority of 
the Buhavu chiefdom in 1928, instituting a centralized, territorially bound and 
hierarchical model of political authority that contrasted with the decentralized and 
fluid polities that had characterized the region in the pre-colonial era (Hoffmann K. 
2014 p.182; Newbury 1992).  This generated political grievances by the “ethnic” 
groups that were subjected to the Bahavu chiefdom, in particular the Tembo who 
repeatedly complained of unfair taxation and political marginalization as a result of 
their subjection to the Bahavu authorities.180  From 1945, Tembo leaders had been 
pushing for the creation of a separate Tembo territory, the Territory of Bunyakiri, on 
the basis of what they perceive as a legitimate right to self-administer their own ethno-
territorial constituency.  In the midst of a long and tortuous history of administrative 
reconfigurations, a territory of Bunyakiri was erected twice, once in the immediate 
aftermath of the independence, before Mobutu’s second republic, and again in 1999, 
during the RCD rule.   
                                                 
179 The Village is the smallest administrative subdivision of the Congolese state; some of these villages 
are in fact small towns, such as Numbi or Lumbishi.  The Five Hills are Numbi, Luzirantaka, 
Ngandjo/Bulagiza, Lumbishi and Shanje.  
180 APC (2009).   
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Because of their economic attractiveness, the Five Hills were a central stake in these 
administrative and jurisdictional battles, and repeatedly changed administrative status.   
When the Bahavu Chiefdom was created in 1928, The Five Hills were incorporated as 
a sub-Grouping of Buzi, while Buzi was relegated from Chiefdom to Grouping within 
the Bahavu Chiefdom.  In 1961, Ziralo and the Five Hills were removed from the Buzi 
Grouping and incorporated into the newly created Bunyakiri territory (a Tembo 
territory), only to then be “returned” to the Buzi Grouping in 1968, following 
Mobutu’s dissolution of the territory of Bunyakiri (Hoffmann K. 2014 p.207).  
Resenting this state of affairs, the Tembo authorities of Ziralo obtained in the 
administrative reconfiguration of 1978 the autonomisation of Ziralo, under Chief 
Chabango Chanda, through an arrête by the governor of South Kivu.181  Attempts by 
the chief of Buzi, Hubert Sangara, to reclaim the status of Buzi as a Chiefdom and 
integrate Buzi-Ziralo as a Grouping were then stalled, and finally ruled out by a 
decision of the tribunal de Grande Instance de Bukavu in 1985. Further 
reconfigurations during RCD rule led to the upgrading of Buzi into a chiefdom and the 
Five Hills into a Grouping, called the Grouping of Myanzi, with Boniface Buhuzu as 
its chief.  After the war, however, the Grouping was relegated back to a Village in 
2006.182 
 
To this day, confusion remains as to whom had the legitimate authority to administer 
the Five Hills, which both the Grouping of Buzi (Havu) and the Grouping of Ziralo 
(Tembo) claim as part of their purview.  However, “effective” power over the Five 
Hills has progressively tilted to the side of Buzi, as the chiefs of Buzi - Hubert Sangara, 
and then his son Raymond Sangara183- cultivated powerful allies, in particular Tutsi 
landowners with political connections in Kigali and Kinshasa, establishing de-facto 
authority over the Five Hills.  
                                                 
181 Op cit. p.19. 
182 In 2006, the Government of National Union pronounced the dissolution of the territory of Bunyakiri 
and the Grouping of Myanzi. 
183 Raymond Sangara Bera succeeded to his father, Hubert Sangara, after his death in 1990.   
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7.1.2.2.  Land Ownership and Political Representation of the Rwandophones 
Imbricated in the conflict over rights of administration of the Five Hills, a second 
longstanding line of conflict in the region has been the presence, since the colonial era, 
of a large Rwandophone population in the Highlands, and their claims to citizenship, 
political representation, and rights to own land.   
 
In contrast to the Banyamulenge population of the Highlands of the territories of Fizi 
and Uvira in Southern South Kivu, whose first wave of migration into the region dates 
back to the 19th century,184 the first Rwandophone populations arrived in the coastal 
areas of Kalehe in the late 1930s as part of Mission D’Immigration des Banyarwanda 
(Mission of Immigration of the People of Rwanda), a settlement program orchestrated 
by the colonial authorities to provide a more docile labour force for the development 
of Kivu.185  These migrant workers started acquiring land in the Kalehe Highlands, 
where most land was still covered in forests, striking deals with Havu authorities for 
the customary acquisition of land.  With subsequent waves of - mostly Hutu - migrant 
labourers from Rwanda arriving in the 1950s to work on the colonial coastal 
plantations, a pattern of migration and settlement took shape, with new migrants 
following family or community networks and settling in the Highlands, where land 
was still available.   
 
The Rwandophone settlers obtained land through the customary system of land 
acquisition, with the payment of an initial tribute called Kalinzi, which conferred the 
right of usage of the land, conditional on yearly tributes (the mutulo) to Havu 
customary authorities.186  The granting of customary usufruct rights over land formed 
the backbone of the structure of authority that emerged within the Rwandophone 
populations of the Highlands.  The first families who claimed clearance rights and 
obtained customary usufruct over land became the representatives of the Havu 
customary authorities over the Rwandophone populations of the Highlands, in charge 
of collecting annual customary tributes, with Elias Buhuzu becoming the customary 
representative over the Rwandophone populations in the Northern Highlands.  As the 
                                                 
184 Vlassenroot (2013 p.16). 
185 Interview with Havu authorities, Minova, October 2012.  
186 Interview with Havu authorities, Kalehe littoral; APC-LPI (2009 p.25).   
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customary tributes were then hereditarily passed on to heirs, these families - such as 
the Buhuzu, Rugona or Lwahisha - progressively formed a landed class, the core 
structure of the Rwandophone societies of the Highlands.   
 
Following political turmoil in Rwanda in the late 1950s, a second large wave of 
Rwandans started migrating towards the Highlands in the 1960s, this time mostly 
composed of poor Tutsi pastoralists fleeing Rwanda with their cattle, who were 
directed towards the Highlands by the Havu customary authorities and “integrated” 
into the system of decentralized authority over the Rwandophone populations under 
the coordination of Elias Buhuzu.  A third wave of Rwandophone migrants arrived 
after the 1973 coup in Rwanda and was mainly constituted of smallholding Tutsis who 
followed the networks of those arriving before them.  By the 1970s, the majority of 
the population of the Highlands was Rwandophone, mostly Hutus.   
 
Tensions over land ownership were exacerbated when, following the Bakajika law of 
1966 and the land law of 1973 whereby the Congolese state reclaimed ownership of 
all land and proceeded to redistribute ownership and usage rights, King Hubert 
Sangara of Buzi facilitated large scale land purchases in the most lucrative areas of the 
Highlands by regional and national elites, many of them Tutsis.  This generated a 
differentiated landscape of ownership in the Highlands.  On one side, large private 
concessions, mostly owned by business or political elites residing in Goma, Kigali or 
Kinshasa, concentrated mainly around the town of Numbi. 187   On the other, 
smallholding peasants with either customarily ceded rights of land usage, a dominant 
configuration in the Southern parts of the Kalehe Highlands and around the town of 
Lumbishi, or more fragile claims to a form of “squatting rights”.  These emerged from 
longstanding lugabane or conventions - (often informal) contractual agreements 
between labourers and landowners, whereby the labourers were granted a small piece 
of land for self-exploitation in exchange work on the owner’s land.188  As many of 
these arrangements dated back several decades and were passed on through 
generations, they are now interpreted as a form of effective ownership over the land, 
                                                 
187 Interview with Havu Landowner, Numbi, October 2012. 
188 Interviews with Landowners and labourers, Numbi, Lumbishi and Shandje, October 2012.   
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nested in social relations between landowners and labourers, but without any official 
recognition, making them particularly vulnerable.  
 
This fragile “architecture” of property relations that underpinned the organization of 
the Rwandophone societies of the Highlands was repeatedly jeopardized by regional 
and national events, including the conflict of the Five Hills.  Following the 1985 
adjudication that the Five Hills were part of the Ziralo Grouping, which effectively 
annulled the rights of usage that Rwandophone populations had negotiated with Havu 
landowners, the Rwandophones refused to recognize the authority of Chabanga 
Chanda, the new chief of Ziralo, and to pay the customary tributes on land in the 
1980s.189  Rwandophone populations of the Highlands started mounting claims to 
autonomy and self-administration, requesting their own customary administrative 
entity.  These requests were backed by the fact that the Rwandophones had virtually 
no representation in the higher echelons of customary or provincial state institutions 
in South Kivu.  These tensions were exacerbated in the explosive political climate of 
the 1990s, eventually leading to the Masisi war and the first round of armed 
mobilization in the region.   
7.2.  Armed Mobilization in the Highlands of Kalehe 
In this section, we will analyse the armed mobilizations of the 1990s, in particular the 
Masisi War that spread to the Kalehe Highlands in 1993-1994, the arrival of the Hutu 
militias following the Rwandan genocide and the outbreak of violence it initiated, the 
first and second Congo wars as well as the post-war CNDP and PARECO 
mobilizations.  While an exhaustive analysis of each of these key episodes would be 
took long, the section seeks to identify the social and institutional mechanisms of the 
repeated rounds of armed mobilization, and the progressive adaptation of the 
populations of the Highlands to a militarized political economy.   
                                                 
189 APC-LPI (2009).   
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7.2.1.  Armed Mobilization in the early 1990s: The Masisi War and the 
Rwandan Genocide 
The first round of armed mobilization and armed conflict that took place in the 
Highlands was tied to the propagation of the Masisi War; from 1993-1995, inter-ethnic 
violence spread all across the Highlands of Masisi and Kalehe, initiating a logic of 
mobilization and militarization that would be repeatedly “activated” in the following 
two decades. 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the presence of a majority Rwandophone 
population in the prosperous Highlands of Kalehe, as well as in the neighbouring 
Highlands of Masisi in North Kivu, had progressively become a source of regional 
tension, as competing “native” customary authorities claimed rights over the land that 
these populations were occupying, but were seeing their power over these areas 
waning as a result of the growth of the Rwandan population, as well the rise of 
Rwandan business and political networks in North Kivu, who were mounting claims 
to political and fiscal autonomy.  These tensions were exacerbated in the early 1990s 
as Marechal Mobutu, whose authoritarian rule over the country was being jeopardized, 
started engaging in what was known as geopolitique, the strategic appointment of local 
politicians to provincial governorate posts. 190   Threatened by the prospect of the 
introduction of multi-party politics as a result of the Conference Nationale Souveraine 
(CNS- National Sovereign Conference) of 1990-1992 because of the demographic 
majority of Rwandophones in territories such as Masisi, politicians and leaders of the 
so-called “autochthonous” groups of North Kivu - the Nande, Hunde and Nyanga - 
attempted to counter the rise in power of Rwandophone elites, stirring up popular 
resentment against the Rwandophones, discursively pitted as “foreigners” against the 
“autochtones”, from which they were accused of stealing the land.191  The threat to 
Rwandophone livelihoods was accentuated by the debate on citizenship, as the CNS 
organized a census to ascertain the nationality of populations living in the East, on the 
basis of the 1981 law.  As the 1981 law’s definition of citizenship excluded most of 
                                                 
190 Previously, ethnic “foreigners” were appointed to these positions to reduce ethnic strife (Jackson 
2006).   
191  For a more detailed analysis of the discursive underpinnings of the Autochtones vs allogene 
discourse, see historical chapter as well as Jackson (2006). 
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the Congolese Rwandophones, 192  the census represented a direct threat to the 
Rwandophone population’s livelihoods, as rights to land usage was conditional on 
citizenship.  On both sides of the Rwandophone/“autochthones” divide, militias started 
being formed in 1992-1993, as youth wings of local parties on the autochthonous side, 
and through the conduit of the Mutuelle d’Agiculteurs des Virunga (MAGRIVI) on the 
Rwandophone side.  Rumours abounded on both sides about plans to exterminate each 
other, leading to regular skirmishes and a climate of omnipresent tension.  The first 
outburst of violence happened in Ntoto, a village of the territory of Walikale in North 
Kivu, in 1993, where several Hutus were killed in the market, spurring a chain of 
retaliatory violence and armed mobilization in the territories of Walikale and 
especially Masisi, which left more than 6000 people dead in 6 months.  
 
The speed and extensiveness of the armed mobilization that the Ntoto events triggered 
should be understood in the light of the context of structural stress in which the Hutu 
rural populations found themselves, entirely dependent on fragile and versatile 
property arrangements with “autochthone” landlords and authorities.  The armed 
mobilization of 1993 wasn’t a coordinated movement, but rather one that took the 
shape of the decentralized rural agrarian communities of Masisi, with small groups of 
Combatants and Bakobwa, as the Hutu militias were called, sprouting in numerous 
villages and towns of the Highlands of Masisi.  Local notables - schoolteachers, clerks, 
and various leaders - stepped in as leaders and often played key roles in organizing the 
mobilization.  Stearns (2013) shows that the initial leaders of these mobilizations – 
such as Zabuloni Munyantware, Mayanga Wa Gishuba, Turinkinko - reflected the 
initial civilian nature of the mobilization, which was also displayed by the low levels 
of technology of the groups, who were armed with machetes and spears.  
 
The spread of the violence of the Masisi war to the territory of Kalehe can be explained 
by the similar underlying conditions that prevailed in the Highlands of Masisi and 
Kalehe, and the dense social networks that connected the neighbouring Hutu societies 
of Masisi and the societies of the Northern Kalehe Highlands. Although violence did 
not immediately erupt in the Highlands of Kalehe - the first “major” incident in Kalehe 
                                                 
192 In order to claim citizenship according to this law, one had to provide evidence that 2 of his direct 
ancestors had been residents in the Congo before 1908. 
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happened in October 1994 - 193 the fear and paranoia was deeply felt and accentuated 
by the arrival of numerous displaced Hutu fleeing Masisi.  As a farmer from Lumbishi 
recalls:  
“Everyone was scared, because we knew the violence was very close and 
could arrive here very quickly; We were hearing so many stories of 
massacres, mothers being raped, houses burned, the children killed, so we 
were already fearing for our lives (...) The assassins were already there, 
many people were coming into town and telling us that they were already 
in the mountains very close to here, pillaging our cows and destroying our 
fields; And there were a lot of Tembo youth joining those groups, so we 
knew what to expect” 194 
Indeed, the anti-Rwandan militias that had formed in Masisi, such as the Bangilima, 
the Katuku and the Batiri 195 had started conducting raids on cattle in the Kalehe 
Highlands.  In the Grouping of Ziralo, tensions soon escalated between the Tembo and 
Rwandophone populations, which had lived in close yet tense cohabitation in the area.  
Hutu armed groups started recruiting in the Highlands towns of Lumbishi and Shanje 
in 1995, according to the chief of Lumbishi.196  According to several sources, the 
MAGRIVI - A Hutu association that spearheaded the mobilization in North Kivu - 
which had established itself in the Kalehe Highlands in early 1992, as well as in Ziralo 
and in the Mbingas197- had started agitating the youth in towns such as Lumbishi and 
Shanje in 1993-1994, in preparation for the formation of the militias.198   
 
As for the Masisi War, a specific set of events triggered an escalation in violence and 
mobilization in the Ziralo Grouping and Kalehe Highlands.  On October 25, 1994, a 
Hutu was assassinated by the Batiri militia in Katale, sparking anger within the Hutu 
                                                 
193 APC- LPI (2009).   
194 Interview with farmers on the road between Numbi and Lumbishi, October 2012.   
195 The Batiri were ad-hoc militias, initially created by the Hunde of Masisi, but quickly joined by many 
Nyanga and then Tembo groups.  Local Tembo chapters of the Batiri then emerged in Kalehe (APC-
LPI 2009 p.19).   
196 Interview with Chief of Lumbishi, October 2012.      
197 APC-LPI (2009 p.26).   
198 Interview with ANR representative, Numbi, October 2012.    
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community.199  But the event that set fire to the region was the assassination, on 
February 17, 1995, of a local Hutu notable of Lumbishi, Bugabo Burasharira, 
concomitantly to a series of assassination and pillages in the area, attributed to the 
Batiri militia.200  This sparked retaliatory attacks on Tembo houses in the villages of 
Chambombo, Lurere, Mianda and Tushunguti in the Grouping of Ziralo, setting forth 
a set of tit-for-tat attacks in the region.  In Tushunguti, Kachihonda Makoni, a local 
Tembo notable, was assassinated with members of his family during one of these 
attacks, further escalading the tensions.  The Bakowba and Combattants militia on the 
Hutu side, and the Batiri and Katuku militia on the Tembo side, saw their numbers 
increase substantially as local chiefs and community leaders encouraged youth to join 
the militias.   
 
As Stearns (2013) argued about Masisi, the initial round of mobilization in the Kalehe 
Highlands was rooted in peasant community structures, encouraged by leaders and 
notables and mediated by families and peer groups, in particular the youth.  According 
to the chief of Lumbishi, the Combatants groups that formed in Lumbishi were a “local 
movement”, composed of voluntaries who took up arms to protect the land of the 
Hutus against the menace of the Tembo militias, with the support of the population 
and the involvement of the authorities.201  As in Masisi, the leaders of the 1995 armed 
mobilization in the Highlands of Kalehe - such as Gwigwi, Bisagwira, and Rutambuka 
- would become the commanders of subsequent rounds of mobilization, in particular 
the PARECO and Nyatura mobilizations.  Along with them, an entire generation of 
youth were mobilized and took part in combat, and would constitute the first strata of 
militarized labour in the region.  The violence of 1995 led to around 1000 deaths in 
the area,202 and spread to Ramba, the Highlands of Bushengeshenge, the Grouping of 
Ziralo and the northern Highlands. 
 
As noted by APC (2009) and Stearns (2013), these mobilizations enhanced the 
geographic divide between Rwandophone and Tembo populations in Ziralo, as ethnic 
violence forced Rwandophone populations to flee the ethnically mixed areas of the 
                                                 
199 APC-LPI (2009 p.20). 
200 According to the chief of Lumbishi and his Nyumbakumi, the Batiri killed a total of 21 people in 
Lumbishi in 1995.  
201 Interview with Chief of Lumbishi, October 2012.      
202 This figure is not confirmed but was advanced by a security expert in the region.   
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Western Midlands of Ziralo (which became Tembo in majority), while the Tembo fled 
the towns of Lumbishi, Shanje and Numbi, which became Rwandophone in majority.  
To this day, the ethno-geographic divide remains strong.  According to a Hutu peasant 
of the Highlands: 
“The Highlands, where one can plant the haricot (beans), belong to the 
Hutu.  You cannot find Tembos there.  Lower, (on the western slopes of 
the mountain range), where one can plant the manioc, that belongs to the 
Tembo”203   
The violence subsided in late 1995, after a mediation was carried out by the governor 
of South Kivu, which led to a cease-fire.  In the highly tense context of the mid-1990s, 
however, the militias did not disarm, and would soon be remobilized in the context of 
the 1990s regional wars.   
7.2.2.  The Rwandan genocide and its aftermath 
The arrival of a large number of Rwandan refugees following the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide, and, in their midst, of heavily armed ex-Forces Armees Rwandaises 
(Rwandan Armed Forces, ex-FAR) and their ancillary militias, further contributed to 
the militarization and destabilisation of the Highlands.  The Rwandan war had already 
affected the Rwandophone populations of eastern DRC, as both the Habyarimana 
regime and the Rwandan Patriotic Front had developed recruitment networks among 
the Rwandophone populations of eastern DRC, including in the Highlands of Masisi 
and Kalehe (Stearns 2013).  Upon their arrival in the coastal areas of Kalehe, where 
they were initially installed in refugee camps, the Rwandan armed factions started 
contacting Congolese Hutu populations in the Highlands, who started providing food, 
in some cases in exchange for weapons.204  
 
As a result, the social climate between the Hutu and Tutsi in the Highlands started 
polarizing, and many Tutsis started leaving the Highlands to return to Rwanda from 
                                                 
203 Interview with Hutu peasant, Lumbishi, October 2012.   
204 APC-LPI (2009). 
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late 1994, either selling their land or entrusting it to local Havu, which would create 
conflicts upon their return (Ansoms, Claessens & Mudinga 2013).  Tensions escalated 
drastically in 1996, when the Rwandan Patriotic Army started conducting military 
raids on the refugee camps of the Lake Kivu shores, pushing the ex-FAR and Rwandan 
militias into the Highlands, where they arrived by thousands and started spreading 
havoc, targeting Tutsis and burning down Numbi, the “capital of the Highlands”, 
which had the largest concentration of Tutsis in the Kalehe Highlands. 205   Most 
witnesses describe this period as a time of unprecedented crisis, particularly in the 
eastern areas of the Highlands and Midlands that had been relatively spared of the 
violence of the Hutu/Tembo conflict.  As a farmer of Bulagiza recalls:  
“This was the first time that we heard the coup de balles (gunshots), never 
before had these things been heard around here; Many families fled, but 
at the time we had no organization, we didn’t know where or how to flee” 
206 
Most interviews point to a clear targeting of Tutsis, and trace the ethnic polarization 
in the Kalehe Highlands to this period.  The current Chief of Numbi, a Tutsi, recalls:  
 “When the Rwandan Hutu arrived, they started arming the Congolese 
Hutu of the Highlands.  The Hutu then became the masters of the 
Highlands, and they started attacking numerous families, in particular the 
Tutsis, who were fleeing the violence, and taking their land and seizing 
their goods.  After a few years, the Hutus were chased away by the AFDL, 
but the Hutus had formed groups of bandits, such as Rutambuka and his 
bandits who continued to pillage”207 
According to the authorities of Lumbishi, the Rwandan Hutu militias arrived in 
Lumbishi in 1996, more than a year after the cease-fire that had followed the Hutu-
Tembo ethnic conflict.  The arrival of the Rwandan armed factions in the Congolese 
Hutu areas did not, however, cause automatic identification or appraisal by the Hutu 
                                                 
205 Interview with Celestin Seburikande, Chief of Numbi, October 2012.   
206 Interview with Havu landowner of Numbi, October 2012.    
207 Interview with Chief of Numbi, October 2012.   
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Congolese populations, partly because of the violent behaviour of these militias, who 
often didn’t spare the Hutu Congolese areas, causing deep fractures in the Hutu 
societies of the Highlands.  The Hutu militias of Lumbishi - the Combattants - had 
kept concealed weapons, and the heavily armed Rwandan armed factions found a 
receptive ear in numerous disaffected Hutu youth of the Highlands, whose prospect of 
economic livelihood and social integration in the context of land saturation and 
political marginalization were dire, and were easily influenced by the ideologies of 
scapegoatism and ethnic hatred which the Rwandan armed factions carried.  A former 
Combattant who was mobilized in Lumbishi, recalls having been trained by an Ex-
FAR lieutenant:  
“When our Rwandan cousins arrived to the Highlands, they informed us 
that the Tutsis had the plan of conquering us and reducing us to slavery; 
they gave us their ideology.  Us, the Congolese Hutu, we didn’t have this 
“mentality” of attacking the Tutsis, who were living with us.  But when 
they came, this changed, and they started attacking the Tutsis”208 
Numerous armed groups of various size were formed, either by ex-FAZ soldiers or 
Congolese Hutu militia men.  Taking advantage of the difficult terrain and relative 
isolation, these opportunistic groups started raiding cattle and pillaging isolated 
villages, developing the economy of pillage that would become endemic in the 
Highlands.  Most interviewees establish a clear distinction between participation in the 
community self-defence initiatives (during the Tembo-Hutu conflict, and subsequently 
with the Nyatura), and participation in these types of gangs and armed groups.  While 
participation in the former was attributed to defence of the land and the community, 
participation in the latter was often attributed to economic deprivation and 
landlessness, with several interviewees identifying the “rebels” as the “sans terre” 
(without land).209  Yet, despite the fact that a difference was established between these 
two types of groups and the participants they attracted, the reality seems to have been 
much more blurred, with many of the self-defence groups and their participants 
                                                 
208 Interview with Hutu peasant and ex-combatant, Numbi, October 2012.   
209 The lack of land as a determinant of participation has been identified by the chiefs of Numbi, 
Shandje, Lumbishi, and their councillors, as well as in interviews with ex-combatants or sibling and 
kins of combatants.   
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developing into more violent and predatory organisations.  As we will see, the inter-
dependence of the “protective” function of armed groups and their more predatory 
activities would become a central feature of the political economy of the Highlands.  
7.2.3.  Amplification and extension during the Congolese Wars 
The two Congolese wars of 1996-1997 and 1998-2003 had profound consequences on 
the region, tying local dynamics of armed conflict to national level dynamics of war.  
When the AFDL took control of Goma in 1996, it started mounting attacks on the 
Rwandan Hutu armed faction, many of whom had taken refuge in the Highlands.  In 
order to boost its ranks and break support for the genocidaire armed forces within the 
Congolese Hutu population, the AFDL used its military and political strength to co-
opt the Congolese Hutu elites in Masisi, managing to obtain the support of the vice 
president of the Combattants, Robert Seninga, who integrated several hundred of 
troops into the AFDL.  The Congolese Hutu military and political leadership was, 
however, sharply divided, with another branch led by Bigembe Turinkinko and Hassan 
Mugabo opposing the AFDL under the Mongol banner, and forging an alliance with 
the Rwandan Hutu rebels regrouped into the new politico-military movement called 
ALIR210 (Stearns 2013 pp.15-16).   
 
In the Kalehe Highlands, the progression of the AFDL quickly became enmeshed with 
land ownership disputes.  As previously mentioned, many Tutsi landowners had fled 
the Highlands following the threats posed by the arrival of the Rwandan Hutu armed 
factions, entrusting their land to intermediaries, through leases and conventions.  
Benefitting from the AFDL advance, several Tutsi landowners started returning to the 
Highlands, and claiming back their land, which had often been sold by the 
intermediaries, initiating ownership disputes with the new owners or occupiers of the 
land (Ansoms, Claessens & Mudinga 2013).  In a militarized environment, this led to 
clashes, as some military factions within the AFDL backed the Tutsi landowners, 
forcefully seizing land from the - often Hutu - families that had settled on it, initiating 
a perverse logic of ethnically polarized violent land acquisitions that would become of 
                                                 
210 This movement regrouped ex-Rwandan Armed Forces officers, but also ex Rwandan militia leaders 
(Interhamwe), and would later become the Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR). 
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a central component of repeated violence in the region.  In interviews with Hutu 
representatives, these were often associated to a larger Tutsi “grand scheme” to seize 
all of eastern Congo, and expropriate the Hutu communities. According to the 
mediator of the Centre de Dialogue et de Mediation (Centre for Dialogue and 
Mediation) of Numbi, the AFDL was initially systematically targeting the Hutu 
population, which it associated with the Hutu armed groups it was combatting.211 
 
The RCD rebellion of 1998 further intensified the game of military and ethno-political 
alliances in North and South Kivu.  While some sections of the Congolese Hutu 
militias allied with the coalition of forces backed by the Kinshasa government - which 
included the FDLR, the constellation of Mayi-Mayi groups, and the Congolese Hutu 
militia of Bigembe - a large majority of the Rwandophones in the Highlands of Masisi 
and Kalehe sided with the RCD-Goma rebellion (Stearns 2013; Hoffmann K. 2014).  
Furthermore, The RCD-G and Rwanda eventually chose to co-opt the Congolese Hutu 
leadership in North Kivu in order to drive out the FDLR.  Eugene Serufuli, a Congolese 
Hutu from Masisi, was appointed governor of North Kivu, which enabled the 
consolidation of substantial political and economic power by the Hutu elite in Goma.  
To consolidate his power base in the Hutu societies of the Highlands, Serufuli 
launched the Tous pour la Paix et le Developpement association (TPD - All for Peace 
and Development).  The TPD set up local branches in most Hutu villages of the 
Highlands, channelling rural development programs and organizing the resettlement 
of Congolese Tutsis that had fled to Rwanda.  To further consolidate its power base, 
the RCD started replacing Village Chiefs by Hutu and Tutsi, reducing the power of 
the “native” customary authorities.  Several testimonies point to the effectiveness of 
this strategy in bolstering popular support for the RCD-Goma.  According to the 
director of the CDM, the nomination of Serufuli as governor of North Kivu 
immediately reduced tension and violence between the RCD and the Congolese Hutu 
armed groups in the Highlands.  However, it led to further fractures in the Hutu 
societies of the Highlands, in part because the FDLR conducted retaliatory attacks 
against Congolese civilian populations in response for their alleged collusion with the 
RCD.  According to the chief of Lumbishi, the FDLR carried out an attack on 
                                                 
211 Interview with Action pour la paix et la Concorde representative and director of the Numbi Centre 
de Dialogue et de Mediation, Numbi, October 2012.   
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Lumbishi in 1998, “pillaging systematically and burning down all the houses of the 
village”.212  
 
In order to consolidate its power in Kalehe where the Mayi-Mayi resistance was 
strong, particularly in the Bunyakiri area, the RCD elevated Bunyakiri to the status of 
a Territory, granting the Tembo ethno-political constituency their long requested 
political autonomy in the hope it would reduce support for the Mayi-Mayi insurgency, 
which had strong ties with Tembo customary authorities (APC-LPI 2009 p.13).  The 
RCD also elevated the Buzi Grouping to the status of Chiefdom, under Raymond 
Sangara, and the Five Hills to the status of a Grouping (The Myanzi Grouping) with a 
Tutsi chief at its head (Boniface Buhuzu), facilitating direct control over the mineral 
rich area at the time of the coltan boom of 2000.213  A new round of large scale land 
acquisitions in the Highlands by high ranking political authorities of the RCD-G, such 
as Bizima Karaha or Eugene Serufuli, was facilitated by the Buzi authorities and the 
Chief of the Myanzi Grouping Boniface Buhuzu, causing further expropriations of 
smallholding peasants.214  This further tied the region to regional and national level 
politics, as these influential landowners would regularly weight in to local disputes in 
order to ensure the protection of their acquired land.   
 
When the war ended and a transition government incorporating the former rebel 
factions was formed, the political dynamics shifted significantly in eastern DRC.  The 
unity of the RCD-G as a movement was threatened by the move of a large part of the 
movement’s administrators to Kinshasa, and the prospects of military integration and 
democratic elections in the East.  As a result, Eugene Serufuli made thorough efforts 
to consolidate his power base in the East, in particular by developing and intensifying 
his influence over grassroots politics, through his TPD movement, but also through 
the Local Defence Forces that he had set up.  This phase was crucial in further 
integrating rural community politics into a larger, regional power nexus, controlled by 
elite Hutu power brokers.  Indeed, resources were distributed through these elite 
networks to rural community leaders – credit, money, cattle - in “exchange” for 
                                                 
212 Interview with Chief of Lumbishi, October 2012.   
213 According to the chief of Numbi, the RCD had initially been looking for Tourmaline in the area 
around Numbi, before switching to Coltan in 2000.    
214 Interview with landowner, Numbi, October 2012.   
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resource mobilization, in particular taxes and labour.  Stearns (2013) recounts that, in 
order to gain influence over the military integration process, Serufuli organized a 
mobilization of the Local Defence forces in 2003, in view of weighting in on the 
military integration process.  The means used are telling: Local leaders and 
Nyumbakumi (hill chiefs and neighbourhood chiefs), representing the entire rural 
architecture of political power of the Hutu community, were directly provided with 
money and weapons, and charged with recruiting soldiers in rural areas.  These 
resource mobilization networks that connected rural Hutu societies of the Highlands 
to the central nodes of political power in Goma would become crucial in further rounds 
of mobilization, in particular the PARECO mobilization.   
7.2.4.  Post War Mobilizations: The PARECO 
The PARECO movement, which emerged in 2007, represented a further step in the 
political and social reorganization of the region.  The PARECO - Union des Patriotes 
Resistants Congolais - was a politico-military movement that emerged in the post 2006 
elections era and the emergence of the CNDP, and eventually became the most 
powerful vehicle of Congolese Hutu interests in the region.  The military strength of 
the CNDP, due to its backing by Rwanda and its access to the networks of mobilization 
of the RCD, was a direct menace to the Kinshasa government, who, after clashes 
between the CNDP and FARDC that turned in favour of the former in 2006, attempted 
to co-opt the CNDP by integrating it into the army.  The army integration program, 
which offered CNDP commanders the highest ranks in the FARDC’s eastern 
commands, crystallized the grievances of a range of actors who opposed the rise in 
both military and political power of the CNDP.  At the military level, these included 
the former Hutu dominated armed groups that had fought on the side of the Kinshasa 
government during the second Congo war, such as the Hutu Mayi-Mayi groups under 
the leadership of Mugabo, who had been integrated into the FARDC in the transition 
period but often side-lined and marginalized.  At the level of territorial politics, 
opponents to the CNDP included a broad coalition of mid ranking politicians and 
leaders who were seeing their position threatened by the rise of this new player, from 
local Hutu political leaders who had benefited from the RCD era such as Bigembe 
Turinkinko, to leaders of the so-called “native” ethnic groups (Hunde, Nyanga, 
Tembo) who had accumulated grievances against what many considered as a foreign 
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invasion.  But, as argued by Stearns (2013), it was the involvement of the larger 
politicians, such as Dieudonne Bakungu Mithondeke, a Hunde politician, and former 
RCD Hutu elites, in particular the Eugene Serufuli himself, that put the crucial political 
and financial weight behind the PARECO movement.   
 
In order to build a broad military and political coalition, PARECO leaders started using 
their influence over the networks they had forged under RCD rule, which ran deep into 
the military, business and political spheres in North and South Kivu, and in which the 
CNDP had tapped for its mobilization.  While the CNDP, using financial means, had 
been able to mobilize a large number of ex-combatants in the Highlands of Masisi and 
Kalehe, resentment was rife within the ranks as a result of poor conditions and 
perceived marginalisation.215  Dieudonne Bakungu Mithondeke, a fiercely anti-CNDP 
Hunde politician, stirred resentment among integrated Mayi-Mayi soldiers, fostering 
defections from army ranks.  Military leaders of the Hutu rebellions, such as General 
Janvier Mayanga wa Bishuga, or Zabuloni Munyantware in North Kivu, or Colonel 
Gwi Gwi Busogi in South Kivu, activated their former chains of command and 
provoked defection from the ranks of the national army (FARDC).  Eugene Serufuli, 
the former governor of North Kivu, also used his influence over the former Local 
Defence Forces to provoke defections towards the PARECO, as well as the deep 
channels of influence developed by the TPD to garner support at the grassroots level 
in rural North and South Kivu, and recruit additional soldiers.  Although it would 
progressively build up into a Hutu organization, the PARECO was initially a multi-
ethnic movement, with prominent Hunde political and military leaders weighing in to 
mobilize support and troops for the movement.  In August 2007, the army integration 
program broke down, and heavy fighting started between PARECO and CNDP armed 
factions.  Complex games of alliances and opposition ensued between the different 
factions of the FARDC, the CNDP and the PARECO, with the FARDC repeatedly 
providing support to the PARECO.  
 
In the Highlands of Kalehe, the PARECO movement inserted itself at the nexus 
between land ownership, political power and military force that had become the central 
node of the political economy of the region.  Because of their much smaller 
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demographic weight in the Kalehe Highlands, the Hutu population had not been able 
to obtain the type of political clout that the much larger Hutu community of Masisi 
had obtained under Eugene Serufuli’s rule in North Kivu.  As a result, rural Hutu 
populations remained highly vulnerable to land expropriations, often carried out with 
the backing of the CNDP that had established a military base in Numbi in 2008, in part 
to protect the assets of - often Tutsi- political and military elites, but also weighting on 
land disputes which had taken an ethnic character in the Highlands.216  
 
The South Kivu chapter of the PARECO, that had emerged under the leadership of the 
former leaders of the Hutu militia of the ethnic wars of the 1990s - in particular Gwi 
Gwi, Rutambuka and Nsabimana - started weighting militarily on the game of land 
control and political power of the Highlands.  Installing their headquarters in the town 
of Shandje, the PARECO extended to their military control to Luzirantaka, Lumbishi, 
and, on several occasions, Numbi.  This led to a de facto isolation of the main Hutu 
towns of the Kalehe Highlands, which were administered autonomously by the 
PARECO, in collaboration with Hutu civilian leaders.217  A PARECO police, led by 
“Inspector” Ngundiye Bestro, operated in Shandje and Luzirantaka, symbolizing the 
separate administration of the Hutu villages of the Highlands.218  
 
In interviews, attitudes towards the PARECO military presence in 2008 diverged 
sharply.  The authorities of Lumbishi stated that the purpose of the movement was 
communal protection “against the Tutsi aggression”.219    In other interviews, the 
PARECO occupation was portrayed as brutal and arbitrary as a result of the 
undisciplined recruits in its ranks.  Former PARECO commanders and members 
admitted that recruitment procedures were lax, allowing a large number of “bad 
elements” to enter the ranks, and that there was very little training before deployment, 
which was attributed to the haste of the mobilization and the need to rapidly boost 
troop numbers.220  The large numbers of ex-combatants that populated the Highlands 
                                                 
216 Interview with Landowner, Numbi, October 2012.   
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police.  Interview with Numbi Police Chief.   
219 Interview with chief of Lumbishi, October 2012.   
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constituted prime recruitment pools for the PARECO, who also became enmeshed 
with the economy of pillaging and racketeering that had developed in the region.   
 
Recruitment superseded pre-constituted ex-combatant networks, 221  mobilizing 
another “layer” of combatants from rural Hutu populations, sometimes with the active 
intermediation of Hutu civilian leaders.  According to some interviewees, injunctions 
to provide soldiers to the movement were relayed by the authorities in Shandje and 
Lumbishi, on the basis of the necessity to provide protection to the Hutu populations 
of the Highlands, although this does not necessarily entail support by these authorities.  
Furthermore, the PARECO of the Kalehe Highlands were considered deeply 
“ethnicist” by non-Hutu interviewees, several of whom recall having been intimidated 
because of their non-Hutu status.   
 
The fighting escalated until late 2008, with the CNDP threatening to capture Goma on 
October 6, 2008.  The political process that had been set up to attempt to solve the 
crisis, the Goma Conference, ended with the March 23, 2009 Agreements, that started 
the military integration of both the CNDP and PARECO troops, and the end of the 
rebel occupation of the Kalehe Highlands.  It did not, however, fundamentally solve 
the underlying causes of the crisis, and, as we will see, led to a new round of 
mobilization in the Kalehe Highlands.   
7.5.  Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have seen that violent conflicts that have affected the Highlands of 
Kalehe were a conjunction of longstanding conflicts over land and identity and 
regional and national processes of politico-military competition and control.  Focusing 
on the Hutu populations of the Kalehe Highlands, we have seen that the initial episodes 
of armed mobilization reflected the decentralized and agrarian basis of the Hutu 
societies.  The repeated wars that affected the region following the Rwandan refugee 
crisis and the Congolese wars, however, sparked the progressive integration of this 
isolated area into regional dynamics of politico-military competition.  Armed 
mobilization reinforced mechanisms of autonomous organization of the Hutu societies 
                                                 
221 Stearns (2013) notes that around a third of the PARECO recruits were ex-combatants. 
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of the Highlands, but also entrenched a logic militarization in those societies.  While 
this chapter adopted historical angle to trace the repeated rounds of armed mobilization 
in the Kalehe Highlands, the following chapter on the Nyatura mobilization of 2011, 
a direct continuation of the dynamics of armed mobilization identified in this chapter, 
provides a closer view of the “social architecture” of armed mobilization in the context 
of an already militarized political economy.  The broader conclusion on these two 
chapters is provided at the end of chapter 8.  
 
 
Photo 3: The town of Numbi 
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Chapter Eight                                                                                                       
The Nyatura Mobilizations of 2011-2012 
“Here, we have the culture of self-defence; in front of any need or 
problem, people have the reflex of taking things in their own hands” 
Hutu agricultural worker and ex-combatant 
  
 
In August 2011, the town of Lumbishi was shaken by a call to arms that rallied dozens 
of combatants and gave birth to a new armed movement in the Hutu societies of the 
Highlands, known as the Nyatura - a Kinyarwanda term that means “to hit hard in 
order to correct”.  The emergence of yet another rebellion in the Kalehe Highlands, in 
the very same town where the first armed mobilization had occurred, speaks to the 
entrenchment of dynamics of violence in eastern Congo, which in many senses seem 
to have become “intractable”.  Yet it raises the question that is at the heart of this study: 
Given that almost twenty years separate the first mobilizations from the Nyatura 
rebellion, during which widespread war, violence and destruction have ravaged the 
Kalehe Highlands, what has changed? How does the Nyatura mobilization differ from 
the initial mobilizations of the 1990s? 
 
This chapter provides a close-range analysis of the two initial phases of the Nyatura 
mobilization in 2011 and 2012, situating the social processes of armed mobilization 
within the reconfigured “social architecture” of the region resulting from the 
progressive adaptation of the Kalehe Highlands societies to the entrenchment of a 
militarized political economy.  In particular, we will argue that the Nyatura 
mobilization is a manifestation of the transformation of the Hutu societies into a “de-
facto” ethno territorial constituency, inserted in the regional political economy of 
power and protection.  We have seen that, while the armed mobilizations of the early 
1990s had an ad-hoc, grassroots character that reflected the decentralized nature of the 
agrarian societies of the Highlands, the ascending role played by Hutu elites in the 
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RCD and then the PARECO movement brought the Hutu societies of the Kalehe 
Highlands into regional dynamics of power, profit and protection organized around 
ethno-territorial constituencies.  The culture of autonomous political organization that 
the Hutu populations of the Highlands had developed as a result of persistent political 
marginalization in South Kivu therefore became bound to larger processes of politico-
military accumulation and control.  The Nyatura mobilization of 2011 and 2012 are 
thus at the crux of two, somewhat opposed logics: On one side, the new forms of 
control that armed organizations have come to exert on the rural societies of eastern 
DRC, and in particular on military labour.  On the other, they remain part of a wider 
effort by the Hutu ethno-territorial constituency to organize protection in the face of 
repeated existential threats.  Participation in the Nyatura armed factions is therefore 
not only representative of the entrenchment of violence as a form of labour, but 
inscribed - albeit problematically - in the militarized “communities” of the Highlands. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections.  First, we trace the underlying causes of the 
emergence of the Nyatura movement to the nexus between two factors: On one side, 
the exacerbation of existential threats to the Hutu societies of the Highlands of Kalehe 
due to a sharp increase in violent land seizures, which threatened the very basis of 
these societies and activated mechanisms of communal protection, of which armed 
factions are an essential part.  On the other, the more prosaic agendas of the 
movement’s military leaders in the context of a highly volatile and politicized process 
of army integration.  As we will see, both aspects are mutually dependant, a result of 
the nexus between access to resources by ethno-territorial constituencies, political 
control and military hierarchy, that characterize the novel political economy of eastern 
DRC.  The second and third parts trace the “social architectures” of two distinct rounds 
of armed mobilization by the Nyatura movement in the Hutu societies of the Kalehe 
Highlands, with the objective of understanding the particular mechanisms through 
which participants are recruited in a context where military actors have become 
embedded in society.   
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8.1.  Structural and Proximate Causes of the Nyatura Mobilization 
8.1.1.  Military Integration and “Military Business”222 
In their efforts to justify their insurgency, the leaders of the Nyatura movement, most 
of them former PARECO commanders,223 advanced the frustration that followed the 
military integration program as one of the main motives for creating the rebel 
movement, making the Nyatura movement look like a replica of the PARECO 
movement.  Indeed, the distribution of military ranks and positions that had been 
agreed in the Accords de Goma of 2009 and hastily implemented through a military 
integration program reflected the balance of power between armed groups, 
contributing to the volatility of the national army (Baaz & Verweijen 2013; Baaz, 
Stearns & Verweijen 2013).  As the second most important armed group after the 
CNDP in 2008-2009, the integrated PARECO found themselves under the command 
of former CNDP commanders against whom they had been fighting, creating strong 
resentment from PARECO officers.  Furthermore, the “treatment” of ex-PARECO 
soldiers in the national army, where salaries were often delayed or withheld and living 
conditions were dire in comparison to the “treatment” of their ex-CNDP counterparts 
added to the general frustration.224  
 
The stakes of military integration went beyond the issue of status and military rank, as 
a result of the inter-dependence of military territorial control and economic activity 
that had become a central feature of the political economy of eastern DRC.  As military 
control entailed control over economic activity, usually in the form of various extra-
legal taxation schemes, protection arrangements and business ventures controlled by 
military actors (Verweijen 2013), the issue of territorial deployment of military units 
was highly politicized, as entire equilibriums of protection arrangements depended on 
them.  Following the Goma conference and military integration, the former military 
                                                 
222 This expression is borrowed from Verweijen (2013).  
223 These included Gwi Gwi, Rutambuka, Bisagwira Muhindi, Colonel Karume Kenge, Bahati Ntiba 
Yoruka, all former PARECO commanders.  A notable exception was Fikiri, a young civilian from 
Numbi who would become the spokesperson for the Nyatura movement in 2012-2013, and then a 
Colonel in the FARDC. 
224 Interview with ex-PARECO soldiers, Numbi, Lumbishi, Minova, Nyabibwe, September-November 
2012.   
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head of the PARECO South Kivu, Colonel Gwi Busogi, had been affected to the 
strategic town of Nyabibwe, from where he commanded the 24th   FARDC secteur 
composed mainly of former PARECO soldiers loyal to him.  Situated at the foot of the 
Kalehe Highlands, Nyabibwe was a key military position not only because of its 
proximity to major mining sites and trade routes, but also because the military position 
enabled quick military interventions in the Hutu populated Highlands of South Kivu, 
in particular in the town of Shandje that had been the centre of the PARECO’s 
operational command in the South Kivu Highlands.  As a result of this military 
deployment, the protection arrangements that had developed between PARECO 
military and Hutu business owners, which constituted an important tenet of the relation 
between military actors and the wider Hutu “community”, were temporarily 
maintained and expanded.225    
 
The fragility of these arrangements was revealed in 2011, when a series of events built 
up to the Nyatura mobilization in August 2011.  First, as part of the regimentation 
program of 2011, 226 several ex-PARECO battalions were sent to the integration camp 
of Luberizi in Uvira territory, causing a significant reduction of the number of “Hutu” 
military in the Highlands.  Furthermore, many former PARECO officers, often self-
appointed, were laid off during the regimentation program, further enhancing 
resentment within the ranks of the ex-PARECO (Stearns 2013).  But it was the arrest 
in Nyabibwe of the former military commander of the PARECO movement in South 
Kivu, Colonel Gwi-Gwi Busogi, which triggered the revolt.  His arrest for illegal 
trafficking threatened the entire economy of protection that had developed around the 
ex-PARECO integrated troops, and was perceived by many ex-PARECO as an attempt 
by the FARDC leadership to destroy the Hutu military organization, and, by extension, 
the Hutu community of eastern DRC.  The arrest of Gwi-Gwi triggered the defection 
of dozens of ex-PARECO soldiers, mainly from the Luberizi integration camp in Uvira 
Territory, many of whom moved back towards the Highlands of Masisi and Kalehe, 
and in particular Lumbishi where Matias Kalume Kenge, an ex-PARECO officer 
integrated into the 24th secteur in Uvira but without any effective responsibilities 
                                                 
225  These protection arrangements were pointed out in conversations with business owners in 
Nyabibwe, Kalungu, and Numbi.   
226 This program objective was to reduce and rationalize the army structure by creating regiments 
instead of battallions, in an effort to streamline what was a bloated and inefficient army.   
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(“dispo”), had initiated he call to arms in July and August 2011, 227  sparking the 
beginning of the Nyatura movement.   
8.1.2.  “Community protection” 
While discontent in the ex-PARECO was an important factor, it is not sufficient in 
itself to explain the emergence of the Nyatura movement.  Nor does the emphasis on 
the “greed” of military actors fully capture the intricate interdependence of the Hutu 
“community” and the Hutu military that formed the basis for the mobilization.  As we 
have seen, the Hutu armed organizations had emerged in the 1990s as a result of the 
political marginalization of the Hutu populations and the situation of extreme 
existential threat that the ethnic and regional wars had provoked.  In many instances, 
those auto-defence organizations had morphed into larger military ventures that had 
entered the regional war economy and broader military coalitions, losing the relation 
to their rural bases, as the example of the PARECO movement has shown.  But the 
climate of insecurity that prevailed in the post Goma Conference era revived the 
demand for a form of “communitarian” security provision. 
 
According to several sources, a series of meetings of Hutu community leaders of the 
Kalehe Highlands in 2011 led to a call for the return of the ex-PARECO troops to the 
region following their transfer to Luberizi and the insecurity and instability this had 
generated for the Hutu populations of the Highlands.228  The Hutu leaders include both 
the Hutu Sub-village chiefs and neighbourhood chiefs as well as organizations such as 
the La Communaute Hutu (Hutu Community Association) and the Hutu Civil Society 
organization, which both have representatives in most villages the Highlands of 
Kalehe. 229   They also include religious leaders and representatives of different 
corporations - mining, agricultural workers - as well as Hutu notables, gathering up to 
70 people per meeting.230  
                                                 
227 While the Nyatura movement was launched in August 2011, ex-PARECO defectors had been 
congregating in the town of Lumbishi since July 2011.  MONUSCO report and interview with Colonel 
Bruce, Numbi, October 2012.   
228 Interview with protection officer, Numbi, October 2012. 
229 The current president of the Hutu community in the Kalehe Highlands is Nibamwe Muyaga Jean, 
while the leader of the Hutu Civil Society organization is Sengimana Monde.   
230 Interview with representative of the Communaute Hutu, Numbi, October 2012.   
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The meetings of 2011 were organized in reaction to evictions of Hutu families that 
were taking place in the central Highlands, in the vicinity of Ngungu, Kabingu and 
Luzirantaka.  Often carried out by ex-CNDP elements integrated in the FARDC, they 
threatened once again the fragile equilibrium that supported the livelihoods of many 
Hutu families in the region.  Indeed, contrarily to the “Hauts plateaux du Sud” and the 
Lumbishi and Shandje areas the customary land tenure regime prevailed and Hutu 
landowners had purchased the land customarily, land in the northern Highlands had in 
large part been domanialise (de facto sold out of the customary system of land tenure 
and sold to private owners under the statist regime231) and was owned by large 
landowners who had acquired it during the waves of acquisition of 1975-1985 and 
1998-2003.232  We have seen in the previous chapter that many Hutus had settled on 
these lands as agricultural labourers, establishing contractual agreements with local 
landowners that conferred a sense of entitlement and “squatter” rights to these families.  
Furthermore, the Tutsi that had fled the region during the periods of PARECO military 
control over the Highlands, had either sold their land or entrusted someone to take care 
of it through informal deals and contracts, a situation that led to many encroachments 
and land seizures by opportunists (Ansoms, Claessens & Mudinga 2013).  After 2009 
and the Goma Conference, many Tutsi families returned to the area and reclaimed the 
land they allegedly owned, which triggered numerous land conflicts as well as violent 
evictions of Hutu families, often with the support of ex-CNDP soldiers.  For example, 
in Fungamwaka, a sub-village in the vicinity of Numbi, a Tutsi landowner contracted 
ex-CNDP militaries to forcefully evict Hutu families from the land in 2009.233  In early 
2011, a Hunde landowner evicted Hutu families who had long occupied land near 
Ngungu in neighbouring Masisi, leading to tit-for-tat attacks between ex-CNDP 
FARDC soldiers and Hutu peasants.234  These violent evictions caused population 
displacements towards Lumbishi.  The arrival of a large number of displaced 
populations in the summer of 2011 added to the agitation in a town that had historically 
                                                 
231 In the situation of legal pluralism that prevails in most of the DRC regarding land tenure, the 
registration of land at the state cadastre to obtain a land title is a usually accompanied by a withdrawal 
from the customary land tenure regime by a substantial payment to the landholding customary authority.  
Through this process, the land is withdrawn from the legal jurisdiction of customary authorities, which 
tends to consolidate property rights, although confusions often remain (Mpoyi 2013).   
232 Interview with local landowner, Numbi, October 2012.  Also see Ansoms, Claessens and Mudinga 
(2013). 
233 Interview with former Chief of Fungamwaka sub-village, Numbi, October 2012.   
234 APC (2011).   
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been a hotbed of rebellions, and where defecting ex-PARECO soldiers had been 
congregating.    
 
Adding to the mounting pressure, an important episode of the conflict of the Five Hills 
took place in 2011 and further threatened the fragile political arrangements that 
underpinned the Hutu societies of the Highlands.  In August 2011, the Chef de 
Groupement (chief of Grouping) of Buzi Raymond Sangara replaced the Village Chief 
of Lowa-Numbi, whose authority extended to the sub-Villages of Lumbishi, 
Luzirantaka, Shandje and Mutuza, covering the area referred to as the Five Hills.  As 
seen in the previous chapter, historically, the King of Buzi Raymond Sangara had 
appointed Elias Buhuzu, a Tutsi, as the chief of Numbi, in charge with collecting the 
customary taxes on land.  The Buhuzu family had become crucial intermediaries for 
the - often Tutsi - landowning elites who had acquired land in the area.  After Boniface 
Buhuzu family abdicated in 2003, the chief of Numbi was replaced by a Hutu, 
granting, for the first time in the region, an official position to a Hutu in the Highlands 
of South Kivu.  However, the appointment of a Hutu in a context of acute ethnic strife 
threatened the – mostly Tutsi - landholding elites.  As a result of alleged lobbying by 
these elites, Raymond Sangara replaced the chief of Lowa-Numbi in July 2011 by 
Celestin Seburikande, a Tutsi and former counsellor of Boniface Buhuzu.235  In the 
highly tense climate of the “land grabbing” and evictions of 2011, this replacement 
was seen by many Hutu leaders as an attempt to further destabilize the Hutu 
community by seizing their land and assets to distribute them to Tutsis arriving from 
Rwanda.236  
 
While the nomination of Seburikande was met with little resistance in Numbi Centre, 
where the elite interests in land were concentrated and a large Tutsi population lived, 
it was met with much more resistance in the ethnically homogenous Hutu sub-villages 
of Shandje, Lumbishi and Luzirantaka that putatively fell under the authority of chief 
of Lowa-Numbi.  In these sub villages (that can reach the size of small towns), 
customary representatives (although not officially recognized by the state) were 
exclusively Hutu, and had acquired a significant level of administrative autonomy that 
                                                 
235 Raymond Sangara designated his own son as the chief of Numbi.  As his son was studying in 
Belgium, he appointed Celestin Seburikande as his interim.   
236 Interview with representative of the Hutu Community, Numbi, October 2012.   
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had been reinforced by the isolating effects of the wars, constituting these sub-villages 
as a de facto ethno-territorial constituency.  In Lumbishi for example, the Sub-Village 
Chief sat atop a ramified architecture of governance and social organization, from the 
Hill Chiefs (22 in the case of Lumbishi) to the Family Chiefs, the lowest echelon of 
authority around which the basic social unit, the family, organized around rights over 
land. 237   This social architecture formed the landed basis of the Hutu peasant 
communities in the areas where the customary land tenure system prevailed, and, as 
we will see, also provided the basis for the armed mobilizations.   
 
When the Tutsi chief of Numbi, Celestin Seburikande, replaced the Chef de Sous 
village of Lumbishi in August 2011 in an attempt to assert his authority, the new chef 
de sous village was assassinated two days later, allegedly by Nyatura elements.238  
While the connection between the Nyatura and the Hutu authorities of Lumbishi was 
denied by the Lumbishi authorities during interviews, many interviewees assert that 
the assassination was the reflection of the refusal of the Hutu authorities in Lumbishi 
to recognize the authority of the Tutsi chief of Numbi, Seburikande.   This episode 
provides a clear example of the sharp “ethnic” rift between the centre of official 
customary authority of Lowa-Numbi, where a Tutsi chief was in place, and the Hutu 
sub-villages of the Five Hills, which, although officially dependant on the authority of 
Lowa-Numbi, acted as de-facto separate ethno-political constituencies.  The 
constitution of the Nyatura movement would clearly mark this rift, as Seburikande 
recalls: 
“It was extremely difficult to govern in Lumbishi and Shanje; the rebellion 
has broken my authority over those areas; just a few months ago I could 
not even set foot in Lumbishi without an army escort, at the risk of my own 
life” 239 
                                                 
237 Such a “family” could include several households, the defining character of a family being the 
customary entitlement to use the land.   
238 The chief of police of Numbi, in charge with the investigation for the assassination, said that it 
hadn’t been possible to identify the culprits, mostly because of the difficulty of conducting 
investigations in Lumbishi.  Interview with Police Chief of Numbi, October 2012-July 2015.   
239 Interview with Chief of Lowa-Numbi, October 2012.   
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This de-facto autonomy was most visible in the elaborate systems of protection and 
defence that the populations of the Highlands built, which ran sharply along ethnic 
lines.  The protection systems of the Hutu populations included systems of 
communication, first using relays and then through radio systems, in particular the 
system known as Motorola, whereby hundreds of Talkie Walkie relays circulate 
information about movement of armed groups, theft of cattle or other hazards.240  
Other such security systems included the construction of hideouts for people and assets 
and the preparation of escape routes for the population.241  These systems, however, 
often remained insufficient in a context of heavy militarization, and the formation of 
armed factions remained one of the only ways to guarantee protection.  
 
 The fact that, in 2011, the Hutu community association had asked for the return of the 
Hutu armed elements suggests that it played a role in mediating communitarian 
demands for the provision of security.  The Sub-Village Chief of Lumbishi denied all 
implication, or tie, with the Nyatura mobilization, as did most other Hutu authorities, 
perhaps not surprisingly given that, at the time of the interviews, the FARDC were 
carrying out a counter-insurgency operation against the Nyatura.  Yet there is little 
doubt that the leaders of the Nyatura movement were close to at least some Hutu 
leaders, from which, as we have seen, they had initially emerged.  Bisagwira, the 
“political” leader of the Nyatura movement, was considered as a “notable” in the 
region, including by state and military officials in the Highlands.242  The Nyatura 
mobilisation should therefore be seen in the light of the multiple and complex relations 
of inter-dependence between civilian and military actors that has resulted from the 
prolonged conflict in the region. 
The Social Architecture of the Nyatura mobilizations 
Now that we have identified both the structural and proximate causes of the Nyatura 
rebellion, we turn to an analysis of what we have called the “social architecture” of 
armed mobilization.  We focus on two episodes of armed mobilization of the Nyatura 
                                                 
240 Interview with representative of the Hutu Community, Numbi, October 2012.   
241 Interview with intelligence officer, Numbi, October 2012. 
242 Interview with Police Chief of Numbi, October 2012.   
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movement.  The first corresponds to the formative months of the movement, during 
which it took hold in the vicinity of Lumbishi before being forced into hiding by 
repeated counter-insurgency operations of the FARDC.  The second occurred close to 
a year after, in the early summer of 2012, as a reaction to the arrival of Raia 
Mutomboki militia in the Highlands of Northern Kalehe.  Given that the field research 
for this chapter was conducted while Nyatura elements were still operating in the 
region, we acknowledge that the interviews on which this section is based are likely to 
have been affected by the limitations inherent to field research in highly polarized 
contexts discussed in the methodology section.243  
 
The analysis focuses on the relation between the social processes of recruitment and 
control of combatants, and the wider “social architecture” in which they occurred, of 
which we have exposed several of the characteristics.  The first of these social 
processes of armed mobilization was the “activation” of ex-combatant networks that, 
as a result of the previous rounds of mobilization in the area, had become entrenched 
in the very social fabric of the societies of the Highlands.  We will then show that the 
mobilization was “deeper” and more extensive than the sole recruitment of ex-
combatants, bringing in new recruits as a result of a larger political effort to mobilize 
support from the Hutu populations of the Highlands.  Finally, we will see that these 
mechanisms were exacerbated during the “crisis” mobilization against the Raia 
Mutomboki, which displayed distinct features.   
8.2.1.  Activating networks of ex-combatants and violent labour 
The Nyatura mobilization happened in a significantly different social landscape than 
the initial mobilizations of the 1990s.  Among the range of social processes that had 
altered the social landscape of the region and underpinned the macro-process known 
as militarization, the implantation of networks of military labour within these societies 
played a significant role in shaping the “social architecture” of the armed mobilization.  
Repeated rounds of armed mobilization in the region had constituted “pools” of 
military labour, formed of soldiers in the national army, members of armed groups, 
                                                 
243 At the time of the interviews, in October 2012, the FARDC were carrying out negotiations with 
Nyatura commanders, following a phase of violent combat.   
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but also combatants who had demobilized and “reintegrated” civilian life, either 
directly or through demobilization programs.  For ex-combatants, the return to civilian 
life often meant a situation of poverty, unemployment, and social marginalization that 
has been thoroughly documented in studies of demobilization.  In a context of 
protracted civil war and on-going armed conflict, the “return” to civilian life was all 
the more ambivalent as the mechanisms of mobilization - both social and economic 
and individual-psychological - often retain a strong traction over the lives of 
demobilized combatants.  
 
This is particularly the case when ex-combatants tend to congregate in social and 
spatial clusters that reflects and preserves wartime configurations of labour 
mobilization, that Hoffman (2012) calls “barrack spaces”.  The Highlands of Kalehe 
are an exemplar of this phenomenon, as ex-combatants tend to congregate in small 
towns and urban centres such as Numbi, Kalungu or Lumbishi, where they mix with a 
highly mobile workforce that moves fluidly between various labour intensive sectors 
of the economy, in particular mining, transport, and various types of hustling.  In towns 
such as Numbi and Lumbishi, these youth often form groups or “gangs”, as they are 
pejoratively designated in the region, who structure and organize the provision of 
labour to the “informal” economy, in particular the mining economy which attracts a 
large number of unskilled workers in the region, but also, in some cases, the criminal 
economy.244  Indeed, many are said to participate in various forms of racketeering, 
pillaging - in particular raids on cattle - in organizations that function at the nexus 
between petty gangs and armed factions.  In the interviews and discussions carried out 
in the region, unemployment, lack of land were repeatedly singled out as the root cause 
of the vicious cycle these young men were trapped in, and their vulnerability to 
mobilization into rebellions.  A member of Numbi civilian security committee 
explains: 
“It is a big problem for us in the Highlands, these gangs of youth.  They 
have no education, and often their families have given up on them.  And 
                                                 
244 While residing in the town of Numbi in October 2012, I spent a lot of evenings discussing with the 
youth gathered in the city centre.  Various forms of hustling and petty racketeering were visible, but 
participation in more organized types of violent venture was mostly muted, and only mentioned 
indirectly and through rumours.   
 222 
anyways, what can their family do or offer them? They have no land, they 
have no real job.  So they just do stupid things, maraud and steal, take 
drugs (...) for the most part they have “touched the weapon” (ex-
combatants), and they actually don’t know how to do anything else.  It is 
a real problem, and we as authorities do not know how to deal with them.” 
245 
Similarly, the mother of a combatant points to the conjunction between economic 
deprivation, the resulting social marginalization experienced her son, and socialization 
into these groups: 
  “He was already hanging out with the bandits; we were trying to 
dissuade him but he was never listening anyways.  We told him to get out, 
but what could we do? He didn’t have a life with us, we had nothing to 
offer him (...) we didn’t even have any land for ourselves, not even a parcel.  
We worked on other people’s land and here we are renting.  So what could 
we offer him? With them it was bad for him but with us it was also very 
bad” 246 
As the national army, constituted in large part by ex-PARECO or ex-CNDP was also 
present in these centres, social relations forged during participation in armed factions 
often remained strong.  As the chief of Numbi recalls about these gangs: 
 “We call them demobs (demobilized soldiers) but they are not really 
demob; a rebellion just has to break out, and they immediately join.  They 
still have their weapons, hidden in their houses and in the population, and 
so they are still like a rebellion that is dormant.  If their commanders call 
them, they will come immediately. It is a very bad situation because they 
cause a lot of trouble around here”247 
                                                 
245 Interview with Honore, member of the Numbi civilian security council, October 2012. 
246 Interview with family of ex-combatants, Numbi, October 2012.   
247 Interview with Celestin Seburikande, chief of Lowa Numbi, October 2012. 
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Former armed group commanders integrated into the national army often retain strong 
control over their former combatants and the networks in which they are inserted.  This 
is reinforced by the internalized psychological submissiveness to military commanders 
of ex-combatants, forged during participation in armed organization, which remains 
strong even after demobilization.  As a former PARECO demob explains: 
 “They (our commanders) just have to call us and we come back”248 
Although one must be wary of an excessively mechanistic or functionalist conception 
of these networks, as mobilizations have a fundamentally negotiated character, 
testimonies of the initial Nyatura mobilization of August 2011 point to the quick 
“activation” of the ex-PARECO networks.249  In Numbi and Shanje, ex-combatants 
recall having quickly “heard” about the mobilization.  As one ex-PARECO recalls: 
 “Information was already circulating that there was a new movement 
before it came, and people were already talking about whether they would 
join or not (...) After the arrest of Gwi Gwi and the plan to make the Hutu 
population suffer, people were ready, especially the ex-PARECO who 
were in town and were very frustrated.  We were all frustrated at the time 
because the mines weren’t giving anything 250 (...) when the movement 
started in Lumbishi, many went to Lumbishi to inquire about what was 
going on, to see if there was something for them.  Then, it’s as if some 
people were already working for them (the movement), because they were 
sensibilizing us around here” 251 
Other testimonies point to coercion being used, exerted through peer-pressure 
mechanisms, with reluctant former PARECO demobs being forced to join by their 
peers.  According to a relative of several former PARECO soldiers mobilized into the 
Nyatura in Shandje: 
                                                 
248 Interview with ex-PARECO, Numbi, October 2012.   
249 Interview with Numbi Police chief, October 2012. 
250 This is a reference to the temporary national ban on mineral exports in 2011 that halted mining 
activity in eastern DRC.   
251 Interview with ex-PARECO, Numbi, October 2012.   
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“My nephew (a PARECO demob) was a refractaire (refuzenik); when the 
others went to Lumbishi, he did not go with them, instead he told us that 
this didn’t concern him anymore and that he was finished with the military 
career; but after a moment, they came to get him.  He resisted for a while 
and he even hid, but they finally seized him, in the middle of the day, and 
took him with them” 252 
While ex-combatants networks undeniably played a strong role in mediating the armed 
mobilization, which often involved various types of social pressure and coercion 
towards reluctant recruits, ex-combatants retained agency in the decision to 
participate.  In interviews, the supposedly separate categories of individual 
motivations for participation exposed in the theoretical chapter – relative deprivation, 
grievances, incentives, pleasure of agency - were often spelled out together, pointing 
to their inter-connected character.  As the ex-PARECO testimony exposed before 
shows, rumours of a new rebellion enticed many to see if there was “something for 
them”, referring to the economic dimensions of participation, but also wider 
possibilities of social advancement.  A testimony by a participant of the civilian 
security committee, whose role was partly to dissuade such youth from joining rebel 
groups, points to the intermingled nature of feelings of economic and social 
deprivation, jealousy, appeal of economic or social advancement and what Wood 
(2003) calls the pleasure of agency, in the form of a youthful enthusiasm for adventure 
and the promise of a better life.  The testimony also points to the conception of the 
work of war as just another form of labour, inter-changeable with other labour 
intensive activities: 
 “A young man who spends an entire month without earning a single 
dollar will either enter the mines, or enter the rebellion.  Like everyone, 
they want to buy a house or a parcel of land, but these people usually have 
no land.  They see their relatives going to live the big life in Goma, but 
they are stuck here with nothing.  So they want to join the rebellion, to get 
                                                 
252 Interview with Hutu agricultural labourer, Shandje, October 2012.   
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land, to get ranks, but also to discover the land, to travel around the 
country.  For them, it is an adventure”253  
8.2.2.  Beyond ex-combatant networks: Political dimensions of the Nyatura 
mobilization 
Although the mobilization of ex-combatants operated through networks forged and 
sustained as a result of previous mobilizations and military socialization, these 
networks, and the ex-combatants they linked together didn’t operate in isolation from 
the rest of Highland societies, in which ex-combatants are imbricated in more complex 
ways than the metaphor of the Barracks, which emphasizes a social separation, 
suggests.  Interviews revealed that ex-combatants navigated multiple social spheres 
rather fluidly, painting a more complex picture than that of complete isolation and 
marginalization from the rural societies of the Highlands. In the towns of Numbi, 
Shandje, Lumbishi and their surrounding villages, ex-combatants were not 
systematically part of the town gangs, but could be found in most spheres of economic 
and social activity, from agriculture, to teaching, to customary politics. 254  
Furthermore, even the so-called “gangs” operated in much closer relation with the 
Kalehe societies.  For example, Bahati Kana, a former RCD “Commando” who had 
become one of the most notorious coupeur de route (road cutter/bandit) of the region, 
was said to be closely connected to several families in the farms of the Highlands, who 
would offer him hideouts when he was one the run.255 
 
As a result, the re-mobilization of ex-combatants permeated a larger social sphere than 
those of gangs of ex-combatants.  Previous phases of armed mobilization, in particular 
the Local Defence and the PARECO, had created strong linkages between large-scale 
mechanisms of mobilization and local communities, and thus ran deep into the Hutu 
societies of the Kalehe Highlands.  This allowed the Nyatura to exert multi-faceted 
pressures on various nodes of the civilian life, not only of ex-combatants, but also on 
their households and social environment, which was facilitated by the proximity and 
                                                 
253 Interview with member of the Civilian Security Committee, Numbi, October 2012. 
254 In interview with chefs de post and chef de centre, it was noticed that many of the adjuncts of these 
customary representatives were ex-combatants, sometimes quite young.    
255 Follow up interview with police chief of Numbi, July 2015.   
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daily interaction of populations and ex-combatants.  Interviews with refractaires – ex-
combatants reluctant to join the new rebellion - repeatedly reveal this multi-faceted 
influence of the armed organization.  A former PARECO and Nyatura refractaire 
(refuzenik) from Lumbishi recalls: 
 “When they made the call for the combatants to rally, I was in Lumbishi, 
so I saw what was going on, and people were telling me, but I refused to 
go.  I saw one of my former commanders who was going around the area 
a bit hidden and was talking up people to join the movement.  He talked to 
me several times and told me to join; I told him that I had chosen to quit 
the military career.  He told me that a soldier is a soldier and I have to 
come.  I soon felt that they could do a “movement” to catch me, or ransom 
my family, so I moved to Numbi.  But here as well they are present (...) 
some people within my family have even told me to join because they didn’t 
want to pay for me.  What could I do? I had to pay them several times for 
them to leave me alone, but until this day I am restless because I know they 
can easily come and take me”256 
This excerpt is indicative of the multi-dimensional nature of the re-mobilization of ex-
combatants, who are not just coerced directly - through direct physical targeting and 
violence- but also indirectly, through pressure on family and social networks, which 
often had a strong “economic” component.  Indeed, as previously argued, one of the 
central effects of “militarization” is the development and extension of protection 
arrangements between individuals and armed actors.  Taxation can take the form of 
provision of labour for the movement, which can be negotiated on an individual or 
collective-communitarian level.  Although I have not recorded interviews in the 
Kalehe Highlands of individuals or households who experienced recruitments and 
directly equated them to taxation, many interviewees noted that poorer families, which 
were unable to contribute financially to the movement, were required by the movement 
to give young men, suggesting a “politics” of recruitment.  
 
                                                 
256 Interview with ex-PARECO, Numbi, October 2012.   
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As previously exposed, the Nyatura mobilization was part of the intricate power game 
playing out between competing authorities, and the Nyatura represented a bargaining 
chip for Hutu elites in competition and conflict against “Tutsi” politico-military 
networks in the area.  Although collusion with the Nyatura movement was never 
directly admitted by Hutu leaders and customary authorities, the mobilization of 
combatants was mediated by modes of communication which required the backing of 
at least certain segments of the population and authorities.  Several ‘intoxications’ - as 
tracts and rumours are called in the area- circulated before the Nyatura mobilization, 
which framed the land grabs, and regimentation program, as a concerted effort by the 
Tutsis to divide and subjugate the Hutu population and expropriate them from their 
land, and calling the population to resist.  These created a climate of fear and paranoia, 
as well as the basis for popular support for the movement, pointing to a wider political 
effort to attract support for the movement. 
 
Playing on this climate of fear, political leaders of the Nyatura movement deployed 
significant efforts to explain the rationale of the mobilization to leaders and 
populations in the Highlands, and bolster popular support as well as recruitment.  In 
the Hutu majority towns of Shandje, Luzirantaka and Lumbishi, Bisagwira Muhindi, 
the leader of the political wing of the Nyatura movement, organized meetings to 
explain the causes of the rebellion to representatives of the Hutu community.257  These 
political efforts aimed to inscribe the movement’s efforts within the communal values 
underpinning the Hutu collective identity of the Highlands, and legitimize the 
movement.  They involved framing the movement’s goals in a language that reflected 
collective grievances of the Hutu population of the Highlands - in particular by 
emphasizing the threat to collective livelihoods that the land seizures represented - as 
well as appealing to pre-existing communal norms of accountability.  Bisagwira, the 
political leader of the movement, was said to insist that the movement’s members 
would not behave arbitrarily or abuse civilians, insisting that if a soldier were to behave 
badly, the population should refer them directly to the leadership, which would take 
heavy sanctions against him. 258   Through their historic role in the previous 
mobilizations, Bisagwira and Gwi Gwi, leader of the military branch, commanded 
                                                 
257 This was reported in several interviews, including FARDC Commander Colonel Bruce, the chief of 
police of Numbi, the CDM director, as well as the representative of the Hutu community.   
258
 Interview with CDM director, Numbi, October 2012. 
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significant authority that went beyond the strict military sphere, representing a real 
political influence over the Hutu communities of the Highlands.   
 
Tied to the efforts to bolster the legitimacy of the movement among the Hutu 
community was an effort to mobilize resources beyond those already available through 
the “activation’ of ex-combatant networks.  Non ex-combatant recruits from Lumbishi 
and Shandje did join the movement, although it was difficult to ascertain what 
proportion of the estimated 500 combatants the movement had at the time were “fresh” 
recruits.  As a result of the highly polarized climate at the moment of the interview, it 
was also difficult to ascertain the exact role of civilian authorities in supporting the 
recruitment of new soldiers, chiefly because, as previously mentioned, the chiefs of 
Lumbishi and Shandje categorically denied that they had any relations with the 
movement, stating that “we are not concerned when it comes to this movement”.259  
Yet the chief of police, the representative of the Hutu community, the FARDC 
commanders and the CDM representative stated that there was no doubt that “some” 
Hutu civilian authorities were involved in mobilizing resources and providing recruits 
to the movement, usually in the form of financial and material contributions, or “giving 
children” to the movement.  The chief of Police of Numbi argued that: 
“It is official that some people would give both money, and their children, 
to the movement.  In this area, if a child of a known family is in the 
movement, and that the family does not report this to the state authorities, 
it means that his family has accepted to give him, and is not claiming him 
back.  This is a sign of support for the movement”260 
Interestingly, interviews with authorities, participants and relatives of participants 
often establish a distinction between those recruits that joined the movement by 
opportunism, whose interest in the movement was attributed to their bad behaviour or 
ex-combatant status, and those who joined the movement with the legitimate intention 
of defending their land and community.  As one adjunct to the chief of Lumbishi 
recalls: 
                                                 
259 Interview with sub-village chief of Lumbishi, October 2012.   
260 Follow-up interview with Chief of Police of Numbi, July 2015.   
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 “When the movement started, there was a lot of confusion in Lumbishi, 
people were not sure what to think of this new rebellion, it was creating a 
lot of disturbance in the area, many people fled from the town.  Those who 
quickly joined the movement were mostly ex-combatants, and the children 
of the families that weren’t wise261 (...) But there were others who did join 
the movement, who were relatives of wise families (sage), to defend the 
village against the bandits who were threatening to seize our land; but 
these didn’t stay long when they realized that the movement wasn’t good” 
262 
Through a discussion, it was established that the “wise” families refer to the relatives 
of the chef de collines (Hill chiefs) of Lumbishi or other local notables affiliated to the 
landed class of Lumbishi, while those referred to as the “unwise” were either 
immigrant families, or families that had developed close associations with certain 
violent actors.  This suggests differentiated patterns of support for the movement, 
revelatory of the class fractures of the societies of the Highlands, but also the fractures 
tied to the previous rounds of armed mobilization.   
 
The rebellion caused immediate concern among the state authorities of the Highlands, 
and their first reaction was to attempt to quell the movement’s growth by asking Hutu 
leaders, and the Hutu population, to discourage participation of their relatives in the 
movement.263   During the initial weeks of the mobilization, before the repressive 
military operations of the FARDC started, the Nyatura were “visible” in the town of 
Lumbishi, going around town with their weapons and setting up road blocks at the 
exits of Lumbishi.  They also set up positions in Mushebere close to Luzirantaka, as 
well as in Mudugudu in Ziralo, on the road from Shandje to Cyanbombo, thus starting 
to re-establish the zone of military control of the PARECO.  While not militarily 
present in Numbi centre, Nyatura elements could be seen in the town of Numbi, 
suggesting that the group maintained close relations with the wider social environment 
                                                 
261 “pas sage” in French.  
262 Interview with adjunct to Chief of Lumbishi, October 2012.   
263 This was done through a series of meetings of all state representatives, representatives of the civil 
society and Hutu community leaders in Numbi.   
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in the initial period.264  While the state authorities were not in direct communication 
with the Nyatura commanders, a meeting was organized in Numbi between the 
FARDC commander who was dispatched to address the Nyatura rebellion, Colonel 
Chiviri, and Bisagwira, the political leader of the movement, who presented the 
movements grievances and conditions for cessation to an audience of state and 
community representatives.   
 
An agreement was not found, and tension escalated as the FARDC started mounting 
military operations against the Nyatura in Lumbishi, Shandje, and Ziralo.  On 
September 21, 2011, the FARDC chased the Nyatura out of Lumbishi, forcing them 
to disperse into the more remote areas of the Kalehe Highlands and the Ziralo 
Grouping, as well as in the territory of Masisi, or to “hide” in the Hutu populations of 
Lumbishi, Numbi and Shandje.   Military and counter-insurgency operations against 
the Nyatura were then carried out regularly into the fall and winter of 2011, and then 
from February 2012.265  As many of the integrated FARDC carrying out the operations 
were former CNDP, which at the time were coming under the command of a new 
strongman, Bosco Ntaganda, these military operations were often interpreted as a 
further attempt by Tutsi power to destabilise the Hutu.266  Shortly after the FARDC 
chased the Nyatura from Lumbishi, counter-insurgency operations, referred to as 
bouclage and ratissage were carried out in the towns of Lumbishi and Shandje around 
September 20, 2011, targeting hidden combatants, arms caches, and support networks 
of the Nyatura.  
 
 Because of the deep ramifications of these networks within Hutu communities, this 
further polarized the climate, with reports of abuse by FARDC troops against civilians 
reported.  Once again, the position of Hutu leaders seemed ambiguous.  While they 
had declared full cooperation with the government in dismantling the rebellion,267 they 
showed great reluctance to help the FARDC and police operations in Lumbishi and 
                                                 
264 Interview with Chief of Police of Numbi, October 2012.   
265 The first military operation against the Nyatura reported in MONUSCO’s weekly security reports 
dates back to July 24-26, 2011 (MONUSCO Press conference of August 3rd, 2011).  Regular military 
operations ensued.   
266 In interviews, Colonel Civiri was accused several times of being “anti-Hutu”.   
267 This was reported by all interviewed participants in the multi-party security meetings on the Nyatura 
problem that were carried out in Numbi in the fall of 2011. 
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Shandje, refusing to identify Nyatura combatants and affiliates, which was interpreted 
as a sign of possible support for the rebellion.268  While the Nyatura movement seems 
to have remained united in South Kivu during this period, with only on short instance 
of secession within the group,269 the repression, combined to further “sensibilisations” 
of the population to drop support for the movement and exert pressure on relatives to 
leave the movement, seemed to have been relatively successful in temporarily driving 
a wedge between the Nyatura groups and the population, as the former were forced to 
flee the region or go into hiding, tracked down by army intelligence networks.  Arrests 
of Nyatura elements, however, revealed the complicated webs of support for the 
movement.  According to the chief of Police of Numbi, the arrest of a Nyatura element 
would be followed by intense lobbying on military and police authorities for his 
liberation, by private citizens but also by certain authorities, although no name was 
mentioned:  
 “If a member of the group was arrested, we would see that several people 
would suddenly start asking for their liberation, including local notables, 
who argued that they would convince the person not to get back into the 
movement; we could see that this was the manifestation of a form of 
clandestine support” 270 
According to a FARDC Colonel who was in charge of military operations, negotiations 
with Hutu community leaders were engaged by the FARDC after the Nyatura were 
out, although many elements remained dormant.271  This was only temporary, as a new 
round of mobilization would ensue as a result of the Raia Mutomboki “menace”.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
268 For example, the Chief of Police of Numbi said that this could indicate support of these authorities 
for the Nyatura.  Given that their reluctance could also be due to threats of retaliation by the Nyatura, 
we cannot establish for sure whether there was support or not.    
269 This was the case of Major Edison, who had defected for 48 hours with his escorts and installed 
himself in Murambi, sous village Kaloba.   
270 Follow up interview with police chief of Numbi, July 2015.   
271 Interview with Colonel Bruce, Numbi, October 2012.   
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Photo 4: The town of Shandje in the Kalehe Highlands 
 
 
 
 
8.3.  Crisis mobilization under the Raia Mutomboki menace 
We now turn to the second phase of the Nyatura mobilization in the Kalehe Highlands, 
under the menace of the Raia Mutomboki movement.  We will argue that, much more 
than the previous one, this mobilization corresponded to a “crisis” mobilization, 
which, while activating the same types of mobilization mechanisms than the previous 
round of mobilization, exacerbated and superseded them.     
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In the course of 2012, the Raia Mutomboki phenomenon started expanding into 
Kalehe.  The Raia Mutomboki, a loosely coordinated “armed franchise” 272  that 
developed in 2011 in the territory of Shabunda in opposition to the FDLR militia that 
had taken control of several areas of the territory Shabunda in the wake of the 
regimentation program of 2011.273   When the FDLR retreated from Shabunda to 
Kalehe territory as a result of the considerable military pressure of the Raia 
Mutomboki, the former started following them into Kalehe territory, first into the 
Grouping of Kalonge, then into the area of Bunyakiri, before moving into Walikale 
Territory in North Kivu, from which they reached the Highlands of Masisi and then 
Kalehe in the late spring of 2012.  The rapid spread of the movement was due to its 
loose hierarchy and its “contagion” effect, whereby quasi-autonomous local chapters 
would be formed and take up the name.  As the movement started spreading in the 
Tembo areas of Kalehe and the Western Midlands of the Mitumba Mountains, 
subsisting conflicts against Hutu populations of the Midlands and Highlands of Kalehe 
that dated back to the 1990s resurfaced.  Added to this longstanding Tembo resentment 
against neighbouring Hutu communities, the Raia Mutomboki movement carried as its 
core “ideology” a racist anti-Rwandan discourse, and the Hutu populations of the 
Highlands were quickly accused by the Raia Mutomboki of harbouring and hiding the 
FDLR.  
 
The threat of the Raia Mutomboki started agitating the Highlands of Kalehe in April 
2012, when displaced Hutu started arriving from Walikale where the Raia Mutomboki 
were carrying out attacks against FDLR strongholds.  The displaced carried stories of 
the massacres that the Raia Mutomboki had carried out against Hutu civilians and 
rumours that the Raia Mutomboki intended to exterminate the Hutu population of the 
Highlands.  Among these rumours, one that was recounted in several interviews was 
that the Raia Mutomboki had a particular saying to illustrate the fact they made no 
distinction in their wrath between the FDLR and the Hutu civilian populations: “One 
cannot distinguish between a city rat and a country rat”274 
 
                                                 
272 Stearns et al. (2013a).    
273 Stearns et al.  (2013a).    
274 Interview with chief of Lumbishi, Lumbishi, October 2012.   
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The imminent threat of the Raia Mutomboki triggered an unprecedented round of 
mobilization by the Nyatura in the Kalehe Highlands.  According to several military 
and civilian observers, several Nyatura commanders were present in Lumbishi when 
the Raia Mutomboki menace intensified, some of them as civilians and others as 
integrated into the FARDC, including Bisagwira, Colonel Karume Kage,275 Colonel 
Bahati Ntibayoruba and Colonel Felix.  According to several witnesses, these leaders 
launched a call to immediately mobilize a large number of Nyatura in Lumbishi, who 
had kept arms caches in the region.  Hundreds276  of Hutu joined the Nyatura in 
Lumbishi, both “locals”, as well as hundreds of other combatant joining in from Masisi 
Highlands, and congregating in Lumbishi.   
 
The atmosphere of imminent crisis, and the presence of large numbers of armed 
Nyatura fighters in Lumbishi generated exceptional dynamics of armed mobilization, 
making it difficult to ascertain the role of Hutu civilian authorities and communitarian 
mechanisms of mobilization.  Interviews, however, suggest that the power of these 
civilian leaders was greatly diminished, if not inexistent, in the presence of such an 
imposing number of armed actors.  Nyatura chiefs such as Mathias Kalume Kage, and 
commandant Malu, reputed for their brutality, took over the area of Lumbishi, leaving 
little space for dialogue or influence by civilian authorities.  Many interviewees report 
that this was accompanied by a surge of popularity for the Nyatura, and mass 
recruitments into their ranks.  Several interviewees, including the authorities of 
Lumbishi, recall that the armed factions were in full control of the area at the time, 
with civilian and state authorities fleeing the area and the town.  A shopkeeper who 
had fled the town just before the first battles describes the atmosphere in the town at 
the time: 
“It was a crisis; the youth were joining massively, even many older people, 
the soldiers were going around and forcing the reluctant men to join the 
effort, everybody was preparing for combat, with weapons and everything 
(...) what could people do? They had to prepare for combat, or else they 
                                                 
275 Several testimonies reported the presence of Karume Kenge; however, the FARDC had declared 
having killed Karume on December 12, 2011.  MONUSCO press release of December 14, 2011.   
276 The exact number of combatants mobilized at this period is unclear, with a regional security expert 
saying that it was in the thousands.   
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would be exterminated.  As a Shi I was able to leave the town, and many 
others, including women and children, were fleeing the area.”277   
Interviews attest that Nyatura commanders were carrying out public recruitments in 
Lumbishi, calling for youth to join the movement and distributing weapons and 
ammunition.  The situation was made even tenser by the fact that FARDC troops were 
also present in the town, detached from the bataillon in Numbi, as well as from the 
secteur in Nyabibwe, and in an ambivalent position towards the looming crisis.  
Indeed, since early 2012,278 a joint FARDC-MONUSCO military operation had been 
launched in South Kivu against the FDLR, many of which were tied to Congolese 
Hutu armed groups in the Kalehe Highlands, with several large FDLR bases in 
neighbouring Masisi and Walikale.  The operation had been suspended in April 2012, 
but the FARDC remained, at least in principle, in a campaign against the FDLR.  
Several observers report alliances between the FARDC and both the Raia Mutomboki 
and the Nyatura, although these have not been confirmed. 
Spreading from Walikale to Masisi and then South Kivu, violent clashes started hitting 
the Kalehe Highlands in June 2012.  On June 17 and June 18, heavy combats took 
place between the Raia Mutomboki and the Nyatura in Lumbishi, leading to the death 
of 13 Hutu residents and one Hunde in Lumbishi,279 triggering further mobilization 
and retaliatory violence.  The FARDC who were also positioned in Lumbishi,  did not 
directly partake in the fighting but intervened to disperse the combatants.  Further 
violent ensued throughout the summer in several towns and villages of the area, 
combining direct combats, civilian massacres, and pillaging of goods, such as the 
massacre of 15 people by Nyatura militia in Ngungu.  The violence continued until 
August 28, 2012, date of the massacre carried out by the Chambombo based Nyatura 
elements, who killed 6 people and burned the entire village of Rutshu.   
A cease fire agreed by the different armed factions was brokered by delegations 
comprising state representatives, representatives of the different communities, and 
FARDC commanders, known as the Campagne Multilaterale de Dialogue et de 
                                                 
277 Interview with Lumbishi Shopkeeper, Numbi, October 2012.   
278 February 16, 2012 is the launch date of Amani Kamilifu.   
279 Interview with chief of Lumbishi, October 2012.   
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Mediation (Multilateral Campaign of Dialogue and Mediation).280  While the crisis 
mobilization had boosted the ranks of the Nyatura, several observers note that 
population support for the movement dwindled during the Campagne, which also 
included public speeches to reduce support for the movement, combined with more 
repressive FARDC operations to disarm the Nyatura.  The negotiations led to a first 
rounding up of Nyatura soldiers, under the initiative of the Congolese Army Chief of 
Staff, Gabriel Amisi.  This regroupement 281 that took place in Mushaku, Masisi Sud, 
in Sept-Oct 2012, led to a separation of the Nyatura combatants in two groups, where 
half of these went to fight alongside the FARDC against the M23 insurgency in 
Ruthshuru - in what was called the “814th Integrated Nyatura Regiment”.  In the course 
of 2013, several other regroupement in Murambi, and Nyamununi were organized to 
integrate the former Nyatura, but many sources point to large scale defections 
following their transfer to the Province Orientale.  The Nyatura movement would 
know several other reiterations and offshoots, and, far from disappearing with the 
military integration, it was reported that the Nyatura were still present in Lumbishi in 
July 2015. 
8.4.  Conclusion 
These two chapters have explored the evolving political economy, and corresponding 
social architecture in which the repeated rounds of armed mobilization have occurred 
in the Highlands of Kalehe, with a particular focus on the Hutu societies of this area.  
Several salient points emerge from the chapter and inform the central interrogation of 
this dissertation.   
 
First, the chapter sheds light on how two central ‘macro-logics’ have driven armed 
mobilization in the Hutu societies of the region, a ‘protective’ logic on one side, and a 
more accumulative logic tied to the insertion of the region into regional dynamics of 
politico-military competition on the other.  The analysis of the social and institutional 
                                                 
280 At the time of the interviews, the negociations with the Nyatura elements were still ongoing, with 
Numbi based Colonel Bruce carrying out discussion with Nyatura representatives, and representatives 
of the Hutu community.   
281 Regroupement is the term used to designate a rounding up of troops in view of their disarmament 
or integration into the government army.   
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basis of the Hutu societies has allowed us to refine our understanding of ‘protection’.  
Indeed, in a context where the livelihoods of the Hutu societies of the Kalehe 
Highlands rested on a very fragile ‘architecture’ of property rights and relations with 
the Havu landowners and customary authority, and the exclusion from state and 
provincial politics provided no political channel to voice grievances, national level 
debates on land ownership sparked a direct threat to the livelihood basis of these 
societies.  Combined with the direct threat of attacks and massacres when the Masisi 
war spread to the region, this provided the impetus for the formation of the first wave 
of ‘ethnic militias’.   
 
These armed groups, however, quickly inserted themselves into the regional economy 
of violence and predation that developed as a result of the war, as well as regional 
dynamics of resource accumulation.  The constitution and implantation of these armed 
groups, in particular the PARECO movement, brought the region under more direct 
forms of control and accumulation by the Hutu elites based in Goma.  The armed 
groups constituted essential vectors of this control, as they facilitated accumulation of 
both resources and labour.  Yet the entrenchment of this logic of accumulation did not 
break the protective role that the armed groups continued to play vis-à-vis the Hutu 
societies of the Highlands in a context of repeated and intensifying crisis.  Indeed, we 
have seen that the Nyatura mobilization, although tied to dynamics of elite competition 
in the military, was nevertheless driven by a renewed demand for protection by the 
Hutu societies in a context of persistent existential threat to the livelihood basis of 
these societies.  Thus, while the Hutu societies had developed elaborate mechanisms 
of collective protection to palliate the lack of state provided security, the reconstitution 
of the armed group remained the only option for protection in the context of a highly 
militarized society, illustrating the conjunction of these two macro-factors of armed 
mobilization.  
 
Second, the chapter has allowed us to explore another of the central guiding questions 
of this dissertation, the question of how people are brought to participate in armed 
groups.  Through an analysis of the ‘social architecture’ of the repeated rounds of 
mobilization in the region, we have seen that modes of recruitment and control over 
combatants evolved to reflect the progressive implantation of these armed groups into 
the Hutu societies of the Highlands.  The initial mobilizations of the early 1990s 
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closely reflected the decentralized and agrarian nature of these societies and took a 
‘popular’ form.  However, the emergence of a ‘militarized’ workforce, a result of the 
successive rounds armed mobilizations in the region, had spatial and social 
manifestations in the region, in particular the concentration of ex-combatants in the 
town centres of the region.  The analysis of the Nyatura mobilizations of 2011-2012 
showed that the armed group leaders exerted firm control over these networks of ex-
combatants, which they were able to quickly remobilize, a process involving both 
coercion and attraction.  Yet we have seen that the mobilization superseded these 
networks, and that the group was able to mobilize beyond these networks, particularly 
during the “crisis” mobilization against the Raia Mutomboki. 
 
Third, we have explored some of the individual dimensions of participation.  We have 
seen that grievances, particularly in the form of lack of access to land - one of the most 
important markers of social status in the societies of the highlands - played an 
important role in driving youth to join the militia, an aspect that has been underscored 
by several studies of participation in the region (Van Acker & Vlassenroot 2001a, 
2001b; Jourdan 2004).  Such grievances took different emotional manifestations, such 
as jealousy towards those who had left for Goma, and the desire for a form of 
‘adventure’.  Yet we have seen that such grievances were experienced collectively, 
within groups of youth, and that this collective aspect played an important role in 
pushing youth to ‘act’ on such grievances, which came into articulation with the modes 
of control that the armed groups exerted over these youth.  Grievances can therefore 
be ‘activated’ by social networks, as emphasized by Scacco (2009).  This chapter has 
therefore allowed us to refine our understanding of the causes, and processes, of armed 
mobilization and participation in armed groups.  We now turn to our quantitative 
analysis of armed mobilization, in which we will pursue the same lines of 
interrogations into the causes and processes of participation in armed groups.  
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Chapter Nine                                                                                                      
A Quantitative Perspective on Participation 
 
In this chapter, we turn to a quantitative analysis of armed mobilization and 
participation in armed groups in the province of South Kivu, with the objective of 
complementing the qualitative approach of the other chapters, and seeing whether we 
can find statistical evidence for some of the processes of participation and mobilization 
that we identified.  We use original data collected specifically for this thesis through a 
survey in the province of South Kivu. 
 
We ask three main questions in the chapter, which correspond to the guiding questions 
of this dissertation.  The first is who joins armed organizations? This question has 
guided recent quantitative analyses of armed mobilization.  The objective of this 
approach is to identify individual determinants of participation in violent 
organizations, by comparing participants to non-participants, but also, thanks to the 
panel structure of the data, by comparing how the evolution of different individual 
factors affect participation at different periods of time.   
 
The second guiding question is how do people join armed organizations? In line with 
our multi-level framework of analysis of armed mobilization, we look at how 
individual determinants of armed mobilization articulate with supra-individual 
dimensions of mobilization.  In particular, we focus on social and institutional 
mediation of mobilization, i.e. how institutional and social structures mediate armed 
mobilization and influence an individual’s decision to participate.    
 
Finally, we attempt to shed light on the more difficult question of why do people 
participate in armed organizations? While the question of identifying motives of 
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participation is complex and difficult to ascertain with quantitative data, we take an 
original approach to it by taking advantage of the panel structure of the data to look at 
what participation causes for an individual.  In particular, we look at how participation 
affects an individual’s socio-economic positioning, as well as how it affects an 
individual’s security and the security of his social entourage.     
 
The strength of the analysis rests on two main aspects.  First, the panel structure of the 
data allows for a more dynamic analysis of participation than cross-section type data, 
as it takes into account temporal variation in the purported individual determinants of 
participation and the surrounding social, institutional and group-level factors that 
influence participation.  Furthermore, the disaggregated nature of the data allows for 
very close range identification of effects, overcoming the pitfalls multi-country cross 
section analyses of civil wars (Blattman & Miguel 2009).  This allows to analyse why 
an individual chooses to participate in certain groups and not others, but also why an 
individual might participate at certain periods and not others, in particular through the 
use of fixed effects models.  The panel structure of the data therefore allows to address 
one of the most important aspects of recruitment into armed organizations, its temporal 
variation, which has been identified by several authors as being a crucial dimension of 
the understanding of participation (Van Belle 1996; Humphreys & Weinstein 2008 
p.453). 
 
The chapter starts by a presentation of the survey and datasets, and delineates the 
methodological constraints associated with analysing participation, before briefly 
presenting descriptive statistics on participation.  The analysis is then divided into 
three main sections, which correspond to the guiding questions of the chapter.  Section 
1 looks at the individual determinants of participation, in order to shed light on who 
participates in armed organizations.  Section two looks at the institutional and social 
mediation of armed mobilization, and provides insight on how people participate in 
armed organizations.  Finally, Section 3 of the analysis looks at the individual and 
collective effects of participation, in order to address the question of why people 
participate in armed organizations.   
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9.1.  Presentation of Survey and Datasets 
9.1.1.  Survey methodology and implementation 
The analysis carried out in this chapter is based on original data collected through a 
survey carried out in the province of South Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
between August 2012 and December 2013.  The survey was designed and 
implemented as part of a joint-project led by Raul Sanchez de la Sierra and myself on 
the economic and social history of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, which 
comprises several research projects and has been funded by several institutional 
sources.282  The survey was implemented by 11 Congolese researchers in the province 
of South Kivu, with an operational base in Bukavu, the provincial capital of South 
Kivu.283  Training of surveyors and on site supervision of the implementation was 
carried out by Gauthier Marchais and Raul Sanchez de Sierra.  The logistical 
constraints associated with the implementation of a large-scale survey in an active 
Armed Conflict Zone were numerous, mostly tied to problems of access, security, and 
financial constraints.  While an extensive review of these challenges and constraints is 
beyond the scope this chapter, the following sub-section of the chapter will discuss the 
key implementation and measurement constraints, and their implications for the 
analysis.  
 
The survey was implemented in 134 “villages” of the territories of Walungu, Kalehe, 
Shabunda, Idjwi and Mwenga, using a sampling strategy that was designed to 
maximise variation in socio-economic conditions of the villages, and various 
                                                 
282 Funding for this project came from the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Private Entreprise 
Development in Low-Income Country exploratory Grant (PEDL), the International Peace Research 
Association Foundation (IPRAF), the Centre for the Study of Development Strategies at Columbia 
University (CSDS), the Earth Institute and the Advanced Consortium in Cooperation and Complexity.  
283 These are: Jean-Paul Zibika Mutacumura, Christian Mastaki Mugaruka, Christian Pole-Pole Bazuzi, 
Freddy Koleramungu, Aimable Amani Lameke, Simeon Lukeno Bikanaba, Eustache Kuliumbwa 
Lulego, Emmanuel Till Kandate, Floribert Iwaboshi, Salomon Salumu Kombi and Desire Cizungu 
Bazibube.  I thank Raul Sanchez de la Sierra for exceptional help in designing the survey, as well as 
crucial help in carrying out the analysis.  I also thank Soeren Henn for comments on late versions of 
this chapter.  
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randomization procedures.284   Figure 1 provides a visualisation of the geographic 
location of surveyed villages.    
 
In each village, two separate surveys were administered by teams of two surveyors, 
during a period of 7 days per village.  The Household Survey was administered to 8 
respondents, representing 8 households in each village, thus achieving a total sample 
size of 1074 households.  A randomization procedure was followed to select both the 
8 households to be surveyed in the village, and the respondent to be surveyed within 
each household.285  Household surveys were focused on the individual “history” of 
respondents - spanning their economic, social and political life - and lasted between 4 
and 6 hours per respondent.  The recall nature of the survey meant that, for each 
variable, individuals were asked to provide either the dates, or the values and/or 
changes in the value of the variables for each year since 1990.  For example, instead 
of being asked whether they were married and had children, respondents were asked 
the exact dates of their marriage(s) and children’s birth, allowing to reconstitute their 
marital history.  Similarly, instead of being asked whether they owned land or not, the 
respondents were asked to give the dates and characteristics of each purchase, sale or 
loss of land, allowing to reconstitute their land ownership history.  Thus, the survey 
allowed to create a retrospective panel dataset, i.e. one in which each variable contains 
a temporal dimension.  The retrospective panel dataset that is used in this analysis is 
the same as the one used by Sanchez de la Sierra (2016), although the analysis carried 
out by Sanchez de la Sierra focuses on different variables.  Along with the repeated 
collection of observations over time, recall survey methods are one of the two ways in 
which panel datasets can be created (De Nicola & Giné 2014).  It presents, however, 
certain limitations, which are discussed in the following section.  
 
                                                 
284  As one of the main objectives of the research project was to look at the impact of mineral 
endowments on armed group’s strategies, the sampled villages were a combination of a random sample 
of villages with mineral endowments and “matched” agricultural villages displaying similar 
characteristics. The village sampling was done using an existing database on mineral deposit 
distribution in South Kivu (IPIS database), complemented with other databases (the International 
Rescue Committee’s RRMP database, the RGC database) as well as interviews with mining and 
regional experts, and the survey teams who relayed information about additional mines and villages.  
285 In each village, the surveyors drew a list of all households in the village with the help of village 
authorities. 8 respondents were randomly selected from the list, using a list of random numbers 
previously drawn, that selects households for any potential village size based on the number in the 
census. The same procedure was followed to select the respondent within the household.  
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The second survey, the Village Survey, was administered to the Authorities of the 
Village, and was focused on the history of the village as a whole, and also spanned 
economic, social and political aspects.  Because of its complexity and the precision of 
the data required, the Village Survey was carried out throughout the 7 days of presence 
of the surveyors in a village.  On the first day, the surveyors would identify “village 
specialists”, both the village authorities and security and economic specialists, to 
whom the survey protocols and questionnaires would be presented.  During the 
following days, the surveyors would help these “village specialists” collect and 
compile the information from different sources.  On the final day, a reunion with all 
the “specialists” was organized to carry out the final village survey, which lasted the 
entire day.  As for the Household Survey, each question of the Village Survey was 
asked so as to capture levels and changes for each year since 1990.  This allowed to 
create a retrospective panel dataset, based on recall data.  The Household Survey and 
Village Survey protocols and questionnaires are provided in Appendix 3.  
9.1.2.  Logistical challenges associated with collecting data in contexts of armed 
conflict  
Surveyor Safety 
The most pressing challenges of collecting data in conflict-affected areas are safety - 
both of the surveyors and respondents - and access.  In order to address these 
challenges, the projects directors, staff and surveyors developed an extensive set of 
logistical, material and communicational measures to reduce the security risks 
associated with navigating such a volatile security context as that of rural South Kivu.   
 
First, we ensured that the project members and survey teams bore all the necessary 
authorizations to carry out the study.  Given the sensitivity of the information 
collected, surveyors were at risk of being stopped, arrested and detained by military 
and civilian authorities.  In order to reduce this risk, the project was presented to the 
South Kivu provincial authorities, in particular the Ministere de l’Interieur de la 
province du Sud-Kivu (interior ministry of the province of South Kivu), the national 
army (FARDC), and the Agence Nationale pour le Renseignement (the national 
intelligence services).  Following the official authorization of the project by these 
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authorities, all surveyors and project members were given an ‘ordre de mission’ 
(mission statement), which carried the official stamps and signatures of these 
authorities.  This procedure was replicated in each of the administrative units of rural 
South Kivu where the survey took place.  Before arriving in a village, the surveyors 
and project members presented their ordre de mission and authorizations to the civilian 
and military authorities of both the territories and groupings in which the village was 
situated, and obtained the official stamps authorizing the survey by these authorities.  
This procedure was also replicated at the village level, as the surveyors would start by 
presenting the project and survey in detail to the civilian and military authorities of the 
village, and obtain their formal authorization (signature and stamp).  This considerably 
reduced the risk of surveyors being suspected of being spies or informants, and being 
arrested or detained. 
 
Second, a number of measures were taken to reduce the exposure of surveyors to 
various forms of banditry and abuse by criminal or military actors in the areas of 
survey implementation.  In rural South Kivu, the proliferation of weapons, the difficult 
terrain and the lack of infrastructure have created a propitious environment for various 
military or criminal actors to harass the population, often violently.  While the 
surveyors are Congolese citizens from the province of South Kivu, they often weren’t 
‘natives’ of the survey areas, which increased their exposure to such harassment.  In 
order to mitigate this risk, a tracking, information and monitoring system was set up 
to follow closely the movements of surveyors.  Before going to a survey village, the 
surveyors, in coordination with the project supervisor, would start by gathering all 
available information on the security situation of the village.  This included the weekly 
security briefings of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UN-OCHA Sud Kivu), the daily security updates of the International Rescue 
Committee (IRC Sud Kivu, with whom we had a partnership), as well as daily calls to 
Congolese civilian and military authorities in Bukavu.  The surveyors and project 
supervisor would also systematically seek information from local military and civilian 
authorities at the territory and grouping level.  An assessment was then made of the 
security level of the survey villages.  Villages that presented a significant security risk 
were temporarily dropped from the survey, to be revisited later if the security situation 
improved.  Of all of the villages in the initial selection, a total of 3 villages were 
permanently dropped for security reasons.  
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In addition to these preventive measures, the surveyors followed strict security 
protocols for their displacements, communications and accommodation in the 
implementation areas.  First, they were required to spend the night in a village/town 
that displayed an acceptable level of security, and were not allowed to travel at night.  
This meant that, for villages that had a higher level of risk, the surveyors were required 
commute each day between those villages and a larger and safer centre, usually the 
local town with a national army outpost.  The distance between such towns and 
implementation villages varied significantly, and for more remote villages the costs 
incurred by the daily travel could be very high, which led to a reduction of the total 
number of surveyed villages.  Furthermore, a strict communication system was set up.  
Every morning and every evening, each survey team of 2 would send an SMS to the 
project supervisor indicating their position, as well as the time and destination of any 
travel planned in the following days.  These SMS went through a Frontline SMS 
program, which allowed to visualize and track surveyor movements in real time.  The 
supervisor would call each team in the evening to evaluate the security of further 
displacements, and discuss any problem.  The project directors would also call each of 
the survey teams 2-3 times per week.  Finally, all teams were equipped with a Thuraya 
satellite phone, to use in the case of an emergency or to report their position in areas 
that lacked phone coverage.  Despite these measures, surveyors found themselves in 
difficult situations several times, which were dealt with on a case to case basis.  On 
two occasions, surveyors were forced to flee an area because of unpredicted and 
imminent armed clashes. 
 
In areas under military control by non-state armed groups, security and access were 
significantly more complex to address.  Indeed, the institutional safeguards - ordres 
de mission and official authorizations - were no longer effective, and often attracted 
suspicion of collaboration with government forces.  As a result, particular efforts were 
made by the directors, supervisor and surveyors to mitigate risks before entering such 
areas.  Building on the knowledge that these armed groups often have deep social and 
institutional bases, contact was made with the civilian authorities of these areas to first 
evaluate the level of risk of the zone, and then send the ‘message’ to the armed actors 
that the project members worked neither for the government nor any party involved in 
the conflict.  Contact was then made with representatives of the armed organizations 
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in order to obtain official authorization from the leadership for surveyors to carry out 
their research activities.  On three occasions, the project decided to post-pone entry 
into a particular zone because such safeguards and authorizations were not obtained.  
Yet even when these safeguards were obtained, surveyors could still face suspicion by 
the members of the armed group or their sub-factions.  On five occasions, surveyors 
were briefly arrested, detained and interrogated, although no violence or harm was 
reported.  On two occasions, the Raia Mutomboki armed group in Northern Shabunda 
decided to dispatch escorts for the ‘protection’ of the surveyors, which effectively 
served to control the surveyors’ activities and report back to the group’s hierarchy.  
Given the level of interference to the survey protocols that such situations generate, it 
was then decided to drop these observations from the analysis.  
Respondent Safety 
In addition to the safety of the project members and surveyors, the safety of the 
respondents and participants in the study was a central concern.  The highly polarized 
social context created by the civil war, and the sensitivity of the questions generated 
situations of potential risks for the respondents, even though the protocols and survey 
were fully reviewed and authorized by Columbia University’s Institutional Review 
Board (IRB protocol AAAK0552).  
 
The first measure taken for respondent security was the informed consent of the 
authorities of the villages in which the survey was carried out.  The surveyors would 
give a full presentation of the survey questionnaire and hand a paper copy to the 
civilian and military authorities of the survey villages, and present the scientific 
objectives of the study.  The authorities were also informed that the Household 
Surveys would be carried out in privacy with the households, and that the answers 
given by individual households would not be accessible either by the respondent, the 
surveyor or any other person apart from the project directors, and never at the 
implementation site (See Data Storage section in this chapter).  The survey protocols 
(Appendix 3) also stressed that the surveyors explain to the authorities that, while 
sensitive issues were addressed in the survey – such as experience or perception of 
violence or participation in armed groups – none of the armed actors would be named 
in person, and an anonymization process prevented anyone from tracing back subject 
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answers to particular subjects, or particular local institutions or figures (chief, armed 
group etc.).  
 
Second, a range of measures were built into the survey protocols and the survey to 
both detect and avoid any situation that could lead to the respondent being exposed to 
risk as a result of her/his participation in the survey.  First, the surveyor was instructed 
to find an isolated place where no-one else than the surveyor could hear the answers 
of the respondent, and where the respondent himself felt safe.  Second, the content of 
the survey – the different parts, and the different types of questions that would be asked 
– were presented to the respondent before asking for the informed consent.  
Furthermore, before each ‘sensitive’ section of the survey (such as security related 
questions), the surveyors were instructed to repeat to the respondent that he could 
terminate the survey at any moment, that he had the right to not answer certain 
questions and that he should report whether any element of the survey or the situation 
could put him or his relatives at risk.  The respondent was also reminded several times 
during the survey that all the collected information would be anonymized, and that the 
information provided could not be traced back to him.  
 
In order to ensure that the survey answers could not be traced back to any individual 
person, the names of the respondents were never recorded.  Also, the list of village 
residents that were drawn for the random selection of survey households were 
systematically destroyed immediately after selection of the respondents, and the list of 
selected households was destroyed immediately after identification of the selected 
households by the surveyor.  
Data security and Storage 
Integral to the safety of both the surveyors and respondents is the question of data 
security and storage, as anonymity of the data sources is crucial in ensuring that no-
one can be identified by potentially nefarious actors.  All data was collected on 
Personal Digital Assistant (PDA- model PALM Z22) type electronic devices, and no 
paper-based surveys were used.  The parameters of the program used in the Personal 
Digital Assistants were set to prevent anyone from accessing the collected data directly 
from the devices.  The data security and storage chain was the following: Surveys were 
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conducted on the PDA devices in the survey villages.  After a few survey villages, the 
surveyors would come back to the provincial capital Bukavu, where the data would 
safely be transferred from the PDA devices to a project computer.  The computer 
containing the collected data was kept in a safe and guarded project office.  Yet even 
at that stage, the data was still not accessible from the computer, because the program 
storing the data (Pendragon) required access codes.  The data was then sent via internet 
to computers in London and New York to the project directors, who were the only 
bearers of the security codes allowing to enter the databases.  Upon reception and 
verification of the data in London and New York, the data was immediately deleted 
both on the project computer and on the data collection devices.  Through this system, 
it was impossible for any actor to access the data in the zone of implementation or 
even in the project office in Bukavu – except in the presence of the project directors – 
barring advanced computer hacking techniques.  While there were many instances of 
lost or faulty data due to collection device problems or computer synchronization 
problems, there have been no reported incidents where un-authorized project 
members, or any external actor or individual, accessed or attempted to access the 
survey data.  
9.1.3.  Methodological and measurement concerns associated with recall data 
One of the strengths of the survey lies in the collection of recall data, which allowed 
to create panel datasets reconstituting the individual and village “histories” over the 
last 20 years, enabling a more dynamic analysis than cross-section type datasets (the 
structure of the datasets is explained in more detail in the following sections).  As it 
was developed at the same time and as part of the same project, the data collection 
instruments are identical to those used in Sanchez de la Sierra (2016).  The collection 
and use of recall data comes with specific methodological and implementation 
challenges, requiring several measures to guarantee the quality of data.  The following 
sub-sections first discuss the use of recall data in the literature and its challenges, and 
second the measures taken in the study to minimize biases arising from the use of recall 
data.  
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The use of Recall data: Strength and limitations 
This quantitative study relies entirely on the use of recall data, which allows to 
reconstruct past events, based on the recollection and memory of respondents.  In 
eastern DRC, where historical and administrative documents and records are scarce - 
due both to the scarcity of historical archiving, but also to the destructions wrought by 
the war - very little systematic empirical evidence exists of how the war has unfolded, 
how it has affected economic, social and political activity, and how it has been 
experienced and perceived by local populations.  Recall data is one of the ways in 
which this gap in historical records and empirical data can be partially filled, yet with 
important limitations.  
 
The prime resource of the recall data method used in this survey is the memory and 
recollection of the inhabitants of rural South Kivu.  The method takes advantage of the 
fact that one of the central modes of transmission of knowledge in the region is oral 
history, and thus follows methods long used by historians, anthropologists and 
sociologists.  Some of the biases arising from the use of oral history and recall data 
have partially been discussed in the methods chapter of this thesis, in particular the 
biases arising from the context of social polarization and how it can distort 
recollections of events as well as narratives.  Such biases are likely to be amplified in 
the case of large scale surveys, which cannot deploy the time or attention to 
meticulously cross check all sources as qualitative studies do.  Nevertheless, the 
project has sought to deploy a range of safeguards to address and reduce measurement 
error due to recall data.   
 
The literature on the use of recall data shows us that measurement error associated 
with recall data varies with the recall period as well as the nature of the recalled events.  
The cognitive sciences teach us that, the shorter the recall period, the more self-
reported answers converge towards the mean of the real distribution (Tourangeau 
2000; Kjellsson, Clarke & Gerdtham 2014).  Thus, the more a recollected event dates 
back in time, the more the magnitude of the measurement error increases.  This 
constitutes the first significant challenge to the quality of recall data.  Second, armed 
conflict usually constitutes a period of significant crisis for individuals, which is likely 
to affect their recollection of the period.  While the literature points to the fact that 
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recalling levels is easier than recalling events (Kjellsson, Clarke & Gerdtham 2014), 
crisis events are significantly different than other events, and are likely to have 
particular effects.  The literature points to two possible effects of crisis periods on the 
recollection of events.  On one hand, crisis and the traumatic effects they can produce 
can distort the recollection of events and produce measurement errors (De Nicola & 
Giné 2014; Tourangeau 2000).  On the other hand, the intensity of the events unfolding 
during violent conflict may also trigger a more vivid recollection of such events, and 
thus work against measurement error due to the length of the recall period (Bruck et 
al. 2015 p.46; Wood 2003).  Furthermore, in recollecting periods of intense crisis, 
individuals are more likely to recall events with a better accuracy that attitudes, which 
are more likely to be affected by the distortive effects of trauma (Viterna 2006 p.14; 
Schacter 1996).  While the data is inevitably affected by measurement error due the 
recall period and distortion of the recollection of traumatic events, the literature points 
to several ways to reduce it, which have been implemented in this study.  
Situating events in time: Event Timelines 
One of the methods used in this study to reduce measurement error in recall data, and 
in particular the measurement due to inaccurate recollection of time periods and years, 
are time cues and event timelines.  Time cues are events of common knowledge that 
are invoked by the surveyor to allow the respondent and surveyor to situate the precise 
period at which a specific event has occurred.  The literature in psychology and 
economics suggests that the use of time cues can substantially reduce measurement 
error about the timing of events (Dex 1995; De Nicola & Giné 2014 ; Deaton 2001; 
Bruck et al. 2015).  However, Bruck et al. (2015 p.46) note that, while the use of event 
timelines does increase the accuracy of measurement, the quality of the events timeline 
is of particular importance, as innacurate timelines are likely to enhance measurement 
errors.   
 
This study paid particular attention to developing accurate event timelines and training 
surveyors to use them effectively.  First, national and regional events timelines were 
prepared, and served as a baseline for the confection of local – territory and grouping 
level – timelines that were developed by the surveyors in the areas of implementation.  
Before the start of the survey in each village, the surveyors would consult the 
 251 
authorities of the village to develop these timelines, which were then used as temporal 
references to situate the events recorded in the household survey.   These local events 
timelines would typically include exceptional events in the village history of which 
residents were likely to have a vivid recollections, such as attacks on the village by 
armed group, natural disasters such as floods, the discovery of particular minerals (or 
the coltan boom), or the opening of a school, hospital, market or telephone line.  Pilot 
studies carried out in the first months of the study showed that the using these local 
events timelines significantly enhanced the accuracy of the recollection of dates and 
periods of events by respondents.  Particular attention was devoted to training the 
surveyors to the use of these time cues, both during the initial 1 month training that 
preceded implementation, and then during the implementation itself, as I personally 
accompanied surveyors for several months to make sure that the time cues were used 
appropriately.  
Cross checking event recollections: Triangulation 
The second method used to address the risk of measurement error due to recall is 
triangulation.  Triangulation allows to partially address measurement error due to bad 
memory of the timing of events.  It also allows to reduce measurement error due to the 
positionality of respondents, which has been discussed in the methodology chapter.  
  
The survey protocol was designed to safeguard against such biases, by multiplying 
data points and extending the period of data collection and verification as much as 
possible within the logistical and budgetary contraints.  The chief survey was carried 
out over a period of 7 days in each village, and involved the consultation of between 
5 and 10 ‘village experts’, in addition to the village chief.  These experts were selected 
on the basis of their knowledge of the village history, but also the main themes of the 
survey,  in particular security and the economy of the village.  In each village, the 
surveyors would start by presenting the survey questions and the data to be collected 
by the village experts, and then supervise the gathering of information by these village 
experts during the entire week.  On the final day, a day-long meeting with all village 
experts would allow to verify the collected information and cross-check different 
sources, before recording the data.  This process allowed to eliminate  a large part of 
the false or dubious information before it was recorded.  
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Furthermore, in order to reduce the risk that the data collected in the village survey 
could be biased by the positionality of the village experts, all village survey measures 
were systematically replicated in the household survey, which was carried out with 8 
randomly selected village residents, in complete anonymity.  Thus, for all the key 
variables of the study, there were 9 data points, which were then compiled and 
compared, allowing to significantly reduce measurement error by triangulation.  The 
qualitative reports, which were compiled during the 7 days of presence of the 
surveyors in each village, also served as an additional source of triangulation.  For key 
variables of the analysis, the data points observed in the datasets were systematically 
compared to the information contained in the qualitative report (for example, this was 
done for the dates of presence of armed groups in villages, as is detailed in the 
following section).  As reported in Sanchez de la Sierra (2016), the data was then 
benchmarked to data collected from other surveys, as a test of the accuracy of dates.  
As reported in that paper, the data closely matched both the well known and well 
documented historical events in the region – the start of the war, the coltan boom, the 
elections etc -  but also ACLED violent event datasets.  
Measuring changes Rather than Levels 
With regards to those variables that are collected on an individual level (i.e. in the 
Household Survey), measurement error can be particularly acute for variables that bear 
a certain level of complexity, as well as those that are measured on a yearly basis, as 
it is particularly difficult to recall levels.  However, as De Nicola and Giné (2014) 
argue, recalling changes on complex variables is easier than recalling levels.  As a 
result, the survey was re-designed to measure events and changes rather than levels, 
when possible.  For example, rather than being asked to report their level of wealth on 
a yearly basis, the surveyors recorded  the history of the respondent’s purchase and 
sale of key assets – cows, pigs, land, bikes.   During pilots and then during the study, 
it became visible that respondents were much more likely to accurately recall the sale, 
loss or purchase of particular assets – such as a cows - than remembering their stock 
of cows for each year.  The wealth indicators used in the analysis then compiled these 
variables.  
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For those variables where levels were measured, the survey and protocols were 
designed to limit measurement error due to recall.  De Nicola and Giné  (2014) show 
that one of the reasons why measurement error in recall data increases with the length 
of the recall period is that, for longer recall periods, respondents will use inference 
instead of memory to estimate levels.  However, using the example of fisherman's 
recollection of their income level, they show that measurement error mostly affects 
recollection of variations in their income, but not the recollection of their mean income.  
This is because respondents 'revert to the mean' as the length of the recall period 
extends, and thus recall the mean with much more accuracy than the variations (De 
Nicola & Giné 2014 p.58).   
 
For those variables where levels are measured instead of changes, the questions focus 
on getting an accurate measure of the mean, rather than seeking to estimate the 
variations around the mean.  Additionally, the protocols and questions were formulated 
so as to elicit the most accurate response possible for the estimation of the means.  For 
example, for taxation levels by armed actors during a given year, the respondents were 
first asked to recall the maximum that a specific armed group levied in taxes during a 
given period, and then the minimum during that same period.  This usually prompted 
a discussion between the surveyor and the respondent, that allowed to refresh the 
memory of the respondent.  On that basis, the respondent was then asked to estimate 
the mean level of taxation by the armed group.  The comparison of the 8 data points 
of the Household Survey with the Village Survey showed that these means were 
estimated with high levels of accuracy.  
9.1.4.  Dataset consolidation & methodological concerns 
9.1.4.1.  Identifying and matching armed organizations 
The surveys and datasets are separated into distinct modules, which correspond to 
different themes.286  In both the Household Survey and the Village survey, an entire 
                                                 
286 The household survey was divided into the following thematic categories: Family history, migration 
history, professional history, relation to security organizations, ownership of land, investment and credit 
history, history of taxation.  
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module was dedicated to security, and consisted of a broad range of questions on the 
presence, behaviour, activities and respondent perceptions of all security organizations 
present in each village of the survey.  The security organizations that were recorded 
were highly varied.  They ranged from small civilian security initiatives, to state 
security forces (police and military), to large-scale rebel groups.    
 
In preparing the database for the analysis that follows, a particular difficulty arose in 
identifying armed groups.  Indeed, as respondents are highly mobile in periods of war, 
and as several armed factions can successively occupy a village in short periods of 
time - leading to errors in respondent’s assessment of dates - it can become difficult to 
be sure that different respondents within a village are talking about the exact same 
groups.  To address this problem, an extensive work of triangulation was carried out 
during and after the data collection, based on the comparison of different household 
surveys within one village, the Village Survey, my own qualitative fieldwork as well 
as the village level qualitative reports carried out by survey teams.  By individually 
reviewing each group that each respondent referred to, a variable was created that 
individually identifies each group that each respondent refers to, and provided that 
there is sufficient evidence across all sources, matches it with the groups mentioned 
by other respondents.  For example, if two respondents from the same village talk 
about a Mayi-Mayi group, it is only if there is sufficient evidence -in the dates, in the 
periods of presence of respondents in the village, in the chief survey and in the 
qualitative reports - that two observations are given the same group identifier.  Groups 
for which there is insufficient information, as well as groups from other villages than 
the village where the survey is carried out, are left out of the database used for the 
analysis.   
9.1.4.2.  Structure of the datasets 
Using this group-identifying variable, two main databases were created for the 
analysis, to allow for a comparison of different groups.  The first dataset is an 
individual*group database, which is used for most of the analyses carried out in this 
chapter.  The structure of the dataset is as follows: each observation corresponds to an 
individual*group.  The following table gives a clearer idea of the dataset:  
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INDIVIDUAL GROUP Marriage? (year) Participation?(
year) 
V1.I1 
(Village 1, Individual 1) 
V1.G1.  
(Village 1, Group 1) 
1992 1999 
V1.I1 V1.G2.  1992 2002 
V1.I2.  V1.G1. 2003 0 
V1.I2. 
. 
V1.G2. 2003 2005 
  
As can be seen, this dataset is not in a panel format, in the sense that the observations 
are not sorted according to years, although the variables contain information on years, 
and can thus be used for analyses that have a temporal dimension.  For the purpose of 
simplicity and clarity, most of the analyses carried out in this chapter are done using 
this database, except for the two final analyses: One uses a ‘simplified’ panel structure, 
and the final one uses an individual*year panel structure.  Given that each variable has 
a temporal dimension, it is possible to build this individual*year dataset.  The 
construction of the simplified panel used in the third section of the chapter is explained 
in the introduction of that section.  
 
While the two first analyses were carried out using the individual*group format of the 
dataset, all the analyses were also carried out using an individual*year panel format of 
the dataset, in order to verify the validity of the results.  The results from the analysis 
on this panel dataset are not reported in this chapter, but will be made accessible online 
after publication of a journal article based on this chapter.  The Stata do-files that build 
the final datasets and containing the extensive cleaning of group identifiers can be 
provided upon request.   
9.1.4.3.  Methodological Challenges associated with Units of Analysis  
The basic units of analysis used to design the survey, the village and the household, 
necessitate some conceptual and methodological caveats.  A village in the survey 
corresponds to the administrative subdivision of the Village, the smallest 
administrative subdivision officially recognized by the Congolese State.  In more 
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populated villages or in urban centres, a survey village usually corresponds to a sub-
village, neighbourhood or an avenue, when such villages or towns were too populated 
to be included as the entity of study and had to be subdivided into smaller units.287 
Although not officially recognized in the state administration, sib-villages, 
neighbourhoods and avenues are widely used by local state administration and chiefs, 
and thus bear empirical relevance. 
 
However, it is important to consider that, by adopting such units of analysis, one 
confronts two methodological and ontological problems.  First, they reproduce the 
dominant “shape” of political and social organization, which are historically 
contingent and often contested, as has been emphasized in the methodological chapter.  
Second, the processes that are being studied, such as popular mobilization into armed 
organizations, do not necessarily map onto these administrative grids.  In many cases, 
the village might not the only relevant level of decision-making for such processes.  
While the data can be clustered at Grouping, Territory and provincial levels, which for 
certain elements are more relevant, it is important to be aware that a part of the studied 
processes are left out by this particular grid, and is part of the limitations of such 
methods in studying complex socio-political processes.   
 
Furthermore, because of logistical constraints, Household Surveys were exclusively 
carried out with male subjects.  This was a difficult but deliberate choice to maximise 
the information concerning participation in armed groups.  While it is established that 
women are also recruited by armed organizations, and a growing literature is providing 
a solid empirical basis for a thorough re-evaluation of the role of women in armed 
conflict and political violence,288 we evaluated through qualitative interviews with 
armed group members and experts that a large majority of participants in armed 
factions in eastern Congo are men.289  As a result, in order to maximise the number of 
                                                 
287 Because of constraints on the sampling methodology that is too burdensome to implement in areas 
with large populations, entities exceeding 500 households had to be subdivided, and a sub-section of 
the entity was randomly selected to carry out the survey.  
288 A burgeoning literature has been re-assessing the role women in violence and armed conflict, de-
constructing widespread assumptions regarding women’s assumed passivity in violence, and showing 
their multi-faceted role as actors and perpetrators (e.g. Alison 2004; Bethke Elshtain’s 1987; Moser & 
Clark 2001; Sjoberg & Gentry 2007; Viterna 2006; Wood 2003; Parkinson 2013). 
289 Several studies also conclude that participants in collective violence are predominantly male, such 
as Mc Doom (2013 p.463). 
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participants selected for the Household survey, it was decided that the survey would 
be restricted to men.  Once again, it is important to remain wary of the limitations that 
this decision entails.  Further sample measurement related methodological issues that 
are specific to some analysis are discussed throughout the following sections.   
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Figure 1: Surveyed Villages (source: Village Survey data) 
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9.2.  Measuring participation 
9.2.1.  Definition and Measurement of Participation 
The participation variable that will be used in the regression models of this section is 
a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent has reported participation, 
and 0 otherwise.  Participation is defined as being an active member of an armed group 
or security organization.  As mentioned in the introduction, involvement and 
participation in armed groups is multi-faceted and complex, and can take many other 
forms than being an active member: Civilians can work as informants of armed groups, 
covert supporters, tax collectors, enforcers, business partners and many other roles or 
functions.  The participation category used here does not include all these other roles 
and functions.   
9.2.2.   Sample of participants 
Both the household survey and village survey took place in rural villages and towns of 
South Kivu.  Thus, the participants that have been recorded in the survey are those that 
were present in the survey villages at the time of the survey.  We cannot assume that 
the sample is representative of all participants in armed organizations, nor of each 
village's group of participants in armed organizations, as it does not include 1) current 
participants in armed organizations that have left the village 2) the participants that 
have deceased as a result of their participation 3) the former village dwellers that have 
participated in armed organizations but are no longer present in the villages.  Thus, the 
sample does not deal with attrition, which constitutes one of the chief challenges with 
regards to representatitivity of samples of ex-combatants in survey based studies 
(Bruck et al. 2016 p.45).  The survey sample is thus representative of the sub-groups 
of survivors-returnees - those who have both survived their participation and returned 
to rural villages after participation - and participant-dwellers, those are currently 
participating in armed organizations but have remained in the village and were present 
at the time of the survey.   
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Recent studies of participation in war have estimated that a large number of ex-
combatants return to their areas of origin following their demobilization, more than 
50% in the case of Sierra Leone (Humphreys & Weinstein 2008 p.444). This is likely 
to enhance the representativeness of our sample, but we cannot completely rule the 
possibility that our sub-sample of participants systematically differs from the total 
population of participants on some variables.  For example, it could be the case that 
participants who were more marginalized in the village before participating are more 
likely not to return to the village following participation.  Moreover, it could be the 
case that those who participated in more violent and less socially accepted groups are 
less likely to return to their village, as a result of self-selection or various mechanisms 
of social exclusion.  While this constitutes a limitation to the representativeness of the 
sample of participants, several elements allow to mitigate this concern.  First, the fact 
that the survey was carried out both in rural villages and in larger urban centres of 
South Kivu (with the notable exception of the provincial capital Bukavu) means that 
it captures a portion of the population of ex-combatants who have migrated to larger 
towns.  Furthermore, a specific module within the survey is dedicated to previous 
participation - participation in armed groups in other villages or towns than the survey 
villages.   
 
Contrarily to surveys of ex-combatants, the survey was not designed to target ex-
combatants and participants specifically, but male residents of rural South Kivu, of 
which the samples of participants and non-participants are sub-samples.  This has 
several advantages.  First, it allows a close comparison of participants vs non-
participants in very similar contexts and conditions - i.e. within the same village, and 
in some cases the same households. Several studies of participation rely on the separate 
constitution of a sample of non-combatants, which can introduce biases through the 
unobserved constant heterogeneities between the sample of combatants and the sample 
of non-combatants, which are difficult to account for.  Having a sample of combatants 
and non-combatants from the same village or household greatly reduces this potential 
bias, in particular, as we will see, through the inclusion of village and household fixed 
effects in the regression models.   
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9.2.3.   Mis-Reporting of Participation 
A close yet distinct issue affecting the sample of participants in the database is that of 
mis-reporting of participation.  Respondents can mis-report participation in armed 
groups, either by not declaring participation in any group, or by omitting to report 
participation in certain groups.  While the survey protocols were devised so as 
minimise involuntary omissions, voluntary omissions and mis-reporting can affect the 
representativeness of the sub-sample of participants.  Qualitative fieldwork as well as 
existing literature points to several reasons why respondents would systematically 
omit or mis-report participation to specific groups.  For example, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that respondents are less likely to report participation in groups that exerted 
more violence towards the population, as well as less socially accepted groups.  While 
this could simply reflect a lower real rate of participation, or the problem discussed in 
the previous paragraph, we cannot reject the hypothesis that it could be due to 
voluntary mis-reporting, which is inevitable in a context of acute social polarization. 
 
While mis-reporting and under-reporting can bias our estimations of population 
averages, we devise several strategies to make sure that it doesn’t affect our 
estimations of the effects of different variables on participation.  For example, we 
complement cross section analysis of participants and non-participants with temporal 
analysis of the individual effects of participation (using individual fixed effects), to 
make sure that the results are confirmed.  We further discuss the ways in which such 
biases can affect our estimations in the relevant sections of the analysis.   
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9.3.  Participation: Descriptive statistics 
9.3.1.  Timeline of armed groups in Sample 
Figure (2) displays a historical timeline of the “group episodes” in the sample, using 
the data provided by the Village Survey (i.e. using the information provided by the 
village authorities). A group episode corresponds to a year where a group was present 
in a village or its surroundings. 290  The y axis thus gives the proportion of the sample 
villages in which different groups were present in a given year.  They closely match 
the history of the region: The RCD is present from 1998 to 2004; the Mayi-Mayi 
groups rise sharply in 1998 and progressively lose ground from 2004; The Congolese 
Army regains control over the East from 2004; the security gap created by military 
integration programs of Brassage in 2005 and regimentation in 2011 trigger a sharp 
rise in both self-defence organizations and armed groups; From 2011, the Raia 
Mutomboki movement rises sharply in the sample, consistent with the movement’s 
expansion across the territories of Shabunda and Kalehe.   
Figure 2: Timeline of Groups in Sample (source: Village Survey) 
 
                                                 
290 The guidelines for recording an armed group was that it had been present in the environment of the 
village or town, meaning that the group’s actions had direct impact on the life of the village or town. 
Thus, it is not restricted to groups that “occupied” a village, but encompasses groups present in the area 
surrounding a village. 
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9.3.2.  Profile of Recruiting Groups 
Figure (3) shows the total number of episodes of group presence in a village by group 
name, and the number of those episodes in which a particular group carried out 
recruitments in the village, based on the Village Survey data.  The data reported in this 
figure is not affected by the sampling issues discussed in the previous section, which 
concern self-reporting of participation by respondents.  As can be seen, most groups 
did in fact carry out recruitments, but the ones that did so the most, in proportion of 
their presence in villages, are the AFDL, the Mayi-Mayi, the Raia Mutomboki and the 
Local Defence.   
 
In the sample of 1084 respondents from 134 villages, around 12% of respondents 
reported participation in armed groups present in the survey villages.  If extended to 
all participants, including those who participated in groups in other areas than the 
village where they received the survey, the participation rate rises to approximately 
20%.   
 
Figure (4) shows the rates of self-reported participation by the respondent, for those 
groups present in villages (not for previous groups in which the respondent might have 
participated).  As can be seen by comparing both tables, they seem to be presenting 
significantly different stories of recruitment and participation.  This is in part due to 
the fact that the participation table is restricted to those groups that were present in the 
village.  As a result, groups that recruited on their way through an area (such as the 
AFDL) are not reported.  Similarly, given that the survey was not carried out in the 
provincial capitals of Goma and Bukavu, what we observe here is participation in rural 
areas (although some larger towns such as Kamituga are included).  Groups that 
recruited heavily in the provincial capitals as opposed to the rural areas are thus likely 
to be under-represented.   
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Figure 3: Recruitments by groups (Village Survey Data) 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Participation rate by Groups (Household Data)  
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9.3.3. Profile of Participants 
The professional background of the participants in the sample is very diverse.  Using 
the Household Survey data, Figure (5) shows the share of participants within the main 
occupational sector of respondents in the sample (and not the number of participants 
by occupational sector).  As can be seen, the highest probability of participation is 
reached for former military or police officers.  As seen in the theoretical chapter and 
qualitative chapters, networks of security professionals often play a crucial role in non-
state armed organizations.  The rest of the tables shows us that participants can be 
found in all professional sectors, which corroborates the idea of relatively “ordinary” 
participants, in contrast to the widespread idea that participants are mostly 
underemployed and marginalized.  We will further analyse this in the following 
section. 
 
Figure 5: Professional Sector of Participants (Household Survey) 
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Table (1) presents the main motives of participation, as well as the main motives of 
departure, for those respondents that declared participation in one of the groups present 
in the village.  It therefore does not include motive of participation in groups that were 
not present in the village.  The table reports the percentage of respondents who have 
declared that each one of the categories was their main motive of participation.  The 
survey questionnaire and protocols were designed to minimize the surveyor’s 
influence on the respondents’ answers.  The surveyor would ask the question and let 
the respondent answer, without prompting the respondent with categories of answers.  
After the interviewee’s response, the surveyor would determine whether the answer 
corresponded to one or several of the pre-recorded categories of answers and would 
enter them accordingly.  The pre-recorded categories of answers were derived from 
the pilot surveys, which allowed to identify the most recurring motives for 
participation.  However, the survey allowed to enter other motives if one of the 
respondent’s motive did not fit the pre-recorded categories.  While this measure is not 
used in the analysis, they are highly informative.  As can be seen, “community 
protection” is the overwhelming motive of participation in security organizations.  
Furthermore, only a small percentage of the respondents (4.3%) declare that they were 
forced to participate.  While this can be the result of the sampling bias presented 
earlier, it attests that participation is a much more complex phenomenon than is often 
portrayed in studies that focus exclusively on forced participation. 
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Table (1):  Motives of Participation and Departure 
 
MOTIVE OF PARTICIPATION % of Participants* 
Because Everybody participated  0.72 
Because I had nothing else to do 6.45 
Constrained by force 4.30 
Convinced by family 1.43 
Convinced by outsider 1.08 
Convinced by villager 6.45 
Following an attack on my family or community 2.51 
For financial advantage 1.79 
To be feared 1.43 
To find refuge, I was persecuted 0.72 
To protect my community 55.91 
To protect my goods 7.17 
I Wanted revenge 8.60 
I Wanted to become a soldier 1.43 
  
MOTIVE OF DEPARTURE % of Participants* 
I left - Bad Living Conditions 10.49 
I Left-the Group became too violent 1.40 
I Left-I obtained vengeance 3.50 
I Left-I was sent off 1.40 
I Left-Ran away 9.09 
the Group Ceased to Exist 63.64 
Other 10.49 
*These do not include motives for previous participation or departure (just participation in Groups 
present in Village).  Source: Household Survey.  
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9.4.    SECTION 1:  Who Joins Armed Groups? 
9.4.1.  Research Questions and Rationale 
In this section, we carry out an analysis of individual level determinants of 
participation, in line with the guiding question of who participates in armed 
organizations.  In particular, we look at whether grievances (economic, social and 
related to personal victimization), past-participation, and social ties have an effect on 
participation in armed groups.  We briefly review the existing evidence concerning 
these factors before moving to the analysis.   
 
As detailed in the theoretical framework, grievances have long been advanced as a 
central cause for participation in various forms of violent collective action, and in 
particular in armed conflict on the African continent.  In the case of eastern Congo, 
this thesis has been advanced by Van Acker and Vlassenroot (20001a, 2001b), as well 
as Jourdan (2004, 2011), among others.  Grievances are usually tied to structural 
processes of poverty, inequality and access to various types of resources, which can 
translate into various forms of economic, social and political exclusion or 
marginalization.  In rural agrarian-based societies such as those of eastern Congo, land 
is one of the most important resources, and access to land often conditions an 
individual’s economic livelihood and social integration (Van Acker 2005).  As seen in 
the qualitative chapters, lack of access to land was often advanced as a motive of 
participation in rebellions during the interviews.  Similarly, in rural African societies 
where dowry is prevalent, marriage is a strong marker of economic integration and 
social integration.  As Richards (1996) has argued, the structural economic crisis of 
rural Sierra Leoneans societies that preceded the war manifested itself socially by the 
incapacity of young men to meet the high financial demands of marriage, thus finding 
themselves in situations of social marginalization that bred despair and frustration.   
 
Quantitative studies of participation in violent collective action, however, have yielded 
mixed results with regards to the role of grievances.  Analysing the profile of 
participants in the Rwandan genocide, Verwimp (2005) found that they did not 
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significantly differ from non-participants in terms of schooling levels or ownership of 
land.  In contrast, in their analysis of participation in the Sierra Leonean civil war, 
Humphreys & Weinstein (2008) find that relative economic deprivation (proxyed by 
the quality of house walls), as well as education deficit predict participation in armed 
organizations.  Scacco (2009) finds little evidence for absolute poverty as a predictor 
of participation in violent rioting during Nigeria’s riots in 2001, but finds that relative 
poverty has a significant effect, but only when interacted with social connectedness.  
There is therefore mixed empirical evidence concerning a direct causal relation 
between grievances and participation.   
 
In times of war, a separate category of grievances is the experience of violence, on an 
individual or an individual’s entourage.  As we have seen in the qualitative empirical 
chapters, ex-combatants repeatedly invoke direct victimization or victimization of 
their entourage as a trigger for their participation.  As seen in the theoretical section, 
several mechanisms can explain the relation between such victimization and 
participation.  On one hand, they can constitute what Richards (2014) calls 
‘endogenous grievances’, i.e. the grievances and frustrations arising as a result of the 
war itself (rather than pre-existing grievances).  However, as Kalyvas and Kocher 
(2007) have shown, these can also constitute strategies by armed actors to force ‘free 
riders’ to take sides, and join armed groups.  Surprisingly, quantitative studies of 
participation in armed groups have rarely emphasized this aspect.  
 
Quantitative studies of armed mobilization present much stronger empirical evidence 
of a causal relationship between social networks and participation.  Humphreys and 
Weinstein (2008) find strong evidence that having a friend joining a group was a strong 
predictor of participation in that group.  Studying violent riots in Nigeria, Scacco 
(2009) finds strong evidence of “social connectedness” as a predictor of participation 
in violent riots.  Mc Doom (2013), studying the geographic patterns of participation 
during the Rwandan genocide in Tare sector in Rwanda, finds that ‘micro-space” and 
micro-social interactions play a strong role in influencing participation, as part of an 
ensemble of mechanisms of social influence that are mediated by pre-existing social 
ties.  Furthermore, the empirical evidence presented in the qualitative chapters of this 
thesis attests of the significant role of pre-existing social networks in mobilization and 
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recruitment, both as a propagative mechanism of armed mobilization, and as a 
“resource” consciously exploited by armed leaders.   
 
Finally, we also test the role of previous participation in armed groups on the 
propensity to participate.  While this aspect has rarely been explored in quantitative 
studies of armed mobilization, there is substantial qualitative evidence that ex-
combatant and security networks play an important role in re-mobilization.  In the case 
of eastern DRC, this was recently highlighted by Stearns (2013) and Vogel (2014).   
9.4.2.  Model Setup 
We now turn to the econometric estimation of the individual determinants of 
participation in armed organizations.  We use the individual*group structure of the 
database exposed in the previous section, where each observation gives the relation of 
an individual to a given group for a range of variables (thus, one individual can have 
several observations if he experienced the presence of several groups).  For each of the 
independent variables, we construct a before group episode observation.  Thus, we 
look at whether the value of a given variable before the arrival of a group in a village 
has an effect on whether the individual will participate in that given group.  Hereafter, 
participation refers to the binary dependant variable, i.e. the probability of an 
individual having participated in a given armed group in a given village (thus, an 
increase in participation means an increase in an individual’s probability of 
participating in a given armed group in a given village).  
 
We use a linear probability model, which assumes that the relation between the 
independent variables and the dependant variable is linear.  Recent literature on the 
comparison between linear probability models and logistic models – often favoured 
for binary outcome variables – have shown that both models yield very similar results, 
and that the linear probability model fits ‘as well’ as the logistic model, including when 
the dependant variable is dichotomous (Hellevik 2007).  As a result, the comparative 
advantage of the linear probability model is its interpretability, as an increase in a 
probability of a dichotomous dependent variable is much more straightforward to 
interpret than an increase in the log of the odds, which is used in logistic models 
(Hellevik 2007; King & Zeng 2001; Long 1997).  As Von Hippel (2015) suggests, the 
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logistic model is only preferable to the linear probability model when the probabilities 
that are being modelled are extreme, which is not the case with the probabilities in this 
analysis.  Furthermore, a number of models used in this section include interaction 
terms.  As Ai and Norton (2003) have argued, the interpretation of interaction terms 
in non-linear models is much more complicated and tends to generate errors, which 
makes linear models preferable for models that include interaction terms.  However, 
in order to verify the validity of the results, all analysis were replicated using a logistic 
model, and yielded very close results.  For the purpose of simplicity and conciseness, 
only the linear probability model specifications are reported in this chapter (both in 
this section and in the following sections).  However, all alternative model 
specifications will be reported in Marchais and Sanchez de la Sierra (Forthcoming), 
and do files will be made available online along with the data to allow for replication.   
 
The linear probability model uses the binary variable participate as the dependant 
variable, and a range of independent variables corresponding to the individual 
determinants of participation whose effect we seek to estimate.  The baseline 
specification is: 
 
𝚸𝒊,𝒈,𝒗 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝚾𝒊,𝒈,𝒗 𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝚾𝒊,𝒈,𝒗𝟐+. . . + 𝜷𝑲 ∗ 𝚾𝒊,𝒈,𝒗 𝑲  +  𝜺𝒊,𝒈,𝒗 
 
Where: 
𝚸𝒊,𝒈,𝒗 is the binary dependant variable, that takes the value of 1 if an individual 𝐢 participated 
in a group 𝒈 in a village 𝒗. 
𝜶 is the constant.   
𝜷𝟏 … 𝜷𝑲 are the coefficients of the independent variables, which we are seeking to estimate.   
𝚾𝒊,𝒈,𝒗𝟏 … 𝚾𝒊,𝒈,𝒗𝑲 are the individual determinants of participation.  We detail these in the 
discussion of the results.   
𝜺𝒊,𝒈,𝒗 is the error term for an individual 𝐢 participated in a group 𝒈 in a village 𝒗. 
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9.4.2.1.  Justification of additional fixed effect models 
The baseline model allows us to estimate the effects of the independent variables on 
the binary dependant variable Participate across all the villages in the sample, and we 
report the output of this model in Table (2).  However, there is strong evidence that 
the villages in the sample are likely to display substantial and systematic differences, 
owing to the geographical, economic, political and social heterogeneity of the region 
that we have documented in the introduction and historical chapter.  The first model 
does not allow us to discern whether the estimated effects could be due to systematic 
differences between villages, which are likely to affect both the dependant and 
independent variables.  For example, when evaluating the effect of wealth on 
participation, it could be the case that certain villages are wealthier and have many 
more participants, while others are much poorer and have low numbers of participants, 
as a result of observed or unobserved village level differences.  In such a case, the 
across village estimation of the effect of wealth on participation is likely to be biased 
by such village level differences.  In order to ascertain whether the estimations of the 
effects presented in Table (2) might be due to systematic differences between villages, 
we add a second model that repeats the same regressions, while adding village level 
fixed effects.  These allow us to estimate the mean “within village” effect of the 
independent variables on participation.  The results of the model with village fixed 
effects are reported in Table (3). 
 
Moreover, the estimated effect of the independent variables on the dependant variable 
Participate could also be due to systematic differences between groups.  Indeed, 
observed and unobserved systematic differences between groups can also have effects 
on both the independent and dependant variables, which would bias our estimations of 
their effects.  This is also true of time periods.  For example, it could be the case that, 
during a certain period, high levels of marriage coincide with high levels of 
participation, while in other periods this is not the case.  In order to account for both 
observed and unobserved differences between groups and time periods, we add 
another model, that repeats the same regressions, but with added group level fixed 
effects, using the variable that singularly identifies each group in each village at each 
time period.  This allows us to estimate the mean “within group” effect of the 
 273 
independent variables on participation.   The results using the model with group level 
fixed effects are reported in Table (4).   
9.4.2.2.  Rationale of interaction model 
In the final analysis carried out in this section, we add a model that includes an 
interaction between the main determinants of participation used in the previous 
models, and the variable Group Origins.  The literature in political science informs us 
that the intuition behind conditional hypothesis can be tested through interaction 
models (Aiken & West 1991; Brambor et al. 2006 p.46).  However,   as Brambor et al. 
(2006 p.72) note, it is the responsibility of the researcher to provide theoretical 
justification for the conditional hypothesis and the direction of causality in the 
interaction.  The insights developed in the qualitative chapters provide the theoretical 
motivation for the interaction models using Group Origins as the conditioning 
variable.  Indeed, we have seen that there exists significant differences between 
“grassroots” armed organizations and “external” ones, in terms of their relation to the 
local institutional and social environment, their attitudes towards local populations and 
their modes of governance.  Local groups are often formed to protect the livelihood 
basis of local communities, rely on mechanisms of communal mobilization to recruit 
participants, and attract more socially integrated members.  External mobilizations, on 
the other hand, are not necessarily mediated by communal mechanisms, tend to have 
a more accumulative and coercive character, and tend to attract more economically 
and socially marginalized participants.  Thus, the qualitative chapters provide 
preliminary empirical evidence for the idea that the relation between relative social 
and economic deprivation and the propensity to participate is different for local and 
external groups.  This provides the rationale for the conditional hypothesis that will be 
tested using the interaction models:  
 
- Relative social and economic deprivation has a positive and significant effect 
on individual propensity to participate in external groups.  
 
- Relative social and economic deprivation has a weaker or null effect on the 
propensity to participate in local groups.  
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We measure relative economic and social deprivation along the 4 dimensions used in 
the preceding analyses: Marriage, land ownership, absolute and relative wealth, and 
education.  The variables that proxy these dimensions are interacted with the 
conditioning variable Group Origins, which is a binary variable that takes the value of 
1 if the group originated within a given village, and the value of 0 if it originated 
outside of that village (henceforth, these will be referred to as Local and External 
groups).291  The following table illustrates the setup of the interaction model: 
 
Independent Variables Conditioning Variable: 
Group Origins 
Dependant Variable 
Wealth  
Local Groups 
Probability of individual 
participation 
Land Ownership 
Marriage 
Education level 
Wealth  
External Groups 
Probability of individual 
participation 
Land Ownership 
Marriage 
Education level 
 
In order to account for systematic differences between villages, we add village level 
fixed effects to the model specification, and report the output of all interaction models 
in Table (5).   
 
Furthermore, the qualitative chapters point to the possibility that the effect of social 
networks on the propensity to participate in armed groups is also likely to differ 
according to the origins of the group (local or external).  Indeed, local groups are by 
definition likely to rely on pre-existing family and peer networks to mobilize.  External 
groups, however, might not have access to such networks, and, when they do, their 
role might not be as effective given the absence of a local social anchorage.  To 
                                                 
291 This variable was constructed by asking whether the groups were born locally, in the village or town 
or in its immediate surroundings, or whether arrived from elsewhere. For larger groups with generic 
names such as the Mayi-Mayi, this question focused on whether the group that was present in the area 
was born locally, not the movement as a whole: A Mayi-Mayi group formed in the village is coded as 
“local”, while a Mayi-Mayi group arriving from another area is coded as “external”.  
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ascertain whether social networks produce differentiated effects on participation 
conditioning on group origins, we include another series of models using interactions 
between our social network variables and the conditioning variable Group Origins, 
which are reported in Table (5bis). 
 
The analysis and the interpretation of the interaction model follow the rules set out by 
Brambor et al. (2006) on how to carry out accurate interaction analyses.  First, all 
constitutive terms are included with the interaction terms in the models (Brambor et 
al. 2006 p.66).  Second, the interpretation of the results take into account the fact that 
the coefficients of the constitutive terms do not represent the average unconditional 
effect of these variables on the outcome variable, but rather the effect of these variables 
conditional on group origins (Braumoeller 2004 p.3; Brambor et al. 2006 p.73).  Given 
that the conditioning variable is dichotomous, the interpretation requires looking at the 
value of the coefficients of the constitutive terms as well as that of the interaction term 
(Brambor et al. 2006 p.74), as well as reporting the standard errors, which are reported 
in Table (5) and Table (5bis).  Furthermore, the fact that both categories of the 
conditioning variable are plausible allows to avoid the typical interpretation errors that 
arise from interaction models (Braumoeller 2004 p.4; Brambor et al. 2006 p.74).   
 
The different categories of variables whose effect on participation we estimate are 
separated into the following thematic sections. 1) Economic grievances: Wealth and 
Land ownership.  2) Social grievances: Marriage, education and social ties with 
established customary authorities. 3) War experiences: victimization related 
grievances and past participation. 4) Social ties: Kinship with armed group leaders and 
participants.  In order to facilitate the interpretation, we discuss the results 
thematically, incorporating the results of the four tables in each thematic section, 
including the models that use interaction terms.   
9.4.3.  Empirical Results 
Economic Grievances: Wealth  
We consider the effect of a respondent’s wealth on his probability to participate.   We 
use two separate sets of wealth measures from the Household survey to build our two 
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main indicators of the Respondent’s Wealth.  The first concerns the Wealth of the 
Respondent’s Father, which we use as a predictor of the individual’s wealth, as it has 
the advantage of being exogenous to the dependant variable of participation.  The 
Father’s Wealth indicator in Table (2) is a z-score of a series of measures of the 
respondent’s father’s Wealth at the time of the respondent’s birth, including his assets 
in livestock (goats) and the size of his family.  The second measure of the respondent’s 
Wealth is a z-score of the respondent’s assets before the arrival of the group in the 
village, comprising his assets in livestock (cows, goats and pigs) and his cash savings.  
In contrast to the father’s wealth measure, which is time invariant and therefore a 
measure of the respondent’s “exogenous” wealth, the second measure is variable and 
captures the respondent’s relative wealth before a given group episode.   
 
In Column (1) in Table (2), we look at the evidence of a wealth effect on participation, 
using Father’s Wealth, and controlling for the respondent’s age before the arrival of 
the group (all following regressions include an age control).  The coefficient of 
Father’s Wealth is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, of a value 
approximately 0.48%.  This suggests a small but positive effect of wealth on 
participation.  In Column (2), we look at the effect of the respondent’s Assets Before 
Group on Participation.   As can be seen, an increase of one standard deviation in the 
relative wealth index is associated with a 2.8% increase in participation, but is not 
statistically significant at any conventional level.  Therefore, we do not find evidence 
of an effect of relative wealth on participation.   
 
The estimated effects of Table (2) could be due to systematic wealth differences 
between villages, which is plausible in a context where there is high variation in 
economic development and wealth levels between villages.  For example, mining 
villages and towns are often much wealthier than villages where the dominant 
economic activity is agriculture.  Table (3) presents the results of the model with 
village level fixed effects, thus accounting for such systematic differences between 
villages.  As can be seen in Column (1) of Table (3), the relation between Father’s 
Wealth and participation is inverted.  Indeed, the average effect of Father’s Wealth 
within villages is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, although of a 
small amplitude (-0,952%).  This suggests that, on average within villages, poorer 
respondents are slightly more likely to participate.  However, somewhat surprisingly, 
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the respondent’s Assets Before Group still yields a positive coefficient, of a higher 
amplitude (2,18%), and this time statistically significant at the 1% level.  This suggests 
that, within villages, slightly poorer households are more likely to participate, when 
wealth is measured through the respondent’s father’s wealth, but those who participate 
are wealthier than non-participants before the arrival of the group.   
 
These results do not give us a clear idea of the relation between wealth and 
participation.  One possibility that the positive “within village” effect of relative wealth 
on participation might be reflecting is that there is higher participation during “richer” 
periods, or for certain types of groups, which would artificially lead us to believe that 
this is always the case and therefore bias our interpretation of the relation between 
wealth and participation.  In order to see whether this is the case, we use the model 
with Group level fixed effects, whose output is reported in Table (4).  The Father’s 
Wealth coefficients in Column (1) turns negative - although of a smaller amplitude (-
0.355%) - and is no longer statistically significant at any conventional level.  The 
coefficient for Assets Before Group reported in Column (2) remains positive, but of a 
much smaller amplitude (0.27%) and is no longer statistically significant at any 
conventional level.  Thus, while we found in Table (2) that, within villages, relative 
wealth had a positive effect on participation, this effect seems to be affected by 
systematic differences between groups, or between time periods.   
 
In order to see whether there is a systematic difference between local and external 
groups in terms of the relation between wealth and participation, we interact our wealth 
measures with the conditioning variable Group Origins (local versus external), and 
report the results in Table (5).  The model uses village level fixed effects as we are 
interacting a group level variable.  As can be seen in Column (1) and Column (2), there 
is evidence of a differentiated effect of wealth on participation conditioning on Group 
Origins, as both interaction terms are statistically significant.  The coefficient of 
Father’s Wealth and Assets Before Group - our two measures of Wealth - are negative 
and statistically significant, indicating that, for External groups, there is a negative 
relation between wealth and participation, which is statistically significant at the 1% 
level in both cases.  There is therefore evidence that, on average “within villages”, 
absolute and relative poverty are associated with an increase in participation in 
External Groups, thus confirming the hypothesis set out at the beginning of the chapter.  
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The interaction terms allow us to compute the effects of our wealth variables for Local 
groups.  For the Father’s Wealth measure in column (1), the effect is positive but close 
to 0 (0.79%).  For the Assets Before Group variable in Column (2), the effect is also 
positive, of 3.09%.  There is therefore strong evidence that, on average within villages, 
slightly wealthier people are more likely to participate in Local Groups, although the 
effects are of very small amplitude.  
 
 We therefore find empirical evidence for the hypothesis that, for groups that form 
locally, participants are representative of the general population in terms of their 
wealth, and in fact are very slightly wealthier on average.  On the contrary, participants 
in external groups are poorer on average, using both the measure of exogenous wealth 
and the measure of relative wealth before the group.  This points to two different 
stories.  On one hand, a story of relative deprivation and possibly economic grievances 
for participation in external groups.  On the other, a more homogenous story of 
participation for locally formed groups, as participants differ only very slightly from 
non-participants.   
Economic Grievances: Land ownership  
We extend our analysis of economic grievance by looking at the effect of land on 
participation.  As mentioned in the introduction of this section, land is a crucial 
resource in rural agrarian societies as well as a strong indicator of wealth and social 
integration, and lack of land has consistently been advanced as a cause for participation 
in armed organizations in interviews with ex-combatants.   
 
We consider the effect of land ownership on participation, using a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the respondent was a landowner before the arrival of a group 
in the village.292  Looking at Column (3) of Table (2), we can see that the estimated 
effect of land ownership on participation is negative (-2.47%), but not statistically 
significant at any conventional significance level.  Such a negative relation between 
land ownership and participation could be due to systematic differences between 
                                                 
292 Ownership in this case refers both to private ownership of land and customary “ownership” of land, 
which correspond to a form of long-term right of usufruct.  
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villages.  It could also be due to different perceptions of the economic and social effects 
of land deprivation.  For example, there might be differences in the way land is valued, 
and thus the propensity of land deprivation to generate grievances.  The model with 
village level fixed effects reported in Table (3) allows us to control for such systematic 
village level difference between villages.  As can be seen in Column (3), the negative 
relation is maintained, and becomes statistically significant at the 10% level.  Thus, on 
average within villages, owning land rather than not is associated with a 3.56% 
decrease in the probability of participation.  This result provides support for the 
hypothesis that relative land deprivation is likely to enhance participation in armed 
groups.   
 
As with the wealth variables, this effect could be due to systematic differences between 
time periods, or systematic differences between groups.  Using the model with group 
level fixed effects reported in Table (4), we can see in Column (3) that, on average 
within groups, owning land rather that not is associated with a 2.38% decrease in 
participation, and is statistically significant at the 10% level.  We therefore find strong 
evidence that participants are more likely to have been deprived of land before their 
participation, which further supports the relative deprivation hypothesis.   
 
In order to see whether land has a differentiated effect on participation when 
conditioning on Group Origins, we look at the interaction between land ownership and 
Group Origins, reported in Column (3) of Table (5).  The negative relation between 
land ownership and participation is confirmed for External Groups, and even slightly 
stronger than on average for all groups as the coefficient is -4.36%, and statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  The interaction term suggests that, similarly to Wealth, 
this strong negative effect is annulled for Local groups.  However, as the interaction 
term is not statistically significant at any conventional level, there isn’t sufficient 
evidence of a differentiated effect of land ownership on participation conditioning on 
Group Origins.   
 
These results therefore provide empirical support for the idea that land deprivation 
enhances the likelihood of participation in armed organizations.  The effect remains 
strong in the models that use village level and group level fixed effects, suggesting 
that despite the fact that there are many differences between the sampled villages, and 
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between different time periods and groups, the negative relation between land 
ownership and participation is maintained.   
Social Grievances: Marriage  
We now turn to the variables that we use as indicators of social integration.  The 
distinction between economic and social is made for clarity, but does not entail that 
they are mutually exclusive.  For example, owning land is both an economic asset and 
a strong marker of social status.  Conversely, in societies where dowry is prevalent 
and can represent a can represent a substantial expense relatively to an individual’s 
wealth, it can be used as an indicator of wealth.   
 
Column (4) of Table (2) reports the results of a regression on participation using as a 
predictor a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the respondent was married before the 
arrival of the group in the village.  The coefficient indicates that being married before 
the group enhances by 3,91% the probability of participating, and is statistically 
significant at the 10% level.  This suggests a somewhat surprising positive correlation 
between marriage and participation, but one that could be due to systematic wealth or 
social differences between villages.  When looking at the model with village level 
fixed effects in Table (3), we can see that, while the coefficient remains positive, it is 
no longer statistically significant at any conventional level.  The across village positive 
relation between marriage and participation therefore seems to be the result of 
systematic differences between villages.  When adding group level fixed effects in 
Table (4), the coefficient remains positive but isn’t statistically significant either.   
Therefore, contrarily to land ownership, there is insufficient evidence of an effect of 
marriage on participation.  The effect captured across villages indeed seems to be 
attributable to village level differences. 
 
Table (5), however, shows us that Group Origins might be playing a part in this story.  
Indeed, we can see in Column (4) that, for External groups, the within village effect of 
marriage on participation is negative, although not statistically significant at any 
conventional level.  As the interaction term is statistically significant, there is evidence 
that the relation between marriage and participation is different for External and Local 
groups.  The interaction term suggests that it is in fact positive for Local groups, 
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although not statistically significant (the significance here is the difference between 
local and external groups).  Similarly to the wealth measures, we find evidence that 
participants in Local Groups are slightly more likely to have been married than non-
participants, while in external groups, participants are less likely to have been married.  
In contrast to the wealth results, however, the levels of statistical significance do not 
allow us to say that there is sufficient evidence in the data for such a relation.   
Social Grievances: Education  
We pursue our analysis of the relation between different types of grievances and 
participation by looking at the relation between education levels and participation.  We 
use a numeric variable that gives the level of schooling gap of the respondent before 
the arrival of a given group, i.e. the number of missed school years of a respondent as 
compared to a standard benchmark, which is computed with the age, number of years 
of education and date of group arrival.  In Column (5) of Table (2), we can see that, 
controlling for age before group and age squared, a one year increase in an individual’s 
schooling gap is associated with a 0.699% increase in participation, and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  This suggests that educational deprivation is also 
associated with higher participation.  Once again, this could be due to systematic 
differences between villages in terms of education, which are likely in a region where 
education infrastructure and provision is very unequally distributed in rural areas.  
Looking at the model with village level fixed effects in Table (3), we can see that the 
coefficient is almost unchanged, and statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Therefore, there is evidence that, on average within villages, relative educational 
deprivation before the arrival of the group in a village is associated with a higher level 
of participation, although the effect is very small.   
 
This effect, however, could be due to group level difference, or systematic differences 
in time periods in levels of education.  When looking at the model with group level 
fixed effects in Table (4), we can see in Column (5) the coefficient becomes negative 
and of an insignificant amplitude, and not statistically significant at any conventional 
level.  Thus, while we have found that within villages, educational deprivation is 
slightly associated to participation, the effect seems to be conditional on group level 
systematic differences. 
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As with the previous variables, we look at whether this might be due to differentiated 
patterns of participation in Local vs.  External groups.  As can be seen in Column (5) 
of Table (5), on average within villages, the school gap measure is associated with a 
0.153% increase in participation for External Groups, and is statistically significant at 
the 1% level.  As the interaction term is statistically significant, there is evidence that 
the schooling measure has a different effect for local groups, which is actually stronger 
(around 0.2%), although both these effects remain of very small amplitude.   
 
We therefore find empirical evidence that relative educational deprivation is 
associated with higher levels of participation, although the effect is quite small in 
amplitude.  However we find that participants in Local groups are slightly more 
educationally deprived than participants in External groups, although the difference is 
very small.   
Social Grievances: proximity to established authorities 
Furthermore, we look at the effect of the respondent’s level of “social integration” in 
rural agrarian societies on participation.  Although, as we have seen that rural 
established political and social order have been deeply affected by the war, customary 
chiefs retain significant authority in several areas, in part due to the fact that they 
continue to allocate land through the customary system of land tenure (Van Acker 
2005).  As a result, being close to the Mwami (King) of a given area, or to the village 
chiefs can condition access to certain economic and social resources and privileges, 
while relative distance from such authorities can be a sign or cause of social 
marginalization, although the process leading from one to another is highly variegated.  
Nevertheless, we use the respondent’s family association with established rural 
customary authorities as a measure of social integration. 
 
The first variable used in Column (6) takes the value of 1 if the respondent’s father 
had direct “biological” kinship with the Mwami (King) that ruled over the chiefdom in 
which the village could be found, and 0 otherwise.  The second variable used in 
Column (6) captures the exact same type of biological association, but with the chief 
of the surveyed village.   
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Looking at Columns (6) of Table (2), we can see that, while the respondent’s father’s 
kinship with the village chief doesn’t yield a statistically significant effect on 
participation, respondents whose fathers had a biological kinship to their Mwami 
(King) have a 7.74% higher level of participation, a coefficient which is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  Thus, while there is no evidence that participants are 
socially closer or further to village authorities when measured by the respondent’s 
parents’ kinship ties, there is evidence that they are closer to the Mwami.  Both the 
model with village level and group level fixed effects display a positive and 
statistically significant effect of father’s kinship with the Mwami.  In these models, the 
measure of the father’s kinship with village authorities turns negative, but is not 
statistically significant.   
 
In Table (5bis) - an extension of Table (5) - we can see the differentiated effects of 
social ties to established authorities conditioning on Group Origins.  As can be seen, 
the father’s kinship with village chief is not statistically significant for External groups, 
nor is the interaction term.  There is therefore insufficient evidence of a statistical 
relationship between the participant’s father’s ties to village chief and participation.  
However, we can see that the measure that capture’s the father’s ties with the Mwami 
is negative (-1.6%) and not statistically significant for External Groups, while it is 
strong (14.6%) and statistically significant at the 1% level for Local groups.   
 
Therefore, when using the father’s measures of kinship with established authorities as 
indicators of social integration, we do not find evidence for the claim that social 
marginalization enhances participation.  Somewhat surprisingly, we find an effect of 
the father’s proximity with customary authorities on participation that is present in the 
three models.  The interaction with Group origins, however, shows us that this is only 
the case for Local Groups.  Rather than social isolation as an individual level 
determinant of participation, what we seem to be capturing here is the networked 
dimension of participation, to which the second section of this chapter is dedicated.   
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Personal Grievances: Victimization 
We now turn to a different type of grievance, whose effect has rarely been evaluated 
in quantitative studies of participation in violent organizations, which of the direct 
victimization of a person or a person’s household on participation.  We use a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent or one or more members of his 
household has experienced a direct attack before the arrival of the group in the village 
(and thus before potential participation), using data on the respondent’s family’s 
history of attacks.  As can be seen in Column (7) of Table (2), respondents who have 
experienced attacks on their households are 5.541% more likely to participate, an 
estimation that is statistically significant at the 1% level.  There is therefore strong 
evidence that direct victimization is associated with an increase in participation.  
However, this effect could be due to systematic differences between villages in terms 
of attack rates and participation rates.  The model with village level fixed effects 
reported in Table (3) shows us, that, on average within villages, the effect of attacks 
on participation remains positive but drops to 0.288%, and is no longer statistically 
significant at any conventional level.  There is therefore insufficient evidence that, on 
average “within villages”, direct victimization is associated with participation.  The 
effect captured in Table (2) therefore seems to be due to village level differences, 
particularly the fact that some villages experience higher levels of attacks and higher 
levels of participation.  Furthermore, when adding group level fixed effects in Table 
(4), the coefficient becomes negative (-2.24%), but isn’t statistically significant at any 
conventional level.   
 
Thus, while Table (2) suggests that there is a positive relation between attacks and 
participation, these attacks seem to be due to systematic variations in both attacks and 
participation levels between villages.  This indicates that the relation between attacks 
and participation might not play out at the individual level, which is our focus here, 
but perhaps at the village level, although these particular models do not allow us to 
make such a claim.  This motivates our inquiry into the village level relation between 
experience of attacks, armed group formation and participation in Section 3 of this 
chapter.   
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Past participation 
We then look at a different aspect of an individual’s experience of armed conflict: past 
participation in armed organizations.  As has been argued in the theoretical chapter 
and in several of the qualitative empirical chapters, networks of security professionals 
and ex-combatants often play a crucial role in armed mobilizations, suggesting the 
possibility of a strong association between past participation and participation in armed 
groups. 
 
We use a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent has declared 
having participated in a security organization before the arrival of the group in the 
village.293  Looking at Column (8) of Table (2), we can see that having previously 
participated is associated with a 30.8% increase in participation, and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  This suggests a very strong effect of past participation on 
the likelihood of participation in a given group.  As can be seen in Table (3) and Table 
(4), the estimated effect remains strong and statistically significant when incorporating 
both village level and group level fixed effects, –23.7% and 22% respectively, both 
significant at the 1% level.  While not reported here to avoid overburdening the tables, 
the effect of past participation is strong and statistically significant in both Local and 
External groups, and is actually stronger for external groups.   
 
Therefore, when accounting for systematic village, group and temporal period 
differences, there is evidence of a strong association between past participation and 
participation.  Importantly, as we have repeated throughout this section, this does not 
imply causality, because of the possibility of endogeneity.   
Social ties: Kinship with participants 
We then look at the effect of social ties on participation.  As we have seen in the 
theoretical section, and reminded at the beginning of this section, social ties have been 
shown to play a crucial role in armed mobilizations.  In the survey, a series of questions 
                                                 
293 This variable compiles participation in previous village groups (groups present in the village), as 
well as participation in non-village groups.  
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were designed to measure an individual’s social ties with both leaders and members 
of armed groups throughout the period of presence of an armed group in a given 
village, in order to capture temporal variations in social ties between populations and 
members of armed organizations.  In this analysis, we use the measures that correspond 
to an individual’s social relations with leaders and members of the armed group before 
the arrival of the group in the village.  This is done to avoid, as best possible, the 
endogeneity that would result from including those social ties that develop as a result 
of the presence of the armed groups, or as a result of participation.  We focus on two 
variables: Biological Kinship and Close Social Ties.  The dummy variable Bio Kinship 
takes the value of 1 if the respondent has declared strict biological kinship with at least 
one member of the group, before the arrival of the group in the village.  This measure 
is used because it further reduces the risk of endogeneity.  We also introduce an 
alternative variable, that slightly extends the Bio Kinship variable to the larger family 
and close friends of an individual.  The variable Close Social Ties takes the value of 1 
if the respondent has declared that at least one member of the armed group was part of 
his family or a close friend before the arrival of the group in the village.  A more 
detailed explanation of the construction of the kinship variables is provided in 
Appendix 1.  
 
In Column (9) of Table (2), we can see that having biological kinship with a group 
member enhances the probability of having participated by 30,1%, and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  In order to see whether this result could be biased by 
systematic differences between villages, or groups, we look at the models with village 
level and group level fixed effects.   Table (3) shows us that, on average “within 
villages”, the effect of Kinship remains strong at 25.5% and statistically significant at 
the 1% level.   However, when looking at the model with group level fixed effects in 
Table (4), we can see in Column (9) that, while the effect of biological kinship on 
participation remains positive, it is a much smaller amplitude (2.24%), and not 
statistically significant at any conventional level.   Therefore, the strong effects 
identified in Table (2) and Table (3) seems to be affected by systematic group level 
differences.  In order to see whether the group level fixed effects annul all effects of 
social ties on participation, we introduce the alternative measure of social ties before 
the group in Table (4) with the group level fixed effects (As the Bio Kinship variable 
was statistically significant in the previous tables, we did not introduce the alternative 
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measure to unburden the Tables).  As can be seen in Column (10) of Table (4), having 
a family member or close friend in the group before the arrival or constitution of the 
group enhances the probability of having participated by 10.1%, and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.   Thus, while the effect of biological kinship does not hold 
with group level fixed effects, Close Social ties has an effect.   
 
In order to see whether these differences might be due to Group Origins, we look at 
Table (5bis), where both these variables are interacted with the conditioning variable 
Group Origins.  As can be seen in Column (6), the coefficient of Bio Kinship is not 
statistically significant for External groups, and the coefficient of the interaction term 
is not statistically significant.  This can be explained by the fact that it is much less 
likely that residents have biological kinship ties with members of external groups.  
However, as can be seen in Column (7), the effect of Close Social Ties for External 
Group is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.  As the coefficient of the 
interaction term is not statistically significant and of a very low amplitude, the effect 
is very similar for Local groups.   
 
Thus, there is strong evidence in the sample that social ties with members of armed 
groups are associated with participation.  While this is relatively straightforward for 
local groups, the effect remains for External groups.  This is thus consistent with the 
idea, explored in the qualitative empirical chapters, that external groups use social 
networks to recruit combatants.  In the following section, we will explore this point 
more specifically.     
9.4.4. Section 1 Conclusion  
The analysis of the individual determinants of participation has yielded several 
important results, which allow us to better understand who participates in armed 
organizations.  Indeed, we have found evidence for the much discussed idea that 
grievances are an important factor in understanding participation in armed 
organizations, an aspect that, as we have seen in the theoretical chapter, has been 
extensively explored in qualitative and historical studies of armed mobilization, but 
for which quantitative studies have found mixed evidence.  In particular, we have 
found strong evidence that land deprivation is associated with higher levels of 
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participation, a result that echoes the qualitative empirical chapters where many 
interviewees insisted on the fact that lack of land drove young people to join rebellions.  
We also find evidence that relative educational deprivation is associated with higher 
participation, although the effect is small in amplitude.  The results for the other 
proxies of social and economic grievances are not as straightforward.  Indeed, we do 
not find evidence that our measures of social marginalization –marriage and proximity 
to established authorities - are associated with higher participation, and the measures 
of wealth yield somewhat contradictory results.   
 
However, we have seen that a particular group level characteristic, its origins, is 
particularly relevant in the analysis of the determinants of participation, as it conditions 
differentiated effects of grievances on participation.  Indeed, we have seen that relative 
economic deprivation is not associated to higher participation for groups that emerged 
locally, but increases participation for external groups.  This is also the case for land 
deprivation, which is associated with participation for external groups, but not for local 
ones.  Similarly, while marriage has a negative but not statistically significant effect 
for external groups, participants in local groups are more likely to have been married.   
Such differentiated patterns of the effects of the individual determinants of 
participation seem to point to different stories of mobilization.  On one hand, that of 
relative economic and social deprivation as a driver of participation in external groups, 
consistent with the idea that such groups represent an “exit option” for people who 
find themselves in positions of economic and social marginality, that has been 
emphasized extensively in the literature on armed conflict on the African continent 
(e.g. Richards 1996; Van Acker & Vlassenroot 2001; Honwana 2005).  On the other 
hand, a different portrait of participation in local groups emerges.  Indeed, participants 
in such groups are more representative of the general population, in terms of their 
economic and social profiles (and in some cases, such as marriage, slightly more 
“integrated” than average).  Although the category of “local groups” covers a large 
array of very different configurations, this can potentially be explained by the fact that 
such “local groups” emerge - at least initially - as collective responses to insecurity by 
existing socio-political entities.  As seen in the chapter on the “grassroots” dynamics 
of formation of the Mayi-Mayi militia, such groups often “activate” mechanisms of 
communal resource mobilization and governance, which solicit entire communities 
and include mechanisms of screening and vouching of participants. 
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In addition, we have found several other significant results concerning determinants 
of participation.  However, it is important to not misconstrue these variables as strictly 
individual, as we have argued throughout the thesis that the processes they are part of 
operate both at individual and supra-individual levels.  This is the case of social ties, 
for which we have found very strong statistical evidence of an effect on participation, 
both in local groups and in external groups.  The processes whereby individuals are 
“pulled” into armed organizations through their social ties is a supra-individual 
process, that requires to understand the individual dimension in conjunction with the 
collective and social dimensions, which motivates the inquiry carried out in the second 
part of this chapter.   
 
Similarly, while we have found strong evidence that past-participation is associated 
with much higher levels of participation, this does not entail that it is a strictly 
individual variable.  As we have seen in the Kalehe Highlands chapter, the formation 
of an armed group activates social mechanisms of persuasion and coercion that lead 
many ex-combatants to be “pulled” back into armed organizations.  The strong result 
for past-participants might therefore be capturing such processes, and it is important 
to remain wary not to misconstrue them as strictly individual.  Finally, we have found 
that, across villages, direct victimization of an individual or an individual’s household 
is associated with higher participation, but that this result seems to be attributable to 
village level systematic differences.  As with the previous variables, this points to the 
possibility that victimization related grievances do not operate solely at an individual 
level, but rather at a collective/village level.  This informs the inquiry that is carried 
out in the final section of the chapter, which explores the relation between attacks, 
armed group formation and participation.   
 
In the following tables - Table (2) to Table (5bis) - the dependant variable Participate 
is the probability that an individual has participated in a given group in a given village. 
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TABLE (2): INDIVIDUAL DETERMINANTS OF PARTICIPATION (No fixed Effects)      
(dependant: Participate) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Age before group 0.002** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.001 0.009*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Father's wealth 0.004*         0.006*** 
 (0.002)         (0.002) 
Wealth before group  0.029        0.018** 
  (0.018)        (0.008) 
Land before group   -0.024       0.006 
   (0.019)       (0.019) 
Married before group    0.039*      -0.015 
    (0.021)      (0.021) 
Schoolgap before group     0.007***     0.003*** 
     (0.002)     (0.001) 
Age before group squared     -0.000***     -3.31e-05 
     (4.07e-05)     (3.46e-05) 
Father kinship with Mwami      0.078***    -0.001 
      (0.017)    (0.010) 
Father kinship with Chief      0.006    0.013 
      (0.027)    (0.024) 
Family attack before group       0.054***   0.057*** 
       (0.0170)   (0.017) 
Past Participant        0.307***  0.194*** 
        (0.019)  (0.021) 
Bio Kinship group Member         0.301*** 0.258*** 
         (0.059) (0.052) 
Constant 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.058*** 0.066*** 0.060** 0.014 0.059*** -0.003 0.028 0.014 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.025) (0.023) (0.017) (0.0161) (0.0174) (0.025) 
           
Observations 2,175 2,255 2,344 2,344 2,344 2,340 2,344 2,344 2,248 2,002 
R-squared 0.009 0.015 0.008 0.009 0.017 0.022 0.012 0.172 0.043 0.153 
FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Cluster V V V V V V V V V V 
Linear Probability Model. Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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TABLE (3): INDIVIDUAL DETERMINANTS OF PARTICIPATION (Village Fixed Effects) 
(dependant: Participate) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Age before group 0.001 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.007*** 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Father's wealth -0.009***         0.001 
 (0.002)         (0.003) 
Wealth before group  0.022**        0.019** 
  (0.010)        (0.008) 
Land before group   -0.035*       0.005 
   (0.020)       (0.019) 
Married before group    0.026      -0.018 
    (0.023)      (0.022) 
Schoolgap before group     0.006***     0.003*** 
     (0.001)     (0.001) 
Age before group squared     -0.000***     -4.60e-05 
     (3.68e-05)     (3.55e-05) 
Father kinship with Mwami      0.051***    -0.008 
      (0.014)    (0.013) 
Father kinship with Chief      -0.014    0.026 
      (0.024)    (0.025) 
Family attack before group       0.002   0.049** 
       (0.016)   (0.019) 
Past Participant        0.236***  0.155*** 
        (0.019)  (0.022) 
Bio Kinship group Member         0.255*** 0.245*** 
         (0.058) (0.055) 
Constant 0.098*** 0.106*** 0.095*** 0.103*** 0.105*** 0.065** 0.098*** 0.032* 0.052** 0.029 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.026) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.027) 
           
Observations 2,175 2,255 2,344 2,344 2,344 2,340 2,344 2,344 2,248 2,002 
R-squared 0.185 0.183 0.186 0.185 0.192 0.188 0.184 0.252 0.183 0.230 
FE IDV IDV IDV IDV IDV IDV IDV IDV IDV IDV 
Cluster IDV IDV IDV IDV IDV IDV IDV IDV IDV IDV 
Linear Probability Model. Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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TABLE (4): INDIVIDUAL DETERMINANTS OF PARTICIPATION (Group Fixed Effects) 
VARIABLES           
(dependant: Participate) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Age before group -0.001** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001** 0.001 -0.001** -0.001** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Father's wealth -0.003          
 (0.002)          
Wealth before group  0.003         
  (0.005)         
Land before group   -0.023*        
   (0.014)        
Married before group    0.005       
    (0.016)       
Schoolgap before group     -0.000      
     (0.001)      
Age before group squared     -5.63e-05      
     (3.74e-05)      
Father kinship with Mwami      0.033***     
      (0.012)     
Father kinship with Chief      -0.017     
      (0.020)     
Family attack before group       -0.022    
       (0.014)    
Past Participant        0.219***   
        (0.014)   
Bio Kinship group Member         0.022  
         (0.033)  
Social ties group Member          0.101*** 
          (0.006) 
Constant 0.164*** 0.160*** 0.156*** 0.159*** 0.117*** 0.138*** 0.161*** 0.093*** 0.108*** 0.103*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.026) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
           
Observations 2,175 2,255 2,344 2,344 2,344 2,340 2,344 2,344 2,248 2,341 
R-squared 0.630 0.630 0.634 0.634 0.635 0.635 0.634 0.679 0.590 0.679 
FE IDG IDG IDG IDG IDG IDG IDG IDG IDG IDG 
Cluster HH HH HH HH HH HH HH HH HH HH 
Linear Probability Model. Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Table (5): Individual Determinants interacted with Group Origins (model with village fixed effects) 
(dependant: Participate_ Probability of participation) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Father's wealth -0.011***     
 (0.002)     
Group Origin:External/Local 0.365*** 0.359*** 0.338*** 0.285*** 0.457*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.030) (0.031) (0.059) 
Group Origin X Father’s Wealth 0.019**     
 (0.007)     
Age before group 0.000 7.22e-05 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wealth before group  -0.011**    
  (0.004)    
Group Origin X Wealth Before Group  0.043**    
  (0.018)    
Land before group   -0.043***   
   (0.013)   
Group Origin X Land Before Group   0.043   
   (0.040)   
Married before group    -0.007  
    (0.016)  
Married Origin X Land Before Group    0.124***  
    (0.040)  
School gap before group     0.001* 
     (0.000) 
Group Origin X School Gap     0.006* 
     (0.003) 
Constant 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.037*** 0.028* 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
      
Observations 2,175 2,255 2,344 2,344 2,344 
R-squared 0.385 0.381 0.382 0.387 0.384 
FE IDV IDV IDV IDV IDV 
Cluster HH HH HH HH HH 
Linear Probability Model. Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Table (5 bis): Individual Determinants interacted with Group Origins (model with village fixed effects) 
VARIABLES     
(dependant: Participate) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Bio Kinship group Member 0.095    
 (0.089)    
Group Origin:External/Local 0.261*** 0.220*** 0.273*** 0.368*** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.031) (0.022) 
Group Origin X Bio Kin Group Member 0.020    
 (0.111)    
Age before group 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Social ties group Member  0.144***   
  (0.041)   
Group Origin X Social Ties Group Member  -0.010   
  (0.042)   
Father kinship with Mwami   -0.016  
   (0.010)  
Group Origin X Kin father with Mwami   0.146***  
   (0.039)  
Father kinship with Chief    0.006 
    (0.026) 
Group Origin X Kin father with Chief    -0.035 
    (0.068) 
Constant 0.003 0.000 0.017 0.015 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) 
     
Observations 2,248 2,341 2,340 2,340 
R-squared 0.305 0.503 0.390 0.381 
FE IDV IDV IDV IDV 
Cluster HH HH HH HH 
Linear Probability Model. Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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9.5.  SECTION 2: Mediation and Participation 
9.5.1.  Rationale of analysis 
In the previous section of this chapter, we searched for empirical evidence of 
individual level determinants of participation, with an aim to understand who 
participates in armed groups.  One of the conclusions we have drawn is that those 
individuals who had pre-existing kinship or social ties with members of armed groups 
tend to participate more than those who did not.   Tied to the question of who 
participates is the question of how people come to participate, or what authors such as 
Viterna (2006) or Scacco (2009) frame as ‘pull factors’ as opposed to ‘push factors’ 
of participation.   
 
In this section, we look at processes of mediation of participation and how these 
interact with individual factors, in line with our multi-level analytical approach.  As 
argued in the theoretical chapter, participation in armed factions should be seen as part 
of political economies of labour mobilization, which have longstanding institutional 
histories and have shaped the political and social landscape of the region.  For 
example, as has been emphasized in the history section, the institution of the “native 
chief” served as a handle for the state to mobilize labour and resources.  The formal 
institution of the chief, representing state authority, is based on modes of customary 
authority embedded in social structures of rural areas.  In this section, we therefore 
look at what Staniland (2012, 2015) calls the “social-institutional” dimensions of 
armed mobilization, which have rarely been taken into account in quantitative studies 
of participation. 
 
Mediation designate the ways in which institutions of authority – in this case chiefs - 
and structures of social organization – in this case families - influence individual 
participation in armed organizations.  Mediation is not a linear or straightforward 
process, and encompasses a variety of mechanisms of individual and collective 
communication, negotiation, persuasion, or pressure and coercion.  It is not necessarily 
carried out by chiefs and families and encompasses a much larger array of actors, and 
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does not automatically entail support.   Chiefs can decide to carry out recruitments for 
different reasons and in different contexts.  For example, chiefs can mobilize as part 
of efforts to provide security to their constituencies, or as part of wider social-
insurrectional movements such as the Mayi-Mayi or Raia Mutomboki, or under 
pressure by external groups seeking to obtain resources. 
 
Bearing in mind the intricate nature of the process under study, we nevertheless 
attempt to ascertain whether institutional and social mediation increase an individual’s 
propensity to participate in armed factions.  Descriptive data suggests that there is large 
variation in the level of mediation of recruitments into armed groups by local 
authorities.  Figure (6) gives a historical overview of recruitment “campaigns”, and 
those that were mediated by local authorities.294  The red line reveals that a significant 
proportion of total recruitments in the sample were mediated by chiefs.   
 
                                                 
294 A campaign is a measure of whether an armed group carried out recruitments in a given village in 
a given year.  Figure (6) shows the number of villages in which recruitments were being carried out in 
a given year.  The red line gives us the number of villages in which there is evidence that local chiefs 
were directly involved in recruitments. 
Figure 1 Mediation of Recruitments (Village Survey) 
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 9.5.2.  Model Setup 
We now turn to the econometric estimation of the effect of institutional and social 
mediation on participation in armed organizations.  As for the analysis carried out in 
Section 1, we use the individual*group structure of the dataset.  Institutional mediation 
is defined as whether local authorities actively took part in the recruitment of 
combatants.  Social mediation is defined as whether an individual’s familial entourage 
directly encouraged and supported participation.  Table (6) presents the results of a 
linear probability model that uses both the Village Level and Household Level data, 
and with the dummy variable participation as the dependent variable (the probability 
that an individual has participated in a given group in a given village).  As for the 
previous analyses, the linear probability model is chosen over the logit model for the 
purpose of simplicity of interpretation, but the analysis was also carried out using a 
logit model, and yielded very close results.  The baseline specification for the linear 
probability model is: 
 
𝚸𝒊,𝒈,𝒗 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑪𝒉𝒊𝒆𝒇𝒊 ,𝒈,𝒗 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚𝒊,𝒈,𝒗  +  𝜺𝒊,𝒈,𝒗 
 
Where: 
𝚸𝒊,𝒈,𝒗 is the binary dependant variable, that takes the value of 1 if an individual 𝐢 participated 
in a group 𝒈 in a village 𝒗. 
𝜶 is the constant.   
𝑪𝒉𝒊𝒆𝒇𝒊 ,𝒈,𝒗  is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if recruitments were directly mediated 
by local authorities for individual 𝐢 in a group 𝒈 in a village 𝒗. 
𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚𝒊,𝒈,𝒗   is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if recruitments were directly 
mediated by an individual’s family for individual 𝐢 in a group 𝒈 in a village 𝒗. 
𝜷𝟏𝒂𝒏𝒅  𝜷𝟐 are the estimated coefficients.   
𝜺𝒊,𝒈,𝒗 is the error term for an individual 𝐢 in a group 𝒈 in a village 𝒗. 
 
As with the previous analysis, the effects estimated through this model could be due 
to systematic differences between villages.  In order to take into account systematic 
village level differences, we add a model with village level fixed effects, and report 
the output in Table (7).  Furthermore, the estimated effects might also be affected by 
systematic differences between individuals in a village, and temporal variations in both 
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mediation and participation.  In order to measure the average effect of social and 
institutional mediation ‘within individuals’ - i.e. account for systematic differences 
between individuals - we repeat the same model while adding individual fixed effects, 
and report the output in Table (8).  The Individual fixed effects are reported as HH (for 
Household) in the tables.  Throughout the presentation of the analysis and results, the 
term participation (or participate) refers to the binary dependant variable, the 
probability that an individual has participated in a given group, in a given village (thus, 
an increase in participate means an increase in the probability of an individual having 
participated in a specific group in a specific village).  
9.5.3.  Measurement and Sampling  
Two measures of Institutional Mediation are used in the analysis.  The first is a binary 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the Village authorities declared that they directly 
took part in the recruitments of a given group in the survey village.  Importantly, it 
does not mean that the Authorities were supportive of the movement, as it includes the 
cases where authorities were forced or pressured to recruit.295 As Local Authorities 
can conceal or misreport their involvement in recruitments for armed groups for 
multiple reasons, a second measure of Mediation was included in the Household 
survey.  It captures whether the respondents reported that they were ordered or directly 
encouraged to participate by local chiefs.   
 
Additionally, an important risk concerns the possibility of under-evaluating the effect 
of mediation by conflating un-successful mediated recruitments with non-recruitments 
in the sample.   The following tree provides an illustration of this problem: 
 
                                                 
295 See Appendix 2 for details of variable construction.   
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As there are two main binary variables (participation and mediation), these are the four 
outcomes for these two variables in the database:  
 
 Participate No Participate 
Mediated 1 2 
Un-mediated 3 4 
 
The 4th option in the table conflates two outcomes of the previous possibility tree: Un-
mediated mobilization with no participation, and the absence of recruitment at all in 
the village.  We restrict observations to the first branch of the tree, to cases where there 
is evidence that the groups carried out recruitment, in order not to conflate 
unsuccessful mediated recruitments with non-recruitments.   
 9.5.4.  Empirical Results 
Column (1) of Table (6) corresponds to the baseline specification and provides an 
estimation of the effect of Encouragement by village authorities (hereafter called Chief 
Support) on the participation dummy dependent variable.  The Chief Support measure 
used here is taken from the Household Survey, and corresponds to whether the 
respondent considers that the village Authorities were actively involved in the 
recruitment of combatants for a specific group.296  Standard errors are clustered at the 
                                                 
296 The Household Survey also included an alternative measure of mediation of recruitment by village 
authorities.  Instead of asking whether the village authorities were directly involved in the recruitment 
of combatants for a given group, it asked who carried out the recruitments, and let the respondent answer 
openly. The surveyor then had to enter the different actors enumerated by the respondent. As this second 
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group level.  As can be seen in Column (1), Chief Support is associated with a 28% 
increase in participation, and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  This positive 
and statistically significant effect prevails in the model using village fixed effects 
(27.1% in Table (7)), as well as in the model using household fixed effects (22.8% in 
Table (8)), thus accounting for systematic differences between villages, and systematic 
differences between households and time periods.  The strong positive effect also 
remains when using the Village Survey measure of Chief Support, which is not 
reported to avoid overburdening the table.  There is therefore strong evidence that 
mediation by village authorities is associated with an increase in participation, both 
across South Kivu, on average within villages, and on average within households.    
 
As discussed in the qualitative empirical chapters, there is evidence that mediation by 
local authorities often occurs concomitantly to mediation by families, as the village 
authority structure “encompasses” the household social structures and thus mediation 
by authorities can entail mediation by families.  Furthermore, as previously discussed, 
one of the major risks in this analysis is endogeneity.  Indeed, as we have seen with 
some of the examples of Mayi-Mayi mobilizations in Mwenga, high spontaneous 
participation in “popular” movements can constitute a serious challenge to the 
authority of local leaders, who can decide to support such movements in an attempt to 
regain authority over their subjects.  This is just one among several configurations 
where high participation can drive Chief Support, thus introducing endogeneity in the 
estimation of the effect of Chief Support on Participation.   
 
While it is impossible to completely rule out the risk of endogeneity, we insert a control 
for “popular mobilization” in order to isolate the effect of Chief Support on 
participation.  In Column (2) of Table (6), we use Family Support as a proxy for 
popular support, in order to isolate the effect of Chief Support.  The Family Support 
Variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when respondents consider that 
their close family (parents) actively encouraged their participation in a given group.  
When controlling for Family Support, Chief Support is associated with a 14,4% 
increase in the probability of participation and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
When controlling for Chief Support, Family Support is associated with a 15,7% 
                                                 
measure yielded the same results than the first one, it is not included in the results to avoid 
overburdening.  
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increase of the probability of participation, and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  Thus, while the single effect of Chief Support on participation is likely to have 
encompassed that of Family Support in Column (1), Column (2) shows us that the 
isolated effects of Chief Support and Family Support on participation are strong and 
statistically significant.  In Column (3), we can see that these effects remain strong and 
statistically significant when using an alternative measure of “popular support”, a 
binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent considers that their familial 
entourage was “supportive” of their participation (rather than actively involved in it).  
The estimated effects of both Chief Support and Family Support remain strong and 
statistically significant on average within villages, as can be seen in Table (7) that 
reports the results of the model using village level fixed effects.   
 
However, when using the model with household level fixed effects, reported in Table 
(8), we can see in Column (2) and Column (3) that, while the Family Support 
coefficients remain strong and statistically significant, the Chief Support coefficients 
remain positive (respectively 6.89% and 4.18%), but are no longer statistically 
significant at any conventional level.  This indicates that the effects captured in Table 
(6) and Table (7) could be due to temporal variations in both mediation and 
participation, i.e. that there is higher participation in the periods when there is also 
higher mediation within villages.  However, this could also be due to excessive 
breakdown of the correlation by the Household Fixed Effects and resulting lack of 
statistical power. 
 
Furthermore, an important concern is that the estimation of both the separate and 
combined effects of Chief Support and Family Support could be biased by an omitted 
variable, Group Origins.  Indeed, the strong and significant effects of Chief and Family 
Support could just be capturing the “grassroots” or local character of the formation of 
some armed groups - which is likely to be correlated to the predictors (Chief Support 
and Family Support) and the outcome variable (participation) - and not the specific 
effect of the two Support variables on participation.  To evaluate whether or not this 
is the case, we run two additional regressions.  Column (4) reports the estimation of 
the effect of Group Origins on the probability of participating, using a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the group originated locally, and 0 if the group is originated 
“externally”.  We can see that participation is on average 37,7% higher for local groups 
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than for external groups, a result that is statistically significant at the 1% level.  Column 
(5) replicates the Column (1) regression, with Chief Support as the independent 
variable, but adding Group Origins fixed effects to the model, to see whether the effect 
of Support on participation could be due to systematic differences between Local and 
External groups.  The output shows that, on average “within Group Origins”, the 
estimated effect of Chief Support on participation is 15,2%, and is statistically 
significant at the 1% threshold.  This suggests a reduced, yet strong and significant 
effect of Chief Support on participation when accounting for systematic differences 
between local and external groups.  As can be seen in Table (7) and Table (8), the 
effect remains when adding village level and household level fixed effects to the model.   
 
We then look at whether the effect of Chief Support on participation is different for 
Local Groups and External groups.  As discussed in the introduction of this section, 
there exist very different configurations of institutional mediation of armed 
mobilization.  In some cases, chiefs can autonomously decide to mobilize as a result 
of rampant insecurity and the necessity to replace state security forces.  In other cases, 
the decision to mobilize can be taken at a higher level and be mediated by state 
institutions, including chiefs, as was the case during the Local Defence mobilization 
under the RCD rule when local chiefs were tasked with mobilizing recruits for the 
paramilitary force.297  In other cases still, occupying armed groups can be forcing 
chiefs to provide recruit under the threat of direct coercion.  Amid such a variety of 
configurations, we have argued previously that the difference between local and 
external groups remained a salient distinction in the context of high decentralization 
of political authority and resource mobilization.  While many local initiatives are likely 
to obtain the support of local chiefs - although this is by no means guaranteed - the 
“mobilizing capacity” of local chiefs could be different when chiefs are mobilizing for 
external groups.   
 
In order to see whether this is the case, we add an interaction model that incorporates 
both Group Origins and Chief Support, and an interaction term 
GroupOrigins*ChiefSupport.  The rationale and interpretation of this interaction 
model is the same as for the interaction models using Group Origins as a conditioning 
                                                 
297 See chapter on Mobilization in the Kalehe Midlands. 
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variable carried out in Section 1 of this chapter.  As can be seen in Column (6) of Table 
(6), the interaction term is statistically significant at the 1% threshold, indicating 
evidence that the effect of Chief Support on Participate is different for Local Groups 
and for External Groups.  For External Groups, Chief Support is associated with a 5% 
increase in participation, and is statistically significant at the 5% level.  However, for 
Local Groups, Chief Support is associated with a much stronger (30.3%) increase in 
participation, and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  When adding village level 
fixed effects to the model (Table (7)), the coefficients remain of similar sign, amplitude 
and statistical significance.  However, in Table (8), which corresponds to the model 
with household fixed effects, Chief Support is associated with 0.7% increase in 
participation for External Groups, and is no longer statistically significant.  The 
interaction term reveals that, for Local Groups, Chief Support remains associated with 
a 21.3% increase in participation, and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  This 
indicates that the effects are due to systematic differences between time periods, i.e. 
that there is more participation in periods where there is also more mediation.   
 
We have therefore found that the effect of mediation on participation is strong and 
statistically significant for both Local and External groups.  However, for local groups, 
mediation is associated with a much stronger increase in participation.  This suggests 
that chiefs have a higher mobilizing power when initiatives are local, which could be 
due to the fact that they activate communitarian structures of mobilization, but also to 
endogeneity.  Yet there is also evidence that chiefs retain a significant mobilizing 
capacity for external groups, which is consistent with the qualitative evidence that 
armed factions strategically delegate the mobilization of resource and combatants to 
local chiefs because of their higher mobilizing capacity.   
9.5.6.  Section 2 Conclusion 
The analysis of institutional and social mediation of participation that we have carried 
out in this section has yielded several important results that inform our analysis of 
armed mobilization.  First, we have seen that institutional and social mediation are an 
important feature of the armed mobilizations that have occurred in eastern Congo, an 
aspect which we have emphasized in the quantitative chapters.  This substantiates the 
idea that mobilization is not strictly an individual phenomenon, it has a significant 
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“social-institutional” dimension that, although emphasized by numerous qualitative 
studies of mobilization, has been much less explored by quantitative analyses of 
participation that have predominantly taken an atomistic approach to the issue.  
Furthermore, the analysis has yielded strong evidence that the active involvement of 
village authorities in recruitments, as well as the involvement of an individual’s 
familial entourage are both associated with higher levels of participation, although it 
cannot be ruled out that these results might be affected by endogeneity.  While the 
result is quite straightforward, it attests to the mobilizing capacity of chiefs in rural 
areas, and provides quantitative backing to the analyses of mediation of armed 
mobilization carried out in the qualitative chapters.   
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Table (6): Mediation and Participation (Model with no Fixed Effects) 
VARIABLES       
(dependent: Participate) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Chief Support 0.280*** 0.144*** 0.149***  0.152*** 0.050** 
 (0.030) (0.035) (0.034)  (0.027) (0.022) 
Family Support  0.157***     
  (0.038)     
joinattitude_support   0.164***    
   (0.037)    
Group Origin:External/Local    0.377***  0.085*** 
    (0.035)  (0.032) 
Chief Support X Group Origins      0.253*** 
      (0.053) 
Constant 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.019*** 0.061*** 0.013*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) 
       
Observations 1,284 1,284 825 1,488 1,284 1,284 
R-squared 0.172 0.184 0.159 0.253 0.232 0.254 
FE NO NO NO NO Group TYPE NO 
Cluster GROUP GROUP GROUP GROUP GROUP GROUP 
Linear Probability Model. Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). The dependant variable Participate is the probability that an 
individual has participated in a specific group in a specific village.  
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Table (7): Mediation and Participation (model using Village fixed effects) 
VARIABLES       
(dependent: Participate) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Chief Support 0.271*** 0.134*** 0.153***  0.152*** 0.053** 
 (0.029) (0.033) (0.037)  (0.027) (0.026) 
Family Support  0.160***     
  (0.037)     
joinattitude_support   0.143***    
   (0.043)    
Group Origin:External/Local    0.359***  0.103*** 
    (0.032)  (0.036) 
Chief Support X Group Origins      0.243*** 
      (0.058) 
Constant 0.026*** 0.021*** 0.031** 0.025** 0.061*** 0.009 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) 
       
Observations 1,284 1,284 825 1,488 1,284 1,284 
R-squared 0.268 0.278 0.291 0.375 0.232 0.331 
FE Village Village Village Village Group TYPE Village 
Cluster GROUP GROUP GROUP GROUP GROUP GROUP 
Linear Probability Model. Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). The dependant variable Participate is the probability that an 
individual has participated in a specific group in a specific village.  
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Table (8): Mediation and Participation (Model Using Household Fixed Effects) 
VARIABLES       
(dependent: Participate) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Chief Support 0.228*** 0.068 0.041  0.152*** 0.007 
 (0.040) (0.069) (0.063)  (0.027) (0.037) 
Family Support  0.180**     
  (0.074)     
joinattitude_support   0.200**    
   (0.077)    
Group Origin:External/Local    0.385***  0.144*** 
    (0.050)  (0.048) 
Chief Support X Group Origins      0.221*** 
      (0.073) 
Constant 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.056** 0.016 0.061*** 0.016 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) 
       
Observations 1,284 1,284 825 1,488 1,284 1,284 
R-squared 0.699 0.705 0.809 0.684 0.232 0.740 
FE HH HH HH HH Group TYPE HH 
Cluster GROUP GROUP GROUP GROUP GROUP GROUP 
Linear Probability Model. Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). The dependant variable Participate is the probability that an 
individual has participated in a specific group in a specific village. 
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 9.6.  Section 3: Participation, protection and Socio-Economic Advancement 
9.6.1.  Rationale of Empirical enquiry 
The analysis of the individual level determinants of participation carried out in the first 
section of this chapter has shed light on the question of who joins armed organizations, 
by looking at individual level determinants of participation.  The second section has 
focused on how people join armed organizations, highlighting the central role of 
institutional and social mediation in armed mobilizations.  Yet the understanding of 
why people participate remains unclear without an analysis of what people actually 
obtain as a result of their participation.  Table (1) of the descriptive statistics section 
has given us an idea of the main self-reported motives of participation.  It shows that 
people participate for a range of different reasons, including the hope of obtaining 
material benefits, the desire for revenge, various forms of social pressure and coercion, 
and a number of other motives.  The predominant motive, however, is “community 
protection”, suggesting that people primarily join armed organizations in order to 
enhance their security and that of their social entourage and communities.  While such 
a motive can be perfectly genuine, the literature on the discursive strategies of armed 
organizations begs us to be cautious not to accept such motives at face value.  Indeed, 
most armed groups claim that their objective is to bring security and protection to 
civilian populations, despite the fact that a large number of them engage in violence 
against those very populations.  Moreover, community protection can be used as a 
deceptive argument to lure people into joining armed organizations.  The starting point 
of this section is therefore to necessity to investigate whether people actually gain 
protection, or other social or economic benefits, as a result of participation.   
 
This question is at the heart of the general interrogation pursued in this thesis.  As 
argued in the theoretical section, the objective is to analyse the decision of joining 
armed groups not solely as an individual process, but as inscribed in the broader 
transformations that societies undergo during civil wars.  More specifically, we seek 
to understand participation as part of the extension of a political economy of violence 
and protection, and the social architecture that results from this extension.  
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Ascertaining whether or not direct participation or support for armed organizations is 
likely enhance people’s security or socio-economic status is therefore central in 
understanding why they participate in such organizations.     
 
The existing literature on participation points towards two, somewhat contradictory 
effects of participation in armed factions and social proximity to armed factions during 
periods of armed conflict.  On one hand, authors have emphasized the economically 
and socially detrimental effects of joining or being associated to armed factions.  
Because of the nature of military work, but also the widespread negative perception of 
armed factions, those who have been associated with such organizations can 
experience various forms of economic and social ostracism.  This has been extensively 
documented in the case of ex-combatants on the African continent, and more 
specifically in the eastern Congolese wars.298  
 
On the other hand, a burgeoning literature, often based on close-range ethnographies 
of civil wars and civilian-military relations, has shown that association - either 
participation or close relations - with armed factions can enhance an individual’s 
socio-economic positioning, by providing protection, power, or access to particular 
goods or privileges.  Morvan (2005) and Verweijen (2013) have shown that, in eastern 
Congo, civilians often strategically develop relations with armed actors in order to 
obtain protection and various sorts of advantages and goods.  Similarly, Richards J. 
(2014 p.310) identifies a mechanism that she calls ‘recruitment for protection’, 
whereby people participate to avoid being attacked by a group.  Such contentions 
resonate with recent literature on violent organizations such as mafias and gangs, 
which emphasizes the fact that membership in such organizations conditions access to 
certain individual or collective goods, such as protection or material resources, that 
can also accrue to the social entourage of members (Sanchez-Jankowski 1991; Whyte 
1993; Venkatesh 2000). 
 
                                                 
298 For eastern Congo, see for example Jourdan (2004, 2011) or the report by the Eastern Congo 
Initiative and the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative on the post-conflict trajectories of ex-combatants 
(2012). 
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Very few studies that have explored this question through a quantitative angle, perhaps 
because of the dominance of cross section type data on armed conflict.  We therefore 
take advantage of the panel nature of the data to answer two central questions: 
 
1) Does participation in armed faction enhance or deteriorate an individual’s 
economic and social position, and reduce or enhance security? 
 
2) Do social ties with armed group members enhance or deteriorate an individual’s 
economic and social position, and reduce or enhance security? 
 
Our two questions thus concern the effect of participation on socio-economic 
positioning, as well as the effect of social proximity to armed groups on socio-
economic positioning.  We look at the effect of these two factors on three main 
dimensions of socio-economic life, which are 1) Wealth and economic positioning 2) 
Social Integration and 3) Security. 
9.6.2.  Design of Study and model setup 
In order to carry out the analysis, we reshape the dataset into a simplified panel, with 
three temporal observation points of the respondent’s socio-economic variables: 
Before the presence of a specific armed group (Period 0, hereafter referred to as PER0), 
during and after the presence of the armed group (period 1, hereafter referred to as 
PER1), and strictly after the presence of the armed group (hereafter referred to as 
PER2).  As previously mentioned, this reshape is feasible because all socio-economic 
variables have a temporal dimension (i.e. have observations for every year since 1990), 
and the dates of arrival and departure of groups in villages are recorded in both the 
Household Survey and Village survey.  In order to reduce the risk of measurement 
errors of years of presence of groups in villages, these variables were systematically 
cross checked by comparing the Village Survey – the most reliable for village level 
events such as the presence of armed groups because it is addressed to village 
specialists, including security specialists – and the 8 observation points of the 
Household survey.  The qualitative reports were further consulted to verify the 
accuracy of the dates.  In those cases where the dates remained confused, calls to 
village authorities and additional research trips were carried out to verify the dates.  
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This variable is also a key component of the analysis carried out in Sanchez de la Sierra 
(2016).   
 
The re-shaped dataset into three temporal periods is sketched in the following table.  
For each of the variables used in the analysis of this section, a simplified variable was 
computed for each of the three time periods.  For example, the marriage variable takes 
three values for each individual*group, according to the three periods: Whether the 
respondent was married before the arrival of a specific group (PER0), whether the 
respondent got married after the arrival of the group (PER1), and whether the 
respondent got married after the departure of the group (PER2).  This is done for all 
the variables used in the analysis (participation, marriage, land ownership, assets, and 
attacks).  The difference-in-difference model explained in the following sub-section 
allows to calculate the effect of the arrival of a group on these variables, i.e. whether 
the propensity to be married is affected by the arrival of a group.  The difference-in-
difference is done by interaction the period (PER1) with the Participation variation 
(PART), which allows to see whether there is a differentiated effect of the arrival of 
the group on the outcome variables, conditional on whether the respondent has 
participated or not.  For example, as illustrated in the table below, it allows to see if 
the effect of the arrival of a group (PER1) on marriage is different for participants and 
non-participants.  
 
Time period Individual  
X Group  
Participation 
in Group? 
Married? Landowner? 
PER 0 (before 
group) 
I1 X G1 
(individual 
1*Group 1) 
0 1 0 
PER 1 (after 
group arrival) 
I1*G1 0 1 1 
PER 2 (after 
group left) 
I1*G1 0 1 1 
PER 0  I1*G2 0 0 0 
PER 1  I1*G2 1 1 0 
PER 2  I1*G2 1 1 0 
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PER 0  I2*G1 0 0 1 
PER 1  I2*G1 1 0 1 
PER 2  I2*G1 1 1 1 
 
 
This breakdown into three periods has a theoretical as well as empirical justification.  
Indeed, It is assumed that before the armed group, a respondent’s socio-economic 
status is unaffected by the effect of that particular armed group, providing a baseline 
against which the following periods are compared.299  The further separation into two 
periods – During and after and strictly after the Group - is justified by qualitative 
evidence that the purported effects of a group are likely to change upon the group’s 
departure or dismantlement.  For example, there is qualitative evidence that those who 
participate or collude with a given armed group are often targeted for retaliation by 
other armed groups upon the group’s departures, or various forms of institutional and 
social retaliation by various actors.300  As retaliation, or various other social processes 
of marginalization are likely to affect the socio-economic positioning of people who 
have either participated or colluded with armed groups after the group’s departure, the 
effect of the armed group’s presence can be different during its presence and after its 
presence, and justifies the separation. 
 
Using this three period panel dataset, we use a difference-in-difference model to carry 
out the econometric estimation of the effect of a respondent’s participation and social 
proximity to armed group on the respondent’s socio-economic position.  We separate 
socio-economic position into 3 main clusters, which constitute our dependent 
variables: 1) the respondent’s Wealth and land ownership 2) the respondent’s marriage 
and 3) The respondent and his family’s security.   
 
The difference-in-difference model allows us to address the concern of a non-random 
assignment of the “treatment” whose effects we are trying to estimate, in this case 
participation in armed faction or social proximity with armed groups.  This can be a 
                                                 
299 The respondent’s socio-economic status before the group can, however, be affected by participation 
or association with other groups, or by unobserved factors also affecting his future socio-economic 
status. The difference-in-difference model addresses these concerns.  
300 For example, qualitative interviews provide examples where village councils decided to exclude 
anyone who had participated or colluded with certain armed groups.  
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major concern if the selection into the “treatment” (participation) is correlated with the 
set of outcome measures.  It therefore allows us to address unobserved constant 
heterogeneity selection bias, present in standard cross section estimations.  For 
example, a cross-sectional approach to the impact of participation on wealth would 
compare participants and non-participant’s wealth levels, but these could be affected 
by constant heterogeneity between participants and non-participants.  The difference 
in difference focuses strictly on the change in wealth at three periods in time, and on 
the difference between participant’s change in wealth and non-participants change in 
wealth, thus eliminating the average initial difference in wealth between participants 
and non-participants.   Although not perfect, the difference in difference model 
therefore allows to “control” (hold constant) any constant unobserved variable 
potentially affecting both the treatment selection and the outcome variable.  The 
strategy, however, is not immune to biases arising from systematically different 
“paths” by participants and non-participants, for other reasons than the effect of 
participation (differential time trends), which constitutes its main limitation.   
 
Importantly, the database and model restrict the observations to group episodes, i.e.  
the episodes where a group was present in a village.  This allows to avoid the bias that 
would arise from the inclusion of those observations where groups were not present in 
the village, which could bias the estimation of the effects of participation on our 
dependent variables.    
 
Furthermore, while the database is divided into three temporal periods, we choose to 
report the model that includes PER1 (which pools the during and after group periods), 
and not the one that includes PER2.  This is done for purposes of simplicity and clarity, 
but also because some of the groups were still present during the survey, and, as we 
cannot observe PER2 for such groups, we lose many observations.  This was 
particularly the case of the Raia Mutomboki, who emerged in 2011-2012 and were still 
operating when the survey was carried out in 2012-2013.  Furthermore, the analysis 
revealed that there is very little variation between PER1 and PER2.  Thus, we only add 
PER2 to the model in the cases where the marginal effect of group departure is 
statistically significant.   
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Finally, we include group level fixed effects in the model, as they allow to account for 
unobserved constant heterogeneity between groups, but also villages (as the variable 
that singularly identifies groups is village specific).  Furthermore, all regressions 
include a birth year dummy to control for age, and year fixed effects.301  Finally, 
standard errors are clustered at group level.  The results are reported in Table (11) and 
Table (12), and discussed thematically as in the previous sections.  The specification 
of the model is: 
 
𝚼𝒊,𝒈,𝒕 =  𝜶 +  𝜷 ∗  𝑷𝑨𝑹𝑻𝒊,𝒈 +  𝝈𝟏 ∗ 𝑷𝑬𝑹𝟏 +   𝝈𝟐 ∗ 𝑷𝑨𝑹𝑻 ∗ 𝑷𝑬𝑹𝟏 +  𝛑
∗ 𝐗𝐢,𝐠,𝐭  +  ℇ𝒊,𝒈,𝒕 
 
Where:  
 
𝚼𝒊,𝒈,𝒕  is the outcome for Individual 𝒊 group 𝒈 and period 𝒕 (t can take two values PER0, and 
PER1).  We detail and discuss the selected outcome variables that we use in the interpretation 
of results.   
𝜶 is the constant.   
𝜷 is the coefficient of PART. 
𝑷𝑨𝑹𝑻𝒊,𝒈 is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if an individual  𝒊 participated in group 𝒈. 
𝝈𝟏  is the coefficient of PER1, i.e. the effect of the group’s presence and aftermath.   
𝑷𝑬𝑹𝟏 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the time period is after the start of the 
group episode, thus both during and after the group. 
𝝈𝟐  is the coefficient of the interaction term PART*PER1, which measures the differentiated 
effect of a group’s presence and aftermath (PER1=1) for participants (PART=1), as 
compared to non participants.  It is therefore the key coefficient in identifying whether 
participation changes the effect of a group’s presence.   
𝑷𝑨𝑹𝑻 ∗ 𝑷𝑬𝑹𝟏  is the interaction term, a dummy that takes the value of 1 if PART=1 and 
PER1=1.   
𝐗𝐢,𝐠,𝐭  represents the additional individual and group level observed and unobserved factors 
affecting the outcome variable for each individual 𝒊 , group 𝒈 at period 𝒕.  Their effect is 
held constant by using group*individual fixed effects.    
                                                 
301 Indeed, if a respondent is 25 today, he is more likely to have participated in groups in, say the year 
2000, than a respondent who is 18 today. The dummy allows to control for age effects.  
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ℇ𝒊,𝒈,𝒕 is the error term for Individual 𝒊 , group 𝒈 and period 𝒕. 
9.6.3.  Empirical results 
Participation and Marriage 
We start the analysis by looking at whether or not participation has an effect on the 
marriage of a respondent.  We use a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
respondent got married during a given period among the two periods included in the 
analysis.  Hereafter, we refer to PER1 as after the beginning of the group episode 
(which comprises during the group and after the group).  In order to better identify the 
effect of participation on marriage, we condition the regressions on whether or not 
individuals were married before the arrival of the group, creating split samples of 
married and non-married individuals.  
 
Column (1) restricts the sample to those observations where the respondent was 
married before the arrival of a group.  The coefficient of PER1 (-0.935) shows us, after 
the arrival of a group (as compared to before the group, PER0, which is the baseline 
period), those who have not participated in the group (PART=0) are 93.5% less likely 
to marry, which is consistent with the fact that this sample corresponds to those who 
were married before the group (some of whom might re-marry after, hence not 100%).  
The coefficient of PART tells us that, before the group (PER=0), Participants were on 
average more likely to have been married than non-participants, although the use of 
fixed effects and conditioning make the interpretation of this coefficient complex, and 
it is not specifically relevant as we are analysing the effect of participation on marriage.  
The coefficient of the interaction term PER1*PART -the key coefficient to detect 
whether participation induces a differentiated effect - tells us that, on average, 
following the arrival of a group, the likelihood of getting married of participants 
decreases by 4.35% more than that of ex-combatants, a result that is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  Participants are thus approximately 98% less likely to get 
married after the arrival of a group than before.  While this is consistent with the fact 
that we are conditioning on those who are already married, it is not sufficient to 
establish that participation (as compared to non-participation) has a detrimental effect 
on the likelihood of getting married.   
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Column (2) repeats the same regression, but restricts to those observations where the 
respondent was not married before the group.  As the coefficient of PER1*PART is 
not statistically significant, there isn’t sufficient statistical evidence that the likelihood 
of getting married after group increases or decreases more than that of non-
participants.  There is therefore insufficient evidence that participation as compared to 
non-participation has a distinctive effect on marriage after a group arrives in a village.   
Participation and Land Acquisition & Dispossession 
We then look at whether there is evidence of a differentiated effect of a group’s arrival 
on land acquisition for participants and non-participants.  The outcome variable is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if land was acquired by the respondent at a 
given period, and we condition on land ownership before the group. 
 
Column (3) looks at the effect of a group’s presence on land ownership, for those 
respondents who were landowners before the arrival of group.  The coefficient of 
PER1 shows us that, for those who were landowners before the arrival of the group 
and did not participate in the group (PART=0), a group’s presence is associated with a 
75.3% decrease in land acquisition, and statistically significant at the 1% level.  The 
coefficient of PART, which is statistically significant at the 1% level, shows us that, 
before the arrival of the group (PER1=0), those who later participated in the group 
were less likely to own land.    This is consistent with the land deprivation effect on 
participation found in the first analysis of this chapter.  The fact that the coefficient of 
PART*PER1 is positive indicates that, relative to non-participants, participants see 
their likelihood of acquiring land after the group increase slightly, but it is not 
statistically significant at any conventional level.   
 
Column (4) repeats the same regression while restricting the sample to those 
observations where individuals were not landowners before the arrival of a group.  As 
the coefficient of PER1*PART is not statistically significant at any conventional level, 
there is insufficient evidence of a differentiated effect of participation on land 
ownership.   
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We then look at whether the arrival of a group has a differentiated effect on the 
likelihood of losing land after the arrival of a group for participants and non-
participants who were landowners before the arrival of the group.  We choose here to 
incorporate all forms of loss of land and not just expropriation,302 as the presence of a 
group can lead to multiple forms of direct or indirect loss of goods and land, some of 
which cannot be recorded (such as being pressured to sell land).  In Column (5), we 
can see that non-participants are much less likely to lose land after the arrival of a 
group, as the coefficient of PER1 is negative (-86,4%), and statistically significant at 
the 1% level.  As the coefficient of PER1*PART is not statistically significant at any 
conventional level, there isn’t sufficient evidence that for participants the effect of a 
group’s arrival on the likelihood of land acquisition is different from that of non-
participants.   Thus, as with marriage, we have not found sufficient evidence that 
participation significantly changes the effect of the arrival of a group on land 
acquisition and land loss.   
Participation and Wealth 
We then look at whether participation induces a differentiated effect of the arrival of 
a group on an individual’s wealth acquisition.  The dependant variable is constructed 
with the same z-score of yearly net sales and acquisitions of goods that was used to 
construct the measure of relative wealth before group in the previous analysis, adjusted 
here to each period of the analysis, i.e. before and after the arrival of a group (see 
Appendix for variable construction).   
 
As can be seen by looking at the coefficient of PER1 in Column (6) of Table (11), non-
participants experience on average a 4.91% increase in their asset acquisition after the 
arrival of the group, a result that is statistically significant at the 10% threshold.  The 
coefficient of PART shows us that, before the arrival of the group, those who then 
become participants are 18.2% higher on the scale of asset acquisition, and the 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level.  This somewhat surprising result 
                                                 
302 The household survey contains data on all the land that an individual has owned during his life, 
including how the land was acquired and how it was lost.  
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was also present in the analysis of individual determinants of participation, where we 
had seen that it was conditional on group origins.   
 
The most important result of Column (6) is the coefficient of PER1*PART, which 
shows that the asset acquisition of participants decreases on average 28.4% more than 
that on non-participants after the arrival of a group, and is statistically significant at 
the 1% level.  Contrarily to marriage and land, we therefore find statistical evidence 
that participation is associated with a negative effect on asset acquisition.  This 
provides support to the idea that participation has a detrimental effect on wealth.   
Participation and Protection 
We then look at whether participation induces differentiated effects on security after 
the arrival of a group, by looking at both the respondent’s security and the respondent’s 
Household’s security, proxied by the Respondent and his family’s history of attacks 
and sexual violence.  The difference-in-difference model is identical to the previous 
one, and also uses group level fixed effects.  However, we change the conditioning of 
regressions, which is done in this case by group origins.  As argued in the two previous 
sections, there is extensive qualitative evidence that locally formed groups can play a 
different role than external groups, and we thus look at whether this is the case for 
security.  The output of the regressions are reported in Table (12).   
 
Participation and Attacks on Individuals and Household Members 
 
In Columns (1) and (2) of Table (12), we look at the effect of a group episode on an 
individual’s likelihood to have experienced attacks on himself and on his direct family 
members, conditioning on Group Origins.  As can be seen when looking at the 
coefficient of PART in both columns, none are statistically significant, signalling that 
there isn’t sufficient evidence that participants experienced more or less attacks than 
non-participants before the arrival of the group (PER1=0).  When looking at the 
coefficients of PER1 in Column (1), we can see that the emergence of a local group is 
associated with a 7.6% decrease in the likelihood of attacks on non-participants, and 
is statistically significant at the 10% level.  This provides statistical support for the 
idea that local groups have a protective effects on the population.  However, there is 
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not sufficient evidence that this is the case for external groups, as the coefficient of 
PER1 in Column (2), despite being negative, is not statistically significant at any 
conventional level.   
 
In Column (1), the coefficient of the interaction term PER1*PART indicates that, for 
participants, the emergence of a local group decreases the likelihood of attacks by an 
additional 10.9% as compared to non-participants, a coefficient that is significant at 
the 5% level of statistical significance.  As a result of the formation of a local group, 
participants and their direct family members are thus 18.5% less likely to experience 
attacks than before the arrival of the group.  As can be seen in Column (2), this is not 
the case for external groups, as the coefficient of the interaction term is not statistically 
significant at any conventional level. 
 
We have found strong evidence of an association between the emergence of local 
groups and the reduction of attacks on the population, both on participants and non-
participants.  This effect is stronger for participants, suggesting that participation 
increases the protective effect of the formation of a local for those who participate and 
their direct familial entourage.  This result, however, does not stand for external 
groups, for whom we do not find statistical evidence of such a protective effect.   
 
Participation and Sexual Violence on Household Members 
 
In Columns (3) and (4), we use an alternative measure of the victimization of a 
household’s direct social entourage, that of sexual violence against one of his family 
members.303  As the coefficients of PER1 in both columns indicate, non-participants 
are less likely to have had a member of their family raped after the arrival of both local 
and external groups rather than before, as both coefficients are negative and 
statistically significant (respectively at the 10% and 5% levels).  The coefficient of 
PART tells us that participants in local groups are 12.9% more likely to have members 
of their families raped before the arrival of the group, pointing to grievance as a 
                                                 
303 While, as stated in the survey presentation, the household survey was restricted to male respondents, 
the information collected on the respondent’s family included women.  
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potential cause for participation.  This, however, does not hold for external groups, as 
the coefficient of PART is not statically significant at any conventional level.   
 
As for attacks, the coefficient of the interaction term PER1*PART shows us that 
participating in a local group is associated with a 15.6% stronger decrease in the 
likelihood of having a family member raped after the arrival of the group than non-
participants, a result that is statistically significant at the 1% level.  This does not hold 
for external groups, as the coefficient is not statistically significant.  Thus, we find 
further evidence of a “protective effect” (for both participants and non-participants) of 
the presence of both local and external armed groups on populations.  This protective 
effect is relatively stronger for participants as compared to non-participants in the case 
of local groups, but not in the case of external groups.   
9.6.4.  Protection, armed group formation and participation 
We have found strong statistical evidence of a protective effect of the presence of local 
groups on the population, and a relatively stronger one for individuals who participate 
and their social entourage.  However, the coefficient of PART for local groups begs a 
further inquiry, as it suggests that participants are more likely to have experienced 
sexual violence in their households before the group, pointing to victimization as a 
potential cause of participation.  At this stage of the analysis, whether direct 
victimization increases participation is still unclear.  In the first analysis of this chapter, 
we had found that the relation between victimization and participation disappeared in 
the model with village level fixed effects, suggesting the possibility that village level 
variables played a role in the relation between attacks and participation, and in 
particular the formation of local groups, that correspond to village level responses to 
insecurity.  As we only observe group episodes in the difference-in-difference model, 
we cannot analyse the role of the potential omitted variable of local group formation 
on the relation between attacks and participation, and it is hard to say whether we are 
observing individuals who participate because of attacks strictly on their families, or 
individuals who participate collectively as a result of attacks on their villages and the 
formation of local groups.   
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This motivates our brief final analysis of the relation between attacks, armed group 
formation and participation.  We start by reshaping the database into a year*individual 
format, where each observation corresponds to one year of a given individual, between 
1990 and 2012.  As previously explained, the retrospective panel dataset allows us to 
put the data into year*individual format.  For each year*individual, we create a binary 
variable that takes the value of 1 if individual experienced an attack that given year.  
We further create two additional dummy variables, one that takes the value of 1 if for 
a given year*individual a Local Group was present during that year, and the other that 
takes the value of 1 if an External Group was present during that year.  Thus, we can 
observe the relation between attacks on individuals and the presence (the formation or 
arrival) of Local and External groups, and on individual participation in these groups.   
 
We use a linear probability model, with group*village fixed effects and additional year 
fixed effects to control for constant heterogeneity between groups, villages and time 
periods.  The specification is: 
 
𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒑𝒊,𝒗,𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷 ∗ 𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒔𝒊,,𝒗,𝒕 +  𝛑 ∗  𝐗𝐠,𝐯,𝐭 + ℇ𝒊,𝒗,𝒕 
   
Where: 
𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒑𝒊,𝒗,𝒕 is the outcome variable, a dummy that takes the value of 1 if a group is 
present for an individual 𝒊 in a village 𝑣 and year 𝒕 where 𝒕={1990...2012} (either a 
local or external group). 
𝜷 is the main estimated coefficient. 
𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒔𝒊,𝒗,𝒕 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if an  individual 𝒊 was 
attacked in village 𝑣 and year 𝒕.   
𝐗𝐠,𝐯,𝐭 are all the other factors that might affect the formation of groups in villages 𝒗 
and year 𝒕, which are fixed by group fixed effects.   
ℇ𝑖,𝑣,𝑡 is the error term for individual 𝒊 in a village 𝑣 and year 𝒕. 
 
We add yearly lags for the independent variable Attacks, as the effect of attacks on 
group formation might not be immediate, and report the results in Table (13).  As can 
be seen in Column (1), having an attack at a given year is associated with a 4.3% 
increase in the formation of Local groups, and is statistically significant at the 1% 
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level.  In Column (2), we can see that attacks are also associated with an 11.7% 
increase in the presence of External groups, also statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  As can be seen by looking at the coefficients of lagged attacks, the coefficients 
remain statistically significant up until a 4 year lag for local groups, and 5 year lag for 
external groups.   
 
We therefore find strong evidence of an association between attacks and the presence 
(the arrival or formation) of both local and external groups.  This provides evidence 
for the idea that local groups are formed in response to attacks, at a village level.  
Conversely, the relation between attacks and the formation of external groups can be 
explained by “conquest attacks” by external groups. 
 
The final two columns repeat the regressions, but using participate as the dependant 
variable, and adding Local Group and External group formation in Columns (3) and 
Column (4) as independent variables.  As can be seen in Column (3), Attacks do not 
have a statistically significant effect on participation, but the presence of Local Groups 
does.  However, we can see in Column (4) that the attacks still do not have an effect 
on participation.   
 
Thus, we have found that the relation between attacks and participation is in fact 
explained by a third variable, that of the formation of local groups.  Indeed, the data 
suggests that attacks are associated with the formation of Local Groups, and that in 
turn the formation of local groups is associated with participation.  This therefore gives 
strong evidence to a story of collective protection as a determinant of the formation of 
local groups, and as a result, participation in these groups.   
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Table (11): Participation and Socio-Economic Advancement (Model with group fixed effects) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Marriage Marriage Land acquisition Land acquisition Land expropriation Asset acquisition 
VARIABLES self self self self self self 
       
PER1 (after group) -0.935*** 0.351*** -0.753*** 0.325*** -0.866*** 0.049* 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.012) (0.029) 
PART (participate) 0.031*** -0.042 -0.084** -0.040 -0.010 0.182** 
 (0.011) (0.034) (0.039) (0.028) (0.027) (0.086) 
PER1xPART -0.043*** 0.034 0.063 -0.016 -0.022 -0.248** 
 (0.011) (0.042) (0.052) (0.045) (0.030) (0.117) 
Constant 0.933*** -0.691*** 0.417*** -0.423** 0.809*** -0.574 
 (0.078) (0.061) (0.104) (0.166) (0.105) (0.485) 
       
Observations 3,713 2,585 3,016 2,649 3,415 6,067 
R-squared 0.882 0.291 0.695 0.311 0.795 0.174 
FE IDG IDG IDG IDG IDG IDG 
Cluster NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Sample MARRIED SINGLE LAND LANDLESS LAND ALL 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Table (12): Participation and protection (model with group fixed effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Attacked Attacked Raped Raped 
 family member family member family member family member 
VARIABLES local militia external group village militia external group 
     
PER1 (After Group) -0.076* -0.024 -0.039* -0.026** 
 (0.039) (0.016) (0.023) (0.012) 
PART (Participate) 0.069 -0.094 0.129*** -0.040 
 (0.049) (0.075) (0.037) (0.053) 
PER1xPART -0.109** 0.121 -0.156*** 0.088 
 (0.055) (0.114) (0.045) (0.090) 
Constant 0.279*** 0.054 -0.132** 0.180*** 
 (0.104) (0.103) (0.061) (0.065) 
     
Observations 1,700 4,598 1,700 4,598 
R-squared 0.290 0.258 0.255 0.158 
FE IDG IDG IDG IDG 
Cluster NO NO NO NO 
Sample ALL ALL ALL ALL 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 326 
 
 
Table (13): Attacks, Armed Group Formation and Participation (Model using Village Fixed Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Local Group External Group participate participate 
     
Attack on Family 0.043*** 0.117*** -0.006 0.010 
 (0.016) (0.022) (0.009) (0.011) 
Attack on Family_Lag 1 year 0.072*** 0.051** -0.014 0.009 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.009) (0.011) 
Attack on Family_Lag 2 year 0.042** 0.076*** -0.016 -0.000 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.010) (0.011) 
Attack on Family_Lag 3 year 0.046*** 0.073*** -0.015 0.001 
 (0.016) (0.022) (0.010) (0.011) 
Attack on Family_Lag 4 year 0.006 0.056*** -0.012 -0.008 
 (0.014) (0.020) (0.009) (0.011) 
Local Group   0.315***  
   (0.020)  
External Group    -0.032*** 
    (0.007) 
Constant 0.003 0.029*** 8.95e-05 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Observations 17,818 17,818 17,818 17,818 
R-squared 0.183 0.323 0.314 0.136 
FE Village Village Village Village 
Cluster HH HH HH HH 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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9.7.  Chapter Conclusion: a tale of two mobilizations 
This chapter has sought to provide a quantitative empirical analysis of the questions 
of who joins armed organizations, how they come to join such organizations and why 
they do so.  In contrast to several quantitative studies of participation that adopt an 
individual or atomistic approach to these questions, we have sought to look at the 
interaction between individual level factors, and social, institutional and group level 
factors.   
 
In the first part of the chapter, we have sought to identify individual determinants of 
participation, and found evidence that relative economic deprivation and social 
marginalization are associated with higher levels of participation, comforting the idea 
that grievance are an important factor in explaining participation in armed 
organizations.  However, we have seen that the effects of the grievance variables were 
conditioned by a group level variable, the origins of the group.  Indeed, grievance 
based factors are only associated with higher levels of participation for external 
groups, but not for locally formed groups.  While in the qualitative empirical chapters 
we have seen that the relation between armed groups and the societies in which they 
evolve was more complex than this binary categorization of local versus external 
groups would suggest, this nevertheless provides a nuance to the idea that deprived 
people join armed organizations because of a lack of a better alternative, or as a form 
of exit option from an oppressive economic or social context.  This seems to be the 
case only for external groups, and not for groups that form locally.   
 
Furthermore, we have found strong evidence that social networks play a very 
important role in armed mobilization.  This reinforces the results found by several 
quantitative studies of armed mobilizations, such as Weinstein and Humphreys (2008), 
Scacco (2009) and Mc Doom (2013), and provides support to the arguments on the 
social nature of armed mobilization developed in the qualitative empirical chapters.  
In particular, we have seen that social networks of family and community play a strong 
role in armed mobilizations into local armed groups.  As argued in the chapter on the 
grassroots logic of mobilization of the Mayi-Mayi movement, this can be explained 
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by the fact that such local armed groups emerge out of pre-existing forms of social 
organization, which solicit mechanisms of communal governance and resource 
mobilization, and also play the essential role of screening and vouching of participants.  
However, we have also found that pre-existing social ties with members of armed 
groups are associated with higher levels of participation for external groups.  This 
provides support to the argument developed in the qualitative chapters (particularly in 
Chapter 5) that armed groups strategically exploit the social networks of their members 
to recruit combatants.   
 
In the second part of the analysis, we have sought to move beyond individual level 
determinants of participation to look at how people come to participate in armed 
organizations.  In particular, we have looked at the ‘social-institutional’ context of 
armed mobilization, and the processes of social and institutional mediation, for which 
we find a strong positive effect on participation, both for local and external armed 
groups.   
 
In the final section, we have explored why people participate in armed groups, by 
looking at whether participation is associated to material or protective gains.  We have 
found that, on average, participants become less wealthy than non-participants as a 
result of their participation.  This provides support to theories that emphasize that 
enrolment into armed organizations enhances poverty.  However, the most important 
result of this section is the evidence of a “protective effect” of locally formed groups, 
who are associated with a reduction of attacks, both on participants and non-
participants.   This protective effect is in fact stronger for participants and their 
families, which provides evidence that the motive presented by a majority of 
participants of their reason to participate is in fact accurate: that of protecting 
themselves and their entourage.   This constitutes strong evidence towards what 
Richards (2014 p.310) calls ‘recruitment for protection’. 
 
Together, the results found in this chapter seem to tell a tale of two types of 
mobilizations.  On one hand, a story of grievance driven participation, whereby 
economically deprived and socially marginalized people join external armed groups, 
which resonates with a long series of qualitative studies that have emphasized this 
aspect in eastern Congo (e.g. Van Acker & Vlassenroot 2001a, 2001b; Jourdan 2004). 
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On the other hand, a strong story of communal mobilization emerges from the results 
of the three sections.  Indeed, we have found that there is a significant relation between 
attacks on villages and the formation of local armed organizations, and that these local 
organizations have a clear protective effect on their populations, including non-
participants.  The second part of the analysis has shown us that such local groups rely 
on pre-existing “social-institutional” structures, including local chiefs, families and 
social networks - as seen in the first part of the analysis - which mediate the recruitment 
of combatants.  Participants in these groups, as previously mentioned, are more 
representative of the population of the villages in which they form, suggesting a more 
comprehensive collective effort to provide security.  However, the protective effect is 
stronger for participants and their direct social entourage.  This is consistent with both 
the theories that emphasize “selective incentives” i.e. benefits that accrue only to 
members and their direct social entourage, but also recent close range ethnographies 
of civilian-military relations that emphasize the benefits that accrue from social 
proximity with armed groups (Morvan 2005; Verweijen 2013).  
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Chapter Ten                                                                                                       
Conclusion 
The story of the village of Kimua presented in the introduction of this thesis encapsulates the 
story of eastern Congo during the last 20 years, and crystallizes the central interrogations that 
have been addressed in this dissertation.  Fallen under the military control of the FDLR militia, 
Kimua symbolizes the violent subjugation of the rural agrarian societies of eastern DRC to an 
extractive and exploitative economy of pillage and violence.  Yet the emergence of a self-
defence militia that mobilized the village youth signalled the irruption of a phenomenon that 
cannot be fully apprehended through the dichotomist conceptual lens that has dominated 
mainstream depictions of the eastern Congolese situation.  Indeed, the participation of the 
village youth in this armed group seems to be at the crux of two logics that have predominantly 
been conceived as contradictory: On one hand, it is inscribed within the rural moral economy 
of the village, to which it provides a fundamental collective good: protection.  On the other, 
their participation inserts them into the economy of pillage and violence that has come to 
characterize eastern Congo.  
 
In order to provide paths of understanding towards the tension that emerges from the story of 
Kimua, and the puzzle of participation in armed groups eastern Congo, this dissertation has 
sought to answer the questions of why, how and who participates in armed groups.  Conscious 
that years of armed conflict and presence of armed actors in villages such as Kimua is likely to 
have changed the incentives and motivations for participation, we have followed a second line 
of inquiry into the transformative effects of the presence of armed groups on a society, to see 
how this affects in turn the dynamics and processes of participation in armed groups.  
 
In order to address these research questions, I have carried out an analysis of the processes of 
armed mobilization and participation in armed organizations in the conflict affected province 
of South Kivu, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  Recognizing the limitations of strictly 
individual-centred or atomistic approaches, I have developed a theoretical framework that has 
allowed me to study these questions at three articulated and inter-dependant levels: The political 
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economy of labour mobilization and control, the ‘social architecture’ of armed mobilization 
and participation, and the individual determinants and dimensions of participation in armed 
organizations.  The analytical attention paid to the political economy dimension of armed 
mobilization was motivated by the recognition of the quasi ‘industrial’ scale at which the 
recruitment of combatants has been taking place in eastern Congo, signalling that large scale 
forces and factors are at play.  Furthermore, the recognition that the processes whereby 
individuals are drawn into and controlled by armed organizations bear a fundamentally social 
dimension has motivated the inquiry into what Wood (2008) has called the “social processes of 
civil war”, and into what I have named the ‘social architecture’ of armed mobilization.  This 
implied an attention to both the social structures that shape and condition armed mobilization, 
and the more dynamic social mechanisms through which individuals are drawn into and 
controlled by armed organizations.  Finally, I have sought to analyse the ways in the political 
economy and the social architecture of armed mobilization interact with individual 
determinants of participation, and the ways in which individual-level factors evolve over time.  
 
Central to tracing the processes of armed mobilization and participation across these three 
analytical levels has been the adoption of a historical viewpoint.  Researchers have repeatedly 
pointed out that the lack of attention to the history of the region in dominant accounts of the 
eastern Congolese situation constitutes one of major obstacles to the understanding of such a 
complex conflict (Autesserre 2010; Hoffmann K. 2014; Raeymaekers & Vlassenroot 2004; 
Reyntjens 2009; Prunier 2009; Stearns 2012; Vlassenroot 2013).  Accordingly, I have paid close 
attention to the social and institutional histories of contemporary processes of armed 
mobilization in the qualitative chapters, and exploited the retrospective panel structure of the 
datasets in the quantitative chapter.  
 
I began the thesis by situating contemporary processes of armed mobilization in the social and 
institutional history of labour mobilization in eastern Congo in Chapter Two.  Then, Chapters 
Four and Chapter Five were dedicated to the identification of two ‘macro-logics’ of armed 
mobilization in the Mayi-Mayi resistance movement across South Kivu.  On one side, a 
grassroots dynamic of security provision came into articulation with the movement’s 
propagative mechanisms. On the other, a more accumulative logic of recruitment and control 
surfaced and consolidated over time.  The following chapters adopted a narrower geographical 
focus in order to allow a closer historical contextualization of processes of armed mobilization.  
Chapter Six focused on the Midlands of the Mbinga Sud Grouping in the territory of Kalehe, 
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and traced the successive waves of armed mobilization that occurred in the region during the 
rule of the RCD, in particular the formation of the Local Defence which was orchestrated by 
the RCD, and then the “counter-mobilization” led by Cisayura and his Mayi-Mayi group.  In 
Chapters Seven and Eight, I focused on the repeated rounds of armed mobilization that occurred 
in the Hutu societies of the Highlands of the territory of Kalehe.  Chapter Seven presented the 
history of the region to identify how it shaped the lines of conflict that took a militarized turn 
in the 1990s, and analysed the repeated rounds of armed mobilization that occurred in the region 
in the 1990s and 2000s.  Chapter Eight focused on the formation and mobilization of the 
Nyatura armed movement in the Kalehe Highlands in 2011-2012 and provided a close analysis 
of the events that built up to the mobilization as well as the social processes of the mobilization.  
Finally, Chapter Nine pursued the same interrogations into a quantitative analysis of armed 
mobilization, based on panel data collected through a survey of 1084 individuals and 134 
villages in the province of South Kivu.  
 
By carrying out this analysis, I have argued that participation in armed groups is largely driven 
by two ‘macro logics’: The necessity to organize and provide security to the decentralized 
socio-polities of eastern DRC on one side, and a large scale logic of labour accumulation and 
control that has taken novel features with the implantation of a militarized political economy 
on the other.  The armed groups that have proliferated in the region occupy a central role in 
both these logics.  I have further shown that, as a result, there has been a significant social 
implantation of armed groups in rural areas of the region.  This results stems from two main 
elements.  First, the social-institutional basis of these groups, who often emanated from pre-
existing socio-polities and relied on established mechanisms of resource and labour 
mobilization.  Second, the accrued social implantation of these groups, resulting from the roles 
they have come to play in contemporary rural societies of eastern DRC.  Thus, I have shown 
that current social processes of recruitment and control over participants is inscribed in this 
multi-faceted influence and power that these groups have come to exert over rural societies.  
Finally, I have shown that individual dimensions of participation should be understood as 
processual, as they evolve and reflect the changing positions of armed organizations in these 
societies.  
 
This concluding chapter presents these findings and reflects on the central themes raised in both 
the qualitative and quantitative sections of this thesis and the light they shed on the 
understanding of contemporary processes of armed mobilization.  The contributions made to 
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the central question of why, how and who participates in non-state armed organizations are laid 
out in sections 10.1 to 10.4.  Section 10.5 identifies the limitations of this work, and suggests 
avenues for future research, and section 10.6 provides concluding thoughts.  
10.1.  Why Participate?  The central role of Protection 
One of the most consistent findings of this dissertation is also one of the most straightforward 
ones: Protection is one of the key drivers of the emergence and persistence of non-state armed 
groups, as well as participation in these organizations.  Since the crisis of the early 1990s and 
the breakdown of the Zairean State, numerous non-state armed organizations have emerged to 
address the sharp rise in insecurity, driven in large part by the necessity to provide protection 
to the decentralized and fragmented socio-polities of rural eastern DRC.  
 
In Chapter Four, we have seen that the necessity to provide protection to rural communities in 
a context of acute insecurity was one of the driving factors behind the constitution of ad-hoc, 
« grassroots » security organizations in rural South Kivu, which often drew on longstanding 
mechanisms of collective action and security provision embedded in the rural socio-polities of 
eastern Congo.  The articulation between this « bottom up », protection-driven logic of 
formation of security organizations and the Mayi-Mayi insurrection movement was not 
straightforward, as the Mayi-Mayi movement spread in very different ways in different areas 
of rural South Kivu.  Yet in many areas, the mobilizing message of the Mayi-Mayi as well as 
the practical repertoire that it carried provided a template of collective action that was 
« appropriated » by rural socio-polities.  In Chapter Six, which focused on armed mobilization 
in the Midlands of Kalehe, we have seen that the initial impetus for the formation of « Rondes », 
and then the Local Defence was also the necessity to provide protection.  
 
In Chapters Seven and Eight, we have found that protection of the rural Hutu societies of the 
Kalehe Highlands was a persistent driver of the constitution of armed organizations in these 
societies, highlighting the continued role of protection as a factor of armed mobilization from 
the onset of the armed conflict in the region to the current situation.  Indeed, we have seen that 
threats to the fragile architecture of land rights of these societies combined with immediate 
existential threats in the context of the ethnic wars of the 1990s provided the central impetus 
for the constitution and mobilization of the first « generation » of armed organizations in the 
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Kalehe Highlands.  We have also found that, despite the progressive insertion of these armed 
organizations into more accumulative and power-related dynamics of politico-military 
competition, the demand for protection by the Congolese Hutu population and civilian 
authorities of the Kalehe Highlands remained a strong factor in the mobilization of the Nyatura 
movement in 2011-2012.  
 
Finally, in the quantitative analysis carried out in Chapter Nine, we have found strong support 
for protection as both a cause and an effect of the constitution of armed organization and 
participation in these armed organizations, a result that has rarely been demonstrated through 
quantitative methods because of the scarcity of quantitative panel data on zones of active armed 
conflict.  We have found that attacks on a village has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on the constitution of local level armed organisations, providing strong support to the 
idea that local organizations emerge as a response to insecurity.  Furthermore, I have shown 
that both external and local armed organizations have a « protective effect » on the villages in 
which they are present, as their presence is associated with a reduction of attacks on these 
villages, a novel and original result of this dissertation.  Importantly, we have found that, 
although the protective effect is stronger for those who have family ties with members of armed 
groups, it is not restricted to them, and concerns the entire populations of the village.  This 
suggests that these groups provide protection not only to their close entourage or their 
associates, but as a collective good to the villages in which they are active.  
 
Thus, one of the central findings of this dissertation is that protection is one of the central drivers 
of the constitution of armed groups, and participation in these groups.  While fairly intuitive, 
this result is far from trivial, as it has important implications for current debates on the role of 
non-state armed organizations in zones of protracted conflict.  
 
First, the fact that these groups retain a protective role to this day - and not only in the initial 
phases of their constitution, as is often assumed - begs for a more thorough understanding of 
their role.  Recent studies of vigilantism in areas not categorized as zones of armed conflict 
have allowed to move past the negative image that has long been associated with these 
organizations by showing that they play essential roles as protection providers in contexts of 
state retreat of failure and calling for a more nuanced understanding of their role (Fourchard 
2008; Meagher 2007; Pratten & Sen 2007; Pratten 2008).  Yet this shift has rarely travelled into 
areas of active armed conflict – particularly in eastern Congo - where non-state armed 
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organizations remain overwhelmingly depicted as horrendously violent, exploitative and greed-
driven organizations.  While scepticism towards the rhetoric of protection used by armed groups 
is understandable and warranted, a complete dismissal of their protective role is misguided if 
one seeks to understand the causes and consequences of their persistent presence in areas such 
as eastern Congo, but also in the rest of the contemporary world.   As we have seen, these 
groups can provide protection to collectivities, and not solely on an individual or private basis 
as has been emphasized by the literature on private protection by armed groups (Raeymaekers 
2010).  This points to the basis of a political relationship between these armed groups and the 
collectivities under their control.  
 
Second, the policy implications stemming from these findings are straightforward.  The fact 
that these armed groups provide in certain cases a collective good to groups of individuals or 
constituencies provides strong support for the argument that policies addressing the eastern 
Congolese conflict should take into consideration the protective role of these organizations, and 
should have a strong political component.  As has been emphasized by several recent vocal 
commentators of the conflict, in particular Jason Stearns, Judith Verweijen, Koen Vlassenroot, 
Christoph Vogel, Degratias Buuma and others, the current approach of the Congolese 
Government and United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in eastern Congo, which designates 
these non-state armed groups as “negative forces” to be targeted by military operations are 
condemned to yield deceiving results as long as there are not accompanied with an effort to 
address the political basis of their constitution and persistence.  
10.2.  The Political Economy of Labour recruitment and Control 
In the story of the village of Kimua, protection was at the heart of the constitution of a self-
defence organization and the participation of the village youth in that organization.  Yet as soon 
as the village youth joined the group and took up arms, they « entered » a militarized political 
economy in which their workforce constitutes one of the central resources, and that armed 
groups compete to accumulate and control.  
 
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that the mobilization of combatants in eastern Congo 
should be understood in the light of the enduring regional history of large-scale labour 
mobilization in the region that has taken novel features with the development of a militarized 
 336 
political economy in the 1990s.  This follows several recent contentions that such institutional 
histories structure and shape current processes of armed mobilization and conflict (Hoffmann 
K. 2014; Hoffmann & Vlassenroot 2014; Munive 2011).    The role of labour within the ‘war 
economies’ that developed in armed conflict is well established.  In configurations where access 
to economic resources is dependent on military control, and where technology is scarce, labour 
is a crucial factor of production for armed organizations.  By situating current processes of 
armed mobilization within the region’s institutional histories of labour mobilization, this 
dissertation has traced the transformative effects of the current processes of armed mobilization 
on the institutional forms of labour mobilization. 
 
In Chapter Two, I have traced the historical entrenchment and institutionalization of large-scale 
labour mobilization mechanisms in the pre-colonial and colonial era.  In particular, I have 
shown how the colonial state institutionalized the role of the chiefs as central handles for 
resource mobilization, as part of the general reconfiguration and « territorialization » of 
political authority that served the extractive purpose of the state (Hoffmann K. 2014; Northrup 
1988).  
 
Chapter Five was focused on the identification of an accumulative logic in the recruitment of 
combatants in the Mayi-Mayi movement, and the particular manifestations that such a logic 
took the context of the interaction between the Mayi-Mayi armed groups and socio-polities that 
constitute rural South Kivu.  I showed that the centralization and structuration of the Mayi-
Mayi resistance movement enhanced this accumulative logic, leading in many cases to the 
« capture » of the combatants that had been mobilized into small-scale self-defence 
organizations, and to the rupture of the  ‘communal logic’ that had characterized their 
participation in these organizations.  Using interviews and recent studies of armed groups, I 
have also shown how, in areas where they had military control, the Mayi-Mayi relied on chiefs 
to mobilize labour, reproducing longstanding institutional practices of labour mobilization 
(Hoffmann 2007, 2015a; Hoffmann & Vlassenroot 2014).   
 
In Chapter Six, that traced the successive waves of armed mobilization in the Midlands of 
Kalehe, I have shown that the RCD rebellion relied on institutionalized mechanisms of labour 
mobilization of the Congolese state – in particular local chiefs – to coordinate the large-scale 
mobilization of security personnel into the Local Defence.  I have shown that this process was 
relatively successful as long as those mobilized were kept in a protective role towards the 
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villages and towns of the region, but that when the RCD attempted to corral this extensive 
labour force into its army – severing the communal logic that had been at the basis of the 
constitution of these groups – it faced severe resistance from the mobilized youth, a large 
number of whom eventually defected.  Furthermore, I have shown that the Mayi-Mayi group 
of Cisayura, who emerged in resistance to this attempt by the RCD to ‘capture’ the labour force 
of the region, progressively started displaying similarly accumulative logics of labour 
mobilization, albeit on a smaller scale.  In Chapters Seven and Eight, I made a similar argument 
by focusing on the articulation between the security provision to rural Hutu communities and 
the more accumulative dynamic of labour mobilization that emerged in the context of the 
consolidation of a politico-military power basis of the Hutu elites.  
 
Finally, in the second section of the quantitative analysis carried out in Chapter Nine, I have 
found evidence of a positive effect of institutional mediation on the likelihood of participation 
in armed organizations.  While in the case of locally formed armed groups this effect is likely 
to be due to the protective types of mobilization previously mentioned, I have shown that the 
effect remained for « external groups », providing support to the continued role of 
institutionalized modes of labour mobilization – local chiefs – on mobilization into armed 
groups.  
 
Thus, this dissertation has provided an analysis of the central role of large scale mobilization 
processes and the articulation between historically institutionalized forms of labour 
mobilization and the novel forms of mobilization that have emerged as a result of the war and 
the entrenchment of a militarized political economy.  In understanding the macro-factors that 
drive armed mobilization and participation in armed groups, a central tension therefore emerges 
between the «protective » dynamic of mobilization identified in the previous section, and the 
more accumulative and extractive dynamics of labour mobilization that have characterized the 
political economy of eastern DRC.  This thesis has shown that these often operate at the same 
time, and that armed groups are central vectors of these macro-logics.  
10.3.  The evolving ‘social architecture’ of armed mobilization and participation 
Concomitantly to the central question of why people participate in armed organizations, this 
thesis has explored the inter-related question of how people are brought to participate in armed 
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organizations. This question concerns both the processes through which people are brought to 
participate, but also the ways in which their participation is sustained over time (Petersen 2001; 
Parkinson 2013).  The main argument that I have advanced is that, although driven by similar 
‘macro-logics’ (protection and resource accumulation), the social architecture of armed 
mobilization has changed to reflect the evolving position of armed organizations in the social 
landscape of rural South Kivu. 
 
Throughout the thesis, I have argued and shown that social networks are a fundamental 
dimension of processes of mobilization and participation in violent organizations, following a 
long stream of scholarship that has emphasized this aspect (Barkey & Van Rossem 1997; Gould 
1991, 1993, 1995; Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl 1988; Mc Doom 2013; Petersen 2001; Sageman 
2004, 2008; Scacco 2009; Siegel 2009; Staniland 2012; Wickham-Crowley 1992; Wood 2003, 
2008).  
 
First, I have argued that some of the armed mobilizations that occurred in South Kivu bore the 
features of social movements, an aspect that has been emphasized by several recent studies of 
armed mobilization in Africa (Hoffman D. 2007; Hazen 2009; Stearns & Botiveau 2013).  In 
Chapter Three, we have seen that the Mayi-Mayi armed mobilization bore two of the important 
features of a social movement.  First, it articulated a novel political message in longstanding 
idiomatic and cultural frames, and provided a simple and modular repertoire of contention (Mc 
Adam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001; Tarrow 2010).  Second, the process of mobilization was mediated 
by pre-existing social structures, which gave it a powerful mobilizing force.  In the town of 
Bukavu, this included the activation of social networks embedded in urban neighbourhoods, 
but also the universities that provided important mobilizing platforms for the movement.  In 
rural areas, the call to resist the RCD occupation came into articulation with the “protective” 
mobilization of ad-hoc civilian self-defence organizations and in many cases benefited from 
the mobilizing capacity of the rural socio-polities, although the support for the insurgent 
movement varied sharply across different regions.  Although not explored in detail in this 
dissertation, the Raia Mutomboki movement of 2011, the most extensive post-war mobilization 
in South Kivu, also combined a simple and powerful “praxis of armed mobilization” with the 
propagative power of pre-constituted social networks embedded in rural socio-polities (Stearns 
2013; Vogel 2014).  
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Second, I have shown that, even in contexts where the social polarization induced by the 
entrenchment of violent conflict hinders the type of “popular” mobilizations described above, 
social networks continue to play a central role in the recruitment of combatants.  Indeed, In 
Chapter Five, I have shown that in contexts where counter-insurgency operations significantly 
enhanced the risks associated with participating in rebel factions, insurgent Mayi-Mayi groups 
strategically used social networks to covertly approach and enrol new recruits.  
 
Third, I have shown that these processes of attraction of new recruits, but also of control over 
the members of armed groups are part of the multi-faceted forms of influence and power that 
armed groups develop over the societies in which they evolve.  This power is highly variable 
and often dependant on the level of military control that they have over a region, but even in 
the cases where they have little or no military control, they can developed significant levels of 
power and influence.   In Chapter Six, we have seen that the Mayi-Mayi group of Colonel 
Cisayura used the deep channels of penetration into the Havu societies of the Midlands of 
Kalehe to develop a multi-faceted form of influence over the population, through a subtle 
balance of coercion and genuine appeal.  
 
Fourth, I have shown that the protective role of armed organizations towards certain segments 
of the population played an important role in the reconfiguration of societies around armed 
actors and the resulting social entrenchment of armed organizations into the very social fabric 
of societies.  In chapters Eight and Nine, I have shown that the repeated existential threats to 
the politically marginalized Hutu societies of the Kalehe Highlands triggered a form of 
dependence of these societies to “their” armed groups, and induced a progressive social 
reconfiguration of these societies around them, although this process was neither linear nor 
uniform. Thus, while the entrenchment of a militarized political economy subjected this region 
to the types of accumulative and control-focused dynamics previously exposed, the social 
embedment of the armed organizations, whose institutional and social role largely supersedes 
the military sphere, made the armed groups an essential part of these societies.   
 
Finally, I pursued this line of enquiry into the role of social networks in armed mobilization in 
the quantitative analysis carried out in Chapter Nine, where I found strong support for the idea 
that participation is mediated by social networks, in particular by showing that having a member 
of one’s direct social entourage in an armed organizations is associated with a strong and 
positive effect on participation.  This is not only the case for locally formed groups, who often 
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emerge through pre-existing social networks, but also for ‘external groups’.  This result 
confirms those found by several other quantitative studies of armed mobilization, in particular 
Humphreys & Weinstein (2008), Scacco (2009) and Mc Doom (2013).  Furthermore, I have 
found evidence that ex-combatant networks provide strong platforms for remobilizing 
combatants, as having participated in armed organizations is similarly associated to a strong 
and positive effect on participation.  
 
Thus, this dissertation has documented and analysed the evolving “social architecture” of armed 
mobilization.  The central argument that emerges from this analysis is that, while the initial 
armed mobilizations reflected the rural agrarian societies of South Kivu from which they were 
often direct emanations, more recent rounds of armed mobilization reflect the social 
entrenchment that armed groups have developed in the rural societies of South Kivu, of which 
– in many cases, not all – they have become essential features.  The modes of recruitment and 
control over their members that armed groups exert are a part of the wider forms of political, 
economic and social power which these organizations have developed.  The protective role that 
they play, but also the accumulative and extractive processes that they mediate, have put them 
at the centre of the rural political economies, and triggered a profound re-adaptation of the rural 
societies to their presence.   
 
The dominant framings that opposes a rural agrarian social order on one hand and oppressive 
armed groups preying upon these societies on the other, that continue to dominate depictions 
of eastern Congo and many areas of protracted conflict, is therefore either outdated or 
incomplete.   Despite its subjection to the regional political economy of violence, the self-
defence group of Kimua nevertheless constitutes an integral part of the transformed societies 
that have emerged from decades of armed conflict.  While I remain cautious to use such an 
expression in a context where the polarizing effects of the war have in many cases had socially 
destructive effects, what appears in the final “portrait” of the Kimua story can be described as 
a “war community”, that is, a social body that has reorganized around the activity of the war, 
in which protection and violent accumulation are indiscernibly tied, and have come to constitute 
a central feature of these societies.  
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10.4.  Individual determinants of participation 
Finally, I have addressed the question of who participates in armed organizations by carrying 
out an analysis of the individual determinants of participation.  Following recent contentions 
that individual determinants of participation should not be understood in isolation or as 
mutually exclusive (Humphreys & Weinstein 2008; Scacco 2009), I have explored the 
articulation between different individual determinants of participation, in the light of the larger 
social and institutional processes mentioned in the previous sections of this conclusion.  Several 
key results have emerged from this analysis: 
 
First, I have found evidence for the much-discussed role of individual grievances in driving 
participation.  In the qualitative chapters, I have shown that numerous participants pointed to 
such grievances as central factors in decisions to participate.  These included grievances related 
to the dire economic and social situation of many youth in the region in a context of profound 
economic and social crisis, such the being kept out of school because of the financial incapacity 
to pay the school fees, the absence of any prospects for economic stability, and – particularly 
in the Highlands – the dire prospects of acquiring land, which as we have seen constitutes the 
most important economic assets and markers of social status in the region.  The first section of 
the quantitative analysis carried out in Chapter 9 provided us with quantitative evidence of the 
association of such grievances with participation, in particular relative poverty, and land 
deprivation, a result that provides support to studies that have emphasized the relation between 
the lack of prospects of acquiring land, the resulting frustration it generated in a context where 
land is central for economic and social status and the resulting appeal for participation in armed 
groups (Van Acker & Vlassenroot 2001a, 2001b ; Jourdan 2004, 2011).   
 
The qualitative chapters have allowed us to explore in more detail the multiple manifestations 
of such grievances in different contexts, and their articulation with emotional factors, which 
Wood (2003) has shown play an important role in participation.  I have shown that such 
grievances could translate into various forms of envy or jealousy, for example for those who 
hadn’t found the means to go live in town, but also desires for a form of adventure.  
 
Furthermore, I have also shown that the relation between grievances and participation is 
conditioned by group characteristics.  In the quantitative analysis, I have shown that the type of 
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group, in particular its origins – local vs. external groups – conditioned the effects of grievances 
on participation.  Indeed, while I found that relative economic and social deprivation had an 
effect on participation for external groups, this was much less the case for locally formed group, 
which seem to attract a much more representative membership.  For such groups, the 
determining factor is the direct experience of attacks and victimization on an individual’s 
entourage, and much less – at least initially – economic or social grievances.   
 
The qualitative chapters have shown that such factors can evolve over time.  Youth might join 
local groups as a result of the experience of attacks, interacted with particular types of 
grievances.  Their experience within such groups might however progressively change their 
motivations, and bring them to join larger groups – into which they can also be coerced – as a 
result of their change in outlook and the desire to pursue the ‘military career’.  However, this 
does not entail that protection, experienced both individually and collectively, disappears as a 
factor. As we have seen with the case of the Nyatura crisis mobilization against the Raia 
Mutomboki, the impetus to protect their entourage remained a strong factor in a more 
militarized configuration, showing that protection is not a factor that mattered only in the initial 
mobilizations.  
 
Furthermore, in Section 3 of the quantitative analysis, I have found evidence of a ‘protective’ 
effect of participation on an individual’s social entourage.  This is consistent with recent 
contentions that emphasize the ‘protective’ effect of participation or close social relation with 
armed actors in militarized contexts (Morvan 2005; Verweijen 2013; Richards J. 2014).  
Protection can thus be conceived as an individual incentive to participate, yet one that can also 
be strategically ‘provoked’ by armed actors, to obtain recruits (Kalyvas & Kocher 2007).  
However, I have shown that conceiving it as a strictly individual variable is misguided, as is 
also tied to collective strategies of protection.  Families and communities can decide to provide 
recruits to armed groups in order to avoid retaliation, which can be conceived as a form of 
‘investment’ in the economy of protection from the side of those providing recruits, or as a form 
of taxation from the side of the armed group.  In such cases, recruits can be pressured by their 
social entourage to join a group.  Furthermore, we have seen with the case of Padiri’s Mayi-
Mayi group that such processes can occur on a large scale and become institutionalized, giving 
rise to complex ‘politics’ of recruitment within villages and within families. Thus, protection 
works across several levels in explaining armed mobilization and participation:  As an impetus 
of socio-political entities to form armed groups or provide recruits to armed groups, as an 
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‘investment’ by families or collectivities in the economies of protection (although one that can 
be ‘provoked’ by the armed group), and as an individual strategy.  
 
These considerations lead to idea that the relation between individual level determinants and 
factors and participation is neither linear nor uniform.  The emotional manifestations of such 
factors, and the variegated social configurations in which they occur, can lead to very different 
processes of participation.  Thus, I follow several recent contentions, in particular Viterna 
(2006) and Parkinson (2013), in arguing for a disaggregation of participation, but also an 
understanding of differentiated patterns of participation in different types of groups.  Although 
the framing of participation as an outcome variable has allowed us to identify and weight the 
role of several different factors, framing participation as a process is necessary to understand 
the evolving individual factors and dimensions, which change over time.     
10.5.  Limitations and further research  
The scope of this dissertation was to examine the evolving processes of armed mobilization and 
participation in armed groups in contemporary eastern DRC.  Given the vastness of the region, 
the duration of the armed conflict and the multiplicity of actors involved, the dissertation can 
only be a partial account of the multitudinous factors and forces that shape and structure the 
dynamics of armed mobilization in the region.  In this section, I identify some of the limitations 
of this dissertation, as well as paths for future research.  
 
Despite the focus of several chapters on specific regions and specific armed groups, this 
dissertation did not extensively probe into group level factors and dynamics, which are likely 
to significantly affect the ways in which groups recruit combatants.  The armed groups that 
populate rural eastern DRC are subject to quasi-extreme levels of fragmentation.  While such 
aspects are identified and factored in several of the chapters, the dissertation does not provide 
a systematic analysis of the relation between the dynamics of centralization and fragmentation 
of armed groups and the strategies of recruitment of these groups, and how these in turn affect 
the social and individual dimensions of armed mobilization.  
 
Another group level aspect that is not explored in detail in this dissertation is the relation 
between the resource base of the groups and the patterns of recruitment of combatants.  As 
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shown by Sanchez de la Sierra (2016), using data collected through the same survey as the data 
used in this dissertation, armed groups display clear patterns of taxation according to their 
resource base, as well as their time horizon.  Such relations are likely to affect patterns of 
recruitment of combatants, which we have seen be conceived in certain cases as a form of 
taxation.  While preliminary analyses of the relation were carried out, the time constraints and 
the need for additional data did not allow the factoring of this aspect into the dissertation.   
 
In addition, an aspect that was not theorized systematically in this dissertation is that of rebel 
governance, a question that has been the object of renewed attention in the study of armed 
conflict (e.g. Mampilly 2011; Arjona, Kasfir & Mampilly 2015).  While different aspects of 
armed group governance were tied into the analysis at several stages of the dissertation, a 
systematic analysis of the relation between armed group governance and strategies of 
recruitment of combatants was not proposed, mainly because I was not able to collect extensive 
data on these governance practices.   
 
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the analysis of participation carried out in the 
quantitative section leaves out all the other forms of involvement with relation to the group that 
are not directly tied to security related activities, and which Parkinson (2013) has shown played 
crucial role in the organizational capacity of armed groups.  This is tied to the fact that the 
survey was ‘fixed’ at a relatively early stage of this research project, during which I was still in 
the process of learning how armed group functioned and recruited.  Furthermore, as pointed out 
in the quantitative chapter, the survey was limited to male respondents, which fails to capture 
important gendered dimensions of mobilization, an aspect that is also missing from the 
qualitative chapters and the general theoretical discussion of this dissertation, and constitutes 
on of its important limitations.  
 
In addition, while not the central focus of this thesis, an important angle that has not been 
explored in detail is that of elite politics at the provincial, national and regional/international 
levels.  This is both an empirical limitation of the thesis – as I did not carry out research in 
capitals such as Kinshasa or Kigali where many of these elite level politics occur – and a 
theoretical one.  Recent studies have provided fine-grained analyses of the political and 
international dimensions of the eastern Congolese conflict (e.g. Prunier 2009; Reyntjens 2009; 
Stearns 2011).  However, what remains to be explored and conceptualized more carefully are 
the ways in which the ‘ground’ processes of armed mobilization articulate with elite level 
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political negotiations.  Recent research projects such as the Usalama Project, directed by Jason 
Stearns and Judith Verweijen have spearheaded efforts to fill this gap, and are particularly 
valuable as they combine a close analysis of the ways in which the dynamics of armed conflict 
play out on the ground with an analysis of the ways they aggregate into regional, national and 
international politics.  
10.6.  Concluding Remarks  
This dissertation has sought to contribute to the understanding of contemporary dynamics of 
armed mobilization is eastern Congo, and in zones of protracted conflict more generally.   It 
has shown that the mobilization of combatants in the region is tied to the large-scale forms of 
resource and labour accumulation that have taken particularly violent forms with the developed 
of a militarized political economy, but also attempts by the societies that constitute rural eastern 
DRC to protect themselves from the omnipresent violence that this has generated.  Through its 
conclusions, this thesis provides support to the advocates of a political solution to the armed 
conflict in eastern DRC.  Indeed, this thesis has shown the profound ramifications that armed 
groups have in the societies of rural eastern DRC, of which they have in many cases become 
integral parts.  Strictly military solutions and counter-insurgency campaigns, particularly the 
highly disorganized and volatile ones that have been carried out in the region, are unlikely to 
defeat organizations with such ramified social and institutional bases.  But more importantly, 
such military approaches are likely to be insufficient as long as the causes of the emergence of 
these armed groups are not addressed.  Despite the predatory and violent behaviour that they 
often display towards civilians, these armed organizations remain one of the only options for 
rural societies to attain a modicum of security, as the example of the village of Kimua potently 
illustrates.  
 
The attention to history has allowed us to understand that these dynamics have characterized 
the region for more than a century, which unfortunately aliments a certain pessimism with 
regards to the region’s prospects.  With more than 69 armed groups currently operating in 
eastern Congo, a civil war surfacing in Burundi, and an election in DRC that forecasts a high 
level of uncertainty, the factors that have fuelled the region’s tumultuous history of violence 
are, unfortunately, alive and kicking.  For such a beautiful, historically and culturally rich region 
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as the Kivus, this is a grim prospect, and yet one that remains to be understood as a fundamental 
aspect of our contemporary world.  
 
I would like to end this thesis with a consideration that is both theoretical, and to a certain extent 
philosophical and ‘moral’.  Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the emergence of non-state 
armed organizations throughout the contemporary world is the legitimacy that these 
organizations come to find as a result of the type of social re-adaption that occurs around them, 
which we have discussed in this dissertation.  This is particularly troubling with those groups 
that display the more violent types of behaviours, of which we can find examples in the Islamic 
State or the Mexican drug cartels.  While the development of ‘cultures’ of violence around 
military actors has been analysed with refinement in the scholarship on civil wars and violence, 
the emergence of novel, reconstituted forms of ‘community’ around such actors remains 
difficult to fathom from the perspective of societies that have professionalized and 
‘externalized’ the military, and where the social body has in large part been asepticized from 
violence.  Yet understanding them remains crucial, from an intellectual perspective, but also 
personal one, in order to understand the lives of a significant part of the population of this world.  
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Appendix 1: Construction of Variables 
A2.1.  Wealth variables 
The analysis uses two separate clusters of variables to measure a respondent’s 
economic Wealth. The first is the Wealth of the Father of the respondent, and the 
second is the respondent’s wealth.  
Father’s Wealth 
The wealth of the father’s household has been proved to be a solid predictor of an 
individual’s wealth.  Exceptionally, surveyors were instructed in the protocols that 
respondents were allowed to solicit help from their family -and, if applicable, their 
father- to answer this specific section in the case their knowledge was limited.  There 
are three categories of measures of father’s Wealth: The father’s assets and “tangible” 
capital, the size of the father’s family and the number of wives in the family, and an 
indicator of the respondent’s perception of his father’s wealth.  The number of wives 
is used as an indicator because, in societies where dowries are still paid for a majority 
of marriages, the number of wives can be an indicator of wealth.  The measures are 
regrouped in the following table: 
 
CATEGORY MEASURES 
Indicator in 
analysis 
ASSETS 
1. Number of fields owned by 
father 
Kept 
2. Number of cows owned by father 
Z-Score 
2. Number of pigs owned by father 
SIZE OF 
FAMILY 
4. Number of wives of father 
5. Number of sons of father 
6. Number of daughters of father 
PERCEPTION 
OF WEALTH 
7. 4 point scale of perception of 
father’s wealth (was your father 
rich) 
 
kept 
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For the analysis, the information contained in variables 2-6 is summed into one 
variable, Father’s Wealth, which is a z-score of the sum of individual z-scores for each 
one of these variables.  The analysis was also conducted using a Factor Analysis for 
variables 2-6 instead of a z-score, and regressions were run with each one of the 
variables to verify the robustness of results. 
Respondent’s Wealth 
The second measure that is used to estimate the respondent’s Wealth is a z-score of 
his assets, to create three separate temporal variables of the respondent’s wealth, 
before, during and after the group. The variable is constructed with variables that 
record his asset acquisitions and sales since 1990, or the respondent’s birth if he was 
born after 1990.  The yearly recorded assets are:  
 
- Acquisition and sale/loss of cows (yearly) 
- Acquisition and sale/loss of goats (yearly) 
- Acquisition and sale/loss of pigs (yearly) 
- Estimated amount of cash savings (yearly) 
 
An additional set of variables measure yearly acquisition, sale or loss of land from the 
respondent from 1990, in order to construct three temporal variables of wealth in land, 
before, during and after the group.  
A2.2.  Kinship variables 
The analysis uses several measures of Kinship, which include: 
 
1. Kinship of respondent with “local” commander of armed group 
2. Kinship of respondent with closest member in the armed group 
3. Kinship of village chief with “local” commander of armed group 
4. Kinship of village chief with closest member of armed group 
5. Kinship of respondent’s father with village chief 
6. Kinship of respondent’s father with Mwami 
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Measures 1 – 4, which are used as the main measures of kinship with the group, are 
further broken down into two sub-measures, kinship before the arrival or constitution 
of the group, and kinship at the end of the group.  This allows to reduce problems of 
endogeneity in the analysis of participation, and to have a dynamic view of the 
constitution of social relations between respondents and the group during the group’s 
presence.  
In order to refine the analysis of kinship, three binary variables were constructed to 
measure the different “degrees” of kinship and social relations: Biological Kinship, 
“close” social relations, “larger” social relations, according to the following table: 
 
                                    
4thlevel:Acquaintance 
  3rd Level: Part of 
community 
Displaced,  
not from family 
Other 
 2nd Level: Extended 
family 
 
In same 
professional 
organization  
 
do Business 
together 
Neighbour  
 
Same Religious 
organization 
 
Neighbour 
 
1st level: Direct family    
member 
Himself 
Father/Mother  
Son/Daughter 
Brother/Sister 
Spouse/religious relation  
Uncle/Aunt 
Nephew/Niece  
Grand Parent  
Grandson/Grand 
daugther Father/Mother 
in Law 
Brother/Sister in Law 
Daughter/Son in Law 
 
Cousin  
Other Family 
Member  
Friend  
Family Friend 
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A2.3.  Recruitment and mediation variables 
Mediation Variables 
 
Several variables are used to measure mediation by Authorities and Mediation by 
Families, based either on the Household Survey or the Village Survey.  
 
The Chief survey Mediation variables used in the analysis of the Mediation is based 
on one main “source” variable, taken from the Village Survey.  The “source” variable 
is a categorical variable that provides pre-established categories of answers to the 
question: “How were people recruited by this group?” The objective of the question 
was to capture the “dominant” mode of recruitment of combatants, as perceived by the 
village authorities.  The following table shows which categories of answers from the 
“source” variable were used to create the Mediation binary V_recruit_mediation, 
which is used in the analysis.  Importantly, the source variable allowed multiple 
answers, in the case for example that recruitments were both carried out directly by 
the group and mediated by authorities.  
 
Categories of source variable: How were 
recruitments predominantly carried out? 
Institutional 
Mediation 
Binary 
Recruitments were private and clandestine   
Recruitments were private   
Recruitments were public   
Recruitments were never mediated by the chief   
Village authorities recruited voluntary 
  
Village authorities recruited under pressure by group 
 
The measures that correspond to the Respondent’s perception of Mediation by 
authorities and mediation by families are the “source” variables of the Household 
Survey, which are binary variables.  The first (Encou_autor) is dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the respondent perceives that there was encouragement or order 
to participate from village authorities. The second, (Encou_family), is a dummy 
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variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent perceives that there was support or 
pressure to participate from his familial entourage.  Additionally, the Chief Survey 
measure of mediation was inserted in the household survey, and used as an alternative 
variable.  
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Appendix 2: List of Interviews 
DESCRIPTION LOCATION DATE 
CHAPTERS 4 & 5     
Colonel Mbangu: Mayi-Mayi Commander  Bagira 19 June 2013 
Priest Mwenga Centre 1 Mwenga Centre 14 Oct 2011 
Priest Mwenga Centre 2 Mwenga Centre 14 Oct 2011 
Chef de Poste D'encadrement  Mwenga Centre 15 Oct 2011 
Adjunct of Territorial Administrator Mwenga Centre 15 Oct 2011 
ANR representative Mwenga Centre Mwenga Centre 16 Oct 2011 
 Chief of Kitutu Kitutu  19 Oct 2011 
ANR Representative Kitutu Kitutu  20 Oct 2011 
Oxfam Representative Kitutu Kitutu  20 Oct 2011 
IRC Representative Kitutu Kitutu  20 Oct 2011 
ICRC Emergency Team  Kitutu  21 Oct 2011 
FARDC Commander  Kitutu  21 Oct 2011 
Ex-Mayi-Mayi 1 Kitutu  22 Oct 2011 
Ex-Mayi-Mayi 2 Kitutu  22 Oct 2011 
Ex-Mayi-Mayi 3 Kitutu  22 Oct 2011 
Police Chief Kamituga 27 Oct 2011 
Gold Trader Kamituga 1 Kamituga 28 Oct 2011 
Gold Trader Kamituga 2 Kamituga 28 Oct 2011 
Gold Trader Kamituga 3 Kamituga 28 Oct 2011 
ANR representative  Kamituga 29 Oct 2011 
FARDC commander Kamituga 29 Oct 2011 
Hotel Owner Walungu Centre 31 Oct 2011 
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Police Chief  Walungu Centre 31 Oct 2011 
Simeon Lukeno: Mayi-Mayi ex-combatant Bukavu 12 August 2012 
Mayi-Mayi ex-combatant in Bunyakiri 1 Bukavu 12 August 2012 
Mayi-Mayi ex-combatant in Bunyakiri 2 Bukavu 13 August 2012 
Mayi-Mayi ex-combatant in Bunyakiri 3 Bukavu 13 August 2012 
Mayi-Mayi ex-combatant in Bunyakiri 4 Bukavu 14 August 2012 
ex-RCD, Nyabibwe Nyabibwe 19 Oct 2012 
Muganga Murhiminya: Spokesman and Provincial Councellor of the Parti National Mayi-Mayi  Bagira 09 June 2013 
Denis M.: Mayi-Mayi Recruiter in Bukavu Bagira 09 June 2013 
Jacques Nyakasali: Executive Secretary of the Mayi-Mayi Kalehe Bagira 12 June 2013 
Major Muhindu Changoco: Mayi-Mayi Commander  Bagira 14 June 2013 
Mackalele Ntumulo: Mayi-Mayi logistician in Bukavu Bagira 17 June 2013 
South Kivu Provincial Minister for Internal Affairs  Bukavu 10 August 2012 
Secretary of South Kivu Provincial Minister for Internal Affairs  Bukavu 10 August 2012 
Action pour la Paix et la Concorde Director  Bukavu 09 August 2012 
University Professor Universite Officielle de Bukavu  Bukavu 08 August 2012 
 CHAPTER 6: KALEHE MIDLANDS     
ANR Territorial responsible for Kalehe Kalehe Centre  15 August 2012 
Police Chief Kalehe Kalehe Centre  15 August 2012 
Territorial administrator Kalehe Kalehe Centre  16 August 2012 
FARDC Commander Kalehe Ihusi 17 August 2012 
Priest of Irambo 1 Irambo 22 August 2012 
Priest of Irambo 2- former Priest of Nyabibwe Irambo 22 August 2012 
Ex-Mai Mai, Lwege 1 Lwege 23 August 2012 
Ex-Mai Mai, Lwege 2 Lwege 23 August 2012 
Ex-Mai Mai, Lwege 3 Lwege 24 August 2012 
Chief of Village of Lwege Lwege 24 August 2012 
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ANR (intellifence services) representative  Lwege 25 August 2012 
Interview with ex-Mai Mai, Lwege 5 Lwege 25 August 2012 
Interview with ex-Mai Mai, Lwege 6 Lwege 25 August 2012 
Chief of Kiniezire Kiniezire 13 Oct 2012 
Leader of Kiniezire self-defence group Kiniezire 13 Oct 2012 
Kiniezire autodefense group (12 participants- Focus group + individual interviews with 5 
participants) Kiniezire 14 Oct 2012 
Groupement Chief of Mbinga Sud Mukwidja 15 Oct 2012 
Chief of Mukwidja Mukwidja 15 Oct 2012 
ANR representative of Mukwidja Mukwidja 16 Oct 2012 
FARDC commander of Mukwidja Mukwidja 16 Oct 2012 
Ex- Local Defence Mukwidja 1 Mukwidja 16 Oct 2012 
Ex- Local Defence Mukwidja 2 Mukwidja 17 Oct 2012 
Ex- Local Defence Mukwidja 3 Mukwidja 17 Oct 2012 
Priest of Nyabibwe Nyabibwe 17 Oct 2012 
Interview with chief of autodefence, Nyabibwe Nyabibwe 18 Oct 2012 
Autodefence member , Nyabibwe 1 Nyabibwe 18 Oct 2012 
Autodefence member , Nyabibwe 2 Nyabibwe 18 Oct 2012 
Autodefence member , Nyabibwe 3 Nyabibwe 19 Oct 2012 
Autodefence member , Nyabibwe 4 Nyabibwe 19 Oct 2012 
Interview Chief of Butale Butale 20 Oct 2012 
Butale Autodefense member 1 Butale 20 Oct 2012 
Butale Autodefense member 2 Butale 20 Oct 2012 
Butale Autodefense member 3 Butale 21 Oct 2012 
Butale Autodefense member 4 Butale 21 Oct 2012 
Butale Autodefense member 5 Butale 21 Oct 2012 
Priest of Minova Minova 21 Oct 2012 
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ANR officer and former Local Defence Instructor Nyamucubi 31 Oct 2012 
Adjunct of Village Chief of Nyamucubi- ex-Mai Mai Nyamucubi 31 Oct 2012 
Ex-Mayi-Mayi Nyamucubi 1 Nyamucubi 01 Nov 2012 
Ex-Mayi-Mayi Nyamucubi 2 Nyamucubi 01 Nov 2012 
Ex-Mayi-Mayi Nyamucubi 3 Nyamucubi 01 Nov 2012 
Ex-Mayi-Mayi Nyamucubi 4 Nyamucubi 02 Nov 2012 
Muganga Bicinga: Village Chief of Kasheke  Kasheke 08 Nov 2012 
ANR representative and former Local Defence leader  Kasheke 08 Nov 2012 
ex Mayi-Mayi combatant 2 Lemera 09 Nov 2012 
ex Mayi-Mayi combatant 3 Lemera 09 Nov 2012 
ex Mayi-Mayi combatant 4 Lemera 09 Nov 2012 
 Pasteur Nyamigogo Lemera 10 Nov 2012 
J.P Cirundu: "Notable" and landowner  Kasheke 08 Nov 2012 
ex Mayi-Mayi combatant 5 Lemera 10 Nov 2012 
ex Mayi-Mayi combatant 1 Lemera 11 Nov 2012 
ex-Mai Mai combatant Nyamutwe 1 Nyamutwe 11 Nov 2012 
ex-Mai Mai combatant Nyamutwe 2 Nyamutwe 11 Nov 2012 
Sub-Village Chief of Nyamutwe Nyamutwe 12 Nov 2012 
Adjunct to sub-village chief of Nyamutwe 1 Nyamutwe 12 Nov 2012 
Adjunct to sub-village chief of Nyamutwe 2 Nyamutwe 12 Nov 2012 
family of Mai Mai combatant, Nyamutwe  Nyamutwe 13 Nov 2012 
Adjunct to sub-village chief of Nyamutwe 3 Nyamutwe 13 Nov 2012 
Colonel Cisayura: FARDC Colonel / Mayi-Mayi Commander Kavumu 21 June 2013 
   
CHAPTERS 7 & 8: KALEHE HIGHLANDS     
Zihrimwa Bagabo  Floribert: Numbi Police Commissioner Numbi 25 Sept 2012 
Colonel Bruce, Highlands FARDC commander Numbi 25 Sept 2012 
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Honore, Havu landowner and business owner in Numbi Numbi 25 Sept 2012 
Chef de Poste d'Encadrement Administratif de Numbi (administrative officer) Numbi 26 Sept 2012 
ANR official of Numbi Numbi 27 Sept 2012 
ex-Combatant 1 Numbi 28 Sept 2012 
ex-Combatant 2 Numbi 28 Sept 2012 
ex-Combatant 3 Numbi 29 Sept 2012 
ex-Combatant 4 Numbi 29 Sept 2012 
Conversations with market operators in Numbi Numbi 02 Oct 2012 
Celestin Seburikande: Chief of village of Lowa-Numbi  Numbi 04 Oct 2012 
Former chief of Fungamwaka (displaced in Numbi) Numbi 04 Oct 2012 
Director of Center for Dialogue and Mediation for the Highlands Numbi 05 Oct 2012 
representative of the 'Communaute Hutu’ Numbi 05 Oct 2012 
Sub-Village Chief of Lumbishi Lumbishi 06 Oct 2012 
Hutu Agricultural worker and Ex-Combattant, road from Numbi to Lumbishi Numbi 06 Oct 2012 
Adjunct chief (Nyumbakumi) of Lumbishi Lumbishi 06 Oct 2012 
Hutu Agricultural worker, zone of Shandje Shandje 09 Oct 2012 
Interview with agricultural labourer, Shandje Shandje 09 Oct 2012 
Sub-Village Chief of Shandje  Shandje 10 Oct 2012 
Parish Priest Minova 22 Oct 2012 
Mujogo-Viateur: spokesperson of PARECO-PAP Minova 22 Oct 2012 
Havu customary Representative 1 Minova 23 Oct 2012 
Havu customary Representative 2 Minova 23 Oct 2012 
Security Expert Kalehe Highlands 1 Bukavu 25 June 2013 
Security Expert Kalehe Highlands 2 Bukavu 26 June 2013 
Security Expert Kalehe Highlands 3 Bukavu 27 June 2013 
Chef de Poste d'Encadrement Administratif de Nyabibwe (administrative officer) Nyabibwe 19 Oct 2012 
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